


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TARIFF REVISION: ITS NECESSITY AND POSSIBLE METHODS.

SECOND ARTICLE.

IN a certain and at the same time correct sense, all loyal and patriotic citizens are ultra-protectionists. That is to say, every American with one spark of patriotism and national loyalty in his composition prefers the interest of his country to that of any and every other country, and is ever ready with heart and hand to support every measure that tends to promote the development and prosperity of his country and insure the maximum of abundance and comfort to his fellow-citizens. But altho thus united as a whole people in the desire for a common object, the greatest divergence of individual opinion at the same time exists in respect to the methods by which such object can best be attained. On the one hand, a large number who especially arrogate to themselves the title of protectionists (to American industry) assume by their action, if they do not openly proclaim by their speech, that national industrial development can be most speedily effected and permanently maintained by creating and imposing artificial obstructions—mainly in the nature of excessive or discriminating taxes—upon the work of producing and exchanging; while, on the other hand, a not inconsiderable number of citizens, in view of the great and varied resources of our country, the intelligence of its people, their wonderful skill in the invention and use of machinery, and their readiness to adapt themselves to circumstances, believe with equal sincerity that the largest and truest protection to American industry is to be obtained through the removal to the greatest possible extent of taxes and obstructions of every kind on the work of producing and exchanging; and that such pro-

tection, if attainable, is certain to be most stable, because it will be most simple and natural. It is rather difficult to assign any good reason why those who accept the former of these opinions should be always so ready and so uncharitable as to impute improper motives and eminent lack of patriotism to those who believe in the latter. But be this as it may, it must be admitted that the present necessity for making large reductions in national taxation, for reasons independent of any theoretical considerations, affords a most excellent opportunity for safely determining by practical experiments which of the two methods of protection referred to is likely to prove most effective; and with a view of helping to such determination and assuming, in accordance with the deductions of a former article, that the immediate work by Congress of abolishing tariff taxation will be mainly confined to legislation in respect to certain specific taxes, it is proposed to next ask attention to a review of the condition of some of our great branches of industry, and of the requirements essential to give them a further healthy growth or extension; the first example selected being that of the *Manufacture of Cotton*.

This industry ranks third or fourth in importance among the manufacturing industries of the country. It has been long established, enjoys special advantages in the supply and cost of its raw material, and produced goods in 1880 to the value of \$192,773,000. In 1879 a representative of *The British Textile Manufacturer* (a trade journal of established authority), thoroughly qualified for his task, visited the United States for the purpose of ascertaining through extensive personal investigations what the British cotton manufacturers had to fear from American competition in the world's markets. He reported to his employers in December, 1879,¹ "that in the matter of wages America is as cheap as England." (The census returns show

¹ It is somewhat curious that this report, which was not private and is one of the most interesting of recent economic publications, seems to have wholly escaped the attention of the multitude of writers and speakers, in Congress and out, who have discussed the question of the relative wages of the United States and Europe. It was, moreover, not even alluded to in the recent report on wages issued by the Treasury and State Departments, in response to a call by Congress for information on this subject.

that the average wages paid to the hands employed in the cotton manufactures of the United States for 1880 were \$245.47 per annum. The best available statistics for the United Kingdom for 1882 make the annual average for British cotton-spinners and weavers a trifle over \$250. See also U. S. Consular Reports for 1882, to the same effect.) The average relative cost per pound of manufacturing print cloths was returned, with full data for verification, at 11.99 cents for Rhode Island, 12.16 for England, 13.72 for Lowell, and 15.59 for Pennsylvania. It is also most interesting to note, in connection with this matter, that while this English reporter shows the cost of cotton manufacture (print cloths) to be less in New England than in Pennsylvania, the U. S. census for 1880 shows that the general average wages paid in the cotton-mills of New England is about seven per cent higher than the general average paid for similar service in the whole country. In the matter of weaving, in which department the wages paid "amount to as much if not more than all other processes combined," the rates in England were found to average from 22 to 25 per cent more than in the United States; but as the American weaver (working by the piece) attends to more looms and turns out more work per week than his English competitor, the average earnings of the former are much higher than the latter: thus illustrating the economic principle that is now beginning to be recognized, that where machinery is employed to any great extent in the work of production, high rates of wages and low cost of production are correlative results. The advantages enjoyed by American over English spinners were further reported to be "that people in America work longer" (on an average, 66 hours per week, or within a fraction of an entire working day each week more than is allowed by law in Great Britain); attend to their work better; drink less; are less influenced by trade-unions; and have the necessities of life cheaper. In the matter of raw material the English expert showed that American cotton manufacturers have a decided advantage over the English to the extent of 0.7 cents or $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per pound. American experts fix this advantage on our coarser cotton fabrics at "not less than one half cent and oftener three fourths of a cent a pound;" which in turn is said to represent an ability on the part of the manufacturer to pay at least 20 per

cent higher wages, and yet produce a given kind of cloth at an equal cost with English competitors. It is also asserted by experts that the question as to what cotton manufacturers shall supply the bulk of the world's consumption is likely to turn on as small a margin as an eighth of a cent a yard. Under these circumstances the United States has long ceased to *import* the goods necessary to meet the wants of the million, but does import very largely of such finer cotton fabrics as depend mainly on style and fashion for their use; the value of the total importations for the fiscal year 1881-2 being \$34,351,000, an increase over the previous year of about ten per cent. Of these imports, \$7,501,000 represented hosiery, shirts, and drawers; \$2,257,000 jeans and drillings; and \$22,164,000 goods not specially enumerated, mainly fine fabrics and fancy articles. On the other hand, in the matter of supplying foreign countries we do not transact as large a business as we did twenty-two years ago. The United States has never exported as much as 150,000,000 yards in any one year; while Great Britain exports year in and year out nearly *five thousand* millions of yards, or its equivalent. In 1880 we exported *raw* cotton to all countries to the value of \$239,000,000, and thought we did a big business; but during the same year Great Britain, besides supplying her own domestic consumption and with a general depression of her industries, exported *manufactures* of cotton to the value of \$377,000,000. In the business of making cotton goods for export, altho, in addition to other advantages, we are by natural location a cheaper distributing centre than England for a large part of the world's consumption, we may be said to have as yet but barely scratched the ground. Now what more important matter could claim the attention of Congress and the country than the ascertainment of the reason of this remarkable industrial condition of affairs? What better starting-point of inquiry for a national commission authorized to investigate the relations of the tariff to the varied business interests of the country? In most other countries this matter would be considered of sufficient magnitude to warrant the creation of a commission for its special investigation and nothing else. New England ought to take the greatest interest in having such an investigation; for just as bright, sharp Yankees, just as skilled in the construction

and use of machinery, are now scattered all over the West, the South, and the Pacific States, as still live within her borders; and these men, prompted by self-interest, have constantly the objective before them of emancipating their own sections from dependence on New England for supplies of manufactured products. And if current reports are to be accepted, the day is close at hand when the South will seriously break in upon New England's present prerogative of supplying the bulk of the domestic consumption of coarse cotton fabrics, and compel the latter, if she would continue her industrial growth or even maintain her present status in this department of production, to seek for other and larger markets than she now enjoys. Could the United States participate in the existing cotton-fabric export of Great Britain to the extent of only one third, we could at once greatly increase the number of our spindles, give employment to at least one hundred thousand additional operatives, plant factories beside many a now unutilized water-power or coal-mine, and render much substantial help in the way of resuscitating our commercial (ocean) marine. Experts tell us, moreover, that there are from five to eight hundreds of millions of people outside of Europe and the United States who are clothed mainly in cotton manufactured by slow and toilsome hand processes. One skilled female operative in a first-class American factory can produce more and better cloth in one day than the most skilled of these hand-loom workers can in fifteen or twenty days. Could we reach one half of these consumers we should need forty million spindles in addition to our present eleven millions, and 600,000 operatives more than our present 185,000. Under such circumstances what folly it is to talk about relative wages; as if any hand product of even the poorest paid labor of China or India could compete with our machinery: and of what importance it is that we should study and arrange our system and our instrumentalities for foreign commerce, so that the pauper labor of other countries could be induced to give us something satisfactory in exchange for the products of our machinery; and how much longer are we as a nation, in obedience to "wrong end foremost" notions of protection, to let this enriching opportunity of exchanging with "foreign paupers" slip out of our hands?

The result of such an inquiry would probably be in accordance with the conclusions at which most American investigators have for some time arrived ; namely, that the tariff has ceased to be a factor of the slightest importance in determining the source of supply of the great bulk of the cotton fabrics required for the domestic consumption of this country, and that American manufacturers would fully control this supply were every tariff enactment at once swept from our statute-books; but that, on the other hand, the existing tariff and our navigation laws constitute an almost insuperable obstruction to the command by the same manufacturers of any other than the domestic market. The opinions of the English expert on this point, as expressed in the report to which reference has been made, were as follows: "The general impression made upon me," he says, "by what I saw of cotton manufacturing in the United States is that at present England has little to fear from its rivalry, but that it lies in the hands of the people of America to make a considerable change in the state of things, whenever they think proper. While, however, the American nation heaps duties upon the import of foreign machinery, thus increasing the cost of mill construction, and in other ways by her tariff arrangements artificially raising the cost of production, American manufactures will continue too high in price to compete with English goods in all but exceptional instances. America is a world in itself, and she would continue to prosper, tho in a less degree, if the old world disappeared. So long as her population increases in as great a proportion as her manufactures, so long will her manufacturing industries flourish; but the time will come when her factories will turn out more clothing material than the Americans can wear. She will then feel her isolation." These conclusions must commend themselves to every impartial reader as true. But it would, nevertheless, be a most profitable thing if a national commission, fully commanding the confidence of the country, could thoroughly investigate this problem in all its details, and report.

Relation of the Iron and Steel Industries to the Tariff.—As the domestic manufacturers of iron and steel, at least of the primary forms of these articles, always have been, and now are, a most potential element in determining the nature of the tariff of

the United States, it will be interesting and perhaps profitable to ask the attention of the public to a line of fact and reasoning in the interests of those who use iron and steel as the raw materials of their industry, and of the ultimate consumers of these articles, who outnumber the primary workers in the ratio of thousands to one.

And *first* it is to be noted that the system of protection—meaning thereby the imposition of a duty upon a foreign product with a view of making it for a time more costly, and so promoting or sustaining the business of making such product within the limits of the United States—has ceased to protect American labor in the iron-mines, iron and steel works, and rolling-mills of this country, if in truth it ever did so. In proof of this assertion, which to many will seem utterly audacious and unwarranted, it may be stated that the census reports recently made by Prof. Pumpelly in respect to iron-mining, disclose the fact that there were in the census year 1880, 31,668 persons engaged in this branch of American industry, to whom aggregate annual wages were paid of \$9,538,117. It further appears, from the census investigations made by Mr. James M. Swank, that there were also employed during the year 1880 in all the iron and steel works of the United States, in converting ore into pigs, bars, plates, ingots, and rails, 140,978 persons, whose annual wages amounted to \$55,476,785. The whole number of persons employed in these two departments of our iron and steel industries was therefore 172,646, and the sum of all the wages paid them during the census year was \$65,014,902. Assuming the force—made up mainly of adult men—to be employed three hundred days in the year, their average earnings in the census year, which was a year of great prosperity in the iron and steel industries, amounted to \$375 for each workman, or almost exactly \$1.25 per day; a rate which every one knows is only a fair average for the most ordinary labor in other employments, and is much less than is paid on the average to workmen in machine-shops and other branches of industry in which iron and steel constitute a large part of the raw material. (The average wages for the most common labor in 1874 [see Young's "Labor and Wages," pp. 739, 743] were \$1.53 per day in New York, \$1.58 in Illinois, \$1.75 in Michigan, \$1.50 in Missouri. For experienced

farm-labor the average per diem in the Western States ranged from \$1.48 in Ohio to \$1.75 in Michigan.) It is therefore a matter of absolute demonstration that "protection did not protect" the laborer in these departments (iron and steel) of our domestic industry during the census year; and further, that it is no advantage for him to be encouraged to remain in this kind of work, and for the sufficient reason that he can earn as high or higher wages in other employments of a more desirable and attractive kind. That there would be no difficulty in finding other employments, perhaps of a better kind (all things considered), than this work for this whole force of laborers in question, would seem to be proved by the circumstance that their aggregate number is less than one fifth of the number of immigrants who landed on our shores during the past year,—all of whom, certainly all of the more enterprising, appear to have speedily found employment; and it is probable that their average daily wages were not less than \$1.25 per day.

Second. The work of the laborers in the iron mills and works of the United States during 1880 resulted in the production of 3,781,021 tons of pig metal, and its conversion, when mixed with foreign ore and domestic pig, into a proportionate quantity of finished bars, plates, ingots, and rails. For the year 1881 the American Iron and Steel Association reports that the product of pig-iron increased twenty-three per cent, or to a total of 4,641,564 tons; and it is well known that this increased quantity was not sufficient to meet the demands for domestic or home consumption, and that large amounts of iron-ore and of iron and steel ingots, bars, and rails were imported from foreign countries.

Third. The American iron and steel manufacturers (the manufacturers of Bessemer steel excepted) almost unanimously and constantly represent that the manufacture of common iron—pigs, bars, and rails—has not been unusually profitable, or not more so than other branches of industry. On this point the American public have no direct and certain knowledge; but it is not to be presumed that the iron-masters have put forth intentionally false statements. If, then, the average rate of earnings of the workmen in these departments of our domestic industry have only been equal to those of the most common labor outside the mines, the furnaces, and the mills; and if it be also true, as the iron-masters

themselves allege, that there has been no realization of profits above the average in their business, it clearly follows that protection has ceased to protect either labor or capital in the industry under consideration, however it may have been in times past. And this being admitted, the conclusion is warranted that the excess of price, in consequence of protective duties, which the consumers of the United States have paid for iron and steel bars and rails over and above their competitors in other countries has been so much lost to the people of this country, either in useless transportation of ore and coal to furnaces which are misplaced, or in useless royalties to the owners of mining lands; or else the iron-masters of the United States are at this late period still representatives of an infant manufacture, which they are incapable of conducting for want of knowledge, and in which they ask to be sustained at public expense. The above general remarks as to profits may not, and probably do not, apply to very many iron and steel works that are well situated, especially to such as are west and south of the Alleghanies; for the testimony is conclusive that pig-iron has been made at many places in these localities at a cost—including all charges for royalties, for ore, for coal, for depreciation and wages—ranging from \$12 to \$15 per ton, and even less. One iron-master who recently appeared before the Tariff Commission at Nashville (Col. Shook) testified that the cost of the manufacture of pig-iron in Tennessee was \$15 per ton. Near Birmingham, Alabama, the cost is represented as between \$12 and \$13; and at Chattanooga as between \$11 and \$12. Now such works as these, it must be apparent, cannot be protected and need no protection of any tariff of duties against foreign competitors; and simply for the reason that they enjoy so large a measure of protection in their distance from the sources of supply of British iron as to be entirely independent of all artificial encouragements. It sometimes occurs that iron is brought across the Atlantic at a nominal charge, but it may be assumed that the cost of bringing iron from the works of England and Scotland to the Atlantic ports of the United States is, on the average, about one pound sterling, or \$5, per ton. Thence to further transport it either to the iron centre of Ohio or to Alabama will cost at least half a cent a ton per mile, or \$3.50; and much more to the

neighborhood of the iron-works of Missouri. In other words, the protection of distance which the iron mines and works west and south of the Alleghanies now enjoy is greater than the entire sum of wages paid for *making pig-iron in these works*. In fact, the cost of bringing the iron produced in the United States during the census year 1880 from Great Britain to the centre of population of the United States would have been at least \$8.50 per ton, and at this rate would have amounted to more than one half the entire sum of the wages paid in all the iron-mines and iron and steel works of the United States for that year. In view, then, of this demonstrated failure of the attempt to protect either labor or capital in the iron-mines and iron-works of the United States by means of the imposition of heavy tariff taxes upon foreign imports of iron and steel, and the consequent large increase in the cost of such products, is it not clearly for our national advantage to entirely remove all such taxes in order that the people of the country may henceforth be able to purchase iron and steel at prices which shall not be relatively much higher than the prices which are paid by our industrial competitors in other countries; such taxes, furthermore, being no longer needed for the purpose of insuring revenue? It is not to be denied that the prices of iron and steel, especially the prices of Bessemer steel, have been greatly reduced in this country within a comparatively recent period. But the same reductions have taken place in other countries, and in even greater measure; and it should not be overlooked that it is the prices which we pay at any given time for the materials which we use in our manufacturing industries which is of prime importance to us in considering what are to be our relations to the commerce and markets of the world,—which prices may be lower than they were ten, fifteen, or twenty years ago, both here and elsewhere, and yet be relatively much higher here than in any other countries. And of one other thing we may certainly feel assured, and that is if we, by our fiscal policy and taxes, keep up the prices of our raw materials, especially iron and steel, so that they continue to be relatively higher than the prices prevailing in other countries, we must abandon all hope of supplying the world to any great extent with the products of our labor, and the demand for the products of our industries

will, as now, continue to be limited to the relatively small area of our territory.

In the above review the manufacture of Bessemer steel has been excepted. But the following is what an analysis of the census returns of 1880 tell us respecting the relations of the tariff to wages and product in this industry: Value of product (Bessemer and "open-hearth steel"), \$55,805,210; tons of all kinds produced, 983,039; hands employed, 10,835; aggregate wages paid, \$4,930,349. A little application of arithmetic will now show that the ratio of wages to returned value of product was only 9 per cent; and that the amount directly paid out in wages was but a trifle in excess of \$5 per ton. And yet, mainly on the score of protecting labor, a tariff tax is imposed on the import of Bessemer-steel rails of \$28 per ton.

So much for the present relations of the iron and steel industries of the United States to the existing tariff. It is proposed next to take a "look ahead" and endeavor to forecast what would happen if all the tariff taxes which now obstruct the importation of iron and steel from Great Britain into the United States were at once entirely removed; a proceeding which most people in the United States would probably regard as in the nature of an unmitigated national calamity. The present production of pig-iron in the United States is now nearly five millions of tons (4,641,000 tons in 1881), and in Great Britain (our chief competitor in supplying the commerce of the world) a little more than eight millions of tons (8,377,000 in 1881). The immediate effect of a removal of our tariff taxes on iron and steel imports would be a very heavy demand upon the iron-mines and iron-works of Great Britain for a large additional supply. (The American market at present absorbs about 30 per cent of the English, Belgian, and German export of iron; and of all the iron-producing countries of Europe the net export of none, with the exception of Great Britain, is very considerable. The production of pig-iron for the United Kingdom is reported by the "British Iron Trade Association," for the half year ending June 30, 1882, at 4,241,245 tons, and the consumption for the same time at 4,339,392, which was 495,271 tons in excess of the consumption for the corresponding period of 1881. The stock of pig-iron on hand in Great Britain on the 30th of June,

1882, was also reported as nearly 100,000 tons less than on the 30th of December, 1881.) If we could only maintain our product where it is (which we probably could in virtue of natural protection), without increasing it, and call upon Great Britain to supply the increase which we should need, year in and year out, over and above our present consumption—a consumption, which prices made relatively, if not absolutely cheaper, would inevitably increase—it would be impossible for the iron-mines and iron-works of Great Britain to respond to such a demand without instantly occasioning an effect; first, upon the prices of British iron in the state of pig, bar, and rail; second, upon the wages of those who work the British mines, furnaces, and rolling-mills; and third, upon the demand of Great Britain on this country for agricultural products, inasmuch as the iron-workers of Great Britain are even now as largely fed from the products of the prairies of the West as are the iron miners and workers of the United States: and in the case of Pennsylvania to an even greater extent, as the capacity of this latter State to feed her own working-people is much greater than the capacity of the iron districts of Great Britain in a like respect. Then in place of an artificial protection (uncertain in its bearing and effect), such as it is claimed that the laborers in the iron-mines and iron-works of this country now enjoy through our tariff, a natural protection would be established for them through the augmentation of the wages or earnings of their fellow-laborers abroad, without decreasing their own; for it would be obviously impossible to diminish the wages which the American iron miners and workers now receive below the level of common labor outside of the works in which they are employed—which wages, as before shown, average only \$1.25 per day, or less than the average wages which the farmers of the West pay the labor which successfully competes through its products with the poorest-paid labor of Europe and the world. Furthermore, when this additional demand had thus raised the prices of iron in Great Britain and increased the wages or earnings of the English operatives, the cost of iron to English consumers would be much greater and the relative advantages which the persons who use iron in Great Britain—the builders of machinery, steamships, etc.—now enjoy, would be done away.

The use of iron in this country would greatly and rapidly increase; we should at once realize and enjoy the enormous natural advantages which we possess, growing out of the circumstance that our iron and coal mines are much more easily worked and at a cost of much less labor, measured by day's or hour's work, than the English mines can possibly be; and through the speedy attainment of larger markets we should for the first time turn to full practical account our acknowledged skill in using iron and converting it into machinery, hardware, agricultural tools and implements, and a vast variety of other metal products which the world demands and in which supply we yet have as a nation so very little share. Then would follow a transfer of the control of the iron markets of the world from Great Britain to the United States; and the transfer of the control in the working of this imperial metal implies supremacy in the world's commerce and an industrial aggrandizement of the nation that the most enthusiastic of American orators have as yet scarcely dreamed of. And furthermore, if in the readjustment of duties as proposed, any laborers engaged in the primary production of iron and steel should temporarily find themselves displaced from employment, and should prefer a continuance of the same kind of work, the ranks of those who are the users of iron and steel as raw materials will be readily opened to receive them; inasmuch as the number of the latter, already far in excess of the former, will not only all be wanted, but will also be largely increased as soon as a full and unobstructed supply of the raw material of their industry is assured to them.¹

¹ The circumstance that the present (December, 1882) capacity of the furnaces and rolling-mills of the United States for producing iron and steel in their primary forms is probably largely in excess of the present ability of the country to consume, and that trade in Pittsburgh and the great iron centres "is gloomy and disappointing," is no argument against the policy here advocated of removing all duties from the importation of iron and steel, but rather an argument of great weight in its favor. Thus, the revival of business in 1878 and the subsequent large extension of our railroad system created a large demand for iron and steel; and the free supply of these articles being obstructed by tariff, their prices greatly and abnormally advanced, thereby excessively and unnecessarily taxing all the other industries of the country: Bessemer-steel rails, for example, rising from \$42 per ton in February, 1879, to \$85 per ton in February, 1880, and pig-iron from an average of \$17 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ton in 1878 to \$28 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ton in 1880. The realization and prospect of excessive profits next stimulated an unhealthy increase in the "plant" or instrumentalities for production; and as production has gone on, supplies have

Is the picture thus presented overdrawn? The majority, not yet sufficiently educated to appreciate our capacity and readiness as a nation for industrial independence, and the strength and development which will inevitably attend and follow the emancipation of our industries from taxes and obstructions, will doubtless answer in the affirmative. But be this as it may, those who indulge in such forecastings of our possible industrial future, to be attained through a revision of our national fiscal policy, are surely not justly liable to the accusation of being the representatives of foreign interests, altho they may be to that of being enthusiasts. On the other hand, consider some points of a reverse picture.

The representatives of the iron-ore-mining interests in the United States have recently agreed to ask of Congress an increase in the duties imposed on the importation of foreign ores. *Per contra*, the domestic manufacturers of iron assert that the use of the foreign in conjunction with the American ores of iron is of the highest importance, inasmuch as the admixture improves the quality of the resulting product, obviates a necessity of importing the foreign ores worked up into higher forms, rapidly increased, until, with the first check in business activity, they have become in excess of demand: all of which has induced in turn such a severe competition and reduction of prices that the manufacturer, on the one hand, now finds himself threatened with not merely a loss of profits but also of capital, and the laborer, on the other hand, with not merely a prospect of reduced wages, but also with an extensive limitation of his opportunity for labor. It has been intimated, and probably with truth, that the strikes in the iron-mills of the country during the past summer have proved a blessing to the mill-owners. But be this as it may, it is clear that, bad as the condition of the mill-owners now is, it would have been worse had it not been for the strikes. All this experience, however, is not new, but has been characteristic of the industry of the country—and more especially of the iron and steel industries—for the last thirty years, under the influence of frequent modifications of the tariff, and also of the war. What the people have gained as consumers at one time from extremely low prices they have more than compensated for at another by the payment of extremely high rates; and what in the way of high profits has accrued at one period to the manufacturers has been more than offset to him by periodical suspensions of industry, loss of all profits, and impairment of capital. That such experiences could be wholly avoided is not pretended; but it may be claimed that if Government was to cease to interfere through its fiscal policy with the natural course of production and exchange, the industrial course of affairs would be much more stable; and that any loss resulting from abandonment of protection would be as nothing in comparison with the destruction of capital and the waste and misapplication of labor that has been and is certain to be the result of a continuance of the existing policy.

and so, in fact, actually increases the demand and consumption of the domestic ores. And the experience of Great Britain, where every manufacturer is allowed to freely exercise his own judgment in respect to the management of his own business, powerfully reinforces this assertion; for the British iron-smelters, with a view of cheapening and improving their product, have long been in the habit of largely importing foreign ores, altho their domestic supply of other ores is unsurpassed in respect to either quality or quantity. The appeal of the owners of the American iron-mines for an increase of duties on the import of foreign ores, even tho the returns from their investments are not as profitable as could be desired, simply amounts, therefore, to the asking that our ability as a nation to cheapen the production of iron, with all the momentous consequences that would flow from such a result, shall be further obstructed and impaired. And altho, according to the principles which have heretofore characterized our protective legislation, it is most inconsistent for iron-smelters to oppose the petition of the iron-mine owners, the request of the latter is just as unreasonable as would be that of a small teamster to be allowed, for the furtherance of his own interests, to plant his horse and cart directly across the "Broadway" of our large cities to the great obstruction of the vast tide of larger interests that ebbs and flows through it. In short, if the full supply of foreign ore is any advantage to the American manufacturers of iron, the great interests of the country demand that they shall have it. On the other hand, if American mines, as is claimed, can furnish ores equally good and equally cheap, then protection is not needed. That *some* American iron-mines may suffer from the free import of foreign ores may be admitted; but that the domestic ore-mining interest in general is likely to be injured by such a policy, or needs any further protection than what naturally accrues to it from location—the cost of transportation—is not a reasonable supposition. And in support of this view attention is asked to the following items of evidences. An advertisement has recently been continuously and conspicuously published in one of the New York financial journals, of the organization of an American iron-ore company, which states that the company controls 5,000,000 tons of iron-ore, and that "contracts are offered for 300 tons per day on terms that will, on the comple-

tion of certain railway connections, net the company over \$1 per ton, or \$100,000 per annum" (40 per cent) on a total capital stock of \$250,000. Again, the shipments of ore from the iron-mines in the vicinity of Lake Superior have been greater during the past year than ever before, and all the mines are reported as earning very large dividends. Tracts of land which a few years ago would not have commanded a dollar an acre are now worth millions. One hundred thousand dollars is said to have been refused during the past season for one sixteenth interest in the Quinnesic Mine (Michigan), which less than a year ago cost the owners \$15,000. The moment the price of pig-iron rises from any circumstances, that moment the owners of the domestic iron-mines, freed in a degree from foreign competition, advance the price of ore. When the price of iron greatly advanced in the fall of 1879, the price of Lake Superior ore delivered at Cleveland, with cheap water transportation, rose to nearly the same price as that of pig-iron at Glasgow, Scotland. To the mine-owners this advance doubtless seemed a creation of national wealth; but to the consumers of iron, who paid every dollar of such advance, the condition of things was somewhat different.

Again, the manufacturers of iron wire and "barbed iron fencing," whose interests are protected by patents to the extent of creating a monopoly of production, and whose products are especially in demand by the agriculturists of the country, also demand a continuation of the present duty on the importation of foreign competing (steel) wire of from 47 to 65 per cent. *Per contra*, the stock of the principal wire manufacturing company in the United States is scarce at 200—par 100—and pays regular dividends of 20 per cent per annum.

In unison with the ore-miners and wire-manufacturers, the manufacturers of spool-thread—a department of the cotton industry—are of the opinion that the protection of 74 to 78 per cent which they enjoy under the present tariff should also not be reduced. *Per contra*, consider the following statement of the profits of one of the principal thread-mills in the country, which recently appeared in the columns of the newspaper of the town where the mills are located:

"The amount of profits apportioned to the stockholders of the Willimantic Linen Company this year is \$1,432,000, or ninety-five and one half per cent on the par value of January 1, 1882. The total profits of the

stockholders for the past three years is \$2,525,000, which is two hundred and two per cent on the par value of January 1, 1880."—*Willimantic (Conn.) Chronicle*.

Now as the general answer which will be made to the above statements and positions will be that the existing tariff cannot be materially reduced without reducing the wages of labor, and that one positive effect of the protective policy has been to secure high wages to the American laborer, it seems advisable, before further proceeding in this review of the relations of our industries to the tariff, to stop and ask attention to a brief exhibit of what an analysis of the returns of the recent census reveals to us on this topic. And first in respect to great primary manufactures of cotton, wool, silk, iron and steel, and the business of iron-ore mining: for the protection of each one of which, high-tariff taxes on the importation of all competitive products have long been imposed and maintained.

Class of Manufacture.	Hands Employed.	Average Annual Wages per Hand.
Cotton manufactures	185,822	\$245 47
Silk and silk goods, etc.	31,337	291 88
Woollen manufactures of all classes.....	161,000	293 05
Hosiery and knit goods.....	28,328	230 53
Iron and steel.....	140,978	393 51
Iron-mining.....	31,337	301 19

Assuming 300 working days in the year, the average daily wages paid in the above industries would be approximately as follows: In the manufacture of cotton, 81 cents per day; silk and silk goods, 97 cents; wool, \$1 ; iron and steel, \$1.31 ; iron-ore mining, \$1. If these deductions are not correct, the fault must be referred to the experts selected by the Census Bureau, who professed to make their several returns after careful investigation. If, however, they are correct, the claim that high protection insures high wages is proved to be without foundation; for the annual and daily averages for labor above given are less than the averages paid for labor in the great agricultural States of the West.

The following table next illustrates how wages rise in those industries which use textile fabrics and iron and steel in their primary forms as raw materials—industries which employ a very much larger number of laborers, and for the most part cannot be, or actually are not, protected by the tariff.

Class of Manufacture.	Hands Employed.	Average Annual Wages per Hand.
Agricultural implements.....	39,580	\$388 06
Boots and shoes.....	138,819 ¹	381 00
Foundries and machine-shops.....	145,795	454 18
Men's clothing.....	160,810 ²	286 00
Hardware ³	4,034	424 74
Carpentering.....	15,664	544 08
Furniture-makers.....	19,656	470 75
Lumber, planing, etc.....	3,739	458 53

The census statistics further show the percentages of labor, reckoned in wages, to the total value of the finished products of various industries, to be approximately as follows:

In the manufacture of wool.....	16 per cent.
" " " iron and steel.....	21 "
" " " cotton.....	22 "
" " " silk.....	37 "
Iron-ore mining.....	41 "

If now the price of foreign fabrics, of cotton and wool, and of foreign iron and steel landed in the United States is increased by reason of freights, commissions, insurance, and packing to the extent of 5 per cent,—and if the above-specified articles are transported after landing to any considerable distance inland, it is at least this, and more,—then it follows that the American manufacturers of cotton and wool, and iron and steel in their primary forms could afford to pay their laborers some twenty-five per cent more than is paid by their foreign competitors and yet be on terms of equality with the latter so far as wages enter into and control the value of their products. Duties ranging from 30 to 50 per cent and upwards have, however, been given under the existing tariff, mainly on the claim that they were absolutely necessary to protect the American manufacturers against the advantages enjoyed by foreign manufacturers of similar products in the item of wages; but whether such claims have any justification in fact is a matter that may be safely left to the judgment of the reader.

DAVID A. WELLS.

¹ One fourth women.

² More than one half women and children.

³ The analyses for hardware, carpentering, furniture, and lumber working are based on the statistics returned from certain of the leading cities of the United States and not from the whole country; the latter not being yet obtainable.

AN EARLY AMERICAN VERSION OF THE
SCRIPTURES,

COMPARED WITH THE REVISED VERSION OF 1881.

WHILE examining the Revised Version of 1881, I had frequent occasion to refer to the Septuagint, because the citations from the Old Testament by Our Lord and his disciples usually conform to this ancient Greek translation of the Jewish Scriptures rather than to the Hebrew text, and the variations between the two texts are considerable. Portions of the Latin Vulgate also, which it was often necessary to consult, were first made, as is well known, from the Greek of the Septuagint instead of the Hebrew original. Hence, for convenience of reference, I wished to obtain a version of the whole of this Greek text into English; and while searching the library of Harvard College for a copy of such a book, I came unexpectedly upon an early American translation, not only of the Septuagint, but of the whole Bible. It is contained in four octavo volumes, of about five hundred pages each, fairly printed in good-sized type on rather coarse paper, without any preface, advertisement, or table of contents, and only few and meagre references and notes at the bottom of the page. Even the name of a publisher is not mentioned, but only that of the printer; we must therefore suppose it to have been printed at the author's expense, and to have obtained from him what little circulation it may have had, without passing through the hands of those who are technically called "the trade." Certainly, for a work of very considerable erudition and scholarly taste, on which years of patient and loving toil had evidently been bestowed, it was ushered into the world in a very simple and modest way. This

absence of pretension is probably attributable to the early training of the translator by the Society of Friends.

The work has a double title-page, the innermost one of which, for the first three volumes, is "The Old Covenant, commonly called The Old Testament, translated from the Septuagint. By Charles Thomson, *late Secretary to the Congress of the United States*. Philadelphia. Printed by Jane Aitken. 1808." For the fourth volume, it is "The New Covenant, commonly called The New Testament, translated from the Greek," etc. The text is printed as arranged in paragraphs, after the manner with which the Revised Version of 1881 has made us familiar, the customary division into chapters and verses being indicated only in the margin. Also, as in the Revised Version, songs and poetical citations are printed as poetry in lines of unequal length. Of course, we ought not to expect of a translation made in this country, at the beginning of this century, that it should be based upon a critical revision of the Greek text, since the materials for such a labor, the *apparatus criticus*, could not then and there be obtained. But Mr. Thomson was not inattentive to the need of such revision, as appears from his adopting several important corrections, the necessity for which was even then generally admitted. Thus, he omits the famous text concerning the three witnesses in heaven, and also prints in brackets the doxology at the close of the Lord's Prayer, adding in a foot-note, "The words thus inclosed are not in many ancient manuscripts." Again, in Jude i. 4, while he follows the ordinary reading in the text, he appends this foot-note: "In the Alexandrian manuscript as published by Woide, the word Θεός, *God*, is not inserted; in that case, the sentence may be rendered 'our only master and Lord, Jesus Christ,'"—the same words that are adopted by the Revisers of 1881. In like manner, Revelation xviii. 17, he translates, "And every one sailing to the place, both mariners and traffickers by sea, stood afar off," etc. And since this differs from the Common Version, he adds this foot-note: "I here follow the Alexandrian and other ancient manuscripts."

The publication in this country, at so early a day, of a new and complete translation of the Bible, which is at once so painstaking, able, and scholarly in character, is a remarkable fact; and one is naturally desirous to know something about its

author. Charles Thomson was born in Ireland about 1730, and came to America as a poor boy when only eleven years old. His brother enabled him to enter the school of Dr. Alison, at Thunder Hill, in Maryland, books at that time being obtained with so much difficulty that a single lexicon supplied the wants of all the pupils. He was prevented from obtaining a college education; but under Dr. Alison's tuition, he learned enough Latin, Greek, and mathematics to qualify himself to become the teacher of an academy established by the Friends in Philadelphia, in the conduct of which he was very successful. During the troubles which preceded the outbreak of the Revolution, Thomson was an ardent patriot, and when the old Continental Congress first came together, in 1774, he was appointed its secretary, an office which he continued to hold till July, 1789, when this body was dissolved in order to make way for the establishment of the new government under the Federal Constitution. Thus he was perpetual secretary of this assembly, a single chamber, for the whole period during which it discharged all the functions of government, both legislative and administrative, for the confederated Colonies or States. September 30, 1774, only a week before this Congress first met, John Adams wrote in his diary, "We had much conversation with Mr. Charles Thomson, who is, it seems, about marrying a lady, a relation of Mr. Dickinson's, with five thousand pounds sterling. This Charles Thomson is the Sam Adams of Philadelphia, the life of the cause of liberty, they say." We learn something about his personal appearance, when he was nearly fifty years old, through the following description of him by the Abbé Robin, who came over with Rochambeau: "*Sa figure maigre, sillonneux, ses yeux caves et étincelans, ses cheveux blancs, droits, ne descendant pas à ses oreilles, fixèrent et surprisent tous nos regards.*" There is a tradition that he was of so high repute for integrity that an Indian tribe adopted him, and gave him a name in their tongue which signifies "the man of truth;" and in the autobiography of Ashbel Green, president of Princeton College, it is said that it became a proverb respecting any statement by the Old Congress, "It's as true as if Charles Thomson's name was to it."

When Mr. Thomson resigned his official position, being near-

ly sixty years old and comparatively easy in his circumstances, his mind seems to have gone back with enthusiasm to the pursuits of his early and middle life, especially to the Latin and Greek classics and the study of the Holy Scriptures. Without concert with any one or encouragement from any foreign source, but merely for the gratification of his own tastes, he began a new translation of the whole Bible from the Greek into English, taking of course the Septuagint version for the Old Testament, as he was not a Hebrew scholar; and to this self-imposed and disinterested task he gave the silent and patient labor of nearly twenty years of his old age. President Green tells us that Mr. Thomson made three or four distinct transcripts of his whole work, striving in each to make improvements upon the former draft. Surely the declining years of an honored life could not have been devoted to a purer or nobler end. The work was completed and published, probably at his own expense, in 1808, when he was seventy-eight years old. Then he might well have sung his *Nunc dimittis servum tuum, Domine*. But a merciful Providence lengthened the days of his faithful servant far beyond the usual span. Mr. Thomson died in 1824, having attained the venerable age of ninety-five.

The present generation ought to take shame to itself for having almost forgotten the existence of a work possessing so strong claims to respectful consideration; for most persons would probably have been as much surprised as I was, if chance had favored them as much as it did me, when, some three months ago, I happened to stumble upon a copy of it while hunting over the stores of a large library. Not a word has been said about it in the numerous discussions to which the recent appearance of the Revised Version of 1881 has given rise. But this would not be their only cause for surprise; after carefully comparing Mr. Thomson's work with that of the Revisers of 1881, it will be found, I think, that he has anticipated most of their unquestionable improvements on the Common Version (excluding, of course, those resulting solely from emendations of the Greek text), avoided many of the changes made by them which are either decidedly erroneous or of very questionable merit, and made many alterations for the better, the necessity or propriety of which they failed to see. In many respects, his

translation is the better of the two. This solitary and unaided scholar, over three quarters of a century ago, living in what might then have been viewed from the English standpoint as a small provincial city, having at his disposal none of the rich means and appliances of scholarship which were recently collected in the Jerusalem Chamber at Westminster Abbey, and in fact probably possessing hardly any books available for his purpose except an English Bible and a copy of the *Textus Receptus* of the Greek New Testament and the Septuagint, has yet produced a work which may well challenge comparison with the best results of the united labors, during the last ten years, of two companies containing thirty or forty of the best scholars in England and America.

" And Johnson, well armed like a hero of yore,
Has beat forty French, and will beat forty more."

Since this may be regarded as a daring assertion, the remainder of this article will be devoted to setting forth some of the evidence in its favor. Since the course of the discussion must lead to some sharp criticisms on the work of the Revisers of 1881, let it here be admitted once for all, that all English Christendom owes a debt of gratitude to these gentlemen for the care, the patient industry, and the abundant learning which they have applied to the accomplishment of their task, and that the result of their labors, in some respects, tho by no means in all, is an improvement on our Common Version of the Bible. It would be an easier and pleasanter task to point out its excellences than to detect its faults. Unluckily, the purpose now in view must lead one to dwell almost exclusively upon its faults.

The most annoying fault of the Revisers is, that they too often translate a Greek sentence in the same way that a schoolmaster teaches his young pupil to *construe* it ; that is, the tyro is instructed to take successively each word by itself, and to give not only its precise and uniform meaning in the abstract, but to show how this meaning is affected by its case and number, its mood, tense, and person, and thereby to point out its grammatical relations to the other words in the context. Hence we are often painfully reminded of one of those bald *interlinear* translations, printed half a century ago, when an attempt was

made to teach Latin and Greek on what was called the Hamiltonian system. In this way, the general purport of the sentence, its rhythm, its naturalness of expression, and its connection with the course of the argument and with the rest of the paragraph, are sacrificed to an absurd preference of minute verbal accuracy over every other merit of a version. The whole is subordinated to the parts, the spirit to the letter. Even the order of the words in the Greek is often needlessly and pedantically followed in English, to the injury of the sense through diminishing its perspicuity, the spoiling of the rhythm, and the violation of English idiom. Now, Mr. Thomson was a schoolmaster during the larger portion of his active middle life, probably for more than the twenty years next preceding 1774. But he does not translate like a schoolmaster. His fault, if it be one, is just the opposite of that committed by the Revisers. He always prefers paraphrase to metaphrase. He is everywhere intent upon seizing the meaning of the sentence as a whole, even by doing some violence to its parts. He subordinates the letter to the spirit.

Many, perhaps most, of the Revisers of 1881 were experts in textual criticism, and their work consequently shows both the excellences and the defects which are to be expected from the habits of this particular class of scholars. As Lord Bacon somewhere remarks, every man carries over into other pursuits something of the rust and tarnish which he has contracted in his special vocation. The work of the Revisers consists far more largely of an amended Greek Text, than of an amended translation of the Received Text; and they have thus violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the preliminary rules laid down for their guidance, which authorize only "such emendations as it may be found *necessary* to insert in the Text;" and again, "that the Text to be adopted be that for which the evidence is *decidedly preponderating*." Unfortunately, most of the amendments adopted in the Greek Text are not strictly "necessary," since the evidence in their favor is very far from being "decidedly preponderating." As the Revisers themselves admit in their Preface, "Textual criticism, as applied to the Greek New Testament, forms a special study of much intricacy and difficulty, and even now leaves room for considerable variety of

opinion among competent critics. Different schools of criticism have been represented among us," etc. In a vast majority of cases, there is a great conflict of authorities; and in many cases, the evidence on the two sides is so equally balanced that it is hard to decide between them. Accordingly, against many of the changes made by the Revisers we find the fatal admission recorded in the margin, that "many ancient authorities," or "some ancient authorities," or "many authorities, some ancient," are opposed to the change. Far better would it have been, in all such cases, that the Received Text should be let alone. Certainly it should not have been "amended" merely in order to comply with certain technical rules and maxims, which have gradually been incorporated into the science of textual criticism, tho to ordinary thinkers they seem to be of very questionable validity. A common person may reasonably doubt, whether a more difficult reading is always to be preferred to an easier one; whether, during the first three centuries, interpolations were more probable than omissions; and whether the weight of an authority can be more fairly estimated by its supposed "genealogy," that is, by the merits of the family or the recension which it is believed to represent, than by its own undoubted age and other intrinsic merits.

But we have a further quarrel with these critics when they become translators. The whole art and mystery of their special vocation is the microscopic investigation of the minutest details of the Text. They make a distinct study of the words taken separately, and even of the syllables, of single letters, of breathings and accents, and of what we were wont in our school-days to call "the stops and marks." The habits thus formed are not favorable to largeness of comprehension; they exalt words over ideas; they impede a distinct appreciation of the general meaning of the passage, and the drift of the writer's thought and argument as a whole. Still further: when one of these minute changes is made in the Text, the verbal critic is naturally inclined so to modify the translation of the passage that it shall at any rate clearly and fully set forth in English the precise effect of this slight alteration, whatever injury may be done thereby to the meaning of the sentence in other respects. For instance, Luke ii. 14, the Received Text reads, *Δόξα εν υψίστοις θεῷ*,

ναὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις ευδοκίᾳ. By adding one Greek letter, the Revisers change the case of this last substantive from the nominative to the genitive; and then give us this remarkable translation of the verse so modified: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace among men in whom he is well pleased." This is bad enough, for it spoils the antithesis between the two clauses; it is spiritless, and deprives the clause of any obvious significance. But it is not even a correct version of the Text thus "amended;" for if literally construed, it should be, "and on earth peace among men of good-will." We have only to add that many, perhaps most, ancient authorities favor the reading of the Received Text, which gives us without violence those words of the Common Version of this magnificent hymn which are consecrated in the hearts of millions of Christians. It is almost a sacrilegious act to disturb the associations that cluster around those words in the hearts of all English believers. Thomson's translation is that of the Common Version.

The principal guides of the English Revisers in their emendations of the Greek Text appear to have been Drs. Westcott and Hort, whose elaborate edition of the Greek New Testament, tho first published simultaneously with the Revised Version, was confided to both the English and American Committees, through advanced proof-sheets, almost from the beginning of their labors. One cannot help admiring the worldly wisdom evinced by these two learned Doctors, in thus obtaining notoriety for their independent labors by simultaneity of publication, together with an implied sanction of their work arising from the use made of it by these two distinguished Committees. They evidently thought that their work would fly higher if it were pinned to the tail of the Revision kite. If their authority is not followed in every case, the departures from it by the English Committee were probably due to the well-earned reputation and influence, as a textual critic, of Dr. Scrivener. Our only interest in this bit of the private history of the Revision of 1881 arises from the fact, that in the elaborate "Introduction and Appendix," which occupy the second volume of the Westcott and Hort edition, we have a clear and full statement, which may be considered as authoritative,—at any rate, it is the only one

as yet accessible,—of the principles and rules which have guided the Revisers in their emendations of the Greek Text.

Westcott and Hort admit “that repeated transcription involves multiplication of error; and the consequent presumption that a relatively late text is likely to be a relatively corrupt text is found true.” But they immediately proceed to qualify, or rather to nullify, this admission by their *hypotheses*, (for they are nothing more,) about the classification of the MSS. into families or recensions, and about the “unconscious mental action,” which induced the early transcribers to lose sight of the “intrinsic sacredness” of the language in their “instinctive feeling for sense.” Certainly no one will accuse Westcott and Hort and their disciples of *this* fault, but rather of the opposite one, viz., of having no feeling at all for the sense, because they are so eager to hunt out and expose the *verbal* errors into which they suppose the copyists during the second and third centuries to have been betrayed by their “unconscious mental action” in instinctively preferring sense to nonsense. When the testimony of the early MSS. and the ancient versions concerning two readings of a certain text is about equally balanced, a common person would think that the internal evidence ought to be fully considered, as well as the external, and that reading should be preferred which gives an obvious and satisfactory meaning to the passage over that which renders it enigmatical or nonsensical. Not so with these pedantic professional amenders of the Greek text; they hold that the “unconscious mental action” of the early transcribers led them to substitute an easier reading for a difficult one, or to insert a gloss upon the text. Accordingly they strike out the significant words, and give us a text which OEdipus himself could not interpret. Their rule virtually is, when the external evidence is divided, always prefer nonsense to sense; or, if a later manuscript differs from an earlier one, always prefer the former, provided you have some grounds to conjecture that it comes of a better family or recension; that is, if you think it has better blood in its veins; for then it represents a still earlier manuscript which has perished, but which you assume to know all about through what the lawyers call “circumstantial evidence.” This rule seems to admit through a back door what are called conjectural readings, such

as, in the text of the New Testament, are universally acknowledged to be inadmissible. Truly, the secret thoughts of the early transcribers are better known by our textual critics than they were by the transcribers themselves; for the copyist knew only the thoughts which he was conscious of, while our critics know even those of which he was unconscious.

Thus, in Acts xxvi. 28, the Received Text reads, ὁ δὲ Ἀγρίππας πρὸς τὸν Παῦλον ἔφη, Ἐν ὀλίγῳ με πείθεις Χριστιανὸν γενέσθαι. And this reading is confirmed by many ancient authorities, especially by the Vulgate, which translates thus: *Agrippa autem ad Paulum: In modico suades me christianum fieri.* In substantial agreement with the Common Version, Thomson gives this translation: "Upon this Agrippa said to Paul, Thou almost persuadest me to become a Christian." We are here required to supply *χρόνῳ* as understood after *ὀλίγῳ*, that is, "in a little while;" for by saying "in a little while thou wilt persuade me," one obviously implies "thou hast *almost* persuaded me already." But the Revisers proceed to amend the text, first, by leaving out *ἔφη*, in accordance with their wonderful rule, that as the early transcribers were more likely to interpolate than to make omissions, a shorter is to be preferred to a longer reading (in this case, it is true, the Vulgate seems to agree with them); and secondly, by substituting *ποιῆσαι* for *γενέσθαι*, against the authority of the Vulgate, but in conformity with their second great principle, that a difficult or obscure phrase, even if almost unintelligible, is generally to be accepted in preference to another which is easy, familiar, and expressive. And of the text as thus "amended" they proceed to give us this extraordinary translation: "And Agrippa said unto Paul, With but little persuasion thou wouldest fain make me a Christian." But these words are *not* a faithful version of their own corrected text, as even a schoolboy can see; and furthermore, their version as a whole is not only intolerably harsh and awkward, but so obscure as to be practically unintelligible. To think of substituting such phraseology for the idiomatic terseness, the rhythm, and the clear and pure English of our inimitable Common Version!

Let us now consider a passage from the Revisers' work which does not raise any question about the amendment of the Greek

text, but illustrates only the merits of their translation as affected by that study of minute details, that excessive desire of verbal and literal accuracy, which is fostered by long practice in textual criticism. Most readers are familiar with the beautiful verses, II. Peter i. 5-7, which contain an enumeration of the virtues which constitute a Christian life. As the context plainly shows, the gist of the apostle's teaching is, that these virtues must not be practised separately, but together, in the closest union with each other. Each must be *added* to the others. Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, *C. V.* will designate the Common Version; *Revised*, the Version of 1881; and *Thomson*, the translation of 1808. Verse 5, in the passage here referred to, is thus rendered:

C. V. "And beside this, giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue; and to virtue knowledge;"

Thomson. "Therefore, having on your part used all diligence for the very same purpose, add to your faith fortitude; and to fortitude, knowledge;"

Revised. "Yea, and for this very cause adding on your part all diligence, in your faith supply virtue; and in your virtue knowledge;"

Here *C. V.*, as clear and simple in expression and correct in meaning, tho' slightly paraphrased, really needs no change. *Thomson* aims to be more full and exact, and especially to preserve the primitive significance of *ἀρετή* (Latin, *virtus*) as *fortitude* (better, *manliness*), the distinguishing quality of a brave and firm (*fortis*) man. The *Revised*, aiming at metaphrase, is not English, and is really unintelligible. Its clumsy and enigmatical phrase, "*in* your faith *supply* virtue," either has no meaning at all, or must be tortured into signifying just what is plainly and naturally expressed in *C. V.*.

Let us now consider the three translations of verse 7 from the same passage.

C. V. "And to godliness brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness charity."

Thomson. "And to piety, brotherly affection; and to brotherly affection, universal love."

Revised. "And in your godliness love of the brethren; and in your love of the brethren love."

Again, *C. V.* is here inimitably fine, a refreshing draught

from the well of Old English pure and undefiled, and needing change only of the word *charity*, which in English has definitively lost the general meaning of the Latin *caritas*, and has become indissolubly associated with *almsgiving*. And *Thomson* is worthy to stand by the side of *C. V.*, his phraseology being pure and graceful, tho slightly less archaic, and "universal love" conveying the precise meaning of ἀγάπη as contradistinguished from ἔρως, carnal love. It is hard to speak of the *Revised* with any patience, for it unites almost every possible fault of a translation, being incorrect, uncouth, unrhythymical, and really unintelligible. Certainly, to one who retained no recollection either of the original Greek or the Common Version, the concluding phrase, "and in your love of the brethren love," would be meaningless and ridiculous, a mere jumble of words. It is pleasant to know that Luther's German version nearly accords with that of Mr. Thomson, who probably did not know a word of German: "*Und in der Gottseligkeit brüderliche Liebe, und in der brüderlichen Liebe gemeine Liebe.*"

As the *Revised* makes a parade of its strict adherence to the original, we will carry one step farther this comparison of it with *Thomson* in point of exactness. At the scene of the Transfiguration, Matt. xvii. 5, the *Revised*, differing but slightly from *C. V.*, renders thus: "And behold, a voice out of the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." *Thomson* gives this version: "And lo! from the cloud, a voice, saying, This is my Son, the Beloved, in whom I am well pleased." Every one will acknowledge, not only that the old Philadelphia schoolmaster's translation is here incomparably more lively and graphic than the *Revised*, but also that it is more exact, even to the order of the words,—as may be seen by a glance at the original: *καὶ οὐδείς φωνὴ ἐν τῇς νεφέλῃς λέγουσα, Οὗτός ἐστιν δὲ νιός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός ἐν ᾧ εὑδόκησα.*

Let us now see how successful and consistent the *Revised* has been in striving after a rigid application of grammatical rules to its version of the text. The writers of the New Testament were men of comparatively little culture, in the modern point of view, and they used a language which was not, strictly speaking, their mother-tongue. This language, the Hellenistic Greek, was far from possessing the uniformity, precision, and exactness of the

classical dialects of Greece. Hence the style of most parts of the New Testament is loose, popular, and conversational. It generally needs to be interpreted with careful reference to the context and the purpose which, for the moment, the writer has in view. Accordingly, to insist, as the *Revisers* too frequently do, on "rigid adherence to the rule of translating, as far as possible, the same Greek word by the same English word;" or, on what are called "consequential changes," which are held to be necessary by reason of some foregoing alteration; or, on closely following the original in the use of the definite article and the aorist tense,—is to purchase uniformity at too high cost. Give us rather, what the *Revisers* complain of, "the frequent inconsistencies of the Authorized Version," and its "studied variety of rendering" the same frequently recurrent word; for we thus have at least an equal chance of preserving the true sense of the unstudied and conversational style of the apostles and evangelists, and also of retaining a wider range and more free scope for the elastic movement, the idiomatic expressiveness, and the familiar cadences of our own splendidly irregular mother-tongue. In profession, at least, so far as may be judged from their Preface, the *Revisers* are at one with us in this matter; in general terms, they admit nearly the whole doctrine which we are here advocating. But their practice is too often at variance with their profession. System, consistency, dictionary meanings, and grammatical rules are their idols.

Most Englishmen and many Americans, on ordinary occasions, make incorrect use of the auxiliary verbs *shall* and *will*. It would be doing them great injustice to insist on interpreting their careless utterances according to the strict grammatical meaning of these words, and to compel them to abide the moral and legal consequences of such interpretation. The story is told of a poor Frenchman who, having fallen overboard, expressed his entreaty for aid by saying, "I will drown! Nobody shall help me!" It would have been harsh, on the part of the bystanders, to regard this outcry as an avowed intention of suicide.

In the parable of the Prodigal Son, Luke xv. 30, *Revised* translates "thou killedst for him the fatted calf," blindly following the aorist of the text, and thereby not only spoiling the euphony of the clause by the dissonant word *killedst*, but really

sacrificing the sense of the passage, which requires the perfect to express an act just completed, its consequences extending to the present time. *Thomson* rightly follows *C. V.* in saying "thou hast killed." And yet the *Revised*, only three verses back (verse 27), translates the same verb in the same tense, ἔθυσεν, "hath killed." This inconsistency must have been an oversight; but as such, it argues discreditable carelessness in making a change of language without any well-considered reason.

Numerous other instances might be given, as the *Revisers* seem to have had a "craze" on the subject of the aorist tense. Thus, Matt. ii. 2, where both *C. V.* and *Thomson* translate "we have seen," *Revised* has "for we *saw* his star in the east;" but wrongly, for the vision was not momentary, since the star continued to shine, and the Magi followed its guidance. Again, in verses 7, 8, of the same chapter, where we quote at length:

τότε Ἡρώδης, λάθρᾳ παλέσας τοὺς μάγους, ἡκριβωσε παρ' αὐτῶν τὸν χρόνον τοῦ φαινομένου ἀστέρος. παὶ πέμψας αὐτοὺς εἰς Βηθλεὲμ εἰπε, Πορευθέντες ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσατε περὶ τοῦ παιδίου.

Revised. "Then Herod privily called the wise men, and learned of them carefully what time the star appeared. And he sent them to Bethlehem, and said, Go and search out carefully concerning the young child."

Thomson. "Then Herod, having privately called the magians, got exact information from them concerning the time of the star's appearing, and sending them to Bethlehem, he said, Go and make exact inquiry about the child."

Most readers will admit, I think, that *Thomson* here, tho he should have written "the *young* child," is not only more clear and felicitous than the *Revised*, but is more faithful and exact as a version of the Greek text, the precise meaning of the aorist to the contrary notwithstanding. The phrase "learned of them carefully" is not so smooth, or so good English, as we might expect from a company of scholars.

We have next to consider the accuracy and consistency of the *Revisers* in the use of the definite article, in respect to which they claim to have made numerous and important improvements upon *C. V.* As the first and perhaps the most serious instance, take the change which they have made in the Lord's

Prayer, Matt. vi. 13, by substituting "deliver us from the evil one" for "deliver us from evil," because the original reads $\alpha\pi\circ\tau\circ\tilde{\nu}\ \pi\nu\eta\rho\circ\tilde{\nu}$. But this may be the genitive of the neuter, "evil thing;" or "evil" in general, just as well as of the masculine, "evil one;" and when the adjective is used, as here, in the generic or universal sense, the French and German languages, as well as the Greek, require the definite article to be expressed, tho English idiom strikes it out. Hence Luther, who, as is well known, was haunted by a very lively sense of the personality and influence of the devil, still translates correctly, "*erlöse uns von dem Uebel.*" Thomson also, like *C. V.*, renders the clause, "deliver us from evil." Thus the change made by the *Revisers*, which so rudely shocks the feelings of many believers, has not the shadow of an argument in its favor; it is wholly gratuitous. It was probably adopted from the same indistinct and half-conscious purpose of asserting the personality and immediate agency of the Evil One, which induced the English *Revisers*, contrary to the opinion of their American associates, to persist in translating $\delta\alpha\mu\omega\tau$, $\delta\alpha\mu\circ\eta\iota\circ\tau$, and $\delta\alpha\mu\circ\eta\iota\circ\tilde{\gamma}\circ\mu\circ\tau\circ\sigma$, "devil" and "possessed with a devil," instead of their obvious meaning, "demon," "demoniac," "possessed with a demon." But a similar concern for the personality of the Holy Spirit made them wofully inconsistent in the application of their doctrine respecting the use of the definite article; for they will not allow its absence from the Greek to prejudice its retention in the English version, when it is needed in order to assert the distinctive presence of "*the* Holy Ghost." Contrary, again, to the opinion of their American brethren, they refuse to adopt uniformly the rendering "Holy Spirit" instead of "Holy Ghost," and proceed to translate $\pi\nu\epsilon\tilde{\nu}\mu\alpha\ \tilde{\alpha}\gamma\iota\circ\tau$ without the article, just as they do when it is present. Thus, Luke i. 35, the text reads, $\pi\nu\epsilon\tilde{\nu}\mu\alpha\ \tilde{\alpha}\gamma\iota\circ\tau\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\nu}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\ \sigma\epsilon\ \eta\alpha\ \delta\eta\eta\alpha\pi\mu\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\eta\sigma\alpha\ \sigma\circ\tau$. And *Thomson*, with his usual accuracy, translates, "A holy spirit will come upon thee, and the power of the Most High will overshadow thee." But the *Revisers* in both cases follow *C. V.* in rendering "The Holy Ghost," and "shall come," "shall overshadow." And again, in the 15th verse of the same chapter, *Thomson* correctly reads, "With a holy spirit he will be filled even from his mother's womb;" while the *Revisers*, inde-

fensibly on their own principles, persist in reading "shall be filled with the Holy Ghost." They had better talk about their jealous care for the presence and the rights of the definite article!

With these facts before us, it must be admitted that the doctrine of the English *Revisers* respecting the proper use of the definite article in the New Testament breaks down altogether, and their introduction of the Evil One into the Lord's Prayer appears, in its true light, as an unauthorized and offensive interpolation. It was not needed as another voucher of the personal existence of the devil. Under his proper name as Satan or Beelzebub, or his descriptive appellation as ὁ διάβολος, *the slanderer*, there are passages enough in the New Testament which, if literally interpreted, establish his personality beyond all question.

The Gospels consist largely of the reported discourses of our Lord, together with brief and simple mention of the circumstances and incidents which suggested them or accompanied their delivery, and which constitute our only record of the ministry and life of Him who uttered them. The reports and the narrative were probably not reduced to writing till the generation of those who first heard and witnessed them had nearly passed away, but were handed down during those years by oral tradition, kept alive by frequent repetition in the secret or public meetings of the early converts. Then they were written out in order to preserve the memory of them, and that the succeeding generations of believers might know the certainty of those things wherein they had been instructed. In the Synoptic Gospels, as they are called, we have three separate and independent recensions of these reports and the accompanying narrative, which largely repeat each other, because they tell what is essentially the same story, report the same discourses, and present the record of one and the same divine life. Transcripts of them were multiplied by careless scribes, who had not yet learned to revere the written more than the spoken word. And these early copyists, in their haste to finish a protracted, and what was probably sometimes a mercenary and irksome, task, tried now and then to shorten the work, by leaving out what they regarded as insignificant details or needless repetitions of what had been

fully stated in one of the other Gospels. The earliest uncial manuscripts, the Sinaitic and the Vatican, are remarkable for the number and importance of such omissions. The earliest Fathers, on the contrary, who in their citations probably often relied on the early verbal tradition instead of the later written report, not infrequently give us a full or more expanded text. Justin Martyr does not even quote the separate Gospels by name, but lumps them together under the generic designation of "Memoirs" or "Memorabilia by the Apostles and their companions." Clement of Alexandria, also, it is stated, frequently cites from memory and gives rather the sense than the words. Hence we cannot go along with Drs. Westcott and Hort in some of their sweeping mutilations of the Received Text, which are founded on a classification of the authorities by their supposed "genealogy." This hypothesis of a purer origin, a nobler descent, has led them to follow implicitly the Vatican and Sinaitic abridgments, and to put aside almost contemptuously the authority both of the early Fathers and the early Versions. Of course, the question can arise only in doubtful cases, when there is weighty evidence on both sides. But when there is such a conflict of authorities, we maintain the true principle to be, that not one detail, clause, or word, which may probably, or even possibly, belong to Holy Scripture shall be wholly lost. But all shall be preserved, even tho it be necessary sometimes to follow the example set by the *Revisers* in indicating, upon the printed page, that the concluding verses of Mark's Gospel are of doubtful genuineness. The dictum of the textual critics, that the early manuscripts are more likely to have been corrupted by interpolations than by omissions is grossly improbable. For a mere transcriber, it is not so easy or so natural to invent, as it is to overlook, to neglect, and to abbreviate.

Yet the *Revisers*, blindly following their blind guides, give us this pitifully maimed relic as Luke's version of the Lord's Prayer, tho admitting in the margin that "many ancient authorities" favor the retention of the clauses here omitted :

"Father, hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Give us day by day our daily bread. And forgive us our sins; for we ourselves also forgive every one that is indebted to us. And bring us not into temptation."

The argument in favor of this cruel mutilation of the text takes no notice of the obvious consideration, that Matthew and Luke are here reporting the same words of our Lord, when he was teaching his disciples how to pray, whether the words were uttered by him but once, or were repeated on a subsequent occasion; and as it was a formula of prayer for frequent use, it is highly improbable that either evangelist should have ventured to abbreviate it, tho a careless and ignorant transcriber might think it needless to repeat it entire after it had been copied at length elsewhere. The *Revisers* have actually spoiled both versions of the sacred Prayer,—that in Matthew, by putting the devil into it without any good cause, and that in Luke, by cutting it down into a mere fragment.

There are numerous other mutilations of the text made on too slight grounds, tho this one is the most painful and inaeffable of all. From Matt. xvii., in spite of “many authorities, some ancient,” the whole of verse 21 is omitted, apparently for no other reason than because the words are repeated in Mark ix. 29, where we read, “This kind can come forth by nothing but by prayer and fasting.” But this is strange reasoning, as one would suppose that the testimony of Mark’s Gospel, where the passage is indisputably genuine, would confirm, instead of weakening, the “many authorities, some ancient,” which assign it to Matthew also. But no; to the *Revisers*, it is a suspicious circumstance that two independent witnesses should tell the same story. The testimony ascribed to one of them must be an interpolation due to the “unconscious mental action” of the transcriber—an innocent forgery!

Mark’s Gospel is distinguished from the other two Synoptics by a certain minuteness and particularity of detail, which bring the incident described more vividly before the eye, and thus render it more effective and touching. Thus, in the scene after the Transfiguration, when Jesus tells the father of the lunatic child, “all things are possible to him who believeth,” according to Mark ix. 24, the poor father “cried out and said with tears, Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.” Tho “many ancient authorities” favor the reading as I have here quoted it, the *Revisers* pitilessly strike out the affecting words “with tears.” Surely, it is not the heart of a metaphysician, but of a textual

critic, which is as hard as a nether millstone! The founder and master of this kind of criticism was

" Slashing Bentley, with his desperate hook ;"

but that great scholar's edition of the "Paradise Lost" was not a model to be imitated in the *Revision* of the New Testament.

A few more instances of such needless mutilation of the text may be enumerated without comment, taking those cases only in which the *Revisers* admit that there is considerable evidence in favor of retaining the passage. From Luke ix. 55, 56, these words are left out: "and said, Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. For the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them." From the annunciation to Mary, Luke i. 28, strike out "blessed art thou among women." Luke xvii. 36, omit the whole verse, "Two men shall be in the field; the one shall be taken, and the other left." Luke xxiii. 17, omit the whole verse, "For of necessity he must release one unto them at the feast." Luke xxiii. 38, from the story of the superscription on the cross, strike out "written in letters of Greek, and Latin, and Hebrew." John viii. 59, omit "going through the midst of them, and so passed by." The Acts viii., leave out verse 37, "And Philip said, if thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Acts xv., leave out verse 34, "But it seemed good unto Silas to abide there."

The reader can judge for himself how probable it is that all these passages were invented, and interpolated into the manuscripts, during the earlier centuries in the history of the church, through "the unconscious mental action" of the transcribers. By mangling the text in this fashion, the *Revisers* seem unmindful even of the moderation enjoined upon the conspirators in killing Cæsar:

" Let's carve him as a dish fit for the gods;
Not hew him as a carcass fit for hounds."

But this portion of the discussion has been carried far enough to answer the only purpose which we had in view in instituting it, which was to show that, in estimating the comparative merits of *Thomson* and the *Revised*, the former suffers perhaps no great

disadvantage from the fact that he had not at command the abundant critical apparatus, and the refined principles of textual criticism, of which so large use was made by the company of scholars and theologians who worked together in the Jerusalem Chamber. Extensive and minute scholarship has its perils as well as its uses; the habits acquired by long professional training in a somewhat narrow field may serve rather to confuse than to sharpen the vision, and certainly do not favor practical soundness of judgment or a generous breadth of view. Such scholarship easily falls into pedantry; such training finds it hard to leave the ruts in which it has long moved.

Good translation requires the most scrupulous conformity to the text, when the idiom of the two languages and the idiosyncrasy of the writer allow the meaning of the sentence as a whole to be transfused into another tongue with verbal accuracy; while it sanctions and even demands paraphrase, if the failure of either of these conditions does not permit the sense of the original to be expressed by metaphor—*that is*, by rendering word for word. My purpose is now to show, by a series of instances, that *Thomson* excels his later rival in both of these respects; while the *Revisers* seem to believe that the second branch of the alternative is never presented for consideration.

In Matt. vi. 25 and 31 *Thomson* anticipated the *Revised* by substituting “Be not anxious” for the misleading “Take no thought for” of *C. V.* But he avoids the wooden uniformity of the *Revisers*, who invariably translate *οὐ παρώσ*, heaven, tho in some places it obviously signifies *the air*, and in others, *the sky*. Thus, in Matt. vi. 26, *Thomson* rightly gives “birds of the air;” and in Matt. xvi. 3, “the sky is red and lowering,” and “the appearance of the sky;” herein coinciding with *C. V.* In Matt. xii. 32, *Revised* is inconsistent with itself by speaking of the sin against the “Holy Spirit” instead of “Holy Ghost,” and says this sin “shall not be forgiven neither in this world nor in that which is to come;” putting into the margin, however, “age” as a substitute for “world.” *Thomson* is at once more faithful to the original, and more lucid, when he translates, “whoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit is not to be forgiven, either in the present age or in that to come;” adding this explanatory note in the margin, “Neither in the present age, (that is, the age un-

der the Mosaic law,) nor in that to come, (i.e., the age under the Messiah.)"

Life in Palestine and other warm countries of the East is mainly a life out of doors, and we are not surprised to learn that Jesus lived and taught chiefly in the open air. On the mountain and by the wayside, on the lake shore, and while passing around the cultivated fields and the vineyards, or sitting weary by the well, he uttered his parables and more formal discourses, or conversed with his disciples and inquiring strangers. Many passages and illustrations of his spoken words were evidently suggested by the surrounding objects and incidents to which he called the attention of his hearers. The sower, the vine-dresser, and the shepherd at their work, the fields white unto the harvest or gay with flowers, the birds flying past, the sheep and cattle returning to their folds at evening,—all were made to tell their story, to teach a moral lesson, to make clear religious truth. A great merit of Thomson's book is that he has a lively appreciation of such minute details in the Gospels, and sometimes slightly varies the meaning of a word or a particle in order to bring the scene more vividly before the reader's imagination. Thus, in the Sermon on the Mount, he makes Our Lord say, "Observe those birds of the air; they neither sow, nor reap, nor lay up in granaries." And again, "Consider those lilies of the field, how they grow." Here the demonstrative pronoun is substituted for the definite article of the text; but since we cannot doubt that Jesus pointed to these objects as he spoke, and since "the," when emphatic, becomes equivalent to "that," the version is really exact. In Luke xii. 42, even *C. V.* puts the question thus: "Who then is that faithful and wise steward?" while *Revised* coldly and literally renders, "*the faithful*" steward. Again, I. Corinthians xiii. 2, *Revised*, agreeing substantially with *C. V.*, translates thus: "And if I have *the gift of prophecy*, and know all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains," etc. But the Greek text inserts the definite article before each of the three words, "mysteries," "knowledge," and "faith," and therefore *Thomson* more correctly writes, "And tho I have a gift of prophecy, and understand all the mysteries and all this knowledge, and tho I have all that faith, so as to remove mountains," etc. Here the mean-

ing is at once more clear and definite, and the version more exact. In Matt. vi. 27, where both *C. V.* and the English *Revisers* have "can add one cubit to his stature," *Thomson* brings the lesson home by his version of the query, "Which of you can by his anxiety prolong his life one hour?" and the American *Revisers* favor this change, by substituting "the measure of his life" for "his stature."

Thomson invariably distinguishes the meaning of *εὐλογητός* from that of *μανάριος*, while neither *C. V.* nor *Revised* recognizes any difference between these two words, but gives the same English equivalent, *blessed*, for either. These words are of frequent recurrence in important passages of the New Testament, and the distinction between them needs to be preserved. The Greek *εὐλογέω*, *εὐλογητός*, corresponds exactly to the Latin *benedico*, *benediction*, and the English *bless*, *blessed*. On the other hand, the primary meaning of *μανάριος*, *μαναρίζω*, is simply *happy*, *to make happy*. Either of these words is often used in the way of an exclamation, without any finite verb; and then, if we supply the verb in English, it should not be in the indicative mood, but in the imperative or the subjunctive. Then the former, *εὐλογητός*, always has a precatory sense, as invoking or announcing a *blessing*; the latter, *μανάριος*, is the ejaculatory declaration of a present fact, as in the often-cited line of Virgil,

"O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint."

Thus, in Luke xi. 27, *Thomson* renders literally and correctly, "a woman among the crowd, raising her voice, said to him, *Μαναρία ἡ νοιλία ἡ βαστάσασά σε*, Happy the womb which bore thee, and the breasts which thou hast sucked." And the Saviour responds, "Nay, rather, [μανάριοι,] happy they who hear the word of God and keep it." *C. V.* and *Revised* wrongly translate, "Blessed is the womb," "blessed are they that hear." Luther's German version agrees with *Thomson's*, "*Selig ist der Leib*," "*selig sind, die Gottes Wort hören*," etc. On the other hand, Luke i. 42, where the original has *Εὐλογημένη*, Luther translates "*Gebenedeict bist du unter den Weibern, und gebenedeiet ist die Frucht deines Leibes*;" and *Thomson* still more exactly, because omitting the finite verb, "Blessed thou among women, and blessed the fruit of thy womb!" But in the very next

clause of Elizabeth's gratulatory hymn, because a literal version, as in *C. V.* and the *Revised*, gives this comparatively feeble and meaningless phrase, "And whence is this to me," Thomson rightly paraphrases the words thus: "How have I this honor, that the mother of my Lord should come to me!" adding, however, the exact translation in a marginal note.

Again, Luke xxiii. 29, *C. V.* and the *Revised* have, "Blessed are the barren!" But the word in the original is *μανάριοι*, and Thomson translates literally, "Happy the barren, and the wombs which never bare!" But in Romans ix. 5, where the word is *εὐλογητός*, all three versions render correctly, "God blessed forever." The distinction is important in Matt. v. 3-11, since the Beatitudes are commonly misunderstood, as if our Lord was invoking a blessing, that is, a *future* reward, on the meek and lowly in heart, whereas the meaning of the original, *μανάριοι*, without the finite verb, is a gratulatory announcement of a *present* fact, the intrinsic happiness of the righteous. Hence, tho *Revised* makes no change in *C. V.*, Thomson correctly renders, "Happy the poor in spirit!" "Happy they who mourn!" "Happy the meek!" etc.; and therein he precisely accords with the Latin of the Vulgate, "*Beati pauperes spiritu;*" "*Beati qui lugent;*" "*Beati mites,*" etc.; since the primary meaning of *beatus* is *happy*. Yet here it should frankly be confessed, that we are grateful to the *Revisers* for not making any change in the matchless rhythmical English of the Beatitudes in *C. V.*, rich as it is with sacred associations in the hearts of millions. It is now too late for a change in the text, tho Thomson's exact version of the Greek should have been placed as an alternative reading in the margin. In verse 10, one is provoked at the clumsy grammatical pedantry of the *Revisers*, who aimed at exactness out of place by rendering the perfect participle "*have been persecuted for righteousness' sake,*" tho the sense obviously requires "*are persecuted,*" as in *C. V.* and *Thomson*. Their change of the tense in English, by limiting the announcement to those who *have* suffered in this manner, actually takes it away from those who *are now* persecuted, that is, from the very class for whom it was destined. Again, in verse 12, where the finite verb is not expressed in the original of one of the clauses, both *C. V.* and *Revised* are wrong in supplying this verb in the present tense, "great is your re-

ward;" while *Thomson* is right in reading "great *will be* your reward in heaven." Certainly the *Revisers* are not happy in their treatment of the tenses.

In translating II. Timothy ii. 8, 9, *C. V.* is inaccurate and obscure, if not completely unintelligible; while the *Revised* is but little better, for it thus translates: "Remember Jesus Christ, risen from the dead, of the seed of David, according to my gospel; wherein I suffer hardship unto bonds, as a malefactor; but the word of God is not bound." This is inexact, the clauses are awkwardly thrown together with little apparent connection with each other, and the meaning remains obscure. *Thomson* is more faithful, his version is comparatively smooth and flowing, and it brings out the sense with tolerable clearness: "Remember Jesus Christ of the seed of David, raised from the dead, according to these glad tidings of mine for which I suffer even to bonds, as a malefactor; but the word of God is not bound." In II. Corinthians xii. 7, the *Revisers* first render the task of the translator arduous, if not impossible, through foisting $\delta\tau\delta$ into the text unnecessarily, in accordance with their sage maxim that a difficult and even nonsensical reading is always to be preferred to a simple and obvious one, and then, through blindly following the relative position of the clauses in the original, they succeed in producing this uncouth, un-English, and but half-intelligible version: "And by reason of the exceeding greatness of the revelations—wherefore, that I should not be exalted overmuch, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh, a messenger of Satan to buffet me, that I should not be exalted overmuch." With this galimatias contrast the following translation by *Thomson*, which is at once simple, perspicuous, and exact: "Indeed, that I might not be too much elated by the astonishing greatness of these revelations, there was given me a thorn for the flesh, a messenger of Satan to buffet me, that I might not be too much elated." The *C. V.* of this passage, tho much superior to the *Revised*, is not so clear or so elegant as *Thomson*. In I. Corinthians vii. 11, the translation of the parenthetical clause, both in *C. V.* and the *Revised*, is surely awkward and inelegant without any good reason: "But and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband." *Thomson* is more correct and natural: "But if she hath actually

separated, let her continue unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband."

In Matt. viii. 9, the meaning of the centurion's humble confession of his unworthiness does not at all appear in *C. V.*, and can only be doubtfully inferred from the *Revised* translation; but it is thus clearly and fully expressed by *Thomson*: "For even I, who am myself under command, having soldiers under me, say to one, Go, and he goeth." The greater perspicuity of *Thomson* also appears in Matt. v. 37, where, familiar as the phrase adopted by *C. V.* and the *Revised* has now become, "Let your communication be Yea, yea; Nay, nay," its precise meaning is not immediately apparent. By modifying the language very slightly, *Thomson* makes the significance of the phrase at once obvious and emphatic: "But let your word yes be yes, and your no no; for whatever exceedeth these proceedeth from that which is evil." As the Greek of this final clause is $\varepsilon\nu\tau\omega\nu\eta\rho\nu\delta\sigma\tau\nu$, the *Revisers*, in accordance with the precedent set up in their version of the Lord's Prayer, are compelled to adopt this ridiculous version, "Whatsoever is more than these is of the evil one."

Instead of the simple and idiomatic translation of James iii. 5 in *C. V.*, "Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth," the *Revisers* give us this awkward and unmeaning version, "Behold how much wood is kindled by how small a fire." This results from another application of their famous rule, that a difficult reading must supersede an obvious and natural one, in virtue of which they have substituted $\eta\lambda\imath\nu\sigma$ for $\delta\lambda\imath\nu\sigma$. And their translation of the next verse is not an improvement on *C. V.*, which here really needs no change. *Thomson* renders the whole passage with clearness and spirit, tho his phraseology is not so terse and flowing as that of the inimitable *C. V.* He writes, "See what a great pile of wood a little fire kindleth to a flame! Now the tongue is a fire, the leader of iniquity; the tongue is set among the members staining the whole body, and setting the wheel of nature in a blaze, when it is itself set in a blaze by hell." The word $\gamma\acute{e}vv\alpha$ is here rendered as in *C. V.*, tho *Thomson* usually translates it as "the vale of fire," or "the vale of Hinnom." In like manner, $\tilde{\alpha}\delta\eta\varsigma$ is usually translated by him as the "mansion of the dead," or allowed simply to stand as "Hades."

In Mark v., after the message is delivered in the presence of Jesus to the unhappy father, "Thy daughter is dead; why troublest thou the Master any further?" the *Revisers* translate verse 36 thus: "But Jesus, not heeding the word spoken, saith unto the ruler of the synagogue, Fear not, only believe." Now this is a false translation, and misses the whole point of the narration, which is, that Jesus *did* overhear the message and heeded it, for he *immediately* consoles Jairus by saying, "Fear not," tho thou hast received these gloomy tidings; "only believe," and thy daughter shall be restored living to thy arms. And the promise was kept. If Jesus were rightly described as "not heeding" the words of the message, his own words of consolation to the father would have been uncalled for and unmeaning, since he was already on his way to the ruler's house in order to heal the sick child. All this appears clearly enough, as *Thomson* renders the passage: "Upon hearing this message delivered, Jesus immediately saith to the ruler of the synagogue, Be not afraid; only believe." And this is the correct translation, since *παρανούσας*, the word in the original, frequently signifies *hearing accidentally, overhearing*. The fondness of the *Revisers* for difficult readings in the Greek appears to be supplemented by an equal liking for enigmatical versions into English.

The *Revised* version of Luke xxii. 56 is better than that of *C. V.*, because it supplies the reason why the maid was enabled to recognize Peter "as he sat in the light of the fire." *Thomson's* translation is more literal and exact, and brings out this circumstance with even greater distinctness: "And a maid-servant, having seen him sitting opposite to the light, and viewed him attentively, said, This man was also with him." Again, in John i. 15, *Revised* is enigmatical and inelegant: "He that cometh after me is become before me; for he was before me." *Thomson* is at once more lucid and accurate in rendering, "He who is coming after me is preferred before me, for he was before me." Here the obscurity of the *Revised* is caused by its awkward endeavor to *construe* the passage word for word. Striving to preserve the exact force of the aorist, *Revised* gives this harsh and inelegant version of Acts ii. 28: "Thou madest known unto me the ways of life; thou shalt make me full of gladness with thy countenance." *Thomson's* version is far more simple and grace-

ful: "Thou hast made known to me the ways of life; thou with thy presence wilt fill me with joy."

This comparison of the three versions of the New Testament has now been carried as far as our limits will admit, tho the materials are far from being exhausted. But perhaps evidence enough has been adduced to establish the two conclusions at which my own mind has arrived, after a protracted and unprejudiced examination: first, that the errors and shortcomings of the Revised Version of 1881 are so numerous and disheartening as to render it highly improbable that it will ever occupy the place which the Common Version has long continued to hold, as the Bible of the English-speaking people; and secondly, that an American translation of the New Testament, which has remained almost entirely unknown for three quarters of a century, is executed with so much clearness, accuracy, and force, that it deserves to stand by the side of the Common Version, not as a substitute for it, but as a companion volume, and a guide to the studies of all who are heartily desirous to search the Scriptures, and thereby to become wise unto salvation. Mr. Thomson's work unquestionably has its faults, and this is chief among them, that his diction is almost completely modernized, so that it lacks the simplicity and grace, the terseness of idiomatic expression and the harmonious rhythms and cadences, with which our ordinary Bible has so long made us familiar, and which will probably protect it against numerous or important changes in this or any subsequent age.

FRANCIS BOWEN.

DISFRANCHISEMENT FOR CRIME.

SOME recent writers on domestic politics pronounce universal suffrage a failure. Their conclusion, due either to the *a priori* method of reasoning introduced into our politics not less by Garrison and Sumner than by Jefferson and Calhoun, or to the bitter first-fruits of African emancipation, is not accepted by those who adopt the historical method in their study of politics, or who regard Simon De Montfort's device of representative government as still on trial. To such persons universal suffrage appears to be of too recent origin to yield anything more than material for a suspended judgment. Yet it is undeniable that the first results of this greatest political experiment of the century are disappointing, and have led most educated men not only to reject the sentimental notion that the suffrage is a natural right, but also to demand its large restriction, especially in great cities, where it has been found to be pregnant with social dangers.

But no one has yet been able to show how such curtailment can be effected. Political franchises have been won too often amid the throes of revolution to be surrendered upon the asking, and however much we may suffer from a too extended suffrage, it is certain that no responsible statesman will attempt its large restriction in our day.

Will it not be wise then for those who lament the abuses incident to this privilege when in the hands of the ignorant, the improvident, and the base, to cease disputing the question, How far ought our States to have extended the suffrage? and to

attempt the solution of the practical problem, What is the maximum restriction of the suffrage now attainable?

The old qualifications of rank and property are now felt to be unjust in any society where rank may be gained by brute force or courtly favor, and where property may be acquired by fraud. Moreover, the intellectual and moral development of man has made a wide bestowal of the suffrage not only possible but expedient. Notwithstanding these changes, it will never be easy if we begin with those who, judged by any subjective standard, are the most intelligent, the most provident, and the best among the people, to draw the line between those who are fit and those who are unfit to exercise the suffrage. In view of this difficulty, may it not be wise to begin at the other end of the social and economic scale, and with as purely an objective test of exclusion as can be obtained? May it not be possible to find roughly who are the illiterate, the improvident, and the base by consulting the public records of the State? Ought not the acts and the omissions of those who are there legally branded as illiterates, paupers, and criminals to be sufficient proof of their unfitness to have the privilege of electors? Any disfranchisement to be successful in this country must follow closely the lines of the least reasonable resistance. Within such lines three qualifications, we think, may be insisted upon by the State with justice and advantage:

1. An educational qualification evidenced by ability to read and write.
2. An economic qualification evidenced by maintenance without municipal aid, and by the payment of a poll-tax.
3. A moral qualification evidenced by habitual obedience to the positive law of the State.

It is now proposed to consider only the last of these qualifications—that termed moral. This adjective is here used to describe that conduct whose utility is not formally questioned by the State, even tho its inutility is affirmed by the wisest members of the commonwealth. The moral citizen then is he whose obedience to positive law is habitual, and, practically, this is the interpretation given to the phrase “good moral character” by the courts. This identification of law and morality is unfortunate, but we are now only concerned with the fact.

Theoretically the wisdom of restricting the suffrage to those who, at least, profess to obey positive law has been admitted since the first permanent settlement on our shores. Some of the early colonies confined the privilege of voting to church-members; a few of the present State constitutions mention "good moral character" as one of the conditions to citizenship; the United States statutes require an alien applying for naturalization to "make it appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting such alien . . . that during that term (five years) he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same." Practically the enforcement of these constitutional and statutory requirements of good moral character has been impossible, for the law has never given naturalization courts and registrars of election any adequate means for the determination of the law-abiding character of applicants for citizenship and registration. Some objective test of moral character is essential if the elective franchise is to be effectively restricted to law-keepers. It may be objected that the creation and application of such a test for the suffrage is impossible, because it would necessitate the co-operation of federal and State governments. This is not true, altho such co-operation would be desirable. The States can, without any aid from the national legislature, make obedience to their laws a condition precedent to the bestowal or retention of the elective franchise. All of them, except four—Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and West Virginia—now disfranchise for some offences; but how inadequate existing laws are to secure the exclusion of the immoral—the habitual law-breakers—from the ranks of those who vote will be seen by an examination of the annexed table, which shows the various offences for which the different States disfranchise, temporarily or permanently, by the express terms of their constitutions, or for which they authorize their legislatures to make disfranchisement a penalty.

OFFENCES FOR WHICH STATES DISFRANCHISE BY THE EXPRESS
TERMS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONS, OR FOR WHICH THEIR
LEGISLATURES MAY MAKE DISFRANCHISEMENT A PENALTY.

STATES.	Treason.	Felony.	Bribery.	Perjury.	Forgery.	Murder.	Robbery.	Duelling.
Alabama.....	Treason	Felony (1)	Bribery					
Arkansas.....		Felony	Bribery*	Perjury*	Forgery*			Duelling
California.....								
Colorado.....								Duelling
Connecticut.....			Bribery	Perjury	Forgery			
Delaware (4).....		Felony	Bribery	Perjury				
Florida.....		Felony	Bribery	Perjury				
Georgia.....		Felony	Bribery					Duelling
Illinois.....								Duelling
Indiana.....								
Iowa.....								
Kansas (5).....	Treason	Felony	Bribery					
Kentucky.....			Bribery					
Louisiana (20).....	Treason	Felony (1)	Bribery	Perjury	Forgery			
Maine.....			Bribery	Perjury	Forgery			
Maryland.....			Bribery (6)					
Massachusetts.....			Bribery (7)					
Michigan.....								
Minnesota.....	Treason	Felony	Bribery	Perjury				Duelling
Mississippi.....			Bribery	Perjury	Forgery			
Missouri.....		Felony						
Nebraska.....	Treason	Felony (8)						
Nevada.....	Treason (9)	Felony (9)	Bribery (10)					Duelling
New Hampshire.....	Treas'n (11)		Bribery	Perjur'y (11)	Forg'ry (11)	Murder (11)	Robb'y (11)	
New Jersey.....			Bribery					
New York.....			Bribery					
N. Carolina.....		Felony	Bribery	Perjury				
Ohio.....			Bribery					
Oregon.....		Felony	Bribery					
Pennsylvania.....			Bribe'y (12)					
Rhode Island.....			Bribery					
S. Carolina.....	Treason		Bribe'y (14)			Murder	Robbery	Duelling
Tennessee.....			Bribe'y (15)					
Texas.....			Bribe'y (15)	Perjury	Forgery			Duelling
Vermont.....			Bribe'y (16)					
Virginia.....	Treason	Felony	Bribery					Duelling
W. Virginia (18).....								
Wisconsin.....	Treason	Felony	Bribery					Duelling (7)

¹ A crime punishable by death or imprisonment in a State prison.

² * The constitution adopted by California in 1879 expressly disfranchises for any infamous crime, embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and duelling, and says that laws shall be made to exclude from the right of suffrage persons convicted of the above starred crimes.

³ Theft is the term used in the constitution of Connecticut.

⁴ The legislature may make the forfeiture of the right of suffrage a punishment for crime.

⁵ No person who has been dishonorably discharged from the service of the United States, or who has voluntarily borne arms against the Government of the United States, is qualified to vote or hold office in Kansas.

⁶ Since 1876 "the legislature may enact laws excluding from the right of suffrage for a term not exceeding ten years" for this crime.

⁷ These crimes forever disqualify for voting.

⁸ "Under the law of the State or of the United States unless restored to civil rights."

⁹ "In any State or Territory of the United States unless restored to civil rights."

¹⁰ The constitution of Nevada, art. 4, sec. 10, makes ineligible for office persons convicted of embezzlement or defalcation of public funds or bribery, and empowers the legislature to make these crimes punishable as felonies; and by art. 2, sec. 1, felony disfranchises.

¹¹ The constitution of New Jersey, art. 2, sec. 1, says that "no person convicted of a crime which now excludes him from being a witness, unless pardoned or restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall enjoy the right of an elector." The laws of the State make persons convicted of the above tabulated crimes incompetent as witnesses, and if the crime is perjury or subornation of perjury a pardon does not remove the incompetency.

¹² Disfranchise at such election, as do all corrupt offers to give or receive money or other valuable thing for a vote in both New York and Pennsylvania.

STATES.	Embezzlement of Public Funds, Fraud.	Electoral Misdemeanors.	Infamous Crimes.	Larceny.	Other Offences.
Alabama.....	Embezzlement of public funds			Larceny	Malfeasance in office
Arkansas.....	Embezzlement or misappropriation of pub. moneys (2)		Infamous crimes (2)		Malfeasance in office, or other high crimes*
Colorado.....	Fraudulent bank- ruptcy		Infamous crimes (19)	Larceny (3)	
Connecticut (4). .		Election wager	Infamous crimes	Larceny	Malfeasance in office
Delaware (4). .			Infamous crimes		
Florida.....			Infamous crimes		
Georgia.....	Embezzlement of public funds		Infamous crimes		Malfeasance in office
Illinois.....			Infamous crimes		
Indiana.....			Infamous crimes		
Iowa.....			Infamous crimes		
Kansas (5).....	Defrauding U. S. or any of the States thereof				
Kentucky.....					Other crimes or high misdemeanors
Louisiana (20).....					
Maine.....		Illegal voting (7)	Infamous crimes	Larceny	
Maryland.....					
Massachusetts.....					
Michigan.....			Infamous crimes		
Minnesota.....			Infamous crimes		Other high crimes and misdemeanors
Mississippi.....					
Missouri.....		Election misde- meanor	Infamous crimes		
Nebraska.....					
Nevada.....	Embezzlement or defalcation of public funds (10)				
New Hampshire.....					
New Jersey.....				Larceny	Subornation of perjury, blasphemy, piracy, ar- son, rape, sodomy, po- lygamy, conspiracy
New York.....					
N. Carolina.....		Elect'n wager (12)	Infamous crimes		
Ohio.....			Infamous crimes		
Oregon.....			Infamous crimes		
Pennsylvania.....		Wilful violation of the Election laws (13)			
Rhode Island.....			Infamous crimes		
S. Carolina.....			Infamous crimes		
Tennessee.....					
Texas.....					
Vermont.....					
Virginia.....	Embezzlement of public funds			Larc'y (17)	
W. Virginia (18).....					
Wisconsin.....		Elect'n wager (12)	Infamous crimes	Larceny	

¹³ Any person convicted of this offence "shall, in addition to any penalties provided by law, be deprived of the right of suffrage absolutely for a term of four years."

¹⁴ "Any elector who shall receive any gift or reward for his vote, in meat, drink, money, or otherwise, shall suffer such punishment as the laws shall direct."

¹⁵ "Subject to such exceptions as the legislature may make."

¹⁶ "Any elector who shall receive any gift or reward for his vote in meat, drink, money, or otherwise, shall forfeit his right to elect at that time, and suffer such other penalty as the law shall direct."

¹⁷ "Petit larceny."

¹⁸ "No person who is under conviction of treason, felony, or bribery in an election shall be permitted to vote while such disability continues." (Con. of West Va., art. 4, sec. 1.) This phrase "while such disability continues" has not received judicial interpretation in West Virginia, but is construed by election officers to mean *during imprisonment*.

¹⁹ "These crimes are treason, felony, and the *crimen falsi*"—which term includes crimes which involve a charge of such falsehood as may injuriously affect the public administration of justice by the introduction therein of falsehood and fraud, such as forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness.

²⁰ And persons "who may be under interdiction."

An examination of this table shows that conviction of the offences enumerated does or may disfranchise specifically as follows: of bribery in 23 States; of infamous crimes in 16 States; of felony in 16 States; of treason in 11 States; of duelling in 11 States; of perjury in 10 States; of forgery in 7 States; of larceny in 7 States; of embezzlement of public funds or fraud in 7 States; of electoral misdemeanors in 6 States; of other high crimes or malfeasance in office in 6 States; of murder in 2 States; of robbery in 2 States. Conviction of some of the enumerated crimes also disqualifies for jury service in some of the States, while permanent ineligibility to office is the sole political disability that is inflicted upon those guilty of bribery or of duelling in other States. Three States—Nebraska, Nevada, and Wisconsin—admit the principle of the exterritoriality of crime in their constitutional provisions for disfranchisement. This table shows that the people of the United States, viewing the so-called right to vote as the people of Western Pennsylvania once did the distillation of whiskey—as a natural right—have generally refused to take it away except for felonies, petit larceny¹ and violation of election laws being the only exceptions, and these only in a few States. Felonies, however, which include all the other crimes enumerated in the above table, and all of which entail disfranchisement only in 16 States, form a very small part of the offences in any community. In Massachusetts, for instance (Annual Report of Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1880, pp. 181–188), out of the 578,458 sentences inflicted in the twenty years 1860–1879 inclusive, only 57,873, or 10 per cent of the total, were for felonies (including larcenies). That the proportion between felonies and misdemeanors which thus appears to exist in Massachusetts is not exceptional is made probable not only by the police records of our largest cities extending over a long term of years, but also by a comparison of the criminal statistics of twenty-seven of our largest cities for a twelvemonth made by Mr. Frederick L. Jenkins, of the Police Department of Brooklyn, who shows (Rept. of Dept. of Police of Brooklyn, 1876, Table 16) that in these twenty-seven cities, while the number of offi-

¹ See notes to table, 3 and 17.

cers to the population varies from 1:410 to 1:1500, and the number of arrests to the population from 1:9 $\frac{1}{4}$ to 1:26 $\frac{4}{5}$, the percentage of arrests for felonies (including larcenies) to the total arrests varies from 5 per cent in New York to 22 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in Albany, and the percentage of arrests for drunkenness and drunkenness and disorderly conduct to the total arrests varies from 21 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in Charleston, S. C., to 59 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in Philadelphia. The average percentage of arrests for felonies (including larcenies) in these twenty-seven cities to the total arrests reported is only 11 + per cent, while the average percentage of arrests for the two misdemeanors drunkenness and drunkenness and disorderly conduct to the total arrests is 38 + per cent.

Making due allowance for possible errors¹ in the foregoing statistics, and for the fact that the reports cited are not all for the same year, it is still impossible to avoid the conclusion that misdemeanors which are not punishable by disfranchisement are the occasion of four fifths and, perhaps, nine tenths of all the crime reported in localities where population is dense. If this inference is correct, there can be no doubt that the State suffers more economic injury from the constant attack of misdemeanants—drunkards, brawlers, and thieves—than from the occasional assault of felons. To measure that injury accurately is, with present statistical data, impossible, for the economic cost of crime is made up of the value of property destroyed by criminals, the loss occasioned individuals in defending themselves and their possessions, the expenditures for police, prose-

¹ Great caution is necessary in the interpretation of statistics, especially the statistics of crime, even after all errors which attend their collection have been eliminated. There is no common nomenclature for crime, and no system of registering the administration of criminal law. In no States do the reported arrests include all its crime: many offenders escape through the stupidity of the police; some through the unwillingness of those who are injured to prosecute. The crime for which conviction is obtained is often less serious than that charged; the same person may be arrested a score of times each year; and even if all these elements of error were eliminated from police reports, no comparison of the crime of different cities or States would be fair which omitted to state the number of non-residents taken into custody, the proportion between the police force and the population, and the differences in the laws in force in the specified cities or States, as well as the inequalities in the administration of these laws.

cutions, magistrates, and jailers, the outlay for prisons and houses of correction, the interest on all permanent investments for the detection and punishment of criminals, the expense of their maintenance while confined, and the diminution of industrial force due to the withdrawal of both criminals and ministers of justice from the ranks of productive consumers.

Until the Census Bureau issues its bulletins upon crime, no reliable estimate can be made of the value of some of these elements in its cost: the value of the others is known only in a few States. In Massachusetts, which we select for illustration because of the fulness and accuracy of its statistical returns, there was expended (Tenth Annual Report of Coms. of Prisons, 1881, p. 39), in 1880, for—

Police.....	\$1,350,000
Courts (one half of their cost).....	90,254
District and Police Courts (three fourths).....	150,000
County Prisons	186,944
State Prison.....	20,000
Reformatory Prison	70,000
House of Industry.....	74,000
State Workhouse.....	30,000
<hr/>	
Total.....	\$1,971,198

If to this sum we add \$200,000, the annual interest at four per cent upon \$5,000,000, the estimated valuation of the State Prison, Reformatory Prison, and County Prisons of Massachusetts, as reported by Mr. W. F. Spaulding, Secretary of the Commissioners of Prisons, and omit the annual expenditure for the Reformatory Schools at Westborough and Lancaster, the annual interest on the valuation of the House of Industry and the State Workhouse, and the loss of industrial force occasioned directly and indirectly by law-breakers, it appears that the cost of crime to Massachusetts for one year was \$2,171,198, or \$1.21+ per head of the population. Altho Massachusetts is well supported by what John Adams called the four pillars of the republic—the church, the school-house, the town meeting, and the militia—no inference can safely be drawn from these statistics of the cost of crime to the whole country, unless allowance is made for the fact that the value of the elements in the cost

of crime here enumerated is largest where the population is densest, the laws most complex, and repressive and reformatory agencies most abundant.

But whatever may be the exact annual cost of crime to the people of the United States, the burden of taxation directly traceable to criminals is enormous, and four fifths and, perhaps, nine tenths of these are, as we have seen, misdemeanants.

But there is reason to believe that the penalties now imposed upon misdemeanants have small deterrent effect. Few persons, probably, are aware how frequently misdemeanors—especially drunkenness and larceny—are repeated by the same individual. The Board of Police Justices of the city of New York say (Report for 1875, p. 18), "Instances have occurred of persons having been committed to the Island for this offence [drunkenness] over. 100 times." Providence reports for the years 1870-73 an average of 4444 arrests for drunkenness, the average of repeaters for this offence being 1283; and during the last year, 1873, 683 persons were arrested twice, 207 persons three times, and John Smith twenty-four times for the same offence. Brooklyn presents the following confirmatory evidence, which, unhappily, has a parallel in the experience of all our great cities:

NUMBER OF TIMES EACH PERSON ARRESTED WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY IN BROOKLYN DURING THE YEAR 1880.

TIMES.	Total Number Arrested.	For Drunkenness.	For Drunkenness and disorderly Conduct.	For Petit Larceny.	For Grand Larceny.	For other Felonies.	Misde-menors.
Once	14,047	8,811	835	1,116	268	148	2,869
Twice.....	690	760	98	108	14	45	355
Thrice	190	231	37	29	6	37	230
Four	72	129	33	11	2	21	92
Five	40	82	30	19	1	13	55
Six.....	25	85	20	15	..	5	25
Seven.....	6	28	14
Eight.....	5	30	5	5
Nine.....	3	20	7
Ten.....	3	20	10
Eleven.....	1	11
Totals.....	26,785	10,207	1,058	1,298	291	269	3,662

Such statistics show that the customary punishments of fine and short imprisonment have no terrors for the "habitual misdeemant," and the testimony of all penologists is that the sanctions of law must be changed to correspond to the changed conditions of society. Inequalities of wealth have always made the fine an unsatisfactory penalty, and the presence in modern states of a large body of paupers and proletarians who are hereditary criminals often makes the collection of a fine impossible, so that its imposition is like a sentence to short imprisonment, only a welcome invitation to food and shelter. Moreover, when a fine is paid it often inflicts more suffering upon an innocent and dependent family than upon the criminal, and knowledge of this fact embarrasses magistrates in passing sentences. Nor is the other customary punishment for misdemeanants more satisfactory. "Repeated short sentences," said the late Dr. Wines, "demoralize the prisoner, discourage the officers, impose a heavy tax on the public, and interpose an insuperable bar to his reformation." We may safely conclude with another penologist that whatever may be thought of the efficacy of administering infinitesimally attenuated remedies for physical disease, "infinitesimally attenuated sentences are certainly unsuccessful in the treatment of moral infirmities."

Such, then, is our condition: universal suffrage exists and cannot be greatly curtailed; a large criminal population dwells in our midst, albeit there is an abundance of fertile land still unoccupied; protection against its ravages necessitates the withdrawal of thousands of able-bodied men from the ranks of active producers, and the annual expenditure of millions of dollars for police, criminal courts, and prisons; only a small part of these offenders against society are disfranchised; the remainder—misdemeanants—are not effectively deterred from crime by the present penalties, and while law-breakers, inflicting heavy taxes upon law-keepers, are suffered to become and to remain voters—law-makers. The absurdity of the situation is equalled only by its danger, for wherever a bare majority rule and the will of law-breakers is allowed legal expression, the action of the majority and of the State may be determined by its basest elements. The practical suffrage question for us, therefore, is: Can this danger be diminished by any change of

law? We believe it can, and that the most direct and, perhaps, the most feasible method of accomplishing it is by the enactment of:

(1) Laws establishing a systematic registration of criminals, with provisions for the publication and exchange of criminal registers.

(2) Laws so extending the use of disfranchisement as a penalty for crime for males that conviction for any felony shall, in addition to other punishments, entail, *ipso facto*, permanent political disability; and that a single conviction for certain misdemeanors which imply unfitness to discharge the duties of a voter, as, for example, illegal voting and petit larceny, or such repeated convictions for any misdemeanor or different misdemeanors as may by statute law and judicial construction constitute one an "habitual misdemeanant," a "common drunkard," or "a repeater," shall, in addition to any other penalties, be followed by a temporary loss of the suffrage.

(3) Laws requiring clerks of criminal courts to report at stated times the names and descriptions of all persons convicted of disfranchisable crimes to clerks of naturalization courts and to registrars of elections, whose duty it shall be to refuse to such persons citizenship and registration until the disability is removed.

To this proposal three objections are liable to be made:

i. Criminals are not amenable to public opinion; they do not value the suffrage, and would not mind disfranchisement. This objection is plausible, but even if admitted it would not be conclusive, because one of the ends of punishment is the protection of the State from those who have already been adjudged law-breakers, and consequently the utility of a penalty which deprives offenders of all power of determining the national will, as expressed at the polls, may be large even tho its reformatory and deterrent effect is small. It ought to be remembered in all discussions of penal questions that a large majority of felons and habitual misdemeanants are hereditary criminals, who defy all social sanctions, despise all political privileges, and with rare exceptions are never radically reformed nor long deterred from crime. It is unpleasant to have to acknowledge the existence and persistence in society of what is apparently

an irreclaimably immoral element, but nothing can be gained by blinking its constant presence, while much may be lost by neglecting its political disarmament. The fact, then, that this traditional and implacable foe of social order does not value the suffrage constitutes no valid objection to its disfranchisement, so long as the security of the State is thereby increased. There is, however, a class of criminals upon whom there is reason to think disfranchisement would have reformatory and deterrent effect. These are the "occasional misdemeanants"—men of strong passions and weak wills—who when tauntingly challenged, or exasperated by threat or blow, or overcome by drink during periodical festivity, or stung to desperation by poverty, or maddened by a lock-out or the failure of a strike, or excited by the gusts of political passion, defy law and pay by fine and short imprisonment for the license of an hour. Such persons are not irretrievably committed to criminal careers; they have some self-respect and condemn their own lawless acts; they are amenable to public opinion, tho it may be that of their own class; they also value the suffrage, if for no other reason, because it gives power. Educated and refined men often shun the caucus and go reluctantly to the polls, but these occasional wards of the State, be the motive what it may, always vote—early and sometimes often. Is it not, therefore, possible that misdemeanants would feel political disability to be a greater punishment than fine or short imprisonment? Is it not even probable that while the suffrage continues to be prized as highly as it now is, even in those States where the corrupt, insolent, and despotic spoils system has produced the most disgust and the most indifference to political duty, the fear of disfranchisement would be a potent check upon the passionate violence, the periodical drunkenness, and the petty pilfering of a class whose social inferiority makes it value the suffrage, at least, as a badge of legal equality? To vote is, in a democratic state, to assert that equality, and tho an offender may show no shame for the crime which disfranches him, yet, when saluted among his cronies as "the retired politician" or "the ex-senator," he winces because the epithet publishes his inferiority in power.

2. The number that would be disfranchised by such an extension of this penalty as is here advocated would, it may be

objected, be too small to sensibly affect elections, since a large number of females are included in returns of arrests and convictions.

Careful examination of such returns as we have been able to obtain from different cities and States discloses the fact that not more than one third, commonly not more than one sixth, and sometimes not more than one tenth of the whole number of persons arraigned and held for trial are females. Hence the argument that disfranchisement, even if a common penalty for crime, would do little to purify registry lists may be dismissed as too weak to need further answer.

3. Disfranchisement, it may be still further objected, is too severe a penalty except for felons, too liable to be unjustly imposed to make its use expedient in courts of summary jurisdiction where misdemeanants are tried, too apt to discourage young and thoughtless offenders till hope of civic respectability and honor is abandoned and a life of crime is deliberately chosen.

Without commenting upon the contradiction between the allegation that this punishment might fatally dishearten some offenders and the objection previously raised that the criminal class would be indifferent to the loss of suffrage, it is a sufficient answer to the statement that injustice might sometimes result from disfranchisement by police courts, to say that, if so, this would only prove a defect in the administration of the law, and one not incapable of remedy. But is it true that disfranchisement, temporary or even permanent, is too severe a penalty for such misdemeanants as we have described? We have no hesitation, in view of the persistence of these social pests, the frequency of their offences, and the complete failure of milder remedies, in answering this question in the negative.

The time has come for those who never tire of saying "pity is due to the criminal" to be reminded of Sir Matthew Hale's words, "pity is also due to the country."

In primitive society the greatest danger is from foreign enemies, and men are not squeamish in exercising the right of self-protection; now, the growth of commerce and the development of inter-state morality have limited the theatre of war for those in whom the instinct of plunder strengthened by long ages of con-

flict still survives, and the greatest danger of the state is from domestic foes—a parasitic or predatory tribe made up of the surviving savages whom the experience of centuries proves incapable of civilization, the occasional revertents to the older savage type, and “the sediment and failures of civilization,” the weak, the lazy, the thriftless, the vicious, the wilful violators of physical, mental, and moral law, or the helpless victims of adverse environment, or the pitiable sufferers for ancestral ignorance and vice. But, unhappily, the abnormal development of the sentiment of sympathy in modern times has well-nigh unfitted us to deal successfully with this criminal tribe. Once the protection of the state was the only consideration, and hanging kept down the criminal population; now “we do not act either upon the reformatory, or the retributive, or the purely defensive principle, but on a feeble muddle of all three, so he [the criminal] lives and thrives and multiplies, nourished in the bosom of the silly society on which he preys.” Four times within the present century (1810–11–16–18) was Sir Samuel Romilly’s bill, abolishing death for the stealing of goods of the value of five shillings only, thrown out of the House of Lords, and in 1819 the capital offences under English law “reached the number of two hundred and twenty-three,” but to-day, tho “habitual criminality” is known to be what Edwin Hill describes it, “a trade or craft in which the operatives, living mostly from hand to mouth, are, as in other crafts, dependent upon the support of the capitalists who devote their means to the purposes of the craft, the operatives being, as in other crafts, numerous, while the capitalists are comparatively few,” these criminal capitalists—the owners of the trade premises where offenders congregate and plan crimes, the receivers of stolen goods, the manufacturers of burglars’ tools, and the middlemen who convert the vicious into criminals—are in some cases competent to vote and hold office immediately upon release from prison, while even the proposal to disfranchise, permanently or temporarily, the laborers of this craft, the vast majority of whom are misdemeanants, is denounced as cruel. No one advocates a re-enactment of those Draconian codes which, by failing to establish a morally right proportion between offence and punishment, constantly recruited the class whose extermination was intended, tho some

maintain that these codes were "an essential factor of progress, and that our present civilization would have been impossible had there not been some such weeding out and keeping down of the foes of civilization which developed within its body" as was effected for ages by their wholesale executions; but, in the reaction of this century against the brutality of the past, the other extreme has been reached. Now, tho the haunts of the criminal class, and many of its capitalists, its feloniously skilled journeymen, and its misdeemeanant apprentices are as well known as the location of Bunker Hill or the face of our last murdered President, shallow ideas of individual rights, traditions of Anglo-American liberty, and false notions of the strength of republican institutions guarantee personal freedom to this "dangerous class" till its members so violate law that it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the most stupid, or corrupt, or sentimental of twelve jurors. Even then, as Mr. Greg says, tho "all who have really studied the question feel satisfied that professional crime and the class that habitually live by violation of the law might be well-nigh exterminated by the perpetual seclusion of the incorrigible, and by the infliction of the special penalties which are truly deterrent, still we go on from day to day making the criminals as comfortable as we can, pitying them and petting them when an opportunity occurs, raising an outcry against any penalties which are painful, and thinking we have done enough, and arguing as if we had done all we had a right to do, if we tie the hands of the most practised robber and ruffian for a time." Is not such lenity toward those who are "a burden to industry and a menace to property" severity toward law-abiding tax-payers? When Colorado (Constitution, art. 7, sec. 10) provides that "no person *while confined* in any public prison shall be entitled to vote," but allows the perpetrator of any crime to vote immediately upon his release, is she not sacrificing the substantial interests of a State to the idea of individualism? When Massachusetts suffers a misdeemeanant to receive eleven thirty-day sentences in one year, and invites him if he happens to be out of jail on election-day to assist in trying to rule the commonwealth by voting for "the Tichborne claimant," is she not overestimating the educational value of the suffrage, bringing her law into contempt, and giving an artificial

advantage in the struggle for survival to a class whose existence increases the severity of the conflict to every honest and industrious citizen?

Further, critics who pronounce disfranchisement too rigorous a punishment for misdemeanants will do well to study the incidence of crime more closely. Murder, manslaughter, and robbery, whose injurious effects upon society are direct, neither occasion as much immediate suffering and vice nor breed as many paupers and criminals as drunkenness and larceny, whose baneful results are more indirect. It is difficult to trace the incidence of crime, for it varies with every social change, but civilization, division of labor, commerce, the resulting complexity of life and mutuality of interests, and the diverse forms of communism unconsciously adopted, have greatly widened the area over which the injurious effects of any immoral act are felt, and have made each man his brother's keeper in a far deeper sense than is possible in a primitive society. Notwithstanding this difficulty, we may safely challenge the opponents of disfranchisement for misdemeanors to point out two offences that inflict wider suffering or produce more hereditary criminality than drunkenness and the wrongful appropriation of property. "A torrent of authorities" might be cited to prove that among all causes of crime intemperance stands out the "unapproachable chief." One must suffice, and we select Col. Carroll D. Wright, who, as chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of the Statistics of Labor (Annual Report, 1881, p. 479), reports that the whole number of sentences inflicted by the courts of Massachusetts in the twenty years 1860-1879 inclusive was 578,458, of which 340,814, or nearly 60 per cent, were for the six distinctive rum offences—drunkenness, common drunkard, liquor-selling, liquor-nuisance, liquor-carrying, and liquor-keeping, and that in the County of Suffolk, in Massachusetts, in one year, Sept. 1, 1879, to Sept. 1, 1880, 72 + per cent of the total number of sentences were for distinctively rum offences, and that 12 + per cent of the total number of sentences were for other offences committed while the perpetrators were in liquor, making a total of 84 + per cent of all crime due directly or indirectly to the influence of liquor. Of the comparative injury done to society by larceny and by murder, manslaughter, and robbery, Col. Wright testifies

that of the total number of sentences imposed in Massachusetts in the above-specified period of twenty years, 40,574 were for larceny and only 807 were for "murder, manslaughter, and robbery," those for larceny being exceeded only by those for rum offences, and for assault, and for assault and battery.¹ Moreover, studies in heredity tend to prove that no social groups perpetuate through their descendants so much crime and vice and suffering as drunkards and thieves. If, in spite of this cumulative evidence of the injustice done to law-abiding citizens by States that fail to punish drunkards and thieves politically, it is still objected that disfranchisement is too severe a penalty for these offenders, we have only to add that, if satisfactory proof of their reformation is given, the constitutions of ten States, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, expressly permit restoration to the suffrage; some of them by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, others by a majority vote.

Precedents are not wanting for the use of disfranchisement as a penalty for crime, especially in States whose codes are based upon the Roman law, in which political disability was not an uncommon sanction.

France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden all make, tho upon different conditions, the forfeiture or suspension of political privileges a penalty for each one of a long list of offences against person, property, public justice, public policy, and morality, as well as for all criminal frauds and electoral misdemeanors. Great Britain, owing probably to a long restricted suffrage, and a belief that qualifications of rank and property exclude from the electoral body nearly all persons of criminal tendencies, has hitherto disfranchised only for offences connected with the privilege of voting. Evidence is not wanting, however, that the recent extensions of the franchise in Great Britain are making changes which must, sooner or later,

¹ Of the remaining sentences 81,440 were for offences against the person not feloniously—assault, assault and battery; 39,154 were for offences against chastity, morality, and decency; 17,458 were for disturbing the peace; 14,753 were for other offences against property—burglary, arson, and malicious mischief; 2461 were for offences against the currency and criminal frauds; 849 were for other offences against the person feloniously; and 40,148 were for all other offences.

compel the adoption of a political punishment for a large number of offences.

But the wider use among our States of disfranchisement as a penalty for crime finds support not only in the example of foreign countries, but also in the writings of one of our own jurists, whom Sir Henry Maine calls "the first legal genius of modern times"—Mr. Edward Livingston—and in the teachings of the most eminent of our living publicists, ex-President Woolsey. The latter says (*Political Science*, vol. i. pp. 367, 368): "No objection can be brought of any weight against making disfranchisement by itself a penalty for some offences, especially for those which tend to corrupt the political system. . . . This, further, is a penalty well suited to times and to States where universal suffrage and the arts of the demagogue flourish. . . . Besides advocating the free use of penalties like ignominy or dishonor for misdemeanors, especially political, we suggest that it be applied in other cases such as show an unfitness to discharge the duties of voting or holding office, or of sitting on juries. All convictions for theft, all arrests for drunkenness, all assaults and brawls, for which imprisonment for any length of time is the stated penalty, all convictions for frauds in business involving a similar punishment,—in fact, all that renders a man ignominious as well as amenable to the criminal law, should have this as a concomitant of the main penalty, on the ground that suffrage and office are privileges to be won at first and kept afterwards by good and honorable conduct. The penalty, however, should be temporary, at least for minor offences."

Such are some of the reasons and such are some of the precedents for the exclusion of all felons and many misdemeanants from the electorate. This policy of punishing crime politically, if adopted and maintained, would tend, first, to purify the electoral body by purging it of its most corrupt and corruptible elements, and to preserve the national life by limiting its control to law-abiding citizens; second, to lower taxes by divesting the most wasteful and least productive members of society of all power, directly or indirectly, to appropriate the public moneys, and by substituting, in many cases, an inexpensive disability for an expensive confinement; third, to reform occasional offenders and to deter the young from criminal acts by appealing to two

of the strongest motives to lawful action which operate in a democratic country—fear of permanent political inferiority and hope of civic honor. The need of bringing these motives to bear more directly upon the young cannot be more forcibly stated than by a simple recital of the facts that a State so pre-eminent for educational facilities, so abounding in opportunities for honest, industrial careers, and so thoroughly furnished with reformatory agencies as Puritan Massachusetts, reports that on one May day (1875), of all the males under confinement in that State 37 + per cent were under twenty-two years of age and 86 + per cent under forty-one years of age (Report of Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1877, p. 207); that 16 + per cent, or about one sixth, of all the prisoners committed to her State Prison during the twenty-five years 1857–1881 were from fifteen to twenty years of age—the aggregate number for the period being 704—and that the percentage for the past year (1881) is the largest in twenty-five years (Report of Coms. of Prisons, 1882, p. 23); that out of the whole number of commitments to the State Prison during the past twenty-five years (1857–1881) 523, or 12 per cent, were recommitments; and that for the last five years (1877–1881, both inclusive) the percentage of recommitments is larger than for any previous five years in the last quarter of a century (Report of Coms. of Prisons, 1882, p. 22).

The extreme mobility of our population, which led Chevalier to say that we have this in common with Tartars, that we are always on horseback, makes it necessary to abandon the notion that crime is territorial, if political disability is to be made a thoroughly effective penalty. No State, tho protected by laws disfranchising all persons committing crime within its jurisdiction, as well as by federal extradition treaties and constitutional provisions for the rendition of fugitives from justice to the State from which they fled, is secured against the participation of criminals in its elections unless it also excepts from the privilege of voting—as do now only three States, Nebraska, Nevada, and Wisconsin—"those who are disqualified as electors or from holding office in the State or States from which they come." Such provision as this for the punishment of extraterritorial offences, if accompanied with the establishment of Central Registers of Crime, like those instituted in France, Portugal,

and Italy, and the yearly exchange of these registers between all the States, would, it is believed, supply the means now most needed to prevent the usurpation by criminals of the name and privileges of honorable citizens, and to promote a rapid improvement in social order.

The fact that much crime is due to heredity and to pitiable causes which make it worthy of discriminating treatment constitutes no reason for *political* indulgence to its perpetrators. The continuity of the State demands that its foes be politically disabled, whether they are avowed enemies heralded by declaration of war or nominal friends sapping its strength in drunken or furtive silence. No plea for political lenity towards criminals on the ground that they are too few in number to endanger the perpetuity of the State is admissible while "a quarter of a million persons are alive in the United States who have been convicted of crimes which last century would have cost them their lives, a great majority [of whom] are or will be free to breed and educate a new supply."¹ The subjection of the forces of barbarism to those of civilization must be longer continued and far more complete before atavism will be our only peril. But, even if the danger from criminals was too small to jeopard national life, to deprive them of the franchise only "while in prison" must be as fatal to wise legislation as that provision of the Constitution of Texas, adopted in 1868 (art. xii. sec. 48), which declares that "the legislature may prohibit the sale of all intoxicating or spirituous liquors in the immediate vicinity of any college or seminary of learning; provided said college or seminary be located other than at a county-seat or at the State capital."

Finally, the establishment of a moral qualification for the suffrage, besides strengthening the State by politically disabling its domestic enemies, could not fail to enhance the value and dignity of the franchise itself to all law-abiding citizens, and to increase their willingness to discharge their duties as soldiers, as jurymen, and as voters. The bestowal and retention of the ballot once made dependent upon conduct, its possession will become a badge of respectability, if not of honor, and must soon

¹ The New Englander, vol. xxxvii. p. 527.

render the country itself worthier of the sacrifices of its citizens. With or without a wider disfranchisement for crime, the suffrage, if left in the hands of the illiterate and the improvident, will be fraught with dangers, but with it the State will be under the direction of a will habituated to the obedience of law; with or without such disfranchisement taxes will continue, but with it police expenditure will diminish, and those who rob their neighbors in violation of law will no longer be able by their votes also to rob them under the form of law; with or without such disfranchisement the Jukes will linger, but with it they will boast only of the privileges of habeas corpus, trial by jury, and appeal to executive clemency.

JAMES F. COLBY.

THE THEOLOGICAL RENAISSANCE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

In his book "The Nation," put forth during the grave struggles of the late war, Dr. Mulford was occupied in enforcing the principle that the state is of divine institution, and that through the discipline of the relationships which national life implies, a people is enabled to achieve its highest freedom or moral perfection. In his recent work¹ we recognize a continuation of his thought. To call a treatise of theology "The Republic of God," is to intimate that the redemptive work of Christ is closely connected with the highest political ideals; that the life of God in humanity has for its end the upbuilding of a social fabric, not dominated by external authority but ruled by a spirit from within, and that to the development of this redeemed society the state is divinely appointed to minister, as well as the more religious agencies connected with the church. Other expressions such as the kingdom of God, or city of God, drawn from the political life of men in other times, are only equivalents for the same idea to which no special sacredness attaches. The idea indeed gains new force when we invest it with the language suggested by our own political institutions. The phrase "kingdom of heaven" has, like many another, lost its full meaning by constant attrition, and, we may add, by the growing unfamiliarity of the figure which underlies it. In a republic we know nothing of the pomp and circumstance of royalty. Our rulers are representatives of the will of the people. Our conception of the end which the Gospel of Christ proposes in the redemption of humanity is best enshrined in language suggested by the highest political life we know. In the divine republic the will of the people is in harmony with the Divine Will in ever-increasing measure.

¹ *The Republic of God. An Institute of Theology.* By Elisha Mulford, LL.D.

Dr. Mulford has also called his book "An Institute of Theology." But the theological mind, accustomed to the formal divisions of long-prevalent systems, will hardly find itself at home as it scans the table of contents. There is, to be sure, the same general order of treatment. The opening chapters on the being and personality of God are followed by a discussion of the nature and method of the divine revelation. The advent of Christ, including the Incarnation and the Trinity, comes next, and the author then turns to the work of the Holy Spirit, in convicting the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment. The judgment of the world, which in ordinary methods is relegated to the department of eschatology, is here presented as occupying a central place in a living process, and indicates the author's departure from conventional theological thought. The same may be said of the following chapter on the "Revelation of Heaven to the World," which so far as it has a place in institutes of theology is generally found at the close instead of in the heart of the treatment. The remaining chapters are entitled "The Justification of the World," "The Redemption of the World," and the "Life of the Spirit," under which latter head are discussed briefly the church, the Scriptures, the sacraments, the resurrection and the ascension of Christ. On the last page of the book is placed the Nicene Creed, as it is recited to-day in the older historic churches. Had the creed been placed first, we should have possessed the key to the author's formal division; for the "Republic of God" is in reality a commentary on this renowned theological formula, just as much of its thought is also a return to the Catholic theology of which the creed of Nicæa was the expression, and to which it has borne witness during all the vicissitudes of Christian history.

As an institute of theology Dr. Mulford's book deserves a place among treatises of a technical character whose object is to present and enforce by argument a definite theological system. Whatever may be its merits when thus viewed, it has also qualities of another kind. It is not merely a dogmatic treatise, but occupies a place in the literature of the time, as being the outcome and expression of that which is most distinctive of our age. It is pre-eminently a personal book, indirectly revealing the process of a soul in its way to the knowledge of God.

It is no ingenious effort of the speculative instinct, but comes from one who has watched with interested gaze the contemporary processes of thought, who has himself lived in them and measured their significance, who has reached the deepest convictions after wrestling with the negations of criticism and science; who has seen, too, the weakness or error of the current statements of Christian faith, and feels how little the ordinary apologist for Christianity is competent to meet the antagonisms which are born of a desire for a larger faith and not of a shallow scepticism. It is a sustained meditative flight in the highest realms of human thought. It has a tone of solemn deep conviction whose effect is contagious. But it is also marked by a triumphant tone, and the style in consequence takes on at times a rhythmic character like some hymn of victory. With the ancient creeds it is a song of triumph rather than a set of logical formularies. This, indeed, is the real value of these ancient symbols of the faith, not that they were handed down from the apostles through a succession of bishops,—for as a matter of fact they never were,—not that they were reasoned out by a dialectical process, but were the spontaneous utterances of the Christian consciousness of the Church into which had sunk the inmost principle of the Christian faith. These creeds were born of the conflicts and struggles through which the church was passing in an age in many respects singularly like our own; they are summaries of great convictions by which the soul of man was possessed, and hence they have an enduring freshness and value which no lapse of time can impair. It is not so much that we need new creeds as it is to live up to the creeds that we have. It is because the "Republic of God" is conceived in the spirit of these ancient symbols, and is so thoroughly loyal to the great Christian realities which they embody, that we take it as a pledge that the church of our own age will safely make the transition from the confusions in which she is now involved to a higher plane of Christian thought and influence than she has ever before occupied in all her history.

A double interest attaches to Dr. Mulford's book because there runs through it a twofold process of thought. While it cannot strictly be called a treatise in controversial theology, and

the traces of controversy are strikingly absent, yet the author's aim is not only to meet the objections urged by the materialistic school in science against the possible knowledge of God and a future life for the soul, but also to reconstruct the statements of the Christian faith, and to redeem them from the lower interpretation which they take on in popular thought. It would be hard to say to which of these ends he assigns the greater importance. He keeps both in view, and never allows his attention to be drawn away by one to the neglect of the other. This double purpose may account for the difficulty which some will experience in perusing his pages. For most of us have chosen our antagonist, and are interested in one of these objects to the oversight of the other. Hence it is somewhat distracting to have the attention constantly diverted to another line of thought than our own, and to be obliged to face about suddenly to meet a foe to whose presence we should prefer to remain oblivious. But this peculiarity gives the book a double value. To some it will commend itself as a strong assertion of the Christian faith against materialism; to others it will seem the most worthy presentation of what constitutes essential Christianity that has been attempted in a scientific form. Of late years the interest of our theological writers has been centring more and more upon the conflict with science to the neglect of that other field of labor in which the object is to penetrate more deeply into the true meaning of the Christian revelation. They have in consequence been too apt to take it for granted that there could be no doubt as to what Christianity was, and have felt no need to set their own house in order before making the onset on the common foe. Much of the feebleness of recent apologetics is to be traced to this cause. It may not be out of order to remark, and we do so without desiring to impute unworthy motives, that many of the efforts to remove the accretions which in the course of ages have gathered about the substance of the Gospel of Christ have met with such a reception from ecclesiastical courts, who sit in judgment upon offenders against ecclesiastical standards, as to render such work unprofitable or unwise. Our author possesses an advantage in this respect, in belonging to a historic church, which, claiming to be orthodox in the highest and fullest sense after the ancient standards of the

Catholic Church and insisting upon the early creeds as the only tests of orthodoxy, can therefore allow her clergy a large freedom of belief and utterance. The Church of England has indeed her thirty-nine articles, but—unlike the Church of Rome, which accords to the numerous dogmatic definitions of the Council of Trent the same authority as to the early creeds of Christendom—she makes a distinction between these expressions of her opinion and the great symbols of the faith, which she pronounces binding not only on the mind but still more on the hearts of all her members.

In consequence of the numerous references to Hegel and the frequent quotations from Maurice which are to be found in the "Republic of God," it has been inferred by some that Dr. Mulford's thought is simply a reproduction of their teachings,—a mixture, as it were, of Hegel's philosophy with Maurice's theology. But Dr. Mulford is something more than a blind disciple of the German philosopher or the English theologian, and nothing could be more foreign to his purpose than an attempt to harmonize them by some eclectic principle. His book bears upon it the impress of unity of conception, which no mechanical adjustment of the thoughts of others could ever simulate. Of Hegel it has been well said, that to borrow from him "is like borrowing from Shakespeare, a debt that is almost inevitable." In regard to Maurice, some may think that the prominence which Dr. Mulford has given to frequent excerpts from his writings weakens rather than strengthens his work considered from a literary point of view. But one may also admire the self-abnegation of a strong and original thinker, who seems to delight in presenting to his readers coincidences between his own thought as it has come to him by independent mental processes and the thoughts of one who is held by many to be the greatest prophet that has spoken to the church in this modern day. But the spiritual kinship between Dr. Mulford and both these thinkers is a closer one than can be revealed by quotations. He has reached the same conviction that underlies the philosophy of Hegel, the living principle which runs through all that Maurice has written. Like them he rejects the idea of a Deity resting in solitude in some distant sphere, and regards God as actually immanent in the world in which we live in the order and beauty

of nature, in the large movements of human history, to the constitution and capacities of the individual soul. Hence God and humanity and the physical world become component parts of an organic whole; the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite stand in a necessary and living relationship to each other. We have attempted in a previous article in this REVIEW to show the genesis of this principle in the history of theological thought. It is the possession of this principle which makes both Hegel and Maurice distinctive representatives of the modern age. It is this conviction which gives unity and consistency to Dr. Mulford's treatise in theology. He is occupied in tracing the necessary inferences which it compels; in endeavoring to apprehend in accordance with it, as the organon of religious thought, the true meaning and nature of spiritual realities.

In his first chapter, entitled "The Being of God," Dr. Mulford assumes with other recent thinkers that the existence of Deity is incapable of demonstration. The so-called evidences would never have originated the idea of God, and are rather confirmations of that which the mind already receives. The idea of God is given as is the idea of the outer world, and the one is as clearly true and as necessarily true as the other. But Dr. Mulford does not seek the confirmations of this idea as has been generally done in the familiar arguments of causality or of design; he finds them rather in what he calls the moral argument, in the moral experience of man, whether seen in the individual, the family, or the state, or in the larger processes of history, which exhibit a tendency toward a moral end. The tendency in human history toward the achievement of righteousness and freedom must proceed from a source in which righteousness and freedom subsist. "Such is the evidence of the being of God; in another form it is the evidence of the presence of God through the courses of history and in the experience of the life of humanity" (p. 21). The ways in which God manifests his presence become the strongest evidences of his existence. Or in other words, the divine immanence is the only adequate explanation of our belief in the divine existence.

There are without doubt grave misconceptions attendant upon this higher idea of Deity as an indwelling presence in the world and in history. In its origin, as we trace it slowly reappear-

ing in the history of the church, it was connected with pantheism, and modern literature has often been suspected of a onesided pantheistic spirit. In Matthew Arnold's famous definition of God, as "a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness," we miss the personal element which must be conjoined with that other sense of a presence diffused, in order to a complete representation of what God is like. Dr. Mulford lays stress upon the personality of God, and his treatment of this point, brief as it is, will be found we think more satisfactory than any statement of the subject accessible in our language. Most systematic theologians have included the personality of God among the divine attributes, after having first attempted to demonstrate the divine existence. But our author holds the divine being and divine personality as inseparable in thought. We do not know God first as simple existence by the evidences of his power or skill, but we know him primarily and directly as a person. The personality of man has its foundation in that of God, and is the ground of the relationship and communion between them. It is only by postulating the personality of God that we can have any knowledge of God, while it is only through the realization of the personal element in man—that is, through the deeper knowledge of himself—that man comes to the knowledge of God. The more strongly the human personality is developed the more clearly is the divine personality apprehended. The ages in which the consciousness of God is strongest are not the darkest and most barbarous, but rather the most prosperous and enlightened. All that elevates man in his social and physical condition has thus a moral bearing, and brings out more clearly the divine purpose in human history.

So much in Dr. Mulford's reasoning depends upon his definition of personality, as it exists both in God and man, that we give a brief analysis of the chapter which contains his treatment of the subject. By a person or by personality he does not understand what is commonly understood. A person is generally defined as implying intelligence, free will, and affections. But Dr. Mulford makes supreme the ethical element, which the ordinary definition does not contain. With Augustine and Anselm, he does not regard the free will, or freedom, merely as

the power of choice between right and wrong, but freedom is the determination of the will toward righteousness. Hence personality in man implies necessarily, the possibility of growth in the moral nature, and the highest realization of the personality is seen when the will is so fixed in its devotion to righteousness that a man freely works out the highest that is possible to his nature. "Personality therefore is assumed as the highest that is within human knowledge, the steepest, loftiest summit toward which we move in our attainment" (p. 22). All that is impersonal ranks below the personal because it exists in subjection to necessity; that is, has no self-determination, is not determined from within but from without. Man sinks away from his ideal dignity as a person, in proportion as he loses the power of self-determination toward righteousness: or he rises to his true ideal as the increasing purpose of his personality transmutes the changes and chances of life into adjuncts and means of moral growth. The divine personality is in substance the same as personality in man. It is to be interpreted as the self-determination of his being toward righteousness, and herein consists the divine freedom. It is not therefore sufficient to think of God as having only the mere negative ability to choose between right and wrong. His real freedom lies in his self-determination to what is right. The divine personality does not differ from the human in its essence, but in its infinite capacity. "With God there is perfect oneness of the real with the ideal. Thought and will with him are one. In him is the absolute righteousness, the eternal truth, the infinite life."

In thus emphasizing the personality of man, not as a weak imitation of the divine personality, but as most real,—the same in man that it is in God, but differing only in degree,—Dr. Mulford is laying firm and broad the basis of a true theology. We may interpret his language in scriptural phraseology, and then the human personality becomes the image of God in man, that in which he was made after God's own likeness. We should be glad to follow the author in his admirable statement of all that is implied in the relationship between the divine and human personality. But we must leave the subject, with a very condensed outline of its treatment, and with the expression of a

regret that the opening chapters of Dr. Mulford's book are so brief—too brief, indeed, to do justice to his thought.

It is because Dr. Mulford ascribes supreme importance to the principle of personality, or as we should say to the ethical element,—the righteousness which constitutes that which is highest in God or man,—that he takes the position in his third chapter that Christianity is not a religion, but a life. The well-known dictum of Matthew Arnold that conduct is three fourths of life has found acceptance with many who are still glad to reserve one fourth of it for purposes which have no direct moral connection. In the seventeenth century there flourished a divine who surpassed Mr. Arnold in his estimate of the importance belonging to ethical culture. The Rev. Benjamin Whichcote in his "Moral and Religious Aphorisms" remarks that morals and religion make up the business of life, and that morals are in the proportion of nineteen twentieths to religion. But there is a higher view than this quantitative estimate of morality. Origen gave it a fine expression when he said, "Christianity is more than one of the world's religions. It is the declaration of the way of righteousness." Nor was Origen alone among ancient fathers in so defining Christianity. It should be remembered that the spiritual force which proved stronger than the Roman Empire was not regarded by the Romans as worthy to be called a religion, nor did it claim to be so considered by the Christians. It had taken on no ritual forms, no temples, no altars, no priesthood, no images. The Christian apologists disclaimed all these as unworthy or as unnecessary; in the words of Minucius Felix in the third century, "He who cultivates justice makes offerings to God; he who abstains from fraudulent practices propitiates God; he who snatches man from danger slaughters the most acceptable victim. These are our sacrifices, these our rites of God's worship; thus amongst us (Christians) he who is most just is most religious."

But it must be admitted that Christianity did rapidly degenerate into a religion in its historical form and aspect. It took its place among the religions of the world, and surpassed them all in the splendor of its ritual, the might and prestige of its priesthood. With its pantheon of saints and angels, its fasts and festivals, it more than made good to the old world that

which it lost in the seeming extinction of the old cults. That such a transition was a necessary one in the divine purpose we are not inclined to dispute. Mediæval or Latin Christianity must be credited with serving a great end in history. But it was none the less a decline from the true conception of the work of Christ. He did not come as the founder of a religion, but as the revealer of the way of eternal life. Dr. Mulford is right, it seems to us, when he takes the position that neither Christ nor his apostles are presented in the New Testament as giving the outline of a new religion. All that has always been regarded as most essential to a religion not only finds no recognition there, but, on the contrary, is deprecated as imperfect and unnecessary, in the light of God's absolute revelation of himself in Christ. It was only when that revelation began to be obscured by the growing barbarism that Christianity passed over into a religion, and became another method of propitiating Deity by ritual devices. Historical Christianity may therefore take its place among the religions of the world, and even then we believe that Latin Christianity, as it has been so well called by Dean Milman, will be found to possess elements of an immeasurably higher character than Hinduism, Buddhism or Mohammedanism. If the most distinctive feature of the Christian faith be the dying Christ, if the incarnation is most impressively exhibited in the scene on Calvary, then through all the dark ages of history there survived, tho latent in the consciousness, or finding inadequate expression in rites and dogmas, the essential bond which holds God and man in indissoluble relationship. The highest credit that can be given to Roman Catholicism is that it gave birth to Protestantism and the higher spirituality and freedom which are the Protestant heritage.

We regret that Dr. Mulford has not given more attention in his treatment of this point to what is now known as Comparative Religion. Had he done so, his argument would have gained in clearness and cogency; for the process by which God reveals himself, as Maurice has shown, in a way more profound and original than has been adopted by most writers on the subject, is seen by studying these imperfect fragmentary revelations of the past. They, too, bear the

stamp of having been something better in their pristine forms than mere religions. They, too, have gone through a process of degeneration, but it has not been given to them, so far, to rise out of it into something higher. But we also believe with Dr. Mulford that no great results can flow from the study of the religions of the world unless it be admitted at the start that true Christianity does not take its place among them, but is the divine standard by which what they contain may be estimated in its true significance. We have little respect for the method of those who in cultivating this recent branch of theological inquiry reverse this attitude and hope to gain in consequence a more scientific conception of what they are pleased to call the Christian ideal. Too many of these explorers are more familiar with other religions than with their own. Until we first know what Christianity is, there is no prospect of additional light from such a quarter, and any activity of research is only likely to minister to increasing confusion.

Dr. Mulford has drawn in a striking way the perversions which follow by a natural consequence from the assumption that Christianity is a religion. He notes among them the tendency to substitute for the actual revelation the vague aspirations and variable moods of the mind, the thoughts of man about God which spring from a conscience diseased and burdened with a sense of guilt, instead of that thought of God which has been revealed in Christ; and again the cataloguing of Christianity with other religions, or the composition of anthologies in which Christ appears as one among other teachers of morality, Socrates, Mohammed, or Confucius. Hence also the question as to the relation of religion and morality, which has suggested some of the most unprofitable controversy which has ever afflicted the church. Still further, when Christianity became in consequence identified with a ritual, it was open to the introduction of a great variety of notions and practices which had been too familiar to the heathen mind to be easily discarded. An elaborate worship was accompanied by ascetic practices, distinctions between secular and sacred days, holy and profane things, heathen notions of inspiration, of a day of judgment, of heaven and hell, of a God to be propitiated by sacrifices and bodily suffering. Such are some of the charges which Dr. Mul-

ford brings against historical Christianity when conceived as a religion, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. We agree with him that these things do not belong to the essence of the Christian faith, but are gross interpretations of its spiritual methods and realities,—which die out or disappear in proportion as men rise from a lower to a higher conception of the nature of God and his relation to the world. When the doctrine of the incarnation is received in its fulness, and God and humanity are seen in its light to be joined by an indissoluble tie; when the righteousness and love of God are discerned as his all-inclusive attributes entering into the simplest definition of his being; when God is conceived as present, actively engaged in the redemptive forces of human life, not merely superintending them from a distance,—then does Christianity revert to its original idea in the mind of its Divine founder. The world itself becomes sacred because the abode of indwelling Deity, and all days are consecrated to a divine purpose; the only sacrifice that propitiates God is the offering of self in loving obedience; heaven becomes a present reality, the ideal of human society in the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness; hell is in our midst so long as men remain in wilful ignorance and disobedience; life becomes a process of divine education under the immanent guidance of a Holy Spirit, and even now the judgment is here and the books are opened, because the world is organized in accordance with a moral purpose and God is here, conducting things to their consummation.

So far we have been occupied with what is really the introduction to Dr. Mulford's treatise. The vital motive of his book is most clearly apparent when he comes to consider the nature of revelation. The views of this subject which have prevailed in the history of theology, however widely divergent, have yet one element in common, that they spring from and are conditioned by the conception of God. If God be conceived as existing only apart, at a distance from the world, then revelation naturally comes to be regarded as a "deposit,"—a code of laws, a rule of faith, or a scheme of salvation, according as the moral, the intellectual, or the emotional elements in the religion of an age may predominate. But through all these different interpretations of the "deposit" can be seen the belief that God has

communicated in the past a message to men from his remote abode and entrusted its preservation to a church or to a book; and hence on the one hand an ecclesiastical organization guarantees its identity, while on the other the final explication of its contents must be determined by philological experts. The title by which the Bible is commonly known, the Old and the New Testaments, illustrates this idea of revelation; for a testament is the documentary instruction of one who is no longer present. It is to be regretted that the translators of the "revised version" did not call it, as it should more properly be, the "new covenant;" it could not have been a more unwelcome change than some others which they have made with less reason. In the last chapter of his book Dr. Mulford takes up the relation of Holy Scripture to revelation, and we reserve for the close of this article the brief statement which we wish to make upon a topic of the highest importance. It is a very significant fact that discussion should now have turned for two generations or more upon the nature of inspiration, for it indicates that religious thought is in reality concerned with a deeper issue which lies beneath it, viz., how God reveals himself to the world. It is idle therefore to expect any satisfactory definition of inspiration until thought reaches back to the last analysis, and becomes conscious of how our idea of God must condition our view of his revelation. If that primary conviction be changed at its source, it will affect our belief in regard to the method of revelation, while the doctrine of inspiration will be insensibly modified into harmony with these changed relations of theological thought.

Dr. Mulford's treatment of the Divine revelation is based upon the idea of One whose presence pervades the world, in whom, according to St. Paul, humanity also lives and moves. "He is not a distant being that man cannot approach him, he is not an inaccessible being that man cannot find him, he is not an unknown being, but what he is he has made known" (p. 81). "His revelation is the revelation of himself,—of his being and will, a being which is real and a will which is realizing itself in the world." While God reveals himself in nature or the physical world, his highest revelation is in the moral order of things, in the historical development of humanity, in the institutions of

society; in these his will and character become manifest, and the human spirit thus enlightened becomes the mediator through which the divine manifestation in the physical order may be interpreted. The struggle which goes on in nature is carried up into the spiritual and becomes an analogy of humanity's moral advance through conflict to some ideal end. The revelation is its own witness, for it is made not merely in an external history, but also in the consciousness. It is the making known of a person to a person, of God to those who are made in his image. The very fact of a revelation implies the divine character as love, for God reveals himself in order to the well-being of man.

Thoughts like these, it seems to us, are simply inferences, and inevitable ones, from a fundamental concept of God. They are not intuitions, and our author is careful to guard himself against this supposition. "This revelation," he says, "is not an appeal simply and immediately to an intuition. It is a revelation through reflection, through the pure forms of thought, through faith, through the life of the spirit" (p. 87). The quotation which we subjoin will illustrate better than any words of our own the author's thought;

"This revelation is of a spirit, and to a spirit. There must be that in man which is to receive this revelation. There can be no revelation to stones and trees and stars, nor of the spiritual to the physical. God is a person, and the revelation of God is of a person to and with a person. It thus presumes a ground of communion. It is a revelation to the reason and the conscience and the faith of men; but it is to and through them, in their unity and correlation in man as a spiritual being, invested with power to know the things of *the Spirit*. It is not simply the complement of reason; it does not come to take up the lines of thought where the attainment of reason has left them: it is the correspondent, in their energy, of reason and conscience and faith. It is not simply brought to the critical tests of the reason and the conscience and the faith of men, as if it were something external to them, altho it is and is to be verified of them, but it is their very element, so that conscience has its right in it, and reason its ideal, and faith its rest, that they abide in it, as in their home. In its verification to the reason it becomes the strength of the will: *ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.*" (p. 90.)

We leave this subject with two remarks: first, Dr. Mulford's position implies the rejection of any distinction in kind between natural and revealed religion; and second, revelation must ac-

cordingly be held as a continuous process,—not that its substance knows any increase, but in the progress of humanity under the tuition of a divine spirit there lies the ampler knowledge of its contents, the clearer recognition of the eternal, and its growing actualization in the life of the world.

From the general discussion of the nature of revelation, Dr. Mulford turns to the revelation of God in Christ, and it becomes his object to justify the doctrine of the Trinity, not as a mere theological formula, but as the expressive summary of what is most vital as well as most distinctive in the Christian faith. There is not to be found in the history of theology a more striking contrast than is displayed by the rationalism of the last century which rejected the Trinity as absurd or contradictory to reason, and the disposition of our own age to make the Triune name not only the comprehensive formula of the Christian revelation, but with some the philosophic formula for the interpretation of history. And here again so great a revolution in the tendency of Christian thought implies and can only be explained by some corresponding change in the elemental basic conviction in regard to God's relation to the world. Arianism, as we have shown, implied a distant God, and from such a point of view the incarnation became an impossibility to reason. With the return of the belief in an indwelling Deity has come back again the early Nicene faith, according to which God enters into humanity in the person of Christ in all the fulness of the Godhead, and humanity is also taken into the bosom of Godhead. Christ then becomes not only the inspired model of human life, according to its ideal in the perfect righteousness of filial obedience, but he is also the source whence redemption flows to men; he becomes the centre of the race and its representative head; in him humanity realizes its unity and through him enters into oneness with God. Dr. Mulford has worked out this thought with great force and beauty, and the pages which he devotes to it are among the most suggestive in his book. But we reluctantly dismiss the topic with this brief statement, finding room for one extract, in which he interprets Christ's allusions to his future coming:

"The term, the coming of the Son of man, is used of his relations with humanity, that did not terminate with his existence on earth, but had

a more perfect fulfilment. It describes the advent of the days of humanity: the night is far spent, and the dominations that crush the spirits of men are being overcome, and the might is manifest of truth and righteousness and freedom." (p. 108.)

"The advent of the Christ, the coming of the Son of man, is not thus a short and isolated event in history, to be followed by ages and crises in human experience in which he is detached from it, and then to bring history to its close with the recurrence of the same event at a more remote time. The Christ, the Son of man, has come: he may be always coming: he is yet to come. The coming may be in the passing away of that which is old; in the doom of some inhuman system, as that of slavery, which has bound up with destruction the life of the family and the nation, and in some holy war, and in the ordination of society in the family and the nation upon enduring foundations: but it will come to men as they follow their fortunes, as they buy and sell, and build and plant, tho' it may come with the confounding of their schemes, and with the disturbance of their theories, and with disaster to the plans they have framed.

"The coming of the Son of man is thus always at hand: it is a constant motive to duty. It diverts the thought of men from the apathy and dread of a fatalism in which the world fares on, and from following here and there after the signs and signals of the crises that may be. It does not adjourn the thoughts of men to some remote date, in which one shall come in the guise of a king, in certain external relations, to judge and rule the earth. It is represented to those in that age, and in every age, as an event for which they are to be ready, which may come suddenly. . . . In such an hour as ye think not the Son of man cometh." (p. 112.)

The new life of which mankind partakes through its organic relationship with Christ, Dr. Mulford calls the "life of the Spirit;" and in it he finds the continuousness of the incarnation, the fulfilment of the words of the departing Christ: "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." This going away of Christ was also "his coming again in the realization of infinite and eternal relations in the life of the spirit. It is the fact of his going away and thenceforth the coming of the Spirit in the real life, the immortal life of men, that becomes *the evidence of the divine presence and the divine character, and thence transfers the evidence to history.* It is here that the scepticism of men is to meet it. It will not verify itself by external pageants. It will verify itself through the life of the Spirit, in the history of the world: and as the scepticism of men must meet it there, so the faith of men shall there have its strength." (p. 132.) By the expression, the life of the Spirit, we understand

an immanent spiritual activity which is none other, according to the Triune distinctions of the Divine name, than God himself. It becomes the work of the Spirit to inspire a threefold process in the education of humanity: the development of the sense of sin, the revelation to the conscience of the ideal of Divine righteousness, and the manifestation of a law of judgment by which righteousness is vindicated in the moral order, and sin forever appears as involving here and now the divine wrath and condemnation. These points are brought out in a chapter finely entitled "The Conviction of the World." Upon each of these points we let Dr. Mulford speak for himself, in order better to indicate his leading thoughts:

"Sin is the alienation of man from God and from humanity, through the assertion of the law of selfishness as the final law of human action. St. Paul says *sin is the transgression of the law*. It is a transgression by man of the law which is the law of his own being—the law of God and of humanity. It involves a variance from the relations of men in their true and normal development, and from the moral constitution of the world, and consequent injury and consciousness of guilt. Sin consists in following ways that are wrong, as in a wrong world, and in rejecting or refusing the recognition of a law of life of righteousness. Through it the will is unfree, and is brought into subjection to that which is external. In sin there is the defect and the defeat of the personality. It is a malady by which hurt is done to man and is the disruption of the normal relations of society." (p. 134.)

In what he says upon the next point, the "conviction of the world of righteousness," Dr. Mulford is in downright opposition to the notion commonly called in theology the Pelagian heresy, viz., that there can be any goodness in man which does not come from God; and he also combats the view of the physical school, that human ideals of righteousness can be accounted for by any psychological process of growth which originates with man.

"The assertion and recognition of righteousness is in and through the conscience. The conscience is not alone the expression of an external and formal law; it is a law which is involved in the being and freedom of personality—I, I ought. . . . The conscience of man presumes the being of God; it presumes a righteous being. There can be no adequate apprehension of conscience, nor explanation of the facts of conscience, that does not imply the being of God and his relation to man. . . . The principle of

right or righteousness has not its origin in a physical process, which in transmitted lines of descent allows no real freedom and is determined by immediate considerations of advantage or disadvantage. . . . That there is a course and constitution of human nature, that there is an ethical process involved in the relations of men, that righteousness has for its consequence life and freedom, that unrighteousness has its consequence in the detriment of life and subversion of freedom,—*this is the evidence of the presence of a righteous being in the ethical process of the world.*" (p. 145.)

If God be thus conceived as present and inspiring the world's moral order, then the old idea that man apart from God is travelling in lonely probation to some distant judgment-throne ceases to reflect all that Christian experience in the life of the Spirit knows to be most real. "Now," says Christ, "is the judgment of this world." The idea of present judgment is involved in the idea of revelation; for *this is the judgment that light has come into the world.* Judgment is then the process of discrimination between sin and righteousness, and is implied in the continuous order of history as well as in its great catastrophes, in which man reads the divine verdict against unrighteousness. Hence it sometimes becomes, as with ancient Hebrew prophets, the object of earnest desire: *Arise, O Lord, and judge the earth.* Because God's relation to the world is a close and continuous one, so the judgment is constant and knows no relaxation. In such a law of judgment, holding true in the life of individuals and of nations, must be found the sanction and safeguard of all morality:

"The removal of the judgment to a remote future heightens its appeal to the imagination, while it brings indifference to the conscience. But when this judgment is apprehended in its real and spiritual import as near and at the very door, as the judgment of truth, then the conscience cannot be set at rest by any theories or dreams, nor by the undefined anticipations of evasion or delay." (p. 156.)

Our space will not allow more than a brief reference to the remaining chapters of Dr. Mulford's book. In treating of the "Revelation of Heaven to the World" he follows the method of procedure already indicated, and heaven is presented as an ideal to be increasingly realized in this lower world. The Christian heaven is not a Mohammedan paradise, but a moral standard for that earthly citizenship of which it is written that *our citizen-*

ship is in heaven. Such a view is only another protest against the common sentiment in religious history, that heaven is separated from this world in space and time, and that but little can be hoped for here,—no transformation of the world we live in, but rather an increasing manifestation of the powers of evil, and failure of all efforts for improvement until Christ comes in final judgment to do away with all that is. This tendency in Christian belief is also explained by the notion of a remote Deity, and pessimism becomes its natural sequence. It is clear that the worship and service of humanity, as a religious principle, of which Comte and George Eliot were devout representatives, is largely a reaction from this unchristian view of the world. With Dr. Mulford the kingdom of heaven had its realization in the coming of Christ in the life of the spirit, and the signs of its presence are seen in the restored life of humanity. The kingdom of heaven has already come, but while it is here it is still coming and is yet to come, and therefore is an object to be striven for with all the energy and endeavor of man.

We are not quite sure that we are in agreement with what our author has written on "Justification by Faith." We are sure that there is no real conflict between his thought and Luther's doctrine, and are inclined to think that his criticism of Luther's statement is after all a technical one. But we pass over this point with the remark that Oxenham, whom Dr. Mulford quotes with apparent approval, never really understood what Luther meant. In the chapter on "The Redemption of the World," Dr. Mulford treats at length of the nature of sacrifice, and traces in it the redemptive atoning principle, according to which "the law of sacrifice becomes the law of life." This point also we reluctantly dismiss, and turn to the last chapter of the book, entitled "The Life of the Spirit." It is here that the order of the Nicene Creed becomes profoundly suggestive. "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord, the Life-giver." The church does not give us our creed, according to the favorite maxim of ecclesiasticism, nor is it the source of the life and the gifts of the Spirit, but we come to believe in a holy and Catholic Church because we have first shared in the life which the Spirit imparts. The church therefore stands for a manifestation of and a witness to the Divine presence among men. In

it there is to be found the consciousness of the life of the Spirit, in contrast to the unconsciousness of the world. The church stands for humanity on its ideal side: it is not so much to be recognized by exact limits defining its circumference as by grasping the truth that Christ is its centre, from whom through the Spirit redemption flows through all the body. Dr. Mulford is by no means indifferent to what is known as institutionalism, and the church with him is no invisible affair: it has forms and order, it has organic unity and life. Christ did not come merely to exert the leaven of an influence in unseen silent ways. He came also to found a society,—a social order or brotherhood,—which would not be complete till from being Catholic in name it became in reality conterminous with the race. While on the one hand the church cannot be identified with a hierarchy, neither are its forms and ordinances other than verifications to the spirit that is in man of what the Eternal Spirit holds in reserve for all humanity, so also the opposite view that it is a society of the elect becomes equally untrue. The redemption of humanity may imply an elect few, but only in order that through them all men may know of their election of God in Christ. Or in the words of the Anglican Catechism, "*Christ hath redeemed me and all mankind.*" The church's calling becomes complete when we all come unto the perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.

In a few brief and pointed statements Dr. Mulford also criticises the notion that the church gives us the Bible. Such a view would indicate that the life of the spirit was compassed or monopolized by the ecclesiastical organization. But as a matter of fact, the church has been but a poor guardian of the sacred text. The confusion through which the restoration of the text is now working its way could not have happened had there been any keen anxiety in earlier ages to preserve manuscripts free from the interpolations of individual fancy. Indeed, it seems as tho the church, in the comparative indifference shown to the preservation of the exact letter, was unconsciously relying upon a higher power to preserve the revelation incorrupt, which no watchful scrutiny of the written documents could ever have guaranteed. For the "Bible is not itself the revelation, but the record of a revelation which is

made in man and to the world." To such a revelation the Bible bears witness. That which gives the Bible its profound inestimable value, as also its unity as one Book, is the maxim it contains that "God is the educator not of one people but of every people, that all circumstances are his instruments, that all events are assertions of his presence, that whatever happens to men is a means of showing to them his righteousness and of moulding them to his image." (Maurice's Sermons, quoted on p. 225.) To these words there is correlative truth in the language of Carlyle: "All history becomes an inarticulate Bible, and in a dim intricate manner reveals the divine appearances to this lower world. For God did make this world, and does govern it. The loud-roaring loom of time weaves the vesture thou seest him by. There is no biography of a man, much less any history or biography of a nation, but wraps in it a message out of heaven, addressed to the hearing ear and the not hearing."

From such a point of view it is inevitable that the sacraments should be construed as declarations of a divine presence,—the witnesses of that life of the spirit which is given to men in order to their purification from sin, as by the washing of water, or to that divine sustenance of the soul through feeding upon Christ by faith, as set forth in the Lord's Supper. Not by transubstantiation or any kindred method, but through the Divine Spirit is the redemption which is in Christ mediated to men; he alone succeeds Christ; his work it is by presenting Christ to the soul to so transform humanity that the promise of the incarnation shall be fulfilled at last, and Christ's body and blood become the body and the blood of Christendom.

In the order of the ancient creeds it is no accidental thing that the resurrection from death to immortal life should come last. For the doctrine of immortality is not an interesting speculation only, to be determined *a priori* in any abstract manner in the schools, but is vitally connected with Christian belief as it moulds and inspires the Christian life. Immortality now, as when it first became the heritage of the church in its infancy, must still as ever be brought to light by the Gospel. So great a conviction must rest upon a divine spiritual process—the life of the spirit—for its foundation. To believe in the

Triune name of Deity, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to believe in a Catholic Church where the communion of men is to become the communion of saints, is to create a future for the soul, of which the immortal life in God is the only adequate expression. And so the author closes his book by setting forth the resurrection and ascension of Christ, the last historical events in the life of our Lord, as standing for the final apotheosis of humanity when the redemptive process in the long course of ages shall have done its work.

In our first article we maintained that the traditional theology had been conditioned in its growth by the prevailing idea of God and his relation to the world; in this second article it has been our object to illustrate modern theology, as it is sometimes called, and to show the connection between its conclusions and one great underlying conviction. Both theologies revert to Scripture for the contents of the Christian faith, but they carry with them to Scripture a different ruling idea, and hence the difference in the results of their appeal. They are two distinct theologies, but it is not so much their contradiction which we note as that they stand in the relation of the lower to the higher. If we have succeeded in our aim, it is clear enough that these restatements of Christian belief are not the intuitions of a religious fancy, bewildered in the mazes of transcendental thought. So far as the formal appeal to Scripture goes both systems are reflected in the pages of the New Testament, just as both ideas of Deity may be seen in conflict in the old dispensation. So far as the appeal to abstract reason is concerned the former has no advantage over the latter. In the middle ages the scholastic theologians always appear as reasoning most elaborately and profoundly in behalf of the tenets which they maintained. But after all they were resting on assumptions which they never proved. They took for granted the authority of the church and the ancient fathers, while the Protestant theologians who followed them set aside their line of proof as invalid, and substituted the authority of Scripture. But neither of these methods would have carried to the mind the force of demonstration, as both were undoubtedly thought to do, had there not been living convictions, which they did not originate, of which they served as illustrations or confirmations, but not as proofs.

In the nature of the case, where religious truth is concerned there can be no reasoning after the manner of logical syllogisms; if clear statement is not sufficient, there can be nothing more.

In this respect, for clear and eloquent statement of great principles we know of no one book in American or English theology which can take the place of Dr. Mulford's "Republic of God." In our review of it we have not attempted to do justice to the wealth of its thought or the strength and beauty which pervade its pages. It is grand in its conception, and glows with the fervor of a deep spiritual enthusiasm. That it has passed to a fifth edition is evidence of its generous and thoughtful reception. We believe it a book destined to live and exert a far-reaching influence.

A recent writer, Mr. Henry George, in his remarkable work, "Progress and Poverty," has expressed himself in words of solemn warning with regard to modern transitions in religious thought. "Even the philosophic free-thinker," he says, "cannot look upon that vast change in religious ideas that is now sweeping over the civilized world without feeling that this tremendous fact may have most momentous relations which only the future can develop. For what is going on is not a change in the form of religion, but the negation and destruction of the ideas from which religion springs. Christianity is not simply clearing itself of superstitions, but in the popular mind it is dying at the root, as the old paganisms were dying when Christianity entered the world. And nothing arises to take its place." We too admit that a vast change in religious ideas is sweeping over the world, destined to have momentous consequences. We also will admit that what is going on is not merely a change in the form of religion, but the negation of the idea from which religion springs. What that idea has been in the prevailing type of Christianity, as seen in history, we have tried to show. If in the popular mind it is now dying at the roots, we may regard it as a sign that God is taking away the old that he may establish the new. If it is dying at the roots, only as the old paganisms were dying when Christ appeared, then we must bear in mind—all rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding—that the old paganisms never did die at the roots, but only changed

their form and lived on under another name. If this be the religion which is now dying at the roots in the popular mind,—and the popular mind has known no other,—then the crisis may be a grave one, and will be attended by great evils, as such crises always are; but our hope and consolation lie in this, that something better and higher has already risen to take its place, and is indeed now here.

ALEXANDER V. G. ALLEN.

ART AND ETHICS

IN SOME OF THEIR RELATIONS.

We would not have our youth grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there feed daily upon many a baneful flower and herb, until their souls are filled with poison. But let our artists be gifted to discern the true nature of beauty and grace : then shall our youth dwell in a healthful land amid sweet sights and sounds ; and the effluent beauty of fair works will meet the sense like a pure breeze, and draw the soul into harmony with the beauty of reason.—*PLATO's Republic, Book III.*

MATTHEW ARNOLD, who is eminent both as poet and as critic, says that “poetry is at bottom the criticism of life.” He does not mean this for a definition ; if so, it were inexact and worthless. But he means to declare in a luminous way the deep relations between the arts, (of which poetry is the highest,) and ethics. These relations have been virtually denied by two classes of men from utterly hostile stand-points. On the one hand an extreme school of art-critics has proclaimed that the fine arts lie wholly outside of the province of morality, are not to be judged by an ethical standard ; for art is a law and an end unto itself. This is the doctrine of the *unmorality* of art. On the other hand an extreme school of moralists has proclaimed that art is essentially evil ; that its very nature is contrary to ethics ; that the only relation between them is one of direct and irreconcilable conflict, which should be ended by the destruction of art. This is the doctrine of the *immorality* of art. At the outset we must meet these opposing theories.

The first question is one of jurisdiction. Are ethical judgments valid in regard to works of art? May pictures and poems be tried under the laws of right and wrong? Does the domain of ethics extend over the territory of art; or is this a

free and independent realm, subject only to the laws of form, color, and rhythm?

The men who make this declaration of independence base it on the ground of the essential difference between the good and the beautiful. The end of art, they say, is beauty in the object and pleasure in the beholder. If these are gained the art is perfect: the aim of its being is fulfilled; we have no right to demand anything more. I have not been able to find a clearer, bolder statement of this theory than that which has recently been made by the infant phenomenon of this school of criticism, who is himself a practitioner, altho feeble, of one of the arts. He tells us, "We should never talk of a moral or immoral poem. Poems are either well written or badly written, that is all. Any element of morals or implied reference to a standard of good or evil in art is often a sign of a certain incompleteness of vision. All good work aims at purely artistic effect."

It must be confessed that this doctrine has some difficulties even from an æsthetic point of view; for it forces us to the conclusion that Homer, the Greek Tragedians, Dante, Shakspere, and Milton were inferior in "completeness of vision" to Baudelaire, Swinburne, and Wilde. But then it is a doctrine easy to adopt in the abstract, and agreeable to practise in the concrete; and for people who do not care for the trouble of hard thinking it opens a graceful and comfortable way of escape from the painful region of moral distinctions. Therefore it is fashionable. It has many adherents, and an active tho somewhat secret propaganda. It must be met face to face; the question must be fairly considered. Is the autonomy of art to be conceded?

Observe, first of all, how false and unsubstantial is the ground on which the claim is based. The fact that the immediate end of art is pleasure by no means proves that this is, or ought to be, its highest and only end, by no means justifies the freedom of art from moral law. The end of commerce is wealth; but who will maintain that for this reason the merchant may not be judged by an ethical standard, that he cannot do things right or wrong, but only things profitable or unprofitable? That would be a glaring *non sequitur*. Equally great is the absurdity of the man who declares that because the end of

his life is to paint beautiful pictures he may forget the difference between good and evil, or because he proposes to write in an exquisite metre he may blamelessly celebrate the pleasures of cruelty and lust.

If moral law exist it must be supreme. To deny its authority in any one sphere of human life is to overthrow it entirely. If there be any such qualities as right and wrong they belong to all parts and activities of man. And this is true under any theory of the origin and nature of ethics.

Let us take our stand for a moment with W. K. Clifford on the ground of tribal ethics. We have trained our consciences to approve as right "those actions which tend to the advantage of the community in the struggle for existence." No man shall keep any part of his life in which this aim is not controlling, for there is no sphere of human conduct which is not related to the welfare of the tribe; and the last to claim exemption from this law should be the artist, for he is the man whose works most powerfully influence the thoughts and lives of others. If he is painting pictures which teach our young men and maidens to delight in scenes of lust or violence, if he is writing poems which glorify selfishness, cruelty, luxury, we say, "In the name of the tribe I condemn this as wrong." It will not do to answer that it is beautiful, exquisitely fashioned, that it aims solely at an artistic effect of colors and words. If it be not for the good of the community it should not be made. If it be for the harm of the community it must be destroyed. It matters not tho every law of beauty be fulfilled: the prosperity of the tribe is the highest consideration, and works of art must be judged finally by their relation to this end.

When, therefore, one of these precious gentlemen who profess to exhibit in art all things which they deem beautiful without regard to any moral quality or standard, comes along, we will treat him after the manner advised by Socrates. We will fall down and worship him as an utterly sweet and wonderful being; but we shall be under the painful necessity of telling him that there is no room for him in our country, the law will not tolerate him. And so, when we have perfumed him with myrrh and set a garland of sunflowers upon his head, we will send him away. For we mean to have among us only those purer and

sterner artists who shall help us to be strong and virtuous, and bring health to our souls.

Now this is the lowest view of ethics. If even from this standpoint we see that their sway is absolute and all-embracing, how much more will this be true when we regard moral laws as eternal verities written on the heavens and in the heart of man, or as the revelations of the Divine nature and will? For one who has heard the call of Duty as the

"Stern daughter of the voice of God,"

there is no escape thereafter into a region whither that voice cannot follow him. Forevermore it summons him to choose between good and evil in all that he does. He must be obedient or rebellious. There is no middle course. Heavy and grievous necessity of choice! Oftentimes does it destroy our placid, untroubled enjoyment, or check us in careless pursuit of pleasure: but in so far does it lift us above the level of the beasts that take

"Their license in the fields of time."

Does it seem to us a great burden? Well may we remember, then, that every crown is a burden; and this is the painful, ennobling birthright of humanity, to know and share the sovereignty of ethics.

If this be true the artist must submit. He must acknowledge the jurisdiction of morality over himself as man, and over his work as part of human life. And even if he basely and ignorantly denies this the world will not and can not admit the denial. He may cry never so loudly, "You must not ask whether this is moral or immoral, but only whether it is well made or ill made;" the moral sense of mankind will still pass judgment on him and his work. His protest is but a vain revolt. For surely we have the right to say that a poem is pure and noble, just as well as to say that it is graceful and melodious. We have the right to condemn a false sentiment, just as well as a false quantity. Conformity to the laws of beauty can never absolve that supreme allegiance to the laws of right conduct which binds every man in all his actions.

The second question touches the right of art to exist within

the sovereign domain of ethics. Moralists have been found to condemn art altogether, and declare it so evil in its nature and influence that it should not be suffered to live. This condemnation is sometimes based upon the ground that art is fiction, and therefore in itself wrong. Plutarch tells us that when Thespis came to Athens, Solon reproved him, and asked if he were not ashamed to utter so many falsehoods before the people. And I have heard of an old Scotch-woman who refused to read a novel because it was "just a pack o' lees." But this is stupid, because it confounds fiction with falsehood. The same fallacy would condemn the parables of Christ. It is well exposed by the remark of Dr. Samuel Johnson: "Poets profess fiction; but the legitimate end of fiction is the conveyance of truth."

Another objection urged against the fine arts is that their immediate end is pleasure. But why is not pleasure a lawful object of pursuit? Granted that when it is selfish, or cruel, or unbridled, it is wrong. May it not also be kind and generous and reverent? Is there not a rightful delight in the works of God, a just and beneficent exultation in the exercise of our natural faculties and emotions? Surely a man made in the divine image may pursue such pleasure as this lawfully and nobly; and when he attains it he reaches the chief end of his being, for he shows forth most fully the divine glory. Enjoyment of life, in the free and harmonious use of all God-given powers, subject to God-given laws,—this, it seems to me, is the ideal morality.

But it has been said by some moralists that the influence of art is necessarily evil because it excites the feelings without leading to action. It is a sort of emotional dissipation which makes men at once morbidly sensitive and practically inert, and thus unfits them for a self-controlled discharge of the duties of real life. It was for this reason that Plato, inconsistent with himself, proposed to shut out the poets from his Republic. Against this objection we may quote the authority of Milton and Aristotle, who hold that the right exercise of the emotions, which is afforded, for instance, by tragedy, is a discipline of the soul, purging it of excessive passions of fear and hate, making it strong, temperate, and just. It is true, of course, that too great

indulgence in the pleasures of art, especially if it be morbid, hysterical, or violent, weakens the will and finally degrades the character. But here the blame rests not on art itself, but on the temper of self-indulgence and excess in which it is pursued. The best things in the world may be most easily and fatally abused. The good creatures, bread and wine, have been made to minister to gluttony and drunkenness. Religion, like opium, has been used as a narcotic. Because there are some artists who labor chiefly to supply stimulants to the jaded passions of the indolent and luxurious, because there are some men and women who take refuge from the real cares and duties of life in the golden dreams of poetry, painting, and music, like pleasure-lovers in a plague-smitten city shutting themselves in their flowery gardens, shall we therefore say that gardens are evil, that all art is selfish and wrong? No, let us rather say (and remember) that it has often been perverted by the baseness of man to an ignoble end. For the true end of art is not pleasure alone or for its own sake, but pleasure which is noble and helpful. As De Quincey says: "The final object of the fine arts, as truly as that of Science, and much more directly, is the exaltation of our human nature."

If this be denied we have no longer any defence of art. It is immoral; just as truly as the commerce whose final end is wealth, and the civilization whose chief purpose is luxury, are immoral; just as truly as all things selfish and useless, all things which do not tend to make the world purer, happier, better, are immoral. These two questions which we have been considering are at bottom one. They cannot be divided. The relations of art and ethics are vital. The very right of art to exist depends upon its allegiance to morality.

And yet art is not morality.

Just here, it seems to me, a great mistake is often made. Because we assert the relation of art to ethics it is supposed that we mean to teach their identity. The artist very justly, tho somewhat too vigorously, proclaims that he is not a moralist, and demands that we shall recognize the difference between the Golden Rule and a statue of Charity. And certainly, unless we are blind, we must see this. For the rule is simply stated and applied, and that is the whole of it. But the statue is made in

accordance with the laws of beautiful and expressive form. It is not enough that the sculptor should honestly believe that Charity is a virtue. He must know how to bestow upon her a sweet and attractive regard, a lovely and gracious aspect. He must appeal to the imagination. He must delight the sense of beauty. If he can not do this he is no artist, and would be far better employed as a district visitor for a charitable society than in spoiling good bronze or marble. As a man he is bound by the laws of right thought and virtuous conduct: but as an artist he is bound also by the laws of sincere, graceful, and harmonious expression. This it is that distinguishes him from other men, gives him a separate and glorious sphere of work. And from this stand-point we must look at him when we consider the ethical quality and influence of his art.

There are three points at which we can apply a moral standard:

- I. The character of the artist.
- II. The underlying purpose of his art.
- III. The influence of his work.

I. The artist himself ought to be a good man. And by this I mean not so much negative as positive goodness, the goodness which consists, not in doing nothing wrong, but in doing many things right. He ought to be generous, honest, fearless, a man of vigorous and humane virtue, governed by a natural sense of justice, which will teach him to value men and things at their true worth, and filled with a natural sense of mercy, which will make him pitiful and kind and tender. Do you say that this is what every man ought to be? Yes, but especially the artist, not merely for his own sake, but also for the sake of his works. Pure water can flow only from a pure fountain. I know there are some men who deny this. There is an old fable to this effect in the *Gesta Romanorum*. An immoral priest being reproved for his evil life takes his rebuker to a clear stream and bids him drink, then leads him up to the well-spring which flows from the loathsome jaws of a dead dog. I have always despised this story. It is a lie told to prove a lie. If the carrion had been there the water must have been polluted, like a brook of which

I read not long ago, into which the carcass of a sheep had fallen, and tainted the stream so that the little children who drank of it were poisoned. It is folly to think that an evil tree can bring forth good fruit. "You can have noble art," says Ruskin, "only from noble persons, associated under laws fitted to their times and circumstances."

We do not say that this nobility must be perfect and flawless. That would be desirable, but, with human nature as it is, impossible. The very virtues in excess become vices; and artists are exposed to the peculiar dangers and temptations of an overstrained life and sensitive temperament. We know that some of the greatest have had grave defects and faults. But these have not been the sources of their fine and enduring work. They have done well because, in some way or other, they have kept these things out of the inmost sanctuary of their lives; the fountain-head has been pure.

But let evil get possession of a man, so that it controls him, not as an enemy making an occasional inroad, holding some outlying posts, but as a regnant power swaying his heart and life, and he can never be a truly great artist. Just so far as the evil that is in him touches his work it becomes base. Thus the savage moroseness of Salvator made his pictures gloomy and horrible. Perugino's infidelity, his low spirit of material greed, destroyed at last the power of his painting so that he could only cover his canvases with wearisome "Sacred Conversations," in which the saints were idiots and had nothing to say to each other. Byron's unbridled and rebellious pride, which made him revolt against all authority and restraint, barred him, with all his natural gifts, from the first rank of poets; belittled, debased, paralyzed his genius; led him at last to waste his powers in the composition of such a work as "*Don Juan*," of which we may say that it is a mass of sensual and bitter doggerel, lit up by flashes of wit and rare gleams of poetry, the melancholy monument of a noble mind toiling in slavery to base passions. The fame which it once borrowed from the striking personality of its author has faded away, and it is now read chiefly by the ghouls of literature who nightly feed upon the corruptions which they exhume from books dead and buried. When we compare this pitiable fulfilment with Byron's early power and

promise, who can doubt that one of England's greatest poets was spoiled by an evil temper and a licentious life?

The artist must recognize not only the laws of nature which he is to unfold, and the laws of the art which he follows, but also the laws of ethics by which his personal power is conditioned. He must learn that self-restraint is the highest strength, and that he only can express himself truly and nobly who is master of himself.

"Vergebens werden ungebundene Geister
Nach der Vollendung reiner Höhe streben;
Wer Grosses will, muss sich zusammen raffen:
In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,
Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben."

Emerson has well said: "The moral is the measure of health, and in the voice of genius I hear invariably the moral tone even when it is disowned in words,—health, melody, and a wider horizon belong to moral sensibility." Name the supreme artists of the world—Homer, Æschylus, Dante, Shakspere, Milton, Pheidias, Giotto, Michael Angelo, Raphael—and we recognize at once the broad and vigorous morality of the men. They were not, perhaps, free from all faults and vices; but the invariable condition of their power was a profound moral sanity. Without this there cannot be a great artist, because there cannot be a truly great man.

II. The artist should have a moral purpose in his work. But this is something very different from a didactic purpose. For altho the artist is in one sense a teacher, he is first of all a maker, and his teaching is like that of Nature, indirect. If he attempts to use his art merely as a pleasant vehicle of instruction he will fail. The difference between a diagram and a picture is essential, not to be overlooked. I shall not soon forget, even tho Christian charity makes me forgive, the weary time spent with the gigantic cartoons of Peter Cornelius in the top-room of the Berlin National Gallery. I could not help thinking how much better he could have said all that in good plain prose. Didacticism in art is false and impotent. Wordsworth's "Excursion," in spite of all the efforts of his admirers to beguile the public into reading it through, in spite of the grand passages which

shine star-like from the general obscurity, remains a magnificent failure. His "Ecclesiastical Sonnets" taken altogether are worse yet; and the once-popular "Proverbial Philosophy" of Mr. Tupper exhibits the flat imbecility of didactic art.

I must confess to a certain feeling of remorse for having allowed myself to put any work of Wordsworth in the same sentence with that of Mr. Tupper; for I regard the one as among England's greatest poets, and the other as no poet at all. But after all there is a certain reason in it, for the works thus irreverently named in the same breath have something in common. The same theory of poetry which made a great man write sonnets on "Latitudinarianism" and "The Commination Service," made a very small man afflict the public with the folly of his versified morality.

The first end of art is to delight man through his imagination. When it fails to do this it forfeits its claim to exist. But this delight must be of such a kind that we shall not be the worse for it; it must console us in the sorrows and strengthen us in the conflicts of life with pure and lofty thoughts. It must in its highest moments bring us nearer to God and to humanity. In giving this delight the true artist works naturally, spontaneously, almost unconsciously. He is the lover of fair forms and colors and sweet sounds, helping us to love and to enjoy them. But he is also the lover of virtue, and the underlying purpose of his work is right and beneficent.

Take for instance the art of landscape painting. The artist sees, as I cannot see, the beauty of this world which God has made for man to dwell in. He has a keener, deeper insight of the relations of line and color; he has the skilful hand which can fix the vision of grandeur or beauty upon the canvas so that I also can see it and rejoice in it. He shows me the solemn loneliness of the desert, the glory of sunsets glowing and paling over the pathless sea, the shifting splendors of the great palaces of ice cast forth as morsels on the Northern deep. He leads me through the rich groves of the tropics, and down the sombre aisles of old pine-forests. I behold with him the snow-clad peaks whereon

"God makes himself an awful rose of dawn,"

and the soft valleys fed by streams from those pure slopes. He gives me sight of the dark hills of Scotland clad in their royal purple, and the storm-scarred cliffs fronting with resolute face all the on-setting waves of ocean. He reveals to me the deep wonders of Western river-cañons, and the wild beauty of lonely, mountain-guarded lakes. He makes me feel the quiet charm of

“Wet, bird-haunted English lawns,”

and the peaceful loveliness of our New England valleys, shaded by feathery elms, watered by quiet streams, the fair homes of peace and settled order. The purpose of the artist, the end for which he has labored patiently and skilfully, is just to make me see these things and find joy in them. But is not this a good end, a moral purpose? Does he not help me, bless me, uplift me by his art? Surely he has put a new meaning for me into that glad and reverent word of the Psalmist: “O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches.”

And if I shall learn by this to love the creatures of God more deeply, and better to understand their purpose, is not this a good thing for me? It will make me distrust the selfish, reckless civilization which mars the beauty of nature, destroys the forest and blackens the hill-side and pollutes the clear-flowing stream, for the sake of avarice and luxury. It will make me feel that the best and fairest things are those which have been provided most freely for all men to behold and enjoy; and if there be in me that spirit of humility which alone can enable me to take this lesson aright, so shall

“All my heart
Be softened, and made worthy to indulge
Love, and the thoughts that yearn for humankind.”

But it is not alone, nor indeed chiefly, in this work of depicting and interpreting nature that the object of the true artist is moral. For doubtless when he comes to represent nobly the life and character of man, his moral purpose will be clearer and stronger, his moral influence more direct. Yet even here it must be largely unconscious.

If he is painting a historical picture he strives to make the

scene, the characters, vivid and impressive. If he is writing a drama he intends to make us see the actors and feel their passions, so that they shall become real and living to us, as Hamlet and Ophelia, Lear and Cordelia, Othello, Iago and Desdemona are real and living, the lasting objects of our love and our wonder, our pity and our scorn. To kindle these emotions, to make them burn with clear intense flame, to fill the soul with the deep fire of thought and feeling, which shall consume the bonds of time and sense, and free us to the loftiest exercise of spiritual powers,—this is the end for which he labors. This is the rapture of his own strong spirit as he discerns with unsealed vision the mysteries of man's life and destiny; and this he will give to us in breathing forms and burning words. But in all this he must not, he dare not, forget or cast away that noblest power which makes him man,—the moral sense. He must see the evil as evil, and the good as good. To be incapable of this were far worse than to be color-blind or rhythm-deaf. This must rule and guide his work.

He will not analyze and expound the moral duties. But he will show us, in the divine light of genius, the fair virtues and the hideous vices, the mighty strife of Ormuzd and Ahriman, in which good and evil, truth and falsehood, light and darkness are evermore contending for the soul of man. The great tide of conflict sweeps to and fro across the field of human life. There are splendid victories and shameful defeats, storm-clouds darkening the face of heaven, floods of light rolling back the gloom, single combats of elected champions, conquests of brute force, and within them more glorious counter-triumphs of heaven-defended innocence. Hate slays and destroys; lust burns and blasts; love restores and heals, shining as the light and distilling as the dew. But as the poet beholds all this and reveals it to us, shall he forget the eternal issues of the conflict? Shall he confuse or disguise the combatants so that we shall mistake them, not knowing friend from foe, but seeing only shifting forms and changing colors? Shall he ignore the moral meaning of the strife? Nay, for then it becomes nothing more than a struggle of beasts, and we sit as cruel and careless spectators in the amphitheatre, or mingle with our fellow-brutes in the fierce confusion of the arena. All the shame of the defeat, all the

glory of the victory, all the blessedness of the peace, lie in the right or wrong of it. This the poet must feel and make us feel, unless he would degrade himself and us. If his sympathy, his purpose, be not moral, it is base, unworthy. He cannot speak of these things indifferently. He cannot be content with rousing our emotions, careless of the objects towards which they flow. He purposes to make us rejoice and mourn, admire and love and hate ; but in all this he will have us humane and just, feeling our own true part in this mortal warfare : a noble joy, a noble grief, a noble love, and a noble scorn,—by these emotions he will help us to a noble life.

III. Clearly the moral influence of art depends on the moral character and purpose of the artist. But of these we cannot always judge fairly and fully, because they are hidden from us by the veil of distance or the obscurities of human life. The personality and the motive of the workman are often remote, undiscoverable, save as they are actually revealed to us by his works ; and therefore we must judge these as they are, discerning by moral sense the spirit that breathes from them, and reckoning them as base or noble by the influence which they are fitted to exercise upon the world.

Not by the influence which they actually exercise upon certain individuals. For he who has no music in his soul is deaf to the sweetest strains of heaven-born harmony ; and he whose heart is evil will set foul words to the melodies of angels. To the vile all things are vile. This is his curse, the vengeful fate which pursues him because he has sold his heart to sin. For him the whole world, is polluted. Wealth awakens his avarice ; power is to him the minister of selfish ambition and cruelty ; beauty in art or nature only stirs his bestial lust. The glow of rich colors, the imperishable symmetry of pure marbles, the soft cadences of music, the beauty of the human face divine, all that is fairest in the world, is but the stimulant for his foul passions. He reads the noblest poems only to distil poison from them ; with greedy, bestial eyes he scans the purest statues and pictures ; he cons the Bible in secret only to find food for an unhallowed fancy. Shall we therefore destroy the works of Shakspere and shatter the Venus of Melos and hide the Bible in cloistered

gloom? Even then we shall not help this thrice-accursed man; for the fountain of evil is within his soul: among the very angels of heaven he will feed his heart with the thoughts of hell.

Nor can we hope to save this man, and such as he, by any moral ministry of art, however pure and strong. Poems and pictures will not deliver him from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light. Art cannot create morality any more than worship can create religion. There must be first a quickening, an awakening, a new birth in the inner nature of the man, so that he shall know the good, desire it, seek it; and then begins the helpful, cheering, ennobling influence of noble art.

Of noble art, I say; for here is the test by which we must distinguish between high and low, good and evil, in works of art. Does it help or hinder us in the attainment of a pure and lofty character? Does it lift us upward or allure us downward? Does it make us love God better by showing us the beauty of what He has made, and love our fellow-men better by revealing the splendid virtues of which heroes are capable, the grace and humor of the most humble life? Or does it appeal to our baser passions, our selfish pride and avarice, our cruel anger, our unbridled appetite? Here is a standard no less real, and far higher, than the canons of taste, the laws of symmetry and beauty. I do not deny that these are true and necessary. There is a world of difference between fine work and poor work,—between Milton's "Paradise Lost" and Pollok's "Course of Time," Raphael's Madonnas and Carlo Dolci's simpering inanities, Michael Angelo's Night and Morning and Rogers' statuettes. No morality can obliterate this difference. But on the other hand, no art can obliterate the difference between things good and evil; and this goes deeper, infinitely deeper, for it divides eternal life from eternal death.

We shall not always find it easy to apply this moral standard to works of art, partly because our own ideal is too dim and confused; partly because the moral influence of many things is vague, delicate, obscure; and partly because in this intricate world evil is so much mixed with good and good with evil. But sometimes we can distinguish clearly and definitely, and often the moral quality is hidden only because we are wilfully blind to it.

Take for instance the art of sculpture. Is it possible that any sane man does not feel the difference between such works as the Apollo Belvidere, the Ludovisi Juno, the Venus of Melos, and the lascivious nakednesses in marble and bronze and tinted porcelain which have come from the workshops of Paris to decorate our homes? Shall we accept them all with equal complaisance as works of art?

Or take the poems which have the passion of love for their theme. Is there not a great gulf forever fixed between Swinburne's "Laus Veneris" and Tennyson's "Maud"? Are they not animated by different spirits, breathing forth effluences as distinct as the heavy, perfume-poisoned air of the seraglio, and the pure breeze of summer blowing over banks of flowers?

In every field of art this difference holds: we find the works of darkness and the works of light. The painter who seeks his themes among the scenes of war, may appeal to our morbid love of horrors, teaching us to take a strange delight in streams of blood and bursting shells, death-agonies and piles of corpses under the lurid light of battle; or he may exalt mere military glory, the pomp and circumstance of war. Then we shall have pictures like those infernal scenes of battle-pride and blood-thirst which decorate the walls of Versailles, or those which since 1870 have made so many German galleries hateful. But if the painter seeks to show the glory of self-sacrifice, courage, endurance, to make us feel and pity the sufferings of men in a good cause, then even war may furnish some noble pictures, such as Miss Thompson's "Roll-Call in the Crimea."

So, also, in the painting of common life there are two spirits. The one you may discern in the canvases of Teniers and Brueghel; brutal boors, carousing, revelling, fighting, teaching us to despise and hate. The other breathes from such pictures as that priceless interior of Peter de Hooghe's in the Berlin Museum, or Millet's solemn "Angelus." The sanctity and peaceful joy of home, the mysterious depth and value of every life of man, the dignity of labor, the beauty of pure humanity,—these the artist makes us feel and reverence as "over the lowest provinces of man's existence he pours the glory of his own soul, and they rise, in shadow and sunshine, softened and brightened, into a beauty which other eyes discern not in the highest."

The imagination is the medium through which this moral influence of art is exerted. And to a man rightly grounded in ethics it is of greatest value. It quickens, informs, enlightens the moral sense; reveals the inner soul of men and things; embodies evil that we may hate it, and good that we may love it; discloses the far-reaching flow of human deeds and the deep meaning of all man's thoughts and actions: thus it lifts us from the realm of mechanical and unwilling obedience into a higher region where morality is glad, spontaneous, vital. This is the sphere into which religion leads us as the living children of God. "Ye that love the Lord, hate evil." Not a mere sense of duty, but a discerning vision of the imperishable beauty of the good, a deep delight in adoring service; not a mere force-pumped current of thought and action flowing within the walls of law, but a living, springing fountain of love,—this is the highest, best form of spiritual life. And we welcome all that helps us upward into this pure region, all woven harmonies and sweet cadences of music and of words, all fair colors and breathing forms, all worthy monuments of heroes and magnificent temples of worship, all works of human skill and genius which teach us to hate the base and love the noble. For this is the golden dream of the highest art.

"Serene will be our days and bright,
And happy will our nature be,
When love is an unerring light
And joy its own security.
And they a blissful course may hold
E'en now, who, not unwisely bold,
Live in the spirit of this creed,
Yet find that other strength according to their need."

There still remains the practical question of the actual influence of art in the world: has it been good or evil? Remains and will remain; for who can answer it finally and with authority? Who can trace the subtle tendencies of the different forms and schools of art in their historical development, detect the spirit which has animated and controlled them, measure their legitimate effects apart from all other influences which have mingled with them, strike the exact balance of harm and blessing, and pronounce a verdict for or against? Our field of

vision is limited; our powers of analysis are defective. We can only look at certain periods of history, at certain parts of the life of humanity, and beholding art as an active and necessary element of that life, we can say, here it has been a curse because it has been indifferent or hostile to ethics, and there it has been a blessing because pervaded by moral sentiment and guided by moral law. If we attempt to make a general estimate, it will depend largely upon our point of view, but chiefly upon the spirit and temper of our minds, the kind of faith that is in us. If we are pessimists, believing more strongly in the devil than in God, we will think the world is growing worse and art is helping to destroy it. If we are optimists, believing more strongly in God than in the devil, we will think the world is growing better and art is helping to uplift and bless it. And whichever side we take, we shall find no lack of illustrations and arguments.

But apart from this natural distinction between the critics of hope and the critics of despair, it seems to me that there is another circumstance which has given to many modern estimates of the moral influence of art a dark and sombre cast. I mean the fact that the period of artistic development best known to us, most generally studied and widely admired, is the Italian Renaissance, a period which produced at once the most beautiful paintings and the most corrupt men the world has ever seen. It is his knowledge of this period that has colored the writings of Ruskin with such gloomy hues, made him write those magnificent Jeremiads of art, made him liken the names of great painters to the passing bells of national glory, and declare that "at the moment when in any kingdom you point to the triumphs of the greatest artists you point also to the determined hour of the nation's decline."

Was it then art that destroyed Italy, filled her with horrible corruption, debased and degraded her, in the age of the Renaissance? Or was it rather something else that destroyed first Italy and then Italian art? A false and worldly church, a religion enslaved and polluted by the traditions of men, a selfish political system which threw unlimited power into the hands of soldier-nobles and merchant-princes,—these were the influences which wrought the downfall of Italy; and with her fell her art.

That bright promise of a glorious day which had dawned in Cimabue was extinguished. No longer, as in the times of Giotto, the Pisani, Angelico, and the early Florentines, working in the spirit of broad humanity and moral power for the welfare and delight of the people, art, under the insidious influence of that corrupt church whose foundation-doctrine was that every man, and even God himself, has his price, bartered her birthright for a mess of pottage, and bent herself in the spirit of mercenary greed to minister selfish and often sensual pleasure to the rich and luxurious classes.

But is Italian painting the only or the highest development of art? I think not. Greek sculpture, Gothic architecture, English poetry, are even higher triumphs of human genius; and these were wrought among strong, noble, and triumphant people. The age of Pheidias was the brightest and purest period of Athenian history. The great cathedrals which rose from the soil of France and Germany and England into the all-overarching heaven, embodying in their mysterious growth the thoughts and aspirations of hosts of unknown artists, were built by nations whose force, moral and physical, was great and increasing. The golden age of English poetry was the age of England's power and glory under the vigorous sway of the Virgin Queen.

But, mark you, the temper and purpose of these arts was clearly moral. The Greek sculptor carved in ivory and gold the statue of the bright-eyed Pallas, goddess of heavenly wisdom, whose teaching is

“Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,—
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.”

And this he set, not in the palace of some rich patron, but high on the Acropolis, where it should speak of truth and temperance to all the people. The many architects and workmen of the great churches and cathedrals were builders for God and man, repeating with wondering love the lines and forms of nature in their work, rearing temples of worship not for the select elect, but where the rich and the poor might bow together before the Lord, the Maker of them all. The poets whose lofty

verse is the proudest monument of England's glory wrote in the love of goodness and the hatred of evil, wrote so that their art has been a fountain of life and health to the race.

Here, I think, as inheritors of the splendid legacy of English poetry, we can speak without doubt or hesitation. When we talk of the moral influence of sculpture or painting or music upon other races in other ages, there must be something of guess-work, there may be something of exaggeration, in what we say. But the influence of our own art (the highest and purest) upon our own race is beyond all question. Trace the history of English poetry from its beginnings down to the present time, and you shall see that it has always been pervaded with moral purpose and instinct with moral power. It has exposed the corruptions and helped to overthrow the dominion of a false priesthood. It has been the foe of tyrants and the herald of liberty. It has revealed the imperishable beauty of nature and the dignity of simple manhood. It has deepened the love of home and country and humanity. It has kindled lofty emotions and embodied high ideals. It has lifted the race to a nobler level of moral life. Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspere, Milton, Pope, Cowper, Scott, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Tennyson,—these have been the most potent teachers, the greatest benefactors of England and her children. And if there is to-day anything fine and strong, any distinctive quality of moral purity and power in the character of the English race, it is largely due to the mighty and blessed influence of English poetry.

By the honorable glory of that poetry we protest against the false and degrading doctrine that art has no concern with the moral life. We refuse to welcome these new poets who come to us

"With poisonous honey stol'n from France,"

caring not for false or true, caring not for base or noble, worshipping only that beauty which is outward and sensuous, and singing in melodious verse the Cyprian Aphrodite. We will not have their shrill falsetto in the choir of England's true singers. We will not turn away at their call from the

"God-gifted organ-voice of England,"

or forsake for them the pure, sweet notes of him who wears the laurel from the brows

"Of him that uttered nothing base."

We will demand, not from our poets only, but from all our artists, work which shall cheer and bless and strengthen us, an art which shall help us to live more happily and nobly, the beautiful embodiment of that word proceeding from the Spirit of all truth and beauty.

Whatsoever things are pure and lovely and of good report, if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things.

HENRY J. VAN DYKE, JR.

THE LATEST IRISH LEGISLATION AND ITS PRINCIPLES.

If any one otherwise intelligent, but strange to the affairs and recent history of the Western World, were suddenly to light upon the Arrears of Rent Act and the Prevention of Crime Act passed by the British Parliament for Ireland, he would have no small difficulty in discovering amidst the mass of technical detail the clear and strong principles which underlie the whole of the legislation. He would see at once that it is revolutionary legislation, or, speaking more correctly, legislation for an epoch of revolution. But he might not see at once that both the criminal and the civil side of the legislation had their origin in a firm intention to do simple justice to a dependent province, and, as far as might be, to undo centuries of perverse misgovernment. Tho one of the measures is sharply punitive and the other considerably remedial, they both would be found to have their roots in a determined desire to impart to Ireland, if it was not too late, the blessings of order, of security, and the conditions needed for national self-development.

The policy and contents of the last Irish Land Act have been examined in a recent number of this REVIEW. The general objects of the Act were to interpose a forcible court of arbitration between the tenants of the smaller classes of farms in Ireland and their landlords, so as to ascertain by a strictly judicial process what were not merely the legal rights but the morally equitable claims of the parties to the contract of tenancy, and to adjudicate upon all disputes between them,—whether founded on alleged excess of rent, on unreasonable evictions, or on impediments to a free exercise of the right of transfer of interest. Not only rules of common and statute law and the terms of

written engagements were to be taken into consideration by the "Land Court," but local customs, habitual practice of the parties, and generally reasonable expectations as founded on presumed consent. In fact an unprecedented latitude was allowed to a purely judicial body for the purpose of extinguishing all rational (or even irrational) grounds of complaint of harsh, vindictive, or even severely and narrowly economic usage of a tenant by his richer landlord.

The justification of such a stringent measure as this was found in such facts as the pauperization of Ireland, which was being rapidly brought about by evictions and the consequent discontent, disloyalty, and criminality prevailing among large classes of the population. Some of the broader historical grounds for such exceptional land legislation (partaking in the eyes of many persons of the nature of confiscation) will be examined in the latter part of this article.

The true explanation of the "Arrears of Rent Act" passed in 1882, and following upon the "Land Law Act" of 1881, is to be found in the policy and operation of the latter Act. The Act of 1882 is indeed the complement of the former Act, called for in order to give it its requisite universality and to avoid its being a nominal or partial and not a real and general boon.

It was foreseen at the time that the Land Act was under discussion, and it was proved, as soon as it was put into operation, that large classes of the tenants whom it was especially designed to benefit could not come into court in order to take advantage of the Act, because their rent was already so far in arrears that, under the terms of the Act itself, they were liable to eviction. If they could once be relieved from this situation and put on the same footing as the tenants who, it might be by mere good luck, had happened just at the time the Act was passed to be not in debt to their landlords (tho just on the verge of insolvency through excessive efforts to meet an exorbitant rent), they could come into court and have their rent readjusted, or they could sell their holdings and receive the market-price of their tenant-right.

The difficulty was how to satisfy the legitimate demands of the landlord either for his unpaid arrears of rent or for the exercise of his right to exchange an insolvent for a solvent tenant. Mr. Gladstone adopted the bold expedient of applying the funds

which had resulted from the disendowment of the Irish Church to the purpose of paying a certain composition for these arrears; and when these funds were exhausted the consolidated fund might, Mr. Gladstone held, be properly resorted to to make up the deficit.

The conditions for admitting composition for arrears according to the Act are (1) that the tenant has paid the rent for one year, ending the 30th of November, 1881; that (2) antecedent arrears are due to the landlord; and that (3) the Land Court is satisfied that "the tenant is unable to discharge such antecedent arrears without loss of his holding or deprivation of the means necessary for the cultivation of it."

The terms of the composition are that the landlord is to receive, by order of the Court, "a sum equal to one half of such antecedent arrears;" but the whole sum so paid, by way of composition, is not to exceed the amount of the yearly rent payable and paid on the 30th of November, 1881. The only holdings to which the Act applies are those which were valued "under the Acts relating to the valuation of ratable property in Ireland at not more than thirty pounds a year."

Lord Salisbury, by his amendments moved in the House of Lords, did his utmost to render the Act optional on the part of the landlord and not compulsory upon him. But the admission of this amendment would have been counter to one main object of the whole Act and to the general policy of the legislation for Ireland of which it formed a part. The one object of the Act and of the general policy was to prevent existing tenants being turned out of their holdings at all if they were able, in the eye of a competent court, to pay a fairly adjusted rent. It was not enough to make a satisfactory monetary arrangement between a landlord and his tenant. It was intended to rehabilitate the tenants as occupiers of their little farms, and to prevent their landlords turning them out on any pretext whatever short of their proved inability to pay a judicially fixed rent. This policy was in the course of being accomplished, and the main obstacle to its complete achievement was the handle afforded to unreasonable landlords by the accident that tenants who owed arrears of rent were in their power. If these tenants were still left in their landlord's power, through the landlord being able (as Lord

Salisbury advised) to put on a veto on the judicial composition for arrears, this part of the policy would be abortive.

In reference to this amendment Mr. Gladstone said in the House of Commons on August 9th, "I affirm that the Lords' amendment, as distinguished from what we are prepared to agree to, would, if embodied in the bill, prevent a tenant unable to discharge his arrears from going into court and reaping the benefit for the sake of securing which Parliament has been content, in spite of the disadvantages and objections which we admit, to pass such a bill. Now, if that be so—and I believe that it is most strictly so—surely it is impossible that such a claim can be seriously advanced and can be made the basis of a conflict between the two Houses of Parliament."

The result was that the Lords had to consent to the rejection of their amendment by the Commons and the substitution in its place of a clause which bore the appearance of a compromise,—to the effect that ten days' notice must be given on either side before going into court.

Another amendment of Lord Salisbury's was substantially accepted by the Commons, on Mr. Gladstone's recommendation, and now appears as part of the first clause of the Act. The words of the clause are: "Provided, that in the event of a sale of the tenancy within seven years from the making of such order [for payment of composition for arrears], the arrears of rent dealt with by such order and not satisfied by payment or remission shall, to an amount not exceeding one year of such arrears nor one half of the proceeds of such sale, be a sum payable to the landlord out of such proceeds within the meaning of the Land Law Act of 1881."

Mr. Gladstone, in consenting to an amendment of this nature, explained that in such a case, by the hypothesis, two years' arrears would already have been compounded for out of public money; and that one more year's arrears, but certainly not more, might be treated "as representing in Ireland a true and substantial property." He further said that such an assumption could only be made "to a certain extent" and upon "reaching over a moderate term." He recognized that in Ulster, under the old custom of the province, the landlord had had a lien upon the proceeds of the tenant's interest in case of its sale, and he

had been able to recoup himself out of the proceeds of that sale for his arrears of rent. But Mr. Gladstone also noticed that "it would not be reasonable to recognize the claim of the landlord irrespectively of the amount of the arrears, because, again," said he, "in order to have a true comprehension of this subject we must fall back upon the fact that a practice has existed in Ireland upon certain estates—not very few in number, tho far from being the generality—of keeping alive arrears for a course of years, not regarding them as an asset capable of being completely realized, but rather as a powerful leverage by which to obtain the measures which the landlord might desire."

Under a special clause of the Act the benefit of it, less some restrictions, was extended to a higher class of tenants, those whose holding was valued at a sum not exceeding fifty pounds a year. In the case of arrears being due from this class of tenants the Court might order a similar payment to the landlord as in the former case, the difference being that in the case of this higher class of tenants the holding was to be charged with the repayment of the advance by a rent-charge of five per cent on the advance, payable half-yearly.

The two great questions of political principle raised by the debate on the Arrears Bill in and out of Parliament, and certainly involved in it even where not distinctly raised, were, first, whether a landlord who might be held by his tenant's default to have acquired a vested right of ejecting him and of choosing a new tenant could be despoiled of this right and compelled to continue his tenant in his holding on being paid a pecuniary compensation for unpaid arrears; and, secondly, whether the Irish Church funds and the general funds of the British Empire could be properly turned to account for the payment of this composition. The question involved in the amendment relating to the claim of the landlord for a payment of a portion of his arrears on the sale of the tenant-right lies outside these two leading problems, tho, as has been shown, of considerable importance in itself.

The justification of such a stringent policy could only be found in what may be called the ethics of political revolution. Misgovernment in the past brings about a state of things in

which the law is no longer habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population. This state of things in any national society is anomalous and can only be met by anomalous remedies. The elementary notions of mutual confidence and friendly relationship between class and class have to be re-created, as from the first. For the moment society must be treated as hardly emerged out of its primitive condition; and all classes, even those most civilized themselves, are obliged to forego the settled rights and advantages laboriously accumulated by generations of struggle and "the long result of time." Even well-recognized legal rights become anachronisms, and a universal sacrifice is called for in the cause of the primary interests of security and social order.

Such is the meaning of revolutionary legislation, and no better example of it could be presented than the Irish Land Act of 1881, followed by the Arrears of Rent Act of 1882. Both of these Acts call for sacrifices of a kind which in ordinary times would be properly held to war against every principle of equal and just legislation. Landlords are invited, and indeed compelled, to abate what they and their ancestors have been taught to regard as their inexpugnable legal claims. The whole State and the national taxpayer is induced to contribute toward the reparation of a loss which the exceptional legislation brings with it, or rather which it shifts from the shoulders of the tenant to those of the landlord. The only apology for these desperate remedies is to be found in the historical relations of Ireland to England, some account of which will be given further on.

In the meantime it is necessary to cast a glance upon another Act of the session of 1882, apparently of a very different character from the Arrears of Rent Act and yet having a very close connection with its policy. The immediate occasion of the stringent provisions of the "Prevention of Crime Act" was the flagrant murders of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke in the Phoenix Park. The extreme severity of the Act has been objected to from the first not only by enlightened Irishmen but by many English Liberal members of Parliament. The best-founded objection to it is that it was devised under a panic, and that, for the sake of striking at an insignificantly small assassi-

nation society, the constitutional rights of all Irishmen were needlessly sacrificed.

The Act enables the Lord Lieutenant to direct, when he sees it to be necessary, certain classes of offences—that is, treason or treason-felony; murder or manslaughter; attempt to murder; aggravated crimes of violence against the person; arson; attacks on dwelling-houses—to be tried by a Special Commission Court. This court is to sit without a jury and to consist of three judges of the Supreme Court, all of whom must concur for the conviction of a person tried before them. An appeal is allowed in all cases to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which may quash the conviction or reduce the penalty but not increase it.

The Act gives special powers for enabling ordinary criminal trials to be removed to places more favorable for a fair hearing and for the substitution of special for common jurors.

The Lord Lieutenant has large powers conferred upon him of prohibiting public meetings and by proclaiming districts of rendering persons "out of their place of abode at any time after one hour later than sunset and before sunrise, under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of a criminal intent, liable to be arrested and to have to give account of themselves. In proclaimed districts strangers found under suspicious circumstances are liable to be arrested; and the Lord Lieutenant is empowered arbitrarily to seize and forfeit all copies of newspapers circulated in Ireland which "appear" to him to contain matter inciting to the commission of treason or of any act of violence or intimidation. The "Alien Act," which enables the Lord Lieutenant to order all aliens to depart out of the kingdom under penalty of imprisonment, is re-enacted.

The effect of such an Act as this will be determined by the way in which it is enforced, and as far as present experience goes it seems as if good and not evil will come from it. Already by the removal of an accused prisoner to Dublin he has been convicted by a jury for murder and hanged. Nor are there any complaints of an undue use of the perilous clauses for the suppression of newspapers and the banishment of foreigners. It was feared, indeed, at first that the bill displayed a recurrence to the spirit of English rancor against Ireland which would

awake the slumbering flames of Irish animosity and do away with all the pacific influence of the land legislation. But the best excuse for the policy of the Act was that if the condition of things was revolutionary enough to call for unexampled land legislation, the mere objection of want of constitutional precedent and suspension of constitutional right could not prevail. The whole question was how order and security could, for the moment, be best secured. The important point is that this legislation is exceptional and therefore temporary.

It appears that the two great Acts of this session at last exhibit the British Parliament in the attitude of grappling bravely, consistently, and not unwisely with the chronic ills of Ireland. The true seat of these ills lies in the far past. But the inquiry into their history is not a mere antiquarian indulgence. It may have a pertinence to remedies yet needed for Ireland. It certainly has a pertinence for other countries for which the precedent of British policy in Ireland may be either a beacon or an example.

It was the first misfortune of Ireland that in an age of feudalism Ireland alone of the countries of Western Europe never was feudalized. She derived no advantage from contemporary feudalism.

It is often asked, To what irreconcilable or unmanageable temper of the Irish people is it due that institutions which civilized England, Scotland, France, and Germany only vexed, alienated, and barbarized Ireland? The answer is the obvious one that, owing to its geographical remoteness, the circumstances of its so-called "conquest" by Henry II., and its deeply rooted Celtic institutions, Ireland was always outside the feudal system. The essence of that system was hierarchical subordination. But the English who led the settlement in Ireland in Henry II.'s time, and after, easily shook off their allegiance to their own feudal superior and king, while they wholly failed to generate habits of loyalty and reciprocal submission for any purpose whatever among themselves. The annals of the times and the works of all later historians are full of complaints of the imperfect way in which the English annexation was carried out. In form, indeed, the whole of the country was professedly held to be

in subjection to England ; but facts were too openly opposed to the truth of any such assumption for it to be recognized consistently even in State papers. The English in Ireland were regarded not as in undisputed military occupation of a definite territory, but as colonists having a precarious tenure of certain outlying portions of a soil in the possession of barbarians. The native Irish were the English king's "Irish enemies." The ancient laws and institutions were neither effectually suppressed nor, as was afterwards done in Scotland, recognized and incorporated in a newly imposed system of law. They were simply despised and left out of account. They were thus allowed to acquire all the strength of hereditary customs endeared as the symbols of resistance to an alien invader, till the time came at which the native laws had to be openly proscribed and, if possible counteracted. *Hinc illæ lacrymæ.*

It thus came about that the better suited were feudal institutions for England, the less suited was the partial application of them to Ireland. They could not succeed anywhere by being complete in their equipment and universal in their reach. The iron hold of habit and regularity which they had upon those really submitted to them unfitted the same persons to understand and govern those who had been submitted to a very different training. A feudal society, even at its best, could only subsist side by side with a non-feudal society by contemptuously leaving it to itself or by impotent attempts at forcible compression or extinction. The English in Ireland tried both methods. They alternately neglected and domineered, despised and violently assaulted. The result was not better but worse because English society in Ireland became internally disorganized and lost its own feudal cohesion. The feudal superior in England lost his hold over his own liege vassals on what was, in fact, a foreign soil ; and, consequently, the growing requirements of England in constitutional science and practice were never communicated to Ireland. The English carried with them to Ireland the predatory habits, without the discipline, of feudalism, while the native Irish suffered all the disorganization of invasion without profiting from the contact it brought with a more advanced race.

Another lesson taught by the history of the English in Ireland is the political bearing of land laws, especially when the relations of a conquering to a conquered race are concerned.

The essence of the feudal tie from the first was not so much mere reciprocity of obligation as estimated obligation. It was far more of a legal than of a moral tie, or rather the original quasi-moral obligation rapidly generated the distinctest of legal obligations. Feudal law and feudal lawyers combined with surviving Roman law to create the bulk of the law of all the States of Europe which is not purely commercial. It is only necessary to open an old French treatise on the customs of Paris, of Normandy, and of Rheims to understand how precise, far-reaching, and minute were the legal regulations to which the feudal system gave rise. English tenures, even as simplified by the centralizing reform introduced by William the Conqueror, were full of technicalities which it required all the energy of the chancellor and the legislature to moderate in order to secure some measure of practical justice.

This severity of calculable monetary relationship thus became the most marked feature of the English land system. It has no doubt been readily assimilated by the English people, to whom it has, probably, from the first been not uncongenial. It has also been productive of, or at least compatible with, the best agriculture, and, on the whole, the English nation at home has prospered under the system of a tenancy of land based wholly on the regular payment of rent.

But the circumstances of Ireland were just the reverse. Not only, as has been seen, did the feudal usages never extend themselves or take root in Ireland, but the tenure of land had, from the dawn of civilization in that country, up to, and long after, the English conquest been based upon wholly deficient ideas. The Celtic tenures were primarily rooted in tribal, and therefore in personal, relationships; and no necessities for military organization on a large scale ever arose to effect a transmutation of what was indefinite in these relationships into definite and calculable services. The cultivation and appropriation of each assigned portion of the national soil was bound up with the sentiments springing from the consciousness of a common kindred and a common stock. The sense of private ownership was merged in,

and softened by, preponderating sympathies of a kind which stirred the affections rather than kept alive a jealous and self-absorbed vigilance. Thus while in feudalized societies legal distinctions and legal rights and duties only too easily took shape and rapidly were hardened into sharply marked and clearly understood lines of demarcation between class and class, in Celtic Ireland everything tended to keep legal definition in abeyance, and to foster the growth of the doctrine that if there was any proprietor of the soil, the actual cultivator and no other was he.

It is not necessary to emphasize further the conflict of ideas which the introduction of English institutions into Ireland must have brought about, even had that introduction been made with some attempt at completeness and intelligent consideration for the state of things which had to be superseded. But it is well known that the feudalism introduced into Ireland was already internally disorganized ; that no serious attempt was ever made to extend effective English administration over more than a small portion of Irish territory ; and that the smallest possible consideration was ever given to the peculiarities of original Irish tenures or to the discrepancy between Irish and English sentiment as to the ownership of land. The practice of "absenteeism," which is an old disease in the conduct of the English relations with Ireland and was specially legislated against by English statutes, was only one distinct exhibition of the disparity between feudal and Celtic conceptions of the nature and responsibilities of tenure. It might well be that a feudal lord conceived he had no further duties to his vassal than to leave him—and perhaps protect him—in undisturbed occupation of the territory granted to him, and perhaps to accept his son or alienee as his substitute on payment of the customary fines and dues. As for the vassal, he expected nothing from his lord but secure possession of his land and exemption from irregular or immoderate exactions. The notion of the lord's residence near his vassals was no part of the feudal idea, and, except in the case of manors, was rather alien to it than otherwise, because of the strictly military possession on which the idea mainly rested. As was said above, the relations between a vassal and his lord, tho personal in one sense, yet always tended to become definite, legal, and precisely determined.

No more need be said to show why it was that "absenteeism" was a practice at once the most natural to the English landlord and most abhorrent to the temper and moral requirements of the Irish tenant. The Irish tenant knew no obligation to one who did not, at least by his personal presence, represent and recall the blood of the leader of his sept.

The English landlord could not see how his tenant could ask more of him than undisturbed possession of his estate and protection against eviction.

The mere fact that in Ireland the common practice is for the tenant to make his own repairs out of materials provided by himself, and that the reverse is the case in England, might of itself have indicated not merely a different basis for compensation for improvements, but a different relationship, from the first, between landlord and tenant. The law of prescription for land in all countries is based on the inconvenience of disturbing long-used rights and of disappointing the natural expectations and sentiments founded on undisputed possession of the soil. But these expectations and sentiments—which attach to the long-unquestioned use of all material things—attach with far greater strength to the use of land because of its requiring personal labor to make it productive. Hence the material wrought upon and the means and produce of the labor quickly become indistinguishable in the imagination of the cultivator. The rights of the true owner or landlord seem remote and unnatural, and nothing can keep them in memory but his presence and, if need be, his perpetual intervention. But the practice of the tenant undertaking all improvements by himself tended to drive the landlord further out of sight, while his own conception of the looseness of the personal tie between him and his tenant encouraged him to be an absentee. Thus, instead of contact with the English proprietors bringing Celtic notions of tenure into oblivion, the contact only elucidated and fortified them. The cultivator indulged to the full his sentiment of proprietorship, while the English proprietor only intervened by his agent to receive a sorely grudged rent.

It is sometimes supposed that it is the profession of the Roman Catholic religion which has been the main source of Irish

troubles, if not the apology for the prolonged English misgovernment of the country. But the misgovernment, or rather want of government, of Ireland began hundreds of years before the Reformation and the era of the persecuting laws against the Catholics. These laws, in their most stringent form, were only enacted just after the Revolutionary movement in England had rebuilt the throne on the principles of religious toleration and political freedom.

The way in which Catholicism in Ireland aggravated the conditions of the problem was that through the medium of a spiritual allegiance to a Power outside the British dominions and of an ubiquitous and sympathetic priesthood at home, the people was enabled to cherish and protect all the native associations which it had been the suicidal policy of England from the first to stamp out. Roman Catholicism to the Irishman in Ireland was what their Hebrew faith has been to the Jews in all the countries in which they have been scattered. In the one case as in the other the religious faith has preserved and vindicated the national traditions of the race. It has supplied the one and the other with teachers, sacred books, religious symbolism, and a sacramental ritual which have knit together successive ages of suffering and persecution and formed an impassable barrier against indiscriminate admixture with the potent strangers on all sides of them.

These secondary influences of Catholicism in Ireland were instinctively apprehended by the English Government in the early days of the English Reformation. Unhappily the wrong lesson was learnt and the wrong policy adopted. The violent imposition of the Protestant Church establishment and the discouragement followed by the cruel persecution of the national religion, only intensified the very political influences of that religion which it was intended to counteract. Instead of the force and area of Catholicism being reduced, it was rendered far more dear to the people as the strongest bond of their political union. The same story has been re-enacted from century to century in the case of the Jews. Where they have been most persecuted, as in Germany and Russia, their religious and political separation from the people among whom they dwell has been most strongly marked. Where they have been put on a

religious equality with other citizens, as in France and England, even their very religious distinctiveness is scarcely recognizable by those outside.

Thus the religious policy of the English Government in Ireland co-operated with the rest of the policy to exacerbate original differences between the governors and the governed without in any way diminishing their extent and intensity. Either successful propagandism or religious toleration is a possible policy. The first had an apparent success in crushing out the seeds of Protestantism in France. The second was, through political circumstances, forced on the English Government in the case of Scotland. But neither one policy nor the other was even so much as attempted in Ireland till the present century, and never completely so till the Protestant Church was disestablished and disendowed. Irish Catholicism, like the Irish language, and Irish customs, and the very personality of the Irish people, was habitually looked upon in England with mocking contempt. Something of this sentiment is not yet extinct, as the comic English prints frequently show; and it is said in Ireland that some of the recent illustrated Irish histories have done more even than English policy to render the breach between the English and Irish seemingly irreparable. Consequently no pains were taken to spread the principles of the Reformation in Ireland, to promote the religious education of the people in their vernacular tongue, or to stimulate independent thought. The Irish were simply treated as incorrigibly savage, and were commanded to accept the change of their religion or to take the consequences. All that was good and patriotic and generous resented the alternative of conversion; and the result was that the old religious bond became, to an ever-increasing extent, a political and social bond, and at the same time, unfortunately, the symbol of antipathy to the only government which affected to administer the country.

It is no matter of surprise that the constitutional relation of two such different countries as England and Ireland should have occasioned so much practical perplexity in the past, or that the establishment of them on a sacred basis in the future should seem to present almost insuperable difficulties.

During the larger part of the period of the connection of England and Ireland the relations of the two countries have been determined by nothing better than the accident of the original conquest or formal annexation, as afterwards qualified in its effects by every form of ignorant prejudice and political mistake. For centuries Ireland was administratively treated not merely as a conquered country,—because conquest was compatible with a wise and tolerant administration of the vanquished people and soil,—but as a conquered country to be incessantly conquered over and over again. The incessant revolution that prevailed was always attributed to the incorrigible qualities of the people and never to the faults of the government, or to any latent vice in the nature of the constitutional connection. So that each rebellion, or administrative obstacle, called out ever fresh violence of unfeeling aggression, and the constitutional tie seemed to become more and more unnatural and arbitrary.

In judging of all speculations on Irish affairs, especially by Irishmen, the influence of a merely reactionary spirit has to be largely discounted. It has been seen that the ruin of Ireland has been up to, and beyond, the middle of the present century due to the unjust, intolerant, and, at the best, the injudicious spirit in which England has intervened in the administration of the sister-isle. The national customs have been treated with rude contempt. The national religion has been first scouted with ignominy and then visited with every form of disability and practical outrage. The commerce of the country has been ostentatiously paralyzed for fear of its competition with England. The land of the country has been exploited by English landlords, who have habitually absented themselves from the country and done their utmost to apply remorselessly to an unreceptive soil the English law of landlord and tenant. The government of the country, whether administered by Englishmen sitting in a so-called Parliament in Dublin or by an overwhelming and hostile majority of Englishmen and Scotchmen sitting in Westminster, has been up to less than twenty years ago conducted not, even in profession, for the benefit of the bulk of the Irish people, but for that of the English having

estates in Ireland, or, at the most, of the Irish Protestants and landholders.

These facts being indisputable and undisputed it is no wonder that the Irish burst of remedial energy which an improved spirit in the British House of Commons has called forth for the moment should take the form of a cry for separation under the veiled form of "Home Rule." It is perceived with more or less indistinctness and confusion of vision that the past ills of Ireland have been closely bound up with the English connection. It is easy to rush to the conclusion that the cure for those evils is to be sought in breaking off that connection. The more decisive and complete the rupture (it is agreed) the more radical and effectual will be the cure.

The prevalence of such arguments has led to a reconsideration of the true grounds and justification of the existing governmental relations between England and Ireland. It is theoretically admitted, at this day, even in the British House of Commons itself that the good sought by the legislative union of England and Ireland must be found in the advantage of both parties and not in that of one alone. The question rather is what amount of advantage to one party to the bargain may be legitimately sought at the cost of some reduction from what would be of equal advantage to the other party. No one now contends that the union of England and Ireland ought to be maintained if England alone is a gainer and Ireland only a loser. But there are many who would contend that the union ought to be maintained if both countries gain, tho England gains more than Ireland; or, if both countries gain in the most momentous points of all, tho in other points both lose, England however losing perhaps less than Ireland.

The best defence of the union as at present existing is of the last kind and rests on the propositions that, first, in the government of physically separated territories the only choice is between a system of mere local government and one of federal union; and, secondly, while federal union between England and Ireland can be shown by demonstration to involve a constitutional shock to the whole relations of all the dependencies of the British Empire to each other, a system of local government in Ireland can be made compatible with the existing

union just as much as municipal institutions are part of the essential framework of the English constitution at home.

It is scarcely necessary to allude here to the extreme theory, hardly advocated openly in any quarter at present, in favor of entire separation of England and Ireland. Even Irishmen who are not hopelessly embittered, by personal hostility or historical reminiscences against England, scarcely relish the prospect of dispensing altogether with even the chance of finding in England hereafter a just and disinterested arbiter in the contest between Protestant and Catholic, Episcopalian and Presbyterian, landlord and tenant, industrial Ulster and pauperized Connaught. England has hitherto failed in this high duty, but the opportunity for fulfilling it is still there. The march of political conscientiousness and the growth of moral sensibility in politics are all full of promise that England will fulfil better in the future than in the past her high duties towards the weakest of her dependencies. The existing parliamentary representation of Ireland, however, places Ireland on a far more intimate footing with England than any mere dependency separated from England by the sea. This parliamentary incorporation of the two countries into one, if supplemented by a liberal system of local administration, must surely, of itself, go far to amalgamate together Englishmen and Irishmen by accustoming them both to approach questions severally interesting to each in a common spirit and with a common aim. This habit of joint and separate legislation has been attained with conspicuous success in the case of Scotland, tho the dynastic union of crowns and a hundred years' more experience have here supplied far more favorable conditions.

The immediate difficulty is that the relics of the historical antipathy between the two countries still operate strikingly among the lower orders in the constituencies. The result is that every bitter religious animosity, every anarchical passion, every phase of national vindictiveness, even every ignorant race prepossession, finds its personal reflection in the representatives sent to the British House of Commons. The results are seen in the melancholy story of parliamentary obstruction and in manifestation of undiluted anti-English sentiment. The remedy must be found lower down, in the constituencies themselves. Educa-

tion, perfect religious toleration, fair land laws adapted to the habits of the people, and the largest possible concession of local administrative independence, cannot but result in a higher class of candidates commanding confidence at the hustings. Parliament will thus be invigorated rather than weakened by the Irish element, and Irish members will rather be proud of their influence in the imperial politics of the British dominions than jealous of all interference (which in such circumstances would become ever less and less) of England in Irish affairs.

SHELDON AMOS.

THE UTAH PROBLEM: WHY IT REMAINS UNSOLVED.

IN 1846-7, having been outlawed in the States where they had previously attempted to establish themselves, a motley company of men and women took up the line of march for a country where, it was fondly hoped, in the development of the peculiar ideas which formed their bond of union, they would be free from the unwelcome interference of law and public opinion. California, then a part of Mexico, was the Mecca of their hopes, and dreams of a Mormon empire upon the Pacific Coast consoled the followers of the so-called "Prophet of God" for the loss of the homes from which they fled, and the hardships of their wilderness journey.

A study of the elements composing this hegira would open one of the most remarkable chapters in the phenomena of social science. We should here find proof that however singular, revolutionary, or irrational, in the judgment of the average man, may be the views of any individual member of society, if the opportunity be given, as when such a person possesses the qualifications of a leader and the gifts of a propagandist, unsuspected elements will be in readiness to be moulded to them. The power which the self-constituted apostles of the most startling social and religious theories are able to thus exercise over so large a number of their fellows is not to be accounted for by any mere generalization; and to legislate against the errors into which men are thus led upon the basis of such generalizations is a grievous error. Erratic tendencies in the human mind are constitutional, and in minds possessing such tendencies there is the same inherent disposition toward homogeneity and association which is characteristic of other men. To account for the

existence of this erratic element, or to say why it is especially attracted to this or that particular error, is a problem in social science which need not be discussed in this paper. The element and the tendency exist, and we find the logical result in social evolutions like that which has for more than forty years presented itself for the study of the American people, and has resulted in an organization which has proven itself able to survive the repeated assaults of law and to grow strong in the face of an overwhelming adverse sentiment.

It is a matter of history that ten thousand or more men, women, and children, denied the protecting ægis of the law in the profession and practices of a faith which they claimed to be founded on the most conscientious convictions, began an exodus which was intended to place them beyond the reach of the statutes with which that faith was in conflict; that the land of promise which they sought became subject to the United States while they were journeying toward it; that they stopped in their course in a remote and uninhabited portion of the national domain; and, where mountain barriers and leagues of wilderness lay between them and those whom they regarded as their persecutors, resolved to re-erect the altar of their faith and to lay the foundations of a State over whose affairs they should exercise such control as to secure for themselves and their children immunity from the dangers threatened by adverse laws and hostile sentiment.

As we step back into history and look upon the legions which, thirty-six years ago, poured over the Wasatch Mountains and descended into the fair valley below, what do we find them to be, and what shall we say of them? Are we prepared to weigh the motives which urged those beating hearts over a long and weary way into this wilderness with a judgment which shall be generous while it is just? A judgment which takes no account of the most trying and important period in Mormon history can be of little value; that based on mere prejudice is unworthy; and one founded on the strictest interpretation of the law, while legally just, may be most ungenerous. Those who would form a judgment of the members of the Mormon organization, which shall be in accordance with the canons of political wisdom and of Christian charity, are invited to look

upon these thousands encamped under the shadows of the Wasatch Mountains a generation ago. What of the men who have toiled with unmurmuring bravery for months, through dangers of ambush and storm and flood, on their westward way? are these all pretenders and knaves, or the willing dupes of such? Does this theory, or the idea of lust suggested by the doctrine of polygamy (subsequently announced, and never practised by more than a fraction of the Mormon population), afford a sufficient explanation of the spirit which animates this multitude to espouse a common cause, to accept obloquy and exile, and to meet the perils of the wilderness in the face of approaching winter? In this stubborn adherence to a common purpose; in this fierce battle with adverse circumstances; in this devotion to wives and children, do we find evidence to warrant the belief that the aged men, the stalwart husbands, and the youth of this great company are moved solely or chiefly by the lowest and basest of aims? These hundreds of gray-haired women in the passionless calm of old age; these many mothers with patient endurance bearing their part in the struggles of this strange life, and caring tenderly for their babes; these young wives adhering to the fortunes of their husbands; the maidens found in so many of these scattered groups,—are these representatives of woman-kind unreasoning bond-creatures or depraved women whose chief mission is to minister to the caprices and passions of base, hypocritical, and brutal men? Is all of this endurance of trial with a devotion approaching to heroism the outcome of charlatanism, hypocrisy, and libertinism? Are the prayers and hymns of these people nothing but a studied mockery cast in the face of heaven?

He who will answer these questions in the affirmative must be a blind student of nature and human history. To account for a socio-religious movement like that which led these ten thousand people into the wilderness, casting themselves upon the future with a faith or daring, however we regard it, equally wonderful, requires an inspiration based upon something deeper and stronger than the altogether grovelling and mercenary motives which suffice to unite the fortunes of those who are only adventurers or knaves. Whatever the honesty or sincerity of those who moulded the belief of these thousands into its eccen-

tric form, as they enter and take possession of Utah, they present the unmistakable evidences of a faith founded on sincere conviction.

Such was the beginning of the history of Mormonism in Utah. Imposition upon credulity there doubtless was; ambition, charlatany, and lust, each may be supposed to have had its place; but nothing short of a belief to which men and women gave themselves without reserve could have accomplished the results seen, and only this, taken in connection with the mistaken policy of the government and the people of the United States, can account for the subsequent marvellous growth of the Mormon organization.

The Mormon population of Utah from about eleven thousand in 1850 had increased in 1880 to a little over one hundred and twenty thousand out of a total of nearly one hundred and forty-four thousand. In place of a wilderness we find a vast cultivated domain threaded by highways and railroads. The wild lands of 1846 in 1880 yielded a product in cereals of nearly two million bushels, and in precious metals a value of nearly \$9,500,000. As early as 1879 (the only figures as to this item at hand) the total value of the assessed property of the Territory was \$24,985,072. From the number of 13 only in 1850, the public schools of the Territory had increased in 1880 to 390, maintained at a cost, for all classes, of more than \$200,000. And these results have been chiefly due to the enterprise and thrift of a people expelled as outlaws from Illinois, and who have been under the ban of the law during most of their sojourn in Utah.

History affords few examples of the growth, from such humble foundations, of a fabric, based on a religious idea, so important and so enduring as that which originated in the pretended revelations announced as made thirty-three years ago to one Joseph Smith, an obscure resident in a country town of Seneca County, New York. Born in 1830 of imposture and credulity; cast out from the place of its birth immediately after; driven in contumely from its refuge in Kirtland, Ohio; buffeted in Missouri, and driven to Illinois; baptized in the blood of the Nauvoo riots, and compelled in the beginning of its virile strength to fly into the wilderness, and there developing into what it is to-day; with whatever contempt we may regard its

origin, with whatever loathing we may look upon its accursed doctrines, we are compelled to confess that there is something in the Mormon organization which demands for its adherents, in spite of its abhorrent features, a degree of respect and consideration.

Had a policy based upon a reasonable degree of such respect and consideration prevailed in the Nauvoo era of the sect's history, is it probable that subsequent results would have been changed? And is it expedient to permit ideas of consideration and toleration to temper present dealings?

A picture, which we may doubtless accept as a fair one, of the Mormon Church at Nauvoo, was presented in the diary of the late Josiah Quincy, published in the *Independent* a year or more ago. His dispassionate judgment did not lead him to the conclusion so general in those days that the followers of Joseph Smith were for the most part cut-throats, marauders, and libertines; on the contrary, while finding in their fanatical ardor that which opposition might develop into a disturbing element in society, he credits them with qualities such as temperance, industry, and thrift, which are among the most important essentials to good citizenship. What if this eccentric community, with its commingled elements of good and evil, had been permitted to establish itself in Nauvoo, free to develop its theories, in so far as they did not involve illegal acts, and in so far as they did, amenable to the law, but without illegal or supralegal interference?

Individual eccentricity, in all well-ordered communities, so long as it does not lead to breaches of the law, is tolerated. If every man whose mind flies, at any given time, outside the even circle of ordinary thought should be adjudged a madman or condemned as an outlaw, the number of actual and hopeless madmen and outlaws would be so indefinitely increased as to involve society in a perpetual struggle with its erratic elements. Toleration not only prevents such results, but in the end has the effect of bringing thousands of erratic minds back to a natural and healthful course of thought and action. However delicate the questions which arise when we pass from the treatment of cases of eccentricity which are segregate to those which meet us in an aggregated form, the rule of toleration within the

limits of the law, whether judged from the standpoint of political wisdom, humanity, or Christian charity, applies here not less than in the case of the individual. The best safeguard against error and its results is the influence of truth; and the magnetic current of truth which mingles with the common-sense of the people in every circle of society, in a land like this, may be trusted, sooner or later, without the aid of means outside, or, in the natural course of things, extra proceedings within, the law, to prevent the propagandists of error, however they may associate, from doing serious injury to society. The truth of this statement is attested by the history of the many organized movements in opposition to the common-sense of the people, and in a greater or less degree obnoxious or illegal, which have sprung up in the United States, with boastful expectations, and under the influence of an orderly popular sentiment, supported by the impartial administration of the law, been irresistibly forced into conformity with law and public opinion, or driven out of existence.

The Oneida Community—a notable instance—during all of the Mormon controversy, in the midst of one of the most prosperous and intelligent communities in the State of New York, openly defied popular sentiment, and covertly transgressed the law, by the maintenance of a social system as abhorrent as that of polygamy. Its members were not mobbed, they were not terrorized in the name of the law, they were not driven into exile by persecution; and free contact with the healthful currents of the life about them has finally resulted in the disintegration of that portion of their social fabric which was maintained in opposition to law and the sentiment of their neighbors. If, by the exercise of mob law, the Oneida Community had been driven, thirty years ago, into one of the Territories, beyond the reach of the influences under which it is compelled to yield; and had for the greater part of that time had full opportunity for such growth as it could have secured, there is no reason for believing that the vicious features of its doctrines would have worked so little harm or been so soon abandoned.

Had the treatment of the Mormon community at Nauvoo been similar to that accorded to the community at Oneida, the irresistible influence of a hostile public sentiment, and of laws

humanely exercised, would undoubtedly have made the Mormon problem a matter of little concern. To assert the contrary is to assume that law is inadequate to the protection of a community from overt acts, and that the barriers of religion and morality are insufficient for the protection of an overwhelming majority against the contaminating influence of a generally despised minority.

We have said enough to warrant the statement that the people and authorities of Illinois are in a measure responsible for the development of a structure whose abnormal features, capable of but a sickly life, and destined to sure decay in that State, were driven to deeper root by persecution, and to free growth by exile. It is evident that the treatment of the Mormon organization by the government and people at the time of its permanent establishment, which dates from the Nauvoo period, was, aside from considerations of Christian charity and humanity, lamentably wanting in political wisdom.

We turn now to the subsequent period of Mormon history. Driven into the wilderness; incited to the fanatical adherence with which men characteristically cling to the doctrines which have made them the subjects of persecution; isolated from the surroundings calculated to modify, and finally to change, the drift of sentiment,—we find them in a domain wide enough for a kingdom, and practically as far from the seat of authority as if responsible to a power beyond the sea.

In the light of the fires kindled at Nauvoo, it would seem that statesmanship would have discovered a necessity for the adoption of measures calculated to restrain the tendencies toward evil evident in this virile and growing power on the nation's frontier, and to prevent it from developing, as there was plain reason to fear that it would, into a social organization adhering to a religious code, which must inevitably sooner or later bring it into open conflict with the laws of the land.

But where, in the records of Congress or upon the statute-books, is there any evidence of the really serious and statesman-like consideration which this phenomenal social movement demanded? Here is a people openly seeking a refuge where

they will be free to disregard the popular opinion left behind them, and to transgress the laws of the government to which they owe allegiance. Are restricting influences provided? Does the government, in the exercise of its legitimate authority, assume quiet but unmistakable jurisdiction over its territory, seized and appropriated in advance of any form of title? Does it guard against the realization of the boasted dreams of extended domain and self-government entertained by this law-defying people, by erecting guards against undue encroachment on the public domain, and by providing a government with the necessary machinery for securing the impartial reign of law and order? Were provisions made which would encourage the immigration into this garden-land of any portion of the law-abiding thousands who were landing upon our shores, and whose presence in Utah would have been a bulwark against, and an ultimate cure of, the evils of Mormonism?

The facts are the best answers to these questions. First, we find that anomaly in American history, the hierarchical and independent government permitted for three years to act its own will, with graceless conformity to such federal laws as did not interfere with the plans of its leaders, exercising authority under the name of the "State of Deseret." Second, we find this illegal government in 1850, under cover of laws framed to suit the plans of men more astute than the members of Congress who blindly enacted them, cunningly overlaid by a "territorial government," beneath whose framework, as under the ribs of the wooden horse which decided the fate of Troy, were concealed and brought within the domain of recognized law—in the substance of the abrogated code of Deseret—enemies of good government sufficient to account for the present condition of Utah. Third, with a power strengthened because used under statutes approved by Congress, we see a government, as essentially Mormon as that of the so-called State of Deseret, established and continued to this day in the exercise of supreme executive, legislative, and judicial control throughout the Territory. Fourth, we see schemes devised and executed, with little opposition, by which the choicest acres of the Territory are converted into the property of the church and held for distribution among, and, prior to this, as inducements for the immigration of, converts to

the Mormon faith. By evading the provisions of government land-acts, for the above and other purposes, through the perversion of laws relating to incorporated towns and in every other way possible, we see the Mormons come into possession of an area vastly beyond the wants of their population, and including, as shrewdly prearranged for, so large a part of the arable soil of the Territory as to threaten the ultimate closing of the door to an immigration not welcome. Fifth, we find a system of public schools established under laws whose provisions are capable of being so construed as to debar non-Mormons from becoming teachers, and which, in violation of a fundamental principle of our government, are used for the propagation of religious tenets. Sixth, we find, as clearly evidenced in a letter addressed to the writer by John Taylor, the successor to Brigham Young, and the head of the church (published by him in the course of a controversy in the newspapers of Salt Lake City), a power entrenched which assumes to administrate the judicial laws upon the territorial statute-book, but which uses the trust to abuse it by the substitution of religious tribunals which, if not secret, are open only to the audience of the faithful. Finally, we behold in Utah, as represented by the managers of the Mormon organization, a power which is monarchical in its assumption and exercise of authority, and which believes itself strong enough to defy interference with its structure or its schemes.

And this is the outcome of national legislation as applied to affairs in Utah during the last thirty years! An absence of wise legislation in the beginning, then laws calculated to suit the use of those whom they should have controlled, and now a people of law-breakers waxed strong and maintaining an attitude of defiance to authority in the face of anathemas from the pulpit, objurgations from the press, and a hot fusillade of ineffective enactments from the halls of Congress!

In view of the facts, we venture to affirm that the responsibility for the present condition of affairs does not wholly lie at the door of the Mormon Church, and much less at the doors of those who constitute the mass of the Mormon people. The individual members of that church are for the most part, whatever the prevailing opinion may be, as sincere in their adher-

ence to the doctrines which have been accepted by their credulous minds as are the Hindus in their belief in the divinity of the Veda. An epidemic of error, like that which has seized upon their minds and turned them from normal conditions, is not a solecism in history. Instances where apostles of strange doctrines have led men captive by thousands, and held their minds in thrall for periods varying in length, will occur to every reader. Schisms and errors of all descriptions, from those which offend against ecclesiastical canons to those which outrage moral sentiment and transgress civil law, are a part of the strange ordering of affairs which permits evolutions in human thought as eccentric and unexplainable as the character of the erratic bodies which appear and disappear in the heavens. The more than fifty thousand men and women (actual adult members of the Mormon Church) who blindly follow the lead of the apostles of a religion whose doctrines are at variance with the laws of the land, merely present a marked instance of what has occurred many times, and may occur often in the future, when doctrines suited to the purpose are instilled into minds that need only the occasion to bring them into cohesion. In the light of the teachings of social science, the success of the Mormon Church is only phenomenal because of the circumstances under which it has been attained, and for these phenomenal circumstances, justice demands that the responsibility be laid at the door of the government and people of the United States.

A young oak may lodge itself by the foundations of our house. As the result of our apathy, preoccupation, or want of foresight, it may be permitted to grow deep into the soil, to obtrude its roots beneath our walls, and, as it grows upward, to afford support to a poisonous vine. Under the circumstances, when the oak's uplifting roots threaten a breach in the wall, and the vine exhales deadly poison, if house and occupants suffer, where does the fault lie? Surely the mischief wrought by the vital forces which some freak of nature has planted at our side, is to be attributed not so much to that which is inherent in the nature of things as to our own fault in not taking proper preventive measures at the right time. Nevertheless, it will be said, oak and vine must be hewn down. True, as to

the material elements which threaten our dwelling; but the simile, while it clearly indicates where the responsibility for their thrifty growth lies, does not apply when we seek a remedy for the evils wrought and threatened by the Mormon oak and its polygamous vine. Axe and fire are not the instruments with which to cure the ills which our own supineness, want of statecraft, and mislegislation, have permitted to burrow beneath the walls and to poison the air of the state. Proscriptive legislation may drive conscious outlaws into unwilling obedience to civil mandates, but if applied to fatuous transgressors who base disobedience on religious convictions, when they are represented in a union of thousands of consciences, may produce a contrary result by making outlaws of citizens enough to form a kingdom, and invite a struggle which, while it could have but one ending, would be as unwelcome, unwise, and inhuman, as unnecessary.

A government which is itself largely responsible for evils which it seeks to cure is in duty bound to consider well and act wisely in the application of remedies. But while the responsibility of the government and people of the United States binds them to the application of a cure for the evils invited which shall not be intolerant or inhuman, it does not forbid the use of effective remedial measures suggested by political expediency and in keeping with Christian charity.

The consideration of such measures may begin with the axiom, That to tolerate error where truth surrounds it is the best means for its destruction. But for its isolation from vital contact with truth, the evil in Mormonism would have long since sunk out of sight. The remedy of first importance, then, lies in the adoption of measures which shall bring the people of Utah into contact with truth as truth is represented in the healthful, permeating, conquering common-sense of the average American citizen. Such measures are not difficult of adoption. Notwithstanding the pre-emption of so large a portion of the best arable lands of the Territory by adherents of the Mormon Church, there is yet a large and fertile acreage open for settlement. To ensure the occupancy of these wide and inviting fields by thrifty, sturdy settlers opposed to the unlawful tenets of Mormonism, laws relating to grants may be so amended as

to prevent sales to those who are not prepared to prove their intention to become, without reserve, supporters of law and order. Still further to encourage immigration of the desired character, exceptional inducements in the acquisition of lands may be offered to American citizens disposed to engage in agricultural pursuits or in the development of the vast and inestimably rich mineral resources of the Territory. As the result of inducements and restrictions such as those indicated, it is safe to say that, in a brief time, the population of Utah would be surrounded with a battery of influences whose electric currents would act with irresistible force in hastening the establishment of a normal condition of things. Another essential step toward remedying the present evils is to secure for Utah a popular government, conceived and administered in accordance with the spirit of the laws provided for the governing of the people of the other States and Territories. To secure a government of this character, aside from certain changes in its present constitution, will require a law-abiding majority among the voters of the Territory. The total polygamous vote, assuming that in a contest between Mormon and anti-Mormon candidates the Mormon vote would be practically unanimous, is at this time, as nearly as can be ascertained, not greater, and probably less, than twenty-five thousand, while the anti-Mormon vote is about twenty-four hundred. Female suffrage accounts for, it may be safely assumed, one fourth of the vote first named, while it affects the latter vote to a degree scarcely perceptible. The disfranchisement of women would, therefore, reduce the Mormon vote to less than nineteen thousand, or to nearly the actual vote cast for the Mormon representative in 1880. It is evident, therefore, that the increase of the anti-Mormon vote by sixteen thousand five hundred would in a general election overcome the Mormon majority. Such a change would not, it is true, immediately deprive the polygamists of control in the Legislature, but its effect would be to introduce into it an element which would speedily make its power felt, which would afford active support to the Governor and his adjutants, and whose influence would soon divide the already dissentient Mormon elements, in so far as wise legislation relating to polygamy is concerned, by winning the co-operation of the vast and increasing majority of non-polygamous Mormons, while the introduction and natural

increase of such an element in the assembly would of itself lead to rapid and wholesome changes. A wide discretion left in the hands of the Governor as to the use of the veto power, and the appointment to that position of a man of requisite wisdom and integrity, would put it in the power of the executive to defeat any attempt at improper legislation. Finally, provision should be made by which the public schools shall cease to be used in the interest of a religious faith. This can be best accomplished, and the efficiency of the system at the same time greatly increased, by placing the office of Superintendent on the same footing with the other executive offices; its incumbent to be appointed by the President. The administration of such an officer, if he be properly qualified, and if he shall be supported by provision for the withholding of public funds from schools which instruct in matters of religion, and have also the power to veto the appointment of improper teachers; would so change the character of the schools of Utah as to make them efficient means for breaking down such of the influences of Mormonism as are pernicious, instead of, as now, a potent means for their propagation.

The application of these remedies would not interfere with the more essential features of the Edmunds bill. That that bill alone would fail to afford a solution of the Mormon problem was inevitable. Enactments whose enforcement depends, in the ordinary use of civil processes, upon favorable local sentiment, to be effective without the aid of something like martial law, must have the support of a sufficient modicum of the right sentiment. If this essential element is wanting, until it can be brought into existence, unwelcome enactments will of necessity be made operative with such difficulty, in the absence of military force or its equivalent, as to prove practically ineffective. The introduction of the law-abiding elements necessary to secure their enforcement would give validity to the best features of the Edmunds bill,¹ as to all other wholesome laws; would render the disfranchisement of actual polygamists less difficult; and obedience to the statutes would be increased accordingly. The continued absence of such elements in the population of Utah,

¹ Without attempting a discussion of the various provisions of this bill, it may be remarked that there is grave question as to the constitutionality of measures intended to exclude from juries those professing the Mormon faith.

aside from other considerations to which we have called attention, will in itself secure the comparative failure of the recent Congressional enactments as remedial measures.

In conclusion, the means now necessary for the cure of the existing evils in Utah may be summarized as follows: First, Congressional enactments which shall offer special inducements to an agricultural and mining population opposed to the law-defying features of Mormonism, and which shall provide restrictions preventing further sales of government land to a population not of the character indicated. Second, the abrogation of the present constitution or such of its features as are designed for the benefit of Mormons, including female suffrage, and the substitution of laws not capable of such easy perversion in the interests of a law-defying organization. Third, the investment of the executive officers of federal appointment with the widest authority for the correction of abuses consistent with the spirit of our institutions. Fourth, a change in the office of Superintendent of Public Schools which shall make its incumbent a federal officer, and the placing of such power in his hands as shall secure the schools from danger of perversion, to use for illegitimate ends, by any class or sect.

The application of these or equivalent measures, with an allowance of sufficient time, must accompany attempts to enforce penal statutes like those provided in the Edmunds bill, or the enforcement of these statutes, in the face of a defiant population of one hundred and twenty thousand souls, may be expected to precipitate a conflict which will not soon terminate, will drive desirable settlers from the Territory, reduce its people to a state of active outlawry, and prove in other ways disastrous to the best interests of the Territory and the nation. The people, through their representatives in Congress, have before them three alternatives: that of applying remedies like those proposed or their equivalent; that of permitting the recent enactments, for reasons stated, to become nugatory while defiance to law shall continue; or that of subjecting the people of the Territory to a reign of military authority which shall kindle the fires of religious fanaticism, prevent desirable immigration, and continue for an indefinite period. Of these alternatives which will they accept?

HENRY RANDALL WAITE.

A NEW EXPERIMENT IN EDUCATION.

THE title of this article refers to an experiment which has been conducted during the last five years in New York under the auspices and chiefly with the support of members of the society for Ethical Culture. With the initiation of the enterprise the heart had quite as much to do as the head. Those who entered upon it were inspired by the hope of contributing in some degree to the relief of the masses, and were impressed with the belief that an improved educational system is the most efficacious means to this end, indeed the only measure that promises to pluck up the poisonous weed of pauperism at the root.

Having started, however, with a purpose dating from the heart, the supporters of the new school¹ are well aware that their work can only prosper if it receives the sanction of the ablest minds, and that no generosity of intention can recommend an undertaking unless the ideas on which it is based will bear examination in the clear, cold light of the intellect.

The following pages have been written with a threefold purpose: first, to bring the experiment to the notice of that large class of thoughtful readers who may be expected to take an interest in *any* new movement in education; secondly, to con-

¹ The Workingman's School and Free Kindergarten. The name Workingman's School is designed to indicate that the benefits of the institution are intended especially to accrue to the children of the working people, on the principle that those who are most sick need the physician most. By this is not meant, however, that the method of education by work should be confined to the children of the poor; on the contrary, it is important for the children of all classes, as will be sufficiently emphasized in what follows. The Workingman's School receives children from the Kindergarten at six and retains them until their fourteenth year. Thereafter the instruction is to be continued in a series of evening classes.

tribute to the spread of the principles here advocated ; thirdly, to evoke criticism in so far as there may be occasion for it.

The salient feature of the new experiment is that it introduces what may be called the *creative method* into school-education. The system of teaching by object-lessons has long been familiar to educators. It is proposed to improve upon this system by giving lessons in the *production* of objects. The step forward taken by Pestalozzi, when he summoned teachers to desist from the vain work of teaching the names of things, and to lead their pupils rather to a first-hand observation of things, marked a new epoch in the science of pedagogy. At present still another step must be taken, *viz.*, from the mere observation to the production of things as a means of acquiring knowledge ; and the taking of this step will mark another epoch in pedagogy. Froebel began to apply the principle of the creative method in his kindergarten. But the kindergarten system covers only three years of the child's life, while for the school-age proper no valuable and tangible formulation of the creative principle has yet been given. Here the work remains to be done, and the experiment of which this article speaks is an attempt to do it.

I find it necessary, in this place, to mark the distinction between the creative method applied to education and what is commonly known as industrial education. A great deal of confusion is often caused and a vast amount of prejudice is needlessly aroused by the use of ambiguous terms, especially in designating new methods or ideas. The phrase 'industrial education' may have, and has acquired two entirely distinct meanings. As understood by one party, it means the kind of education that is intended to foster industrial skill and to fit the pupil, while at school, for the industrial pursuits of later life. Perhaps the majority of those who insist on the importance of industrial education in public schools, and who are urging its adoption use the phrase in this sense. And the strenuous opposition to industrial education on the part of many teachers is doubtless explicable by the same understanding of it. They declare with some vehemence, and, I firmly believe, with entire justice, that the State violates the rights of children when it undertakes to prescribe their future career dur-

ing the school-age, and that the public system of education should be kept free from any subserviency to "the bread and butter interests" of later life. But there is a totally different sense in which the phrase 'industrial education' may be understood: not that education shall be made subservient to industrial success, but that the acquisition of industrial skill shall be a means for promoting the general education of the pupil; that the education of the hand shall be a means of more completely and more efficaciously educating the brain. It is in the latter sense, in which labor is regarded as a means of mental development, that industrial education is understood by the most enlightened of its advocates. They are well aware that to introduce a trade into the school is to dégrâde the school; that to take away from the young the time that should be dedicated to the elements of general culture and devote it to training them in a special aptitude, however useful later on, is to impair the humanity of the children. They desire nothing of this sort, and they ask that a workshop be connected with every school, for no other reason than that a chemical laboratory is connected with every college.

There are thus two antagonistic parties whose watchword 'industrial education' has alike become. The one seeks to make the mass of mankind more machine-like than they already are, tho with the proviso that they shall be made more perfect machines, more skilful to increase wealth and to feed the channels of the manufacturer's profits. The other party, standing at the opposite pole of thought, seeks rather to elevate the masses, to more completely develop the humanity of the young, and looks upon technical and art education in the school as a novel and admirable means for achieving this result. Since, then, the phrase 'industrial education' is susceptible of interpretations so diverse and so incompatible with each other, it is in the interest at least of those who have the higher educational aim in view to make use of a less equivocal designation; and the phrase 'the creative method' will henceforth be adopted by us.

Let me then endeavor to point out the application of the creative method in the school to the training of the intellect, to the development and refinement of the taste, to the formation of character. In respect to the training of the intellect, the

bearing of the creative method on the study of geometry will be especially obvious. The work on which the pupil is engaged in the school-workshop will make his conception of the fundamental geometrical relations unusually clear and distinct. The properties of a square, trapezoid, circle, ellipse, cube, cylinder, etc., will be more vividly realized by those who *embody* these forms than by those who only observe them. And if we remember that the geometrical forms are the key to the understanding of all forms whatsoever, we shall not underrate the importance of a perfect grasp of these forms by the youthful mind. At the end of this article will be found an outline of the scheme of lessons projected for the school-workshop. It will there be seen that the geometrical forms are produced by the pupils in different kinds of material and with a considerable variety of tools; and that the difficulties of the technical work and of the mathematical knowledge involved advance as far as possible in parallel lines. What Froebel began in the kindergarten is here carried out on a higher plane and with much greater minuteness of detail.

Secondly, in the school-workshop there is an intimate and constant connection between the drawing and the technical work. They are mutually complementary. The work is the concrete representation of the drawing, the drawing is the abstract representation of the work. It is well known how few workmen in the various trades are able to comprehend the abstract expression of form in a drawing so well as to translate it without the assistance of a model into the material at their command; or conversely, to represent a material form, if it be at all of a complicated character, in a correct drawing. But this faculty, which is of such inestimable advantage to the workman, and the lack of which is the subject of so many complaints, should be a part of the mental equipment of every well-educated person whether workman or not. No one can doubt that the language of form is one of those languages which every one should seek to master as being essential to the harmonious development of the mind; nor will it be gainsaid that the power of concretely expressing forms will give us a firmer mental hold upon the forms themselves.

Thirdly, the work of the pupils will aid them to a clearer un-

derstanding of the elementary facts of mechanics. The pupils will be taught to make parts of mechanism and will afterwards learn how these parts are put together. They will thus not only gain a more realizing knowledge of machines and their functions, but will also be led up to a better comprehension of the general laws and principles that underlie the action of machinery. Toward the end of the course they will be taught to cast in plaster of paris the most important parts of the steam-engine.

Fourthly, a series of workshop lessons has been specially prepared for the purpose of supporting and, as it were, supplying a foundation for the teaching of natural philosophy. The pupils will as far as possible construct their own scientific apparatus.

Parenthetically I would mention that the technical work of the pupils will be to them a gymnastic of the eye and hand. We hear much said concerning *mens sana in corpore sano* and concerning the importance of making every member of the body supple and pliable, every organ true and quick, so that the whole of our physical nature may be the ever ready and nimble servant of the soul. But how then does it come to pass that those two organs, the eye and the hand, which are the preferred messengers for carrying out the intentions of mind, should receive so little adequate discipline? To make good this deficiency, to secure a more perfect eye and hand training, and thus to carry forward the *gymastic art* to its highest applications, the workshop in the school is needed. Who will deny that the future physician, the experimenter in every department of science, and indeed every one to whom a deft hand and keen powers of observation are important, will find such a preparatory discipline in early youth an inestimable advantage?

I have thus far spoken only of the value of the creative method for the culture of the intellect. But we who desire an "all-sided" rather than a one-sided development of the child must take into account the æsthetic and moral nature as well. Only by the harmonious culture of all three can the larger humanity be perfected, and the creative method must show itself capable of giving a powerful stimulus in all these different directions if it

would vindicate its title to the high significance which we are inclined to ascribe to it.

Now it is easy to see that the production of beautiful forms by the pupil will tend to heighten his appreciation of what is beautiful, and to refine his taste. I here speak of the school-atelier as I have before spoken of a school-workshop. Both are equally needed to supplement the class-rooms of the ordinary school. In the latter mechanical drawing is made the basis of instruction, and the work executed is the means of creating mathematical precision; in the former free-hand drawing is the basis, and the work done is the means of cultivating a sense of harmony and of beauty. Little children of eight years in our school-atelier are now learning to model leaves of various shapes, architectural ornaments, the features of the human face, and heads of animals; and it is wonderful to see with what delight they enter upon their work, how like a flood the instinct of creation, which is usually repressed and pent up in children, rushes forth as soon as an opportunity is given it to vent itself. The writer of this article can testify that children of the poorest class have displayed a liking and an aptitude for artistic production that seemed in the judgment of artists who saw their work truly remarkable. Let us consider what a promise is contained in this beginning; and what a benefit it would be if pupils in all schools could receive a similar education! How would art flourish anew if the slumbering art-instincts of the masses of the people were awakened, and a public sentiment were formed favorable to and appreciative of the highest efforts of true art! For it is idle to expect that great artists will be formed in this country, or in any country, by schools and advantages for the few. The solitary artist must perish or deteriorate for lack of the congenial atmosphere in which alone he can live. The great artist is the rich, ripe fruit of a whole people's art-life; is the high-crested wave that rises out of a whole sea of similar tendency and endowment. And not only would the public encouragement and understanding of the best art be fostered in school-ateliers, but the faculty of adequately executing the ideas of a sculptor or an architect would thus be trained. The complaint is made that we have not in this country workmen who, like those of France, can enter sympathetically into

the conception of an artist, feeling what he desires to express, and, in their subordinate capacity, contributing to the fine realization of his intentions. Can it excite surprise that this should be so, when we compare the pains which are taken with the art-education of the people generally in France and the all but neglect into which this branch of education is suffered to fall amongst ourselves? The creative method has here, too, a great mission of reform to fulfil; and a fairer future will dawn for art in America when its principles shall be understood and recognized.

Lastly, in this connection I shall have to dwell upon the influence of the creative method on the formation of character. The influence of the new method in education will be nothing short of revolutionary in this respect inasmuch as it will help to overthrow many of the impure conceptions of morality that prevail at the present day. The mass of mankind have not yet learned the immanent quality of virtue, and seek in extraneous motives the sanctions of moral conduct. The very question they ask—What is the good of performing a virtuous act?—shows how unsound and how unmoral their conceptions of virtue are. And the answer commonly given—For the sake of some reward or punishment, either here or hereafter—tends to confirm the same conclusion. What men need to learn is the intrinsic value of virtue; what they need to revere is the authority and majesty of laws inherent in the soul.

And now I would point out how the occupations of the workshop and the atelier combined tend to establish in the mind of the pupil an unselfish and impersonal standard of valuation which will prepare him admirably for the truer moral estimate of life. For days and perhaps for weeks he labors to convert a formless material into a form illustrating mathematical truth or æsthetic harmony. He undergoes protracted toil and meets perhaps with many failures and disappointments in order to be rewarded at last—by what? Simply by realizing in some degree that perfectness of the object which he aimed at from the beginning. His work is devoid of any pecuniary value. It is a mere typical form. Its worth consists in being true or in being beautiful. And a habit is thus formed of judging things in general according to their intrinsic rather than their superficial qual-

ties. Gradually, and almost insensibly, the analogy of the work performed on outward objects will be applied to inward experience. A delicate sensibility to true and harmonious relations will be engendered, and the impressions thus obtained can later on be raised into convictions by direct moral instruction. The pupil, when of sufficient age, can be taught that in the world of thought, and feeling too, truth and harmony of relation are the sole ends to be sought. He can be exhorted to undergo similar toil, to be prepared for similar failures and disappointments, in order to realize at last something of the same inward perfection which is to be his only and all-sufficient reward. Thus while he is shaping the typical objects which the instructor proposes to him as a task, while he pores silently, persistently, and lovingly over these objects, reaching success by dint of gradual approximation, he is, at the same time, shaping his own character, and a tendency of mind is created from which will eventually result the loftiest and purest morality.¹

There are other incidental moral influences implied in the creative method. It leads to comradeship among the little workers. It allows of union of effort in the performance of those common tasks which are occasionally proposed to a whole class, when all the pupils combine to produce a common result and are alike interested in it because they have all contributed to its achievement. It leads to a willing recognition of superior merit in fellow-workers, and a subordination of the less to the guidance of the more efficient. This indispensable element of a generous character, in which the generality of workmen are so sadly deficient, is inculcated by the appointment of the abler pupils of a class to be the helpers, the foremen as it were, of the less able.

Having thus passed in review some of the principal advantages which the system of education by production carries with it, it will be readily perceived that they are calculated to accrue to the children of the rich as well as the poor, to those who will

¹ It may be objected that the pursuit of the beautiful does not always, as experience shows, react favorably on the character. But it must be answered that this is true only of a one-sided development in the direction of art; while in the school the severe discipline of the workshop is combined with the refining influence of the study and the creation of the beautiful.

later in life enter the professions as well as those who are destined for a trade, to those who will be merchants and scholars as well as those who will be compelled to do the hard physical labor of the world. But for the class last mentioned certain additional advantages will result from the method we have described ; and a few words concerning these may not be amiss. I count among the peculiar benefits which the working class will reap from the introduction of the creative method into schools, first, the circumstance that, becoming possessed of superior skill, they will turn out superior work ; that they will enhance the value of their country's manufactures in the great markets of competition, and will secure a larger share of the general wealth for themselves. But this pecuniary benefit, important as it is to the wage-earning class, we distinctly refuse to recognize as the chief aim and end of work-education, and we regard it as insignificant compared with a higher mental and moral good which superior training will place within reach of the future workmen. The worker in the factory at the present day too often moves like a machine among machines. He does not comprehend the wonderful processes which occur around him, and his mind is blunted and degraded by constant contact with operations of whose principles he is ignorant. Far otherwise would it be if he could be so far educated as to understand the nature of the material with which he deals, the laws which the gigantic forces that he utilizes obey ; and if the mechanical contrivances amongst which he labors would become transparent to his eyes so as to reveal their underlying plan. The worker becomes truly independent then when he has intellectually mastered his work. And it is one of the fairest promises of the creative method that it will ultimately help to build up such intelligence, that it will give a new dignity to labor by putting more mind into it, and that it will saturate the daily toil of the masses of mankind with understanding. Thereafter, when independence shall have been achieved in one direction, it will be less difficult to achieve it in others as well ; thereafter experiments looking to the more equal distribution of society's wealth will have some chance of success ; higher and juster forms of social life will not appear so hopelessly out of reach as they do now, and the individuals who must form the constituent factors of the new society will be prepared

and disciplined by intelligence and the practice of self-restraint to enter into a better order.

The leading features of the creative method have thus been delineated, and it only remains to add a number of minor points whose importance will be especially apparent to professional teachers.¹ The creative method will open a new avenue for exploring the individuality of the pupil. It will offer a new opportunity for the nature of the child to declare itself and to reveal its bias. The progress of all modern education is in the direction of greater individualization, and wise pedagogues will welcome any new test of individuality as an invaluable help.

The creative method affords a wholesome alternation between work and study, and thus provides an additional means of mental and bodily recreation. Change of occupation is often better than entire rest. When pupils shall pass from the class-room to the workshop or atelier, and from these back to the class-room, they will experience a new zest and relish for their school duties, and every faculty will become brighter and keener. It is a noteworthy fact that in England the results achieved in the half-time schools, which are attended by factory children, are on an average as high as in the ordinary day-schools. The work of the factory tends to quicken the observation, to concentrate the attention, and to stimulate the mental activity of those children, so that they learn in half time what others learn in full time. This experience may well serve to refute a persistent objection which the opponents of improved methods of education are in the habit of urging; namely, that the young are already sufficiently burdened, and that it would be injurious to impose new loads upon their already overtaxed brains. The system of education by work will have no such tendency; on the contrary, the exercise of their creative instinct will be a genuine refreshment for the

¹ It should be noted that not all the pupils of the school are required to go through the entire course of technical and art instruction which has been marked out. Those who, after a prolonged trial, show themselves to be hopelessly incapacitated in either direction are dropped from the course, and the main stress of their education is laid on other studies. In our own experience, tho we are dealing with the poorest class, the list of incapable pupils, as compared with the total number, is small.

young, and instead of imposing an additional load we shall in reality make all their other studies easier by the salutary influence which variety of occupation cannot fail to exert.

Furthermore, the creative method often affords us the means of rescuing an intellectual life that seems already past redemption. It is necessary to the mental health of adults, and deeply important in the education of children, that they should be able to do some one thing thoroughly well. The being able to do one thing well is the starting-point for doing other things well. Now it happens not infrequently that children, and especially those whose memory is weak, fall hopelessly behindhand in the ordinary branches of a public-school course. In consequence they are set down as dunces, and hearing this opinion constantly repeated by others, they gradually adopt it themselves, settle down to the conviction of their stupidity, and fall into a dull, brooding condition from which they may never emerge. Cases of such children have occurred in the Workingman's School. But what a change was observed in these very children when they were taken into the school-workshop! They happened to be exceptionally endowed with manual skill: in the workshop they easily performed the tasks set them, and even excelled their fellow-pupils. As a consequence their crushed self-respect re-arose, their attitude became manlier, their look more confident, they had done one thing well; and this gave a favorable turn to their whole development, and a new impulse to their exertions in every direction. It is assuredly no slight argument in favor of the creative method that it affords us a means of building up the self-respect of children who are mentally backward, and thus furnishes a point where the lever may be applied in order to raise their entire intellectual status.

In conclusion it should be said that the reflex influence of the creative method is felt even in those branches in which its direct application is impossible. There are many objects of knowledge which children cannot reproduce. But they can be taught to represent the objects which they cannot make, and they may even be led to enact at least the simpler events of history dramatically in the class-room. This indeed is, in a word, the meaning of the forward movement in education which we advocate; namely, that whatever the subject taught may be, the appeal

should be to the spontaneity of the pupils, and that their relation to the objects of knowledge should be as far as possible active, not merely contemplative.

The purpose of the creative method is to build up a more complete humanity in the young. The total humanity of the child is the ideal aim; and in the interest of no base or mercenary end, but of this highest spiritual purpose, the school workshop and atelier are demanded. Over their portals should be inscribed: "Sacred to the larger Humanity."¹

FELIX ADLER.

¹ It may be proper to add that in the school whose method we have described, seeing that the total humanity of the children is the aim, we have found it necessary to extend our influence beyond the school into the homes. A close connection between the parents and the teachers of the school has been established. Every month a so-called Parents' Meeting takes place at which the progress or deficiencies of the pupils are brought to the notice of their parents. At these meetings, moreover, some special features of the method of the school are always discussed, so that the parents may gain an insight into our plans and give us their assistance in carrying them out. The result has thus far been most satisfactory. The parents have, of their own accord, organized a committee to support the managers of the school, and a feeling of mutual confidence and good-will prevails.

A second measure was found necessary to facilitate the working of the system. In teaching natural history it became evident that many of our pupils, taken as they were from the tenement-houses of New York, did not possess those elementary impressions of nature upon which, as a foundation, the instructor must build. We arranged, therefore, to send out a vacation-colony into some picturesque district of country, and selected the little town of Sherman, in Pennsylvania, for this purpose. Thither, for several years in succession, almost the entire school has gone in charge of the principal. And there in the woods, and among the hills, and along the streams, they have gained not only new health and vigor, but also that more vivid realization of natural objects which will contribute greatly to enhance the value of their winter's study.

The chief practical difficulty in carrying out the plan of the school was found to consist in formulating a series of workshop lessons whose value should be educational. Numerous attempts at so-called industrial education have been made, both in this country and abroad, but to our knowledge they are for the most part aimless, incoherent, and lacking in system. There are thousands of manual occupations from which a selection must be made, and of these, now one kind, then another, has been chosen for introduction into the school (printing, carpentry, basket-making, and the like), without much rhyme or reason in the choice. What is needed is a principle of selection which shall organically connect the work-instruction with the remaining branches. It seemed to the writer that such a principle of selection might be found in the drawing course in both its de-

partments: mechanical drawing to be the basis of instruction in the workshop, and free-hand drawing the basis of work in the atelier. In the department of art-instruction the realization of this idea seems comparatively easy; in the department of technical instruction the difficulty is much greater. An attempt to solve it has however been made, and the following outline will afford the reader a survey of the scheme of workshop lessons projected for and partly carried out in the school. The board of managers of the school are not committed to all the details of the plan, which will continue to be modified as the experiment proceeds. But the scheme will show at least the lines along which we hope to advance toward our goal.

The following is submitted as a plan of co-operative drawing and work instruction for the eight classes of the workingman's school:

This plan consists of a series of exercises so arranged that the different tools and materials of construction employed are successively introduced according to the ages and abilities of the pupils, so that the actual practice necessary for the skilful manipulation of the tools may be given simultaneously with an education of the mind.

The exercises planned for the five lowest classes involve the rudiments and most important principles of geometry, and also introduce such study of mathematics found to be necessary for making measurements and for the calculation of areas and volumes.

For the latter part of the course exercises have been arranged in which the pupil will make drawings and construct the apparatus necessary for making simple experiments illustrating the elementary principles and most useful laws of mechanics and physics. Throughout the scheme the exercises in the work-instruction course will be constructed from the pupil's own drawings. By this means the work of both the drawing and the work-instruction departments will be pursued at a greater advantage than they would be if entirely independent of each other; but besides this, the pupil will be taught to appreciate the true relation between the plan and the construction. The habit of working from a definite plan will be inculcated, which will be of great value and an important factor to the pupil's success in whatever he may undertake later in life.

To illustrate definitely the connection that exists between the drawing and the work-instruction courses, an example of an exercise designed for the fourth class is taken. In the drawing-room the pupil will be given a model of a cone from which he will take measurements and then make a complete working drawing. In the workshop, with the drawing, proper material, and tools, the pupil will turn in his lathe a cone according to his drawing, which when completed will be a copy of the original model used in the drawing-room.

The following is a very brief summary of the plan for each class:

The exercises planned for the eighth and seventh classes introduce the use of paper, pencils, triangles, compasses, and rulers in the drawing-room. In the work-room small toy squares and chisels are employed for carving geometrical forms from pieces of clay. Only plane figures are involved in the exercise for the eighth and seventh classes, from which the pupil will acquire a knowledge of the names and properties of lines, angles, polygons, circles, parts of the circle, and also the methods of construction of many geometrical forms.

In order that the exercises may have greater interest to the pupil than could

be elicited from the study of abstract geometrical figures, the pupil will first be shown a model of some familiar object composed of pieces representing different geometrical forms. For example, a model of a house will be taken at first, and then the different geometrical figures, as the square, the rectangle, and the triangle, which enter into the structure of the model will be taken as the subjects of different exercises.

The exercises designed for the sixth class introduce the use of the drawing-board and "T-square." In the work-instruction course the knife is employed in cutting the developments of geometrical solids from pasteboard. By means of the exercises arranged for this class the pupil will be given a conception of the relation between the development and the finished solid, and will also acquire a more thorough knowledge of the properties of the plane figures which have been subjects of exercises during the two preceding years.

The exercises arranged for the fifth class introduce the use of the hand-bracket or scroll saw in the workshop.

In connection with the exercises, methods will be given for calculating the area of different plane figures and for the construction of ovals and ellipses.

The exercises planned for the fourth class introduce in the drawing-course the drawing of solids, and in the workshop a series of parallel exercises in which the hand-saw is introduced and practice given in wood-turning. The aim of the exercises prepared for this class is to teach the methods of draughting solid bodies, and methods for calculating the volumes of many of the solids which are subjects of the exercises.

In the exercises arranged for the third class the drawing of objects composed of several parts is introduced. In the workshop a carpentry course will be taken up in which a large part of the apparatus used for the experiments in mechanics and physics will be constructed. By the construction of different types of joints used in framing, and applying them in the simple form of bridge or roof truss, the pupil will be taught the form that should be given joints, to illustrate special varieties of strain.

The exercises planned for the second class introduce drawing, from "free-hand sketches," parts of the machinery used in the shop. In the workshop a series of exercises will be given in moulding, in which a general knowledge of the principles of moulding will be taught. The moulds will be set up as they would be in any iron-foundry, but, as a substitute for molten iron, liquid plaster of Paris will be poured in casting. Many of the patterns used in making the moulds will be the results of preceding exercises.

The exercises designed for the first class give a continuation of drawing parts and combinations of parts of machinery used in the shop. In the workshop practice will be given in the chipping and filing of metals and the hand-turning of brass. Many of the exercises in drawing will be the representation of parts of the steam-engine; and as a culminating exercise in the shop the pupil will construct a small and simple form of steam-engine. In connection with this last exercise the pupil will become familiar with the operations and functions of the parts of a steam-engine.

The exercises intended to illustrate many elementary principles and laws of mechanics and physics have been chosen so that the pupil, with the knowledge of the use of tools acquired in the workshop, will be able to construct most of the

apparatus necessary for the experiments, as well as to afford him the opportunity of taking part in their performance.

In mechanics experiments will be made illustrating the action of force, inertia, gravity, laws of the pendulum, laws of falling bodies, moments, centrifugal force, etc.

In physics a number of exercises have been planned to illustrate the most important facts with regard to hydrostatics, hydraulics, pneumatics, sound, light, heat, and electricity.

In order to give an idea of the plan to be adopted with reference to the experimental exercises an example is taken in which the reflection of sound will be illustrated by experiment. In the workshop the pupil will construct from his drawing a simple apparatus consisting of a stand carrying two pulleys, one of which is much smaller than the other and can be rotated with considerable velocity by turning the larger wheel, which communicates its motion to the smaller one by means of an endless cord extending around the circumferences of both. A disc of card-board with two sectors cut out of it on opposite sides of the centre will be attached to the axis of the smaller wheel. A toy-trumpet held near the revolving disc will be used to produce the sound, which to a listener will seem to increase and diminish in power as it is alternately shut off and reflected or is allowed to pass through one of the apertures.

The foregoing is a general outline of the detailed plan which is submitted as provisional, and will be modified at any time as experience may dictate to be necessary for the fulfilment of its object.

ST. PAUL.

THAT the apostle Paul was one of the greatest men, if not the greatest, in the spiritual history of our race is universally admitted. "Should any one ask me," said a distinguished French orator (Adolphe Monod), "to name the man who, of all others, has been the greatest benefactor of our race, I should say without hesitation, the apostle Paul. His name is the type of human activity the most endless, and at the same time the most useful that history has cared to preserve." Another Frenchman (Dr. Godet) calls him "a unique man for a unique work." Even Renan, who has no sympathy whatever with Paul's doctrines and inner life, and cannot understand them, yet feels constrained to do homage to the lofty intellect and the noble heart of him whom he designates as the apostle of marching and conquering Christianity ("*le christianisme conquérant et voyageur*"). Baur and the Tübingen school of radical critics almost make Paul rather than Jesus of Nazareth the founder of Christianity as a system of free and universal salvation.

Paul's career was that of a moral hero and conqueror of souls for Christ, far less brilliant indeed, but infinitely more noble, beneficial, and enduring, than that of military conquerors prompted by ambition, sacrificing millions of treasure and myriads of lives, to die at last in a drunken fit at Babylon, or of a broken heart on the lonely rocks of St. Helena. Their empires have long since crumbled into dust, but St. Paul still remains the great moral teacher of victorious faith, of Christian freedom and progress; and the pulses of his mighty heart are beating even with greater force now than ever before throughout the civilized world. His Epistles are to this day, as they have been for eighteen centuries, a mine of wisdom and comfort, an inspira-

tion to great thoughts and deeds, a Magna Charta of freedom from bondage, a lever of reform in countries and languages of which he never heard.

Paul had the natural outfit for his great work. He combined Semitic fervor, Greek versatility, and Roman energy. A Hebrew of the Hebrews of the school of Gamaliel, a Hellenist of Tarsus and master of the Greek tongue, and a Roman citizen by birth, he was better qualified than any other apostle to proclaim, expound, and defend the Christian religion as a power of universal salvation for Jew and Gentile on condition of a living faith.

But his great talents were at first weapons of destruction. He was an architect of ruin before he became an architect of the temple of God. Educated in the strictest school of the Pharisees, he regarded Jesus of Nazareth as a dangerous innovator, as a false Messiah and seducer of the people who was justly put to death. He placed himself at the head of persecution which broke out after the bold speech of Stephen, the protomartyr, and determined to stamp out this dangerous sect, thinking thereby to promote the glory of God and the honor of his ancestral religion. After scattering the congregation of Jerusalem, he proceeded with full authority from the Sanhedrin to Damascus to bring the fugitive Christians back to Jerusalem in chains. But the height of his fanatical opposition was the beginning of his devotion to Christianity.

That event at Damascus marks an epoch not only in the history of Paul and the apostolic church, but also in the history of mankind. The sudden and radical transformation of the most dangerous persecutor into the most successful promoter of Christianity is nothing less than a miracle of divine grace which rests on the greater miracle of the resurrection of Christ. Both are inseparably connected; without the resurrection the conversion would have been impossible, and on the other hand the conversion of Paul is one of the best proofs of the resurrection of Christ. Both stand or fall together.

Attempts have been made, as in the case of the resurrection of Christ,¹ to explain the conversion of Paul from purely natu-

¹ Compare an article on that subject in the PRINCETON REVIEW for May, 1880.

ral causes without a miracle, but they have failed. Let us briefly examine them.

1. The old rationalistic theory of thunder and lightning, which has been abandoned in Germany, but recently revived and rhetorically embellished by Renan (in his "Les apôtres," ch. x. pp. 175, *sqq.*), attributes the conversion to physical causes; namely, a violent storm and the delirium of a burning Syrian fever in which Paul superstitiously mistook the thunder for the voice of God, and the lightning for a heavenly vision. But the record says nothing about thunder-storm and fever, and both combined could not produce such an effect upon any sensible man, much less upon the history of the world. Who ever heard the thunder speak in Hebrew or in any other articulate language? And had not Paul and Luke eyes and ears and common-sense, as well as we, to distinguish between an ordinary phenomenon of nature from a supernatural vision?

2. The vision-hypothesis resolves the conversion into a natural psychological process and into an honest self-delusion of Paul; as the resurrection of Christ is supposed to have been a sweet dream of the apostles. This is the favorite theory of the modern rationalists of the Tübingen and Leyden schools and their followers in England. Dr. Baur and Strauss started it, and Holsten, Lipsius, Pfleiderer, Hausrath, and the author of "Supernatural Religion" adopted and defended it. Holsten is its chief expounder and advocate, in his "Christusvision des Paulus." The theory is undoubtedly more rational than the thunder-and-lightning theory, because it ascribes a mighty moral change to intellectual and moral rather than physical and accidental causes. It assumes that a great fermentation was going on in the mind of Paul on his way to Damascus which resulted at last by logical necessity in an entire change of conviction and conduct, without any supernatural influence, the very possibility of which is denied by this school as a breach in the continuity of historical development. The miracle in this case was simply the symbolical reflection of the commanding presence of Jesus in the thoughts of Paul; in other words, a delusion.

It is incredible that a man of such a sound, clear, and strong mind as that of Paul undoubtedly was, should have made such a radical and far-reaching blunder as to confound subjective reflec-

tions with an objective appearance of Jesus whom he persecuted, and to ascribe solely to an act of divine mercy what he must have known to be the result of his own thoughts, if he thought at all.

The advocates of this theory throw the appearances of the risen Lord to the older disciples, the later visions of Peter, Philip, and John in the Apocalypse, into the same category of subjective illusions in the high tide of nervous excitement and religious enthusiasm. It is plausibly maintained that Paul was an enthusiast, fond of visions and revelations, and that he justifies a doubt concerning the reality of the resurrection itself by putting all the appearances of the risen Christ on the same level with his own, altho several years elapsed between those of Jerusalem and Galilee, and that on the way to Damascus.

But this, the only possible argument for the vision-hypothesis, is entirely untenable. When Paul says, "*Last* of all, as unto an *untimely* offspring, Christ appeared to me also," he draws a clear line of distinction between the *personal* appearances of Christ and his own later visions, and closes the former with the one vouchsafed to him at his conversion. Once, and once only, he claims to have seen the Lord in visible form, and to have heard his voice; last, indeed, and out of due time, yet as truly and really as the other apostles. He uses the *realness* of Christ's resurrection as a basis of his wonderful discussion of the future resurrection of believers, which would lose all its force if Christ was not actually raised from the dead.

Moreover, his conversion coincided with his call to the apostleship. If the former was a delusion, the latter must have been a delusion. He emphasizes his direct call to the apostleship of the Gentiles by the personal appearance of Christ without any human intervention, in opposition to his Judaizing adversaries who tried to undermine his labors. (Gal. i. 1-18).

The whole assumption of a long inward preparation, both intellectual and moral, for a change is without any evidence, and cannot set aside the fact that Paul was, according to his repeated confession, at that time violently persecuting Christianity in its followers. His conversion can be far less explained from antecedent causes, surrounding circumstances, and personal motives than that of any other disciple. While

the older apostles were devoted friends of Jesus, Paul was his enemy, bent at the very time of the great change on an errand of cruel persecution, and therefore in a state of mind most unlikely to give birth to a vision so fatal to his present object and his future career. How could a fanatical persecutor of Christianity, "breathing threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord," stultify and contradict himself by an imaginative conceit which tended to the building up of that very religion which he was laboring to destroy?

But supposing, with Renan, that his mind was temporarily upset in the delirium of feverish excitement, he certainly soon recovered health and reason, and had every opportunity to correct his error: he was intimate with the murderers of Jesus, who could have produced tangible evidence against the resurrection if it had never occurred; and after a long pause of quiet reflection he went to Jerusalem, spent a fortnight with Peter, and learned from him and from James the brother of Christ their experiences and compared them with his own. Everything in this case is against the mythical and legendary theory which requires a change of environment and the lapse of years for the formation of poetic fancies and fictions.

Finally, the whole life-work of Paul from his conversion at Damascus to his martyrdom in Rome is the best possible argument against this hypothesis and for the reality of his conversion as an act of divine grace. "By their fruits ye shall know them." How could such an effective change proceed from an empty dream? Can an illusion change the current of history? By joining the Christian sect Paul sacrificed everything, at last life itself, to the service of Christ. He never wavered in his conviction of the truth as revealed to him, and by his faith in this revelation he has become a benediction to all ages.

The vision-hypothesis denies objective miracles, but ascribes miracles to subjective imaginations, and makes a lie more effective and beneficial than the truth.

It is evident, therefore, that the rationalistic and natural interpretations of the conversion of Paul turn out to be irrational and unnatural; the supernatural interpretation of Paul himself after all is the most rational and natural.

And to this conclusion honest doubt has been driven at last

in its ablest representatives. Dr. Baur, the master-spirit of sceptical criticism and the founder of the "Tübingen school," felt constrained, shortly before his death (1860), to abandon the vision-hypothesis and to admit that "no psychological or dialectical analysis can explore the inner mystery of the act in which God revealed his son in Paul" (*keine, weder psychologische noch dialektische Analyse kann das innere Geheimniß des Actes erforschen, in welchem Gott seinen Sohn in ihm enthülte*). In the same connection he says that in "the sudden transformation of Paul from the most violent adversary of Christianity into its most determined herald" he could see "nothing short of a miracle" (*Wunder*); and adds that "this miracle appears all the greater when we remember that in this revulsion of his consciousness he broke through the barriers of Judaism and rose out of its particularism into the universalism of Christianity." This frank confession is creditable to the head and heart of the late Tübingen critic, but is fatal to his whole anti-supernaturalistic theory of history. *Si falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.* If we admit the miracle in one case, the door is opened for all other miracles which rest on equally strong evidence.

Dr. Keim (d. 1879), an independent pupil of Baur, who in his "Life of Jesus" even went beyond Baur on the Johannine question, admits at least *spiritual* manifestations of the ascended Christ *from heaven*, and urges in favor of the objective reality of the Christophany of Paul, as related by him 1 Cor. xv. 3, *sqq.*: "The whole character of Paul; his sharp understanding, which was not weakened by his enthusiasm; the careful, cautious, measured, simple form of his statement; above all, the favorable total impression of his narrative and the mighty echo of it in the unanimous, uncontradicted faith of primitive Christendom."

Prof. Reuss, of Strassburg, likewise an independent critic of the liberal school, in his recent Commentary on the Pauline Epistles (1878), came to a similar conclusion; namely, that the conversion of Paul, if not an absolute miracle, is at least an unsolved psychological problem. "*La conversion de Paul,*" he says, "après tout ce qui en été dit de notre temps, reste toujours, si ce n'est un miracle absolu, dans lesens traditionnel de ce mot, du moins un problème psychologique aujourd'hui insoluble. *L'explication dite naturelle, qu'elle fasse intervenir un orage ou qu'elle se retranche dans le do-*

maine de hallucinations . . . ne nous donne pas la clef de cette crise elle-même qui a décidé la métamorphose du pharisen en chrétien."

The conversion of Paul changed his character and course of life, without destroying his identity. The connecting link between Saul the Jew and Paul the Christian was the honest and earnest pursuit of righteousness, or conformity to the holy will of God. First he sought it through works of the law and failed, then he sought and found it through faith in Christ who died and rose for him; and this faith became the most powerful stimulus to holiness. Hereafter he was identified with Christ, and love to Christ was his only passion. The engine was reversed and its direction changed, but it was the same engine, only purged, improved, and intensified in energy. The weapons of destruction became weapons of construction. He remained the same fearless, martial, and heroic nature, but under the banner of the cross against the enemies of the cross. The same vigor, depth, and acuteness of mind, but illuminated by the Holy Spirit; the same imperious temper and burning zeal, but subdued and controlled by wisdom and moderation; the same energy, boldness, and independence, but coupled with gentleness and meekness; and added to all this, as crowning graces, a love and humility, a tenderness and delicacy of feeling, almost without a parallel in the history of saints. The little Epistle to Philemon reveals a perfect Christian gentleman, a nobleman of nature, doubly ennobled by grace; and the seraphic description of charity in the first Epistle to the Corinthians surpasses in beauty anything that has ever been said and written on the same subject. It alone is a sufficient proof of his inspiration.

The work of Paul was twofold—practical and theoretical. We can only glance at it and present it in its general outline. He was the greatest missionary and the profoundest theologian among the apostles. He preached the gospel of free and universal grace from Damascus to Rome, and secured its triumph in the Roman Empire, which means the civilized world of that age. At the same time he built up the church from within by the exposition and defence of the gospel in his Epistles. He descended to the humblest details of ecclesiastical administration and discipline, and mounted to the sublimest heights of theological speculation.

His inspiring motive was love to Christ and to his fellow-men. "The love of Christ," he says, "constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died: and he died for all that they who live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." He regarded himself as a bondman and ambassador of Christ, entreating men to be reconciled to God. Animated by this spirit, he became "as a Jew to the Jews, as a Gentile to the Gentiles, all things to all men, that by all means he might save some."

He made Antioch, the capital of Syria and the mother-church of Gentile Christendom, his point of departure for and return from his missionary journeys, and at the same time he kept up his connection with Jerusalem, the mother-church of Jewish Christendom. Altho an independent apostle of Christ, he accepted a solemn commission from Antioch for his first great missionary tour. He followed the westward current of history, commerce, and civilization from Asia to Europe, from Syria to Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, and perhaps as far as Spain and Gaul; and had America been discovered earlier he might have crossed the ocean and preached to the native Indians. As it was, he came, as Clement of Rome says, "to the extreme boundary of the West." In the larger and more influential cities—Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Rome—he resided a considerable time. From these salient points he sent the Gospel by his pupils and fellow-laborers into the surrounding towns and villages. But he always avoided collision with other apostles, and sought new fields of labor where Christ was not known before, that he might not build on any other man's foundation. This is true independence and missionary courtesy, which is so often, alas! violated by missionary societies inspired by sectarian rather than Christian zeal.

His chief mission was to the Gentiles, without excluding the Jews, according to the message of Christ delivered through Ananias: "Thou shalt bear my name before the Gentiles and kings, and the children of Israel." Considering that the Jews had a prior claim in time to the Gospel ("to the Jews *first*," Rom. i. 16), and that the synagogues in heathen cities were pioneer stations for Christian missions, he very naturally ad-

dressed himself first to the Jews and proselytes, taking up the regular lessons of the Old Testament Scriptures, and demonstrating their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth. But almost uniformly he found the half-Jews, or "proselytes of the gate," more open to the Gospel than his own brethren; they were honest and earnest seekers of the true religion, and formed the natural bridge to the pure heathen and the nucleus of his congregations, which were generally composed of converts from both religions.

In noble self-denial he earned his subsistence with his own hands, as a tent-maker, that he might not be burdensome to his congregations (mostly belonging to the lower classes), that he might preserve his independence, stop the mouths of his enemies, and testify his gratitude to the infinite mercy of the Lord, who had called him from his headlong, fanatical career of persecution to the office of an apostle of free grace. He never collected money for himself, but for the poor Jewish Christians in Palestine. Only as an exception did he receive gifts from his converts at Philippi, who were peculiarly dear to him. Yet he repeatedly enjoins upon the churches to care for the liberal temporal support of their teachers who break to them the bread of eternal life.

Of the innumerable difficulties, dangers, and sufferings which he encountered with Jews, heathens, and false brethren we can hardly form an adequate idea; for the book of Acts is only a summary record. He supplements it incidentally. "Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Three times was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, three times I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep; in journeyings often, in perils of rivers, in perils of robbers, in perils from my countrymen, in perils from the heathen, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren; in labor and toil, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness. Beside those things that are without, there is that which presseth upon me daily, the anxious care for all the churches. Who is weak, and I am not weak? who is offended, and I burn not?" Thus he wrote reluctantly to the Corinthians, in self-vindication against his calumniators, in the year 57, before his longest and hardest trial in the prisons of Cæsarea and Rome, and at least

seven years before his martyrdom. He was "pressed on every side, yet not straitened; perplexed, yet not in despair; pursued, yet not forsaken; smitten down, yet not destroyed." His whole public career was a continuous warfare. He represents the church militant or "marching and conquering Christianity." He was *unus versus mundum* in a far higher sense than this has been said of Athanasius the Great when confronted with the Arian heresy and the imperial heathenism of Julian the Apostate. But in all his conflicts with foes from without and from within, Paul was "more than conqueror" through the grace of God, which was sufficient for him. "For I am persuaded," he writes to the Romans, in the strain of a sublime ode of triumph, "that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." And his dying word is an assurance of victory: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous, shall give me at that day; and not to me only, but unto all them that love his appearing."

The life and labors of such a man furnish the best possible evidence of Christianity, next to the character of Christ himself, who alone was free from sin and imperfection. Paul nowhere claims perfection. He no doubt had a violent temper, which he did not always sufficiently control. He may have handled good old Peter too severely when he called him a hypocrite in the face of the congregation at Antioch for a sin of weakness and temporary inconsistency. He may have been too rigorous when he separated from his old friend and companion, Barnabas, on account of his cousin Mark, whom he refused to take along on his second missionary journey because he had become homesick on the first and returned to his mother in Jerusalem. But Paul grew in humility as he advanced in life. First, in 57, he thought he was "the least of the apostles and not meet to be an apostle"; five years later, in the prison at Rome, he spoke of himself as "the least of all saints;" and two years afterwards, writing to his beloved disciple Timothy, he called himself "the

chief of sinners." The voice of history adds: "and the chief of saints."

The value of his Epistles to the facts of the gospel history is incalculable. At least four of them, and they by far the most important—namely, the Romans, First and Second Corinthians, and the Galatians—are accepted as genuine by the most exacting of the modern critics. Hilgenfeld, Pfleiderer, and Lipsius—all of the Tübingen school—admit seven, adding First Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon. Renan goes still further and concedes also Second Thessalonians and Colossians to be genuine, thus swelling the number of Pauline Epistles to nine. The Ephesians will soon be surrendered, and the three pastoral Epistles alone will remain more or less doubtful among scholars until the second Roman captivity can be more fully established; for it is almost impossible to locate them at any period before the first Roman captivity, with which the Acts conclude. Yet even in these Epistles the evidence of their Pauline origin greatly preponderates over the difficulties and objections which have been raised by Schleiermacher, Baur, and Holtzmann.

But even if we confine ourselves to the four great Epistles which Baur acknowledged and made the very basis of his attacks on the credibility of the Acts, they are sufficient to establish all the prominent facts of the life of Christ as well known and generally believed among the Christians at the time when those Epistles were composed; *i.e.*, between A.D. 54 to 58, within less than thirty years after the crucifixion. They refer to our Lord's birth from a woman of the royal house of David, his sinless life and perfect example, his atoning death, his triumphant resurrection on the third day, his repeated manifestations to his disciples, his ascension and exaltation to the right hand of God, whence he will return to judge all men in righteousness; the adoration of Christ by his followers, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and establishment of the church in Jerusalem, the martyrdom of Stephen, the conversion and calling of Paul by the appearance of Christ to him at Damascus, the rapid spread of Christianity from Jerusalem to Rome and all intervening places of importance, the council at Jerusalem, the controversy about circumcision and the law, the celebration of baptism, and

the Lord's Supper in commemoration of the Lord's dying love for sinners. He alludes most frequently to the crucifixion and the resurrection of Christ as the two most important events by which our redemption was accomplished and our victory over sin and death is divinely secured. It is unnecessary to quote passages which the reader can easily find on every page of those Epistles. All the Pauline and other Epistles of the New Testament are brimful of Christ, and are absolutely inconceivable without the historic foundation of his divine-human life and work on earth, which was to Paul, as it is still to all true Christians, the most certain as well as the most important and sacred fact in the history of mankind.

PHILIP SCHAFF.

THE HIDDEN HEART.

THE word Heart, the words nearly synonymous with it or closely related to it, the kindred forms of expression, the One Great idea and the subordinate ideas suggested by them, occupy a large place in the Scriptural language and the Scriptural thought. It is the purpose of the present paper to attempt an exploration of this rich field. In so doing, the following words of Christ may be taken as the key-text, the starting-point and the returning-goal of the whole discussion: "The good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things; but the evil man, out of the evil treasure of the heart, bringeth forth evil things" (Luke vi. 45). There is no assumption here of philosophical or psychological language. It is a very common saying that the Bible was not given to teach us science—natural science or physiology. Its anatomy is not to be taken as exclusively correct, or binding upon us. So, also, is it maintained, and in a certain sense most correctly, that we must not expect to find in the Scriptures a system of mental philosophy. The remark, however, is often used to denote something different from this, as tho it were in vain to search these divine writings for any aid in discovering the deeper or more interior truths of man's nature. The Bible was given for practical purposes; so is it often and most truly said; it was intended for the guidance of plain minds in the plain duties of life and religion; we must not expect to learn psychology from it. Now it is certainly correct to say that the Scriptures are not philosophical in the ordinary sense of that term. They are not a *γνῶσις*, "a knowledge" or gnostical scheme affecting either a philosophical height or philosophical profundity. They are not esoteric, that is, for the initiated few. Such a style would be unworthy of truth that comes down to us from

Heaven and out of the Infinite Love. In respect to the great ideas of revelation, we are all so much on a par that any language adapted to a certain class of minds would be a mockery of humanity. It would come no nearer to truth in one direction; it would have every appearance of falsity and one-sidedness on the other.

Still may it be maintained that there is in this simple language of the Saviour, and in this plain imagery of the Scriptures, the sounding of a depth in human nature to which no mere treatise on psychology or anthropology has ever penetrated. Our *a priori* or rational psychology may give us the outline of the spiritual structure; it may fix for us, with more or less exactness, and in its own language, the location of this inner chamber which the Scriptures style "the heart" or "the treasure-house of the heart;" but it fails to explore its actual moral or spiritual contents. Our empirical psychology, on the other hand, and our empirical ethics, may trace *effects* or things as "*they come out*" in experience. None but a Divine knowledge and a Divine revelation, either inward or outward, can discover to us the deep fountain of *these outgoings*, or the true condition of the primal source from which they flow.

There is a department of the human soul which Christ calls "the treasure" or "the treasure-house." It is the strong vault of the spirit far down below the outward word and act, below the thoughts in any objective shape they may assume to our thinking consciousness. Yes, below the thoughts, we say, for they are born in it and come *up out of it*. "*Out of the heart come forth evil thoughts.*" "*The imagination of the thoughts of the heart are evil, and evil continually.*" It is below the emotions even, which lie lower down than the thoughts. It is deeper than any motus, movement, or acting of the soul, unless we mean that static action, force, or life which is involved in its very spiritual status or constitution; since all life, all being in fact, is inseparable from the idea of a doing or an energy in some form. It is thus not only below all doing in the motive sense, but all willing as the commencement of any spiritual movement. That which energizes in us "*both to will and to do,*" be it nature or be it a divine life, must be something still lower, still more interior than either the *doing* or the *willing*.

"For out of the heart there come forth (*ἐξέρχονται*) evil thoughts" (Matt. xv. 19). The words are stronger than this. They mean more than thoughts in our common conception of an image or notion, or merely passive mental exercise. "Out of the heart come forth (*διαλογισμοὶ πονηροὶ*) evil reasonings," purposes, conclusions, not formed after they come out, but having received their shape and feature, their organization, their constitutive energy, down in the heart itself through some process of spiritual chemistry unfelt, as it is unknown, to the upper consciousness. They have been *conceived* there, to use the strong metaphor of James i. 15, and brought to birth in this interior generative chamber of the soul: "Then lust, as soon as it hath conceived (*συλλαβοῦσα*, aorist participle), breedeth sin, and sin, immediately finished (*ἀποτελεσθεῖσα*), is pregnant with death." The work down there has been fully done before it comes forth. They are no abortions, no half-formed things, possibilities, susceptibilities—some would call them—*tendencies* to evil, but having in themselves no moral character. Such is not the meaning of the apostle's remarkable language and most expressive metaphor. The *ἐπιθυμία*, the *desire*, hath conceived and generated sin; the sin is full formed, full grown, and hath already generated death.

"Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts." And what a brood are they when they thus come forth from the dark womb of depravity, from the evil mother-heart, and take those specific names of crime, and those outward forms (as distinguished from the inner evil constitution) to which they are shaped by the relations and circumstances of the outer life. Listen to the terrible muster-roll: "Murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, blasphemies;" or, in the fuller statistics of the apostle, "enmities, strifes, jealousies, ruling passions (*θυμοὶ*), divisions, heresies, envyings, revilings, whisperings, backbiting, malice, cruelty." They are not only lusts of the flesh, born of the sentient nature and the sentient heart, but "lusts of the mind" or spirit, pure soul-sins having no fleshly generation—sins such as devils may commit, or disembodied evil spirits—"lusts of the mind," less regarded in our modern ethics, but really more intensely evil and more purely evil than their fleshly sisters.

"Murders, adulteries, enmities, strifes, envyings, whisperings,

malice"—these are their names among men ; these are the forms they assume is the upper world of consciousness, but no less distinct is their being and their character in the birth-chamber of the soul. There they sleep, resting yet energizing ; for rest is not inertia, but the highest energy, whether of dynamical and static or of spiritual forces. There they sleep and grow, until something rouses them to outward action, and then they come trooping forth, translating themselves, first into *thoughts*, then into *acts*, then into *words*, thus bringing into open view all their hidden enormity. And yet there has been no new thing created ; there has been no essential change ; there has been no addition, specific or generic, to the evil that before this coming forth lay slumbering in the soul. In the ordinary conditions of our humanity the naked sight of them is too horrid for us to bear unless we put masks upon them. This fact is yet a redeeming trait in human nature. Man is indeed *all* wrong ; wrong to some extent in every natural energizing of his spirit. But he is not so bad as he might be, and yet may be. In some wholly lost state he may come to love evil, *per se*, and sin may look fair to him *per se*. But he is yet short of such an admiration of evil for its own sake. He is under the dominion of an all-controlling selfishness that makes him put evil for good, yet must he first disguise it, first clothe it in some fancied form of righteousness, before he can look it steadily in the face. The reason of this is found in that strange duality of our nature which is so clearly set forth in the seventh chapter of Romans. There lies above this deep heart the region of the intellectual consciousness, of the abstract ideal virtue which a man believes he really has because he can think it ; he has not yet lost the sight of its ideal beauty ; he is not so wholly gone but that he has some kind of admiration and even love for it. It is "the law of the mind," or reason, ὁ νόος τὸν νοῦς, of which Paul speaks (Rom. vii. 23). This, altho in some sense a redeeming trait, as we have said, altho a remains of the divine image and the ground of human accountability, is yet, in other respects, a hindrance to a thorough self-knowledge. In passing upward through the mid-region of the intellectual consciousness, this part of the "inner man," where there may be even a seeming "delight in the law of the Lord" (*συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ*

τῶν θεοῦ πατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἀνθρώπον, Rom. vii. 22), these ugly children of the evil heart change face and voice. We could not otherwise bear their deformities when they come forth to the upper air. Even the most depraved—in intensity we mean, for in the extensy or totality of depravity all men are alike—even the most depraved have something of this “excusing conscience” (*συνείδησις ἀπολογούμενη*, Rom. ii. 15), which, instead of being proof that man is not depraved, is the very gauge and measure of his spiritual fall. It shows the number of degrees by which the *actual* heart has fallen below the *ideal* mind, altho even the latter has been dragged down by the former to an extent immeasurable when compared with the index of the divine righteousness or the standard of perfect holiness.

We shrink from our thoughts as they rise up in the soul and stand before us, as they sometimes do, in their unclothed hideousness. The best of men have had this experience which the very evil, or those who have sunk to a lower grade, or who are more fortified in worldliness and conventionality, cannot understand. Sometimes they rise suddenly before we have had time for that habitual preparation which the soul involuntarily adopts. We see anger for a moment with its real face of murder, envy with its demon scowl, revenge before it has had time to assume its look of injured righteousness. We shudder at their momentary ugliness. Unless far gone in that intensity of evil which darkens even the ideal virtue, we cannot bear the sight, and so “Down, down!” we say. We drive them back sometimes until we have thrown over them another dress or given them another name. We confound our *reasons* with our *motives*, the one being from this upper or ideal region, the other from the dark yet terribly *moving* world below. Or, rather, we invent, unconsciously invent, fair *reasons* for foul *motives* that would not bear the light, or that would frighten us should they suddenly translate themselves against our will into their native image and their true vernacular name.

No distinction is so important as this between our *reasons* and our *motives*, and yet none so seldom made either in our practical or our speculative ethics. There is no more fertile source of an ever-deepening self-delusion. Our lives are spent

in this strange war between the ideal virtue and the actual depravity, or in the attempt to impose upon ourselves some abstract form of good as a disguise to that deep-down moving impulse in the soul we cannot bear to look upon. How easily, too, do we succeed in this bad work, without seeing the wretched manner in which we daily and hourly cheat ourselves! What we call our reasons are without us. As brought in aid of things within, they connect themselves with us in numberless ways. Some of them may have a real tho a weak and partial connection with the true motive power working within the heart, and these drag in others related to them, and that seem still more plausible and fair. In our endless relations with other men, and with the outer world around us, there may be some reason, yea, in appearance some good reason, assigned for almost every act. There are plenty of them standing objectively before us in the world of things or facts. They would suit well as motives. There are no reasons why they may not be our true subjective reasons; that is, our motives. They *ought* to be our reasons—that we see plain enough—and why then may they not be taken as such; so plausibly do they stand in our way, and so easy is it, because so delightful, to imagine that they really are our *moving* powers; especially since we all admire, and even so bravely laud, the abstract righteousness. The process is so natural; the transitions come so easily out of one another. Really these righteous reasons might well be among the possibilities that move us. It must be a love of right and nothing selfish that is urging us on. We love to imagine that this is so. The imagination easily passes into a thought. We love to think it, and so we do think it. We say it to ourselves. Before we are aware we find ourselves saying it to others. We say it to the world; for in talking to the world we not only talk, but ever think we are thinking virtuously. Now are we sure that these good reasons, so easy to find on every side of every act and every question, are the real motives, the real powers that *move* us, and so the delusion is complete.

We are sincere in this—sometimes very sincere—but sincerity is not truth. We feel virtuous often, very virtuous, in a state of soul which some after and deeper awakening shows may

be full of foulness and deformity. There are, however, times when we have a true glimpse of this lower world, of this spiritual Hades, or invisibility within us. It may be that peculiar facts, whether in our outward or our inward life, have removed in some degree the veil that hides us from ourselves, or some strong foreign light, in power resembling that which shone round Saul of Tarsus, may have cast its rays far down, even to a depth which the ordinary consciousness, tho' it may be the "accusing conscience," fails to penetrate. We shudder as we see the serpent's head, and sometimes almost hear the serpent's hiss. We turn with horror from ourselves. We are troubled at the thought of the Holy One. We have some faint conception of what the vision must be when our "secret sins are set in the burning light of his countenance." "Rocks, fall on us; mountains, cover us from the sight and from the gaze of the Infinite Purity." Surely there is a local hell, but the power of hell must be within the soul itself. We cannot hide from ourselves in the great uprising

"When man to judgment wakes from clay."

Such was the voice of all that was wisest in the heathen world. Nothing can be more vivid, nothing outside of Revelation itself was ever more solemn, than the picture which Plato has given of the naked soul when all its hidden scars stand out, and a glance reveals that realm of darkness which had been so covered by "outward things, whether of the body, or of birth, or wealth, or education," or, in a word, by all that stands between it and the Judge, all that stands between it and the soul's own direct and searching inquisition.

There is, then, in the fallen human spirit a dark work-house of evil thoughts, a chamber of evil imagery, as secret as that which the prophet saw occupied by the elders of Israel (Ezek. viii. 7-12). It is something more and truer than an accommodation when we apply this language to that *terra incognita*, that unexplored region which the Bible calls "the heart," and from which Christ tells us there come forth so many evil things. "At this time," says the learned and pious Halyburton, in giving a most graphic account of his religious experience—"at

this time the Lord gave me light to see what my heart was doing in the dark." Something like this, with more or less intensity of painful conviction, must be the feeling of every one who has attained, in any degree, to the true self-knowledge, that true heaven-given "*γνῶθι σεαυτον*," so much talked of in the schools of philosophy, yet so little known except as it is learned in the school of revelation.

A thorough investigation of this subject requires a comparison of the Greek and Hebrew names for HEART.

The sense of *παρδία*, the Greek name for heart in the New Testament, is much affected by the usage of the corresponding Hebrew term. In classical Greek it is employed mainly for the stronger or bolder affections, such as courage, hope, encouragement, brave endurance, with but slight if any direct reference to the intellect. The best example is in that line of Homer, Odyss. xx. 18, which Socrates quotes as an illustration of the human duality, or the bold, brave heart bearing up against hardship and temptation: *τέτλαθι δὴ πραδίη, ο.τ.λ.*—"Be strong, my heart, thou hast endured worse than this." The Latin *cordatus* has something of the mental sense, tho even as thus denoted it is the wisdom of the heart, or *prudentia*, in the old acceptation of that word as *providentia*, or a wise discernment of Good, in distinction from scientific or speculative knowledge; so *φρόνησις*, in Greek, is a taste or sapience, rather than science. The same may be said of all the Greek ethical terms built upon *φρον-* or *φρεν-*, as *σώφρων*, *σωφροσύνη*, *φρονημα*, *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, *φρονημα σαρκος*, the "mind of the spirit," the "mind of the flesh," or the "carnal mind." They are all more moral than intellectual; they all denote states, dispositions, aptitudes for certain kinds of knowledge, rather than knowledge itself.

Our English word *heart*, tho etymologically the same with *hart*, *chart*, *kard*, *cor*, *cord*, denotes generally the milder and softer affections of pity, love, desire. Thus we make a contrast between the *heart* and the head, as between the affections and the intellect; and sometimes we err by carrying this distinction into our reading of the Scriptures, where it does not so much prevail. Something of the Greek and Latin sense appears still in the word *courage*, a Norman derivation from the

same root, and shows itself also in the Saxon *hearty, heartiness.*

In distinction from all these, the Hebrew word, and from it the New Testament Greek word, have a meaning peculiar to themselves, and found almost without exception in the Scriptures. This consists not in any general application of the term to different states and affections of the soul, as in other languages, but in the superadded and peculiar Scriptural idea that there is something about the heart, and especially the human heart, most mysterious and unsearchable. This is the Bible peculiarity, whatever be the psychological territory assigned to it, be it wide or narrow, be it moral or intellectual, or a compound of both. It is the hidden region, the soul below consciousness, the place in which are born, according to the order of their descent, emotion, thought, conception, action, speech.

It differs also, this word נֶהֱרָה, *nephesh*, or *heart*, from the other Hebrew words for soul in life, in being, beyond them all, most peculiarly human. To understand this it may be remarked that the general words in Hebrew significant of spirituality, such as *ruah*, *nephesh*, and *neshamah*, represent the vital dynamic power of animation in different aspects and degrees, but each in its widest sense. *Neshamah* may be said to denote animation simply. *Nephesh* corresponds to the Greek ψυχη, as significant of all that is immaterial, or rather incorporeal, from the lowest animal life upward to the spirit of man in its highest aspect, altho we think it is never applied, except anthropopathically, to Deity. Ψυχη and *nephesh* represent the general continent, be its particular contents more or less, and in which, when predicated of man, dwell first the mere vital and vegetable yet still immaterial powers of growth; then the dynamical life as exhibited in strength and motion; next the *irascible*, as Aristotle calls it, the θυμός or θυμοειδές, with its wild unreasoning and undirected passions or mere excitements, the same in men and animals; next the appetite, ἐπιθυμία, or the θυμός, or mere *irascible* motion directed toward something, but still unreasoning, and therefore properly styled blind; next the purer affections allied to the reason and the conscience; and finally the νοῦς, *mens*, or *mind* in all its range, including the perceptions, the conceptions, the memories, the intellectual and moral intuitions.

In this manner, both *ruah* and *nephesh* are predicated of life or spirituality in its widest extent, from all that is above the body upwards, with this difference, that *nephesh* is employed of the life of animals as well as of men; whilst *ruah*, tho embracing both these, and being connected sometimes even with the vegetable world, extends beyond them all to the divine spirit, or the great source of all life, moral, physical, and intellectual.

On the contrary, כַּל, *leb*, *heart*, when employed in the Old Testament, either for soul, as it generally is, or for some department or action of the soul, is ever and altogether human. It is ever the heart of man, or when employed of God, it is only by a species of anthropopathism. It sometimes denotes the whole spirituality as distinguished from the flesh; sometimes, like the English *heart*, it expresses the tenderer affections of pity and love; at others it has more of the Greek sense of courage, strength, heartiness; it is employed more extensively at times than the Latin word for the intellect, or knowing faculty, as in Prov. xvii. 16: "Why is there a price in the hands of a fool to get wisdom, and he has no heart for it?"—that is, no capacity, faculty, or mind for it.

Thus it has even a wider range of applications than the corresponding term in any of the other languages; but amid them all, and qualifying them all, there is that one peculiar thought already mentioned, and which it seems never to lose in any passage of its occurrence. This thought is everywhere, more or less, whilst in certain cases, and those the most important as exhibitions of moral truth, it forms the essential idea. The heart, whatever it embraces of intellectual or moral, or of both combined, is that part of the human spiritual constitution which is most interior, *most hidden*, not merely from other souls, but from the man himself whose heart it is. It is the region, acting, stirring, thinking, feeling, willing, yet below consciousness. Whilst employed for all that *cor* and *ναρθία* mean in Latin and Greek, and *heart* in English, the Hebrew *leb* goes still beyond them and below them. It admits not of being characterized in any precise psychological language; it will not be confined by any psychological classification. It is not the reason; it is not the affections, or the appetites, or the will, or the susceptibility

ties, or the conscience. It is not any of these, tho more or less including them all, but the deep seat of moral life and action, unknown and unknowable to man, known only to God. When we say unknowable, we mean by any direct sense-knowledge or intuition. In this its interior seat, and its profound action therein, we neither see it nor think it, nor even feel it. We are conscious when it acts, and of its action as a fact. We know when it has moved, or been moved, by that which is thrown up. We see what comes out of it; and from this we are not only assured of its existence as a powerful agent, but its motions, as acts and facts, become the subjects of outward knowledge. "The heart is *untraceable* above all things (so it should be rendered): who can know it? I the Lord search the heart and try the reins" (Jer. xvii. 9, 10)—"*Inscrutabile est cor. Ego Dominus scrutans cor et probans renes.*" "Thou, Lord of hosts, thou triest the reins and the heart" (Jer. xi. 20, xx. 12). "The Lord seeth not as man seeth, the Lord seeth the heart" (1 Sam. xvi. 7).

Not only the springs of this action, but also the manner of its acting, are below our direct knowledge. In this interior subconscious department of the soul there is not merely a moving, a throbbing, a general life-action, but also a direction of movement and act. There is a combining of affinities, a repulsion of antipathies. There is a loving and a hating, a choosing and a refusing, a *velle* and a *nolle*, a willing and an unwilling, a self-satisfaction and a self-excusing—all real, yet unknown to us in their primal and immediate agency. They are ourselves, yea, our deepest selfhood, tho shut out from our acquaintance and sometimes utterly disowned. There are *motives* moving there, real, powerful, controlling motives, some of them of giant strength, that we recognize not, that we suspect not, and whose very possibility even, if it were charged upon us, we would most indignantly and, it may be, most sincerely deny. There is a war going on between these motives; some are conquering others; but we know nothing about it; we know not which is victor until it manifests itself by an irruption that disturbs the upper self, and that is known to the objective consciousness. We know it by the progress we have made. There is something, too, in after life and after experience that clears our

vision, and we look back and see in memory's light what we saw not when the movement was actually taking place. We have gained a hight that enables us to look over the obstacles that then intervened, and we see what "our heart was doing in the dark." This may seem a paradox as thus expressed, and yet how poor must be that experience that yields not some testimony to its truth! There must have been something on which memory lays hold, and which enables it so clearly to see the motive and the conflict, before unrecognized. There is some way in which we connect it with ourselves, and therefore have we used the term *sub-conscious* rather than one which would give the idea of total unconsciousness. There is a silent untestifying consciousness, if we may call it so, which afterwards wakes to life, and knows that it then knew, and what it knew, altho it made not then the knowledge known to the outer, thinking, acting, talking man. If these seem like riddles, they are all involved in that strange duality of our nature which the Bible teaches and the truest experience confirms.

But we would press it farther still. There is an intellectual as well as an emotional action; yea, it may be said that there is even a logical movement going on down there. It is a chamber of thought as well as of inquiry. There has been a proposing, an intending, a weighing, an estimating, a concluding, a shaping of good *reasons* to cover bad *motives*, a dressing up of the thoughts before we permit them to see the light and appear openly to ourselves. There are not only tastes and instincts there, and tendencies and dispositions, but even a knowledge keen and active, knowing yet unknown. There has been a reasoning going on there. We know this, too, from the mental and moral progress we have made. We have been walking in our sleep, and our spiritual somnambulism has had its processes as regular, as steady, as unerring—yea, sometimes even more unerring—than our waking, conscious, skilfully constructed syllogisms. There must be such combining of powers, and such analytic processes, of which the upper thoughts present no specific indications, and which are only known to the outer man in the generic direction they give the conscious life. These hidden powers cannot be blanks having no tendency to some thoughts and things, or to some directions, more than to others.

They cannot be blind, or work without their patterns, their law or laws, and these workings and these directions and these laws must have working in them some kind of shaping, guiding intelligence. We may call it instinct, nature, governing principle, what we please; it cannot change the fact or lessen the mystery. The Bible calls it the *heart*, the "deep heart," the "dark or darkened heart" (Rom. i. 21), the "untraceable heart" that "God alone can know," the "hidden man of the heart," the deceitful heart whence come forth the thoughts, the images, the purposes, all having their forms, their structures, their ethical relations, their *moral character* given to them in the varied workings of that hidden power in which they had their conception and their birth.

The great proof of this is God's Revelation, a revelation not only of Deity, of eternity, of salvation, of a life to come, but in a most emphatic sense a revelation of man to himself. Our own experience, whether gracious or natural, gives us an assurance of the veritable existence of such a spiritual world within; it furnishes, too, at times a glimpse of its strange manner of working, and of the strange work it does. But the Scriptures are full of it, and their meaning cannot be mistaken. They tell us not only of the soft heart, the tender heart, the hard heart, but also of the impenitent heart, the unbelieving heart, the evil heart full of evil thoughts and evil purposes. It speaks moreover of the "understanding heart, the wise heart," the abode of light and grace, and the "darkened heart," the "foolish heart" (*ἀσύνετος μαρδία*), the "unintelligent heart," the unreasoning heart, or the falsely reasoning heart, the abode of an evil sophistry, vain reasonings (*διαλογισμοῖς*), and given up to false and foul imaginations.

This same heart it declares most difficult of knowledge, if not wholly unknowable except to God. It pronounces the man a fool who trusts it (Prov. xxviii. 26), or confides in his own grace-unaided powers of knowing it. It speaks of it as a fountain of life, and sometimes as a fountain of death. It is to the soul what the organic heart is to the body; the one the spring of moral as the other of physical vitality. In both senses may we regard the word as taken in that profound aphorism of Solomon (Prov. iv. 23). "Beyond all keeping (*omni custodia*), keep

thy heart (or, watch thy heart), for from it are the outgoings of life." It represents this heart as moving when the upper surface of the soul is still. It wakes when we sleep, and sometimes, when stirred within by a foreign heavenly impulse, it talks with us in the night watches (Ps. xvi. 7). At such times we are told to "commune" with it (Ps. iv. 4), as the secret shrine of an oracle whence the divine voice addresses us. In the Scripture-taught liturgy we pray that God would "make us to know wisdom in the hidden part" בְּכַתָּה (Ps. li. 8), the *shut up*, the *enclosed*, the *profound*. Compare the Hebrew word (Ezek. xxviii. 3) and the same thought of the heart's profundity (Ps. lxiv. 6). We are told of a *truth* deeper than that of the words, of the images, or even of the thoughts. It is the "truth that God desireth in the inward parts"—טֹהוּת, another word for the heart in this deep aspect of it. We have the same word (Job xxxviii. 36) where the distinction between the spiritual profound and the imaging, thinking, or outward discerning faculty of the soul is strikingly brought out: "Who hath put wisdom בְּכַתָּה in the sealed place (*cæmentum obductum*), or who hath given to the mind intelligence?"—"Quis indidisset præcordiis sapientiam aut quis dedisset menti intelligentiam?" (Tremelius.)

So, too, are we taught to pray that God "would explore us and try us," as wholly unknown to ourselves. We are told that "the heart is divided," dispersed over innumerable vanities; and so the Psalmist prays (Ps. xxxvi. 1), "*Unite my heart*," make one *my heart*, not our hearts in the plural, but the individual heart—"Unite my heart to fear thy name." There is a civil war in this hidden kingdom. Not only are the appetites warring with the reason and the conscience, according to Plato's vivid picture of the Republic of the Soul, but one evil passion is battling for the mastery with another, and all this has come from that great revolt of the whole man from God of which Plato did not know, and which he does not take into the account in his method of cure and conciliation. It cannot be healed by philosophy, by asserting the supremacy of the *Nous* or reason. It cannot be pacified by any prudential treaty between the warring lusts, whether they be lusts of the flesh or lusts of the mind. The place is too far down for any earthly philosophy;

an "enlightened self-interest" is powerless to reach and quell the strife. Diabolus has been enthroned in the citadel of Man-soul. The war in the heart itself can never be settled until peace is first made with God, and hence the significance of those latter words in the Psalmist's petition, "*Unite my heart to fear thy name.*"

The pious soul, the awakened soul seeking to know itself; the intensity of the petition called out by this feeling is unsurpassed by anything else in the devotional language of the Bible. It shows how deep was such a soul's conviction of the great unknown within, how important it deemed the knowledge, and with what an earnestness of prayer it longed to possess it. No human philosophy could give rise to this; no human philosophy could understand it: "Search me, O God, and know my *heart*; try me (test me) and know my thoughts; and see if there be any evil way in me (*via doloris*), and lead me (*in via eternitatis*) in the way everlasting."

The Bible teaches all that has been said about the *heart*, or the soul below consciousness, not, however, in the language we have employed, so far as it is drawn from the schools, but in its own vivid penetrating imagery—in that revealing language of "the Word that is living and powerful, sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit (the sense and the reason), the joints and the marrow," and which thus becomes "a critical discerner of the *thinkings* and the thoughts of the soul." *κριτικὸς ἐνθυμησεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδιᾶς* (Heb. iv. 12). These two nouns take in the sum of the heart's action—the first denoting the present actual *thinking* as it rises up to consciousness; the other, the thoughts, purposes, movements, or states of the soul as they lie below. Compare Matt. ix. 4: "And when Jesus saw their *thinkings* (*ἐνθυμήσεις*) he said, Why do ye think evil in your hearts?" He looked below the movement which was making itself visible, altho they had only spoken to themselves, or thought to themselves, away down into that lower fountain out of which the thoughts arise. He saw that whatever *reasons* these scribes might be putting on as disguises, or however sincere they might be in believing these to be their real reasons, their virtuous, their religious reasons, still the *motives* or moving powers in that sub-conscious lower

world were very different. "This man blasphemeth," said they. Doubtless they spoke sincerely and thought sincerely so far as this upper thinking was concerned. They unquestionably felt very much concerned for the honor of religion. So "they said to themselves" and thought to themselves. We think there was no consciously designed hypocrisy here. "They verily thought they were doing God service." But Christ looks down to this "sealed place," this "hidden part" of the soul that was concealed from them, and he saw that "they were thinking evil in their hearts." Unless, too, we regard the writer in Heb. iv. 12 as employing a merely intensive tautology in the use of *ψυχη* and *πνεῦμα*, "soul and spirit," there is here also this same distinction between the *motive* coming mainly from the physical, the animal, or sentient part of our nature and the *reason* which the abstract ideal virtue takes to hide, even from itself, the baseness of the former. When man ceases to be animal (*ψυχινός*, 1 Cor. ii. 14) and becomes wholly or predominantly spiritual (*πνευματινός*, 1 Cor. ii. 15, xv. 44), then the motive and the reason are one, the *heart* is no longer divided, the harmony of Mansoul is restored. In the natural depraved state, or during the healing process, it is the Word of God, whether we take *logos* here in the sense of Scripture or the Living Word, that severs this false connection, exposes this subserviency of the higher to the lower action, and thus lays bare this wretched imposture that the soul of man is constantly practising on itself. Altho hard to be shown, yet it is an undeniable fact in the human psychology that a man may be for many long years thus deceiving himself, and at last awake to the full consciousness, the clear and certain knowledge, that the *reasons* which he had been most sincerely representing to himself and to others as his veritable motives, or moving powers, were not his motives. Other lords had had dominion over him; other powers had moved his soul, and his *thought* to the contrary, or, if any prefer to call it so, his consciousness to the contrary, was all delusion.

This view of the deceitfulness of the human heart and of its hidden nature is given to us, it may be said, in the more devotional parts of the Scripture, and therefore we are not to take it in its strict, logical, or philological import. It is found in the

impassioned denunciations or expostulations of the prophets, in the petition of the contrite for the healing of a divided and broken heart, as the strong language of metaphor would express it. It meets us in the prayer of the alarmed sin-convicted man for a deeper knowledge of himself. In all this, it might be said, we have "the language of the emotions," a language not psychologically true, but ever to be regarded as hyperbolical and to be received with much poetical allowance.

To such a view there is, we think, a perfect answer in itself—an answer grounded on the fact that strictly philosophical language, as we call it, or the bare language of the intellect, must ever fall short of this wondrous depth. Poetry, which even the dry, pure reasoning Aristotle declared to be a more earnest thing than history, can alone approach without reaching remotest verity. All language destitute of emotion here must necessarily, or from that very fact, contain an essential falsehood and insufficiency. This developed into a wider argument might furnish a sufficient answer to any such objection, and prove that on certain subjects the language of the emotions is truer than that of the intellect.

But it is not alone in the poetical parts of the Bible that this mystery is taught. In the sober yet wondrous Scripture histories there are presented to us plain hard facts that assume it as a settled truth in the divine dealings with man, and in the divine revelations of human nature. Not in rapt impassioned language, but in the style of ordinary narration are we told of the prophets being sent to one man to reveal to him "what was in his heart," and of which he knew nothing altho he was, at that very moment, thinking to himself false *reasons* for the very acts to which it moved him; to another, to shut up and harden his heart that he might not see it; to another, that he might show him the awful crimes that were then being born within, altho he indignantly and most sincerely denied their possibility; to another still, to make it clear to him that his own vehement condemnation of an ideal act was but the righteous sentence passed upon his own unknown, unconscious, unfelt, actual sin.

We are told of a dark, wicked heart that did not know itself, but must be made to act *out* before it can gain that knowledge,

or be known to others. In this case it was for the divine glory, and for the world's good, in the bringing out and protection of the chosen world-people, that that heart should be made to show itself. But this malevolent spirit lacked physical courage. Pharaoh had a weak as well as a wicked heart, and this physical weakness must be strengthened to enable him to carry out (not to originate) the inward motions of the cowardly evil soul. So God strengthened, gave *nerve* to Pharaoh; for this is the meaning of the Hebrew **פִּנָּה**, so often used in this connection. He nerved him; it was a positive operation, but not on the moral constitution or moral action of the soul. It was an action, a positive action, but on the sentient or physical heart, in order that the bad *spiritual heart*, no worse, no better than before such action, might come forth and be revealed.

This "hardness of Pharaoh's heart" has given great trouble to commentators from Origen down, and it might seem, therefore, rash to speak so positively about what its true import is, yet the writer must express the opinion that a careful attention to the primary sense of the Hebrew **פִּנָּה** would have saved a great deal of the moral difficulty. The sense of this verb as thus used is wholly sentient and physical. The primary idea is *binding*, *tightness*, hence *firmness*, *hardness*. In Kal it is transitive, to be tight, hard, bound, firm; hence to be strong, etc. In this sense it is frequently joined with **עֲמֹד**, of which the primary idea is steadiness, endurance. Thus the frequent **עֲמֹד וְפִּנָּה**, "be *tight and hard*;" *be strong and firm*. This may be in good or in evil; the moral quality not at all entering into the force or significance of the expression. The Piel sense in each of these verbs is causative and intensive of the Kal (or first conjugation) idea—to *make tight* or *tighten*; to bind hard, to strengthen, make firm, make steady, make to stand, etc. This is especially seen in the application of both verbs to the different members of the body, as in Isaiah xxxv. 3: "Strengthen (make tight, **עֲמֹד**) the weak hands, make steady (**צַפֵּת**) the tottering knees." Thence is it transferred to whatever in the body is supposed to be the seat of physical courage or firmness. Hence, in this way, its frequent connection with the heart, the physical heart of flesh and blood, the seat of animal and sentient vigor, or, if

it is predicated of the heart in a more spiritual sense, it is as the supposed seat of emotions and desires, having no reference to the moral state of that heart, but only to its spiritual firmness in carrying out its purposes or impulses, good or bad. Nothing can be farther from the real meaning of this phrase, as thus applied, than any idea of rendering hard or cruel what in itself, and without this, was mild and compassionate. The Jews had doubtless the same moral sense that we have, and the fact that none of the Bible writers, historical, devotional, ethical, or apostolical, betray any more moral repugnance to this language, notwithstanding its frequent recurrence, shows a radical difference of conception in respect to its true import. It means the giving strength, firmness, tightness to a cowardly heart whether that heart be morally good or bad. Here in the case of Pharaoh it was a base evil heart that God tightened, strengthened, hardened. It was the only way in which it could be made to reveal itself: "For this very purpose have I raised thee up (עָמַדְתִּיךְ Exod. ix. 16) made thee to stand, that I might show my strength in thee;" or, as it is admirably rendered by the apostle, Rom. ix. 17, ἐξίγγειρα σε, "roused thee, woke thee up, gave thee vigor and animation." This was the Lord's dealing with Pharaoh's bad heart.

In thus regarding the word as denoting a physical effect, we avoid that merely *permissive* view which has never, in fact, been satisfactory to any thinking mind; since it only creates a new difficulty, or removes the old one farther back. On this account Calvin rejected it. His strong, clear judgment saw at once that it was superficial and settled nothing. But aside from any general reasoning, nothing can be more opposed to this "chaffy" permissive sense, as Calvin calls it, than the etymological and radical image of the word. It would be difficult to find in any language a term more intensely positive than the Hebrew *hizzek*. It is the last one that would come to the mind as suggested by, or suggestive of, any mere negative conception of sufferance, or letting alone. It was not a mere permission to Pharaoh, but an actual doing something to him, a direct influence upon his sentient nature. It was as tho there had been given to his base, cowardly spirit an invigorating *cordial*; that is, an *heart-strengthener*. There is really nothing more that should disturb us here in such hardening, tightening, or nerving of the sentient heart,

whether good or bad, than there is in God's giving health to the wicked man, through which he performs his wickedness, or in suffering him to live. The difficulty is not here. If there is any, it goes back where all such difficulties ever go, to the inexplicable origin of evil. Whence came Pharaoh's evil heart? or how came there evil hearts at all? Alas, we know nothing about it but the awful fact. Every form of religion has this difficulty. The Arminian, the Pelagian, the holder to a moral accountability in even the poorest sense, has it pressing upon him theoretically as much as the Calvinist. None escape it but the atheist, and he does so only by plunging into outer darkness and rejecting all moral ideas whatever.

What shows that the moral sense has really nothing to do here with any difficulty is the fact that it never raises the objection in the opposite case (opposite in purpose tho precisely similar in direct psychical action) where God strengthens, nerves, invigorates the good heart. Thus we stumble not when we read how the divine "strength was shown in the Apostle's weakness," and yet how illustrative is it of the same fundamental psychological truth? This beneficent power may be exerted on the sentient nature; it may even take effect on the bodily constitution. In such cases it is analogous in all respects to the seemingly opposite process of a hardening or nerving in evil. But for good we find no difficulty in supposing a deeper operation than this, even upon that "hidden part" where human knowledge and human eloquence cannot reach, but which is accessible to the divine strength. This heart, whose spiritual maladies no human power can heal, God visits directly by his grace, and makes even its weakness the theatre of his own greatness. And thus the paradox clears up: "When I am weak, then am I strong; wherefore I glory in infirmities that the power of Christ may rest upon me."

Again, the Bible tells us of the good man who has yet much evil generally, or some deep, specific evil buried in his heart. There it lies far down. He knows it not, nor can he know it by any ordinary means. Even the direct verbal message sent from God cannot, of itself, fully reach it. He credits it as a fact, but he does not clearly know what it means. His reverence receives it from the seer, but this is not enough; this alone

would do him but little good. He must feel it; he must see it; it must somehow be brought from its lurking-place and put before his eyes. A divine power simultaneous with the verbal message might bring it forth to light and consciousness, but, beside this, or along with this, there is sometimes, as we are taught in the Scriptures, another method. There is set in motion a train of providential circumstances in the outer world that, with the verbal messages and the inward grace, they may at last reveal the man unto himself. There is a *sibba* (סִבָּה), a *bringing out*, a bringing *about* or *around*, as it is called (1 Kings xii. 15), all ordered by the Lord, and sometimes dating away back of the event to whose revelation it is all intended to be subservient. Such a *sibba*, or revolution, or bringing *about*, may include a great variety of intervening means and causalities. They may be motions in nature, in history, in human wills, all *turned* by God "as the rivers of waters are turned," without breaking any physical laws in the one case, or interfering with any essential evil or any essential virtue in the other. Thus Hezekiah, even after his sick-bed repentance, did not know himself. His convalescent heart was still the seat of a foul and flatulent vanity. Had the prophet told him this in so many words, he would probably have never learned the lesson from him, tho ever so attentive and obedient outwardly. He would not have known what they meant. There must be something to draw it out of his heart, something that might operate as a spiritual catharsis; and so, away from beyond the desert, from distant Babylon, came the messengers sent verbally by the king, but truly by the Lord. They were a wheel in the *sibba* or circuit through which God was effecting the purification of Hezekiah's heart. These Babylonian messengers are very different from the prophet. They have no message from the Lord, no word of divine grace, and yet they are to be the means of opening the bolted evil "treasure" of his soul, even as he opened for them the vaults of his earthly wealth. "For it is written: He showed them all the house of his precious things, the silver and the gold, and the spices and the precious ointment, and all that was found in his treasures." Now was the prophet's time to get access to this hidden place. The king had shown his treasure-house to the Babylonian ambassadors.

"Then came Isaiah unto the king," and showed him what was in the treasure-house of his heart. His sinful vanity was exposed even to his dull vision; there was opened a deeper and darker storehouse than that which had concealed his kingly wrath. And now, too, he had ears to hear. The prophet's message became intelligible; its voice reached the interior chambers of his soul; the door stood open, and he could not help seeing the darkness of the place, and having a glimpse of the dark forms that still dwelt in it. "He saw what was in his heart," is the expressive Bible language—not only effects but causes; not only the mere *movings* of vanity, of which he might have been made sensible by outward signs and outward language, combining with outward experience—and on which he might have put the excusing guise of some fair *reasons*—but the foul thing itself, lying coiled away in a dark region which before was far below his knowledge, far below his direct consciousness, and yet, more than anything else, pertaining to his spirituality, his veritable self.

There is much "instruction in righteousness" to be derived from every part of the history of this King Hezekiah, but none surpassing that of the wondrous chronicle which closes the account of his reign: "Howbeit, in the business of the ambassadors of the Princes of Babylon who sent unto him to inquire of the *wonder that was done* in the land, God left him to try him, that he might *know all that was in his heart*." Most marvellous the motions of the dual shadow, but more mysterious still the shadow in his soul that moved below his consciousness, and stranger than all, the combined spiritual and physical method which God took to reveal it unto him. Oh! had we but eyes to see the moral wonders that are continually presented in the world within us, we should find less difficulty in yielding our assent to the outwardly miraculous or supernatural, as it is recorded in the Bible. The lesser incredibility would be swallowed up in the greater, so surpassing all ordinary sense evidence and yet, in certain states of the soul, so impossible to be disbelieved. We talk of the laws of nature and the secrets of nature; what are they to the abysses of the unfathomable spirit?

In this story of Hezekiah there is a lifting of the curtain just giving us a glimpse of the divine procedure; but it is not an

isolated case. This mode of giving self-knowledge is revealed as a part and practical portion of the Mosaic law. Thus, Deut. viii. 2: "And thou shalt remember all the way which the Lord thy God led thee these forty years in the wilderness, to humble thee, and to prove thee, and that thou mightest know what was in thy heart, whether thou wouldest keep his commandments or not; and that he might make thee know that man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live." How little do they know of the wondrous depth of the Old Testament who call it the book of the outward, the ceremonial, in distinction from the spiritual, and would therefore regard it as obsolete to the higher spirituality of our modern cycle! Self-knowledge is revealed as one great design of God's dealings with his people—not the boastful $\gamma\tau\omega\theta\iota\cdot\sigma\epsilon\alpha\nu\tau\circ\iota$ (know thyself) of the schools, not "the knowledge that puffeth up," but self-knowledge, that it may become cleansing knowledge, healing knowledge, and thus the spiritual life, or head of immortality. Some might smile at the thought of comparing Moses with the Phædo, and yet what is there in Plato's dialogue on the immortality of the soul (sublime as it is in idea, and to a right thinking, most conclusive in argument) to be compared with the depth of those few words—"that he might make thee know that man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord." The Sadducee saw nothing in them, but well does our Saviour say of these and other things he quotes from the ancient law: "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." That there is a *knowledge*, and at the same time a life, is a fact which the highest human philosophy cannot fully understand, but which is most abundantly revealed in the Scriptures.

Our subject is rich in illustrations of a similar kind from the Old and New Testaments. What did Peter know of his heart?—we mean not his torpid, unstirred being regarded as a mere potentiality—but what did Peter know of the moving, imaging, choosing, willing, warring world within him when he made that memorable declaration: "Tho' all men should be offended in thee, yet will not I be offended;" or so vehemently affirmed: "Lord, I am ready to go with thee to prison, or even unto death"? Our Lord's prediction was founded on no foreseen

change, but on what he then saw moving and living in his heart, altho all unknown to Peter.

Who ever obtained a keener insight into the profoundest depths of the human nature, carnal or spiritual, than the apostle Paul? and yet what a vast unknown to himself was his own inner world of thought, emotion, will, and motive, one moment before the heavenly light shone round him on his way to Damascus! Could we see that heart as it was then intensely energizing; could we see it as Paul saw it not, as Paul knew it not—that heart so full of hate, of “malice, wrath, and all uncharitableness;” that heart so sincere in its malice, and at the same time, as he afterwards well knew, boiling over with blind, selfish, Pharisaic rage against the fairest form of truth and love that had ever yet appeared on earth,—could we have looked down into that boiling crater of passion, that dark receptacle of foul *motives* so disguised when they came forth with the masks of fair and specious *reasons* that even their subject did not know them,—could we have seen all this, and then that same heart, the same in personal identity, and yet, oh, wondrous mystery! transformed, yea, more than that, new-born and new-created—that same Paul kneeling before Ananias, the wrath all gone, the heart now filled with love, welling up with the waters of life, budding with the fruits of faith, no longer Saul of Tarsus, but a “man in Christ,”—could we see these two states lying so close together—see them in the very realities of their being, in the very power of their energizings—how ineffably must such a spectacle surpass in wonder and in lofty interest the highest ideals of philosophy, the profoundest marvels that nature ever presented to the scientific analysis. Paul at Jerusalem, not merely consenting to but heartily *approving* the cruel death of Stephen, crying out against the martyr, “casting off his garment,” and throwing dust in the air, even as the mad Jewish mob afterward showed their rage against himself; Paul on his way to Damascus “breathing out slaughter” against the friends of the Redeemer, and Paul kneeling on the sands at Miletus, ready now “not only to be bound,” but also to die for the Lord Jesus! What a transcending mystery is here! The whole evidence of Christianity might be safely rested on the utter impossibility of accounting for it except on the supposition of an unearthly and supernatural

power. There is something more wonderful here than any physical marvel, it transcends any miracle in nature; there is something that goes beyond even the historical verity, strange as that is; it is the fact, not to be questioned, for it is even now before our eyes—that some new light had come into the world from which the human mind could form the glorious ideal.

Paul before his conversion knew not himself. "I did it ignorantly," he says, "in unbelief." Not ignorant of facts, not merely mistaken or led astray by outward errors misleading a pure intention, but ignorant of his *motives* even when moving him with their intensest energy. He had mistaken for them the *reasons* which he had superimposed. It was not ignorance of the Scriptures, ignorance of dogmatic truth, but ignorance of himself, his ruling will, his deeply hidden yet ever-active, ever-choosing, refusing, approving, condemning, reasoning heart. Had he known that selfhood as the devils know it, as perhaps some wicked men on earth may know it,—had he been so intensely evil as to have looked his evil in the face unflinchingly,—had Paul thus known his own heart just as it was on that wrathful journey, he never would have found mercy. But it would contradict his other teachings should we suppose that he meant to acquit himself, or that he regarded the blinding ignorance of an evil heart as anything else than the measure of the depth and *extent*, if not the intensity, of his depravity. Some wicked beings may know themselves better than others who are less depraved, but this is neither justification nor palliation of the evil blindness of the soul. *Aγνοῶν ἐν ἀτιστίᾳ*, "unknowing in unbelief"—the apostle no more means to excuse his want of knowledge than his want of faith, and we may fairly infer from his words here, as well as his teachings elsewhere, that the absence of the one is no more the test of accountability than the absence of the other. "I am not conscious in myself (*οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔμαυτῷ σίνοιδα*) yet herein am I not justified, but he that judges me (*ἀνακρίνει*, searches, separates, analyzes, discerns me) is God." (1 Cor. iv. 4.)

The case of David has less of the supernatural, but in no narrative of the Bible is the great psychological mystery more wonderfully exhibited. Here is something worthy of our deepest study: the abstract virtue pronouncing sentence, not hypocritically, but most sincerely tho most unconsciously, on the

heart's own actual yet undiscovered depravity. When Nathan the seer came with his divine message and his divine light to this most deeply sinning man, the latter had no more true notion of the hell within him, and which had just led him into such enormous outward wickedness, than many a man of seeming health has of some deadly disease concealed in the most secret chambers of his body. How very righteous he was, how unconsciously, how vehemently righteous! But it was the sentence of his own lips that the divine grace made use of as the means of opening his own soul, and then the prophet's voice found access. Through that opened door it went down to the dark vault of evil. David had a glimpse of his own heart. It was this awful sight that made him fall upon his face and cry out, "I have sinned." Then it was that he uttered in spirit that agonizing petition, "Oh, hide thy face from my iniquities!" In the light of this most graphic yet most profound narration, we see the reason of that searching language of the fifty-first Psalm, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and make new within me a spirit of righteousness." I was born in sin; oh, teach me truth "in the inward parts," and "in the hidden part, oh, make me to know wisdom." Exposed thus to himself, how intense became his conviction of exposure to the Divine Eye! and yet it is the same feeling in its more softened meditative form that led him to implore its merciful searching of this dark selfhood, so near to him and yet so hidden from his ordinary knowledge.

TAYLER LEWIS.

CONVICT LABOR AND THE LABOR REFORMERS.

THE employment of the prisoners in the various penal institutions of the United States has become one of the most vexatious of legislative questions. Measures for its regulation or limitation, the exclusion of certain branches of industry from the prisons, or the restriction of the number of prisoners to be employed in any industry, are pressed upon the legislatures of several States from year to year with the persistency and unity of action which the trades-unions have learned to employ so efficiently in settling the relations between the workingmen and their employers, until the subject has come to absorb an amount of public attention entirely out of proportion to its real magnitude and importance.

Labor and capital, so long and so bitterly antagonized, have upon this point foregone their eternal differences, and united zealously and heartily in a common object. The usual expedients by which legislators are accustomed to stave off or wear out the importunity of their constituents have resulted only in strengthening the earnestness and consolidating the efforts of the small but compact and determined body of men who have planted themselves upon the position that the competition between convict and free labor in the mechanical industries must cease. The subject, which demands the calm and dispassionate examination of experts, and whose complications are so many and difficult that even these fail often in agreeing upon important details of it, has been forced into politics, where it should never have entered at all, and has added a new element of bitterness to caucuses, and another source of demoralization to the elections, in which the labor reformers, disregarding all other issues, seem ready to cast their united vote for those who will promise obedience to their dictates.

Argument and demonstration have, so far at least, failed to convince them of the unsoundness of their conclusions, or the weakness of the premises by which they have reached them. A single fact seems, with them, to swallow up every other consideration, viz., that criminals work, while honest mechanics are forced to remain idle. The appearance of wrong upon the face of this is so patent to them that they accept it as conclusive, ignoring the fact that this is only a single feature of a subject embracing many branches, no one of which can be safely neglected in taking account of any other. Their earnestness and sincerity may be freely conceded. The fact that every commercial or financial disturbance brings distress and disaster to the mechanics and their families in increasing proportions; the encroachments of machinery upon the province of the laborer, multiplying many fold his power of production, and making over-production and its consequent stagnation more and more easily possible; and the knowledge that the amount of work to be done is not, and probably never will be, sufficient to employ the hands that are willing and anxious to do it, and which depend upon it as their only means of livelihood, are amply sufficient to justify the jealousy with which the man who must live by his labor regards every unnecessary competition.

Sympathizing fully and heartily with every legitimate effort on the part of such men to protect their rights or promote their real interests, it seems to me that in this case they are mistaken, first as to the necessity which underlies the competition of which they complain, and second as to its amount, and I purpose to show in this paper why mechanical labor has become a necessary constituent of the prison systems of most of our States, and what is its extent and power as a competing element in the labor market.

Every one, with scarcely an exception, concedes that persons who have been convicted of crime, and sentenced to imprisonment in consequence, ought to labor. Humanity demands the distraction from remorse and despair which manual labor affords to the mind of the prisoner. The discipline of a penal institution depends very greatly upon this distraction, and upon the habits of obedience and order which systematic labor engenders and promotes.

And there is almost equal agreement that the expenses of imprisonment ought, either wholly or in great part, to be met from the proceeds of the prisoner's labor. "He who breaks the law should pay for its enforcement," is a saying whose truth and justice long since commended it to popular acceptance. So far the labor reformers agree with their opponents.

But if the prisoner must work, and support himself from the product of his work, the question arises at once, How is this to be done without interfering or competing with labor outside of the prisons? The labor reformers answer this by proposing to distribute the employments of convicts among the several industries carried on by free workmen in proportion to the number of the latter engaged in each. Nothing seems easier or simpler than this in theory. There is no question whatever that if the labor of the comparatively small number of inmates of the prisons of this country could be thus divided among the industries carried on around them, the competition with them would be reduced to proportions too small for appreciation. While the effects of its production would still tell upon the general production of the country, the amount added to that of any particular trade or pursuit would be very slight indeed.

But in attempting such a distribution difficulties, entirely insurmountable, meet us upon the threshold, which can only be overcome by a complete revolution of our prison systems. Many kinds of business cannot be carried on at all in the limited areas of prison enclosures. Others are dangerous, from the fact that the tools necessary in them are easily converted into efficient and deadly weapons; and still others require a constant communication between the workmen which the discipline of the prison forbids. Agricultural pursuits, which Sir Walter Crofton has adopted with so much success as a part of his system, require for their successful administration radical changes in our penal laws, prominent among which would be the "indefinite sentence," the rigid classification of prisoners according to their age, sex, and degrees of criminality, and the exaltation of the reform of the prisoner to the first place among the objects of his imprisonment. All of these are desirable; but the people of this country have not, to any considerable extent, been brought to recognize

the fact, and until they are, their adoption of them, or of any system in which they are prominent features, is not to be expected.

And these, like the coarser, ruder kinds of labor, such as stone-breaking and road-making, fail utterly in enabling the convict to earn his own support. Under the Crofton system, the idea of the prisons being self-supporting is ignored almost entirely. And the rougher classes of employments are objected to on account of their degrading character by very many thoughtful people, who insist that the occupation of the convict should not destroy the remnant of self-respect which may have been left to him. The effects of such labor are simply deterrent, and while it may be adopted as a punishment for vagrants, and the short-term prisoners of a jail, it is not likely to be used in any large prison or penitentiary. Whether it degrades or not, it does not pay. For it is not to be forgotten, in treating this subject, that the cost of maintaining convicts, tho reduced to the lowest point by good management, is considerable, and that cost must be met by public tax, if it is not defrayed from the products of prison labor. Whatever may be the right or wrong of the matter in the abstract, there is no doubt that the immensely greater number of our people want their prisons to support themselves, and the people of the United States are sovereign. Prison industries must then of necessity be productive. The lower grades of employments fail in this respect to meet the requirements of the case, and must be stricken from the list.

Again: in attempting to distribute the employments of our convicts in proportion to those of the free workmen about them we are met by the fact that while each State regulates the affairs of its prisons in its own way, it has no control over the industrial pursuits of its people, or their intercourse with those who are separated from them by lines which in commercial respects are purely imaginary. An impartial distribution of prison industry according to the employments of the people of any one State might, and in most cases would, discriminate directly against them to the advantage of others. The effect of such distribution by individual States would in every case be to bring the prison competition more directly home to the parties who complain of it. The labor reformers generally, when pressed

upon this point, frankly admit that any equitable distribution of the labor of convicts among the various industries of all the people of our country is impossible by individual State action. The general government has no power to provide for such a distribution, and the difficulties of any concerted action towards it, by the agreement of all the States, or even the greater part of them, may be realized by a moment's reflection upon the great variety of interests and feelings involved. The agitation of the subject must be begun and sustained by the manufacturing States, while those whose people are mostly interested in agricultural pursuits will of necessity be either indifferent or hostile to the movement—generally the latter, because the manufacture of any articles largely consumed among them, by their prisons, would be a direct benefit to them, which it would require a very extreme degree of disinterestedness on their part to refuse.

Once more: in order for a business to be profitable to either States or individuals, it must be carried on in considerable magnitude. There must be enough of it to pay for its superintendence by competent persons, and this is a vital obstacle to local distribution of prison labor. The tendency of all manufacturing concerns is more and more towards concentration in large establishments, where the expenses of supervision and direction can be spread over the largest possible surface.

Then, machinery has become inseparable from nearly every department of mechanical industry, and where it is used there is always economy in collecting a considerable quantity of it together. The large shop can employ a variety of labor-saving machines beyond the reach of the smaller one, and to fit up and stock one great establishment is much cheaper than to start two or three with the same productive power, while in the competition between the greater and smaller concerns the latter go to the wall inevitably. This is evident in every branch of business. The wayside shop which did the work for a neighborhood is starved out, and its occupant has gone into the factory or turned his attention to other business. If he remains at all, he lives by repairing the work of the great establishment rather than by making new articles. Such being the facts, it is easy to see that the profitable employment of convicts in small squads, such as would be necessitated by local distribution of

their labor, is difficult in the extreme. The business in which several hundred men are engaged gives room and scope for the development of individual capacity of every variety. If a man fails in one department of it he may be successful in another, and he can be shifted from post to post until his proper place is found. In the smaller concern this is impossible, and all of the most successful employers of convict labor agree that while there may be a handsome profit in working large numbers of prisoners, small lots are undesirable. This was illustrated in a very conclusive manner in the State prison of New Jersey last year. A proposition had been made to the supervisor of the prison, by parties of the first responsibility, to take its whole available force, amounting to more than six hundred men, at prices of from *sixty to sixty-five* cents per day for the labor of each. But while this was pending the legislature passed an act forbidding the employment of more than one hundred convicts in any one branch of industry. As the proposal had been made for a single trade, its acceptance was of course impossible, and when the contracts in existence at the passage of the law expired, the most diligent advertising only resulted in bids for a little more than half the available force, at prices averaging *thirty-seven* cents per day, or a little over, for each. After two months' delay, during which the entire mass of convicts, except those employed in prison duties, remained idle, the supervisor was enabled, by allowing a shirt-making firm to divide the departments of its business into three distinct contracts, to find work for four hundred and forty-five men at *fifty* cents each per day, leaving more than one hundred and fifty in enforced idleness. The direct loss to the State by this experiment amounted to fully thirty thousand dollars yearly, besides the two months' time sunk in its beginning. And this was not the whole of it. It was found that the accommodations which had been ample for six hundred men under one or two employers were hardly sufficient for three fourths of that number under seven. Each contractor required a separate shop and distinct facilities for storage of materials and manufactured goods and for shipping, and to make it possible to employ the remaining one hundred and fifty at any kind of productive labor a considerable outlay was necessary in buildings, not

likely to be needed when the project of an intermediary prison, which has long been agitated, is carried into effect.

In view of such facts, it is easy to conclude that, so far as financial results are concerned, one great industry in a prison is better than half a dozen or more. It does not require very much study of the subject in its practical relations to reach the further conclusion that the discipline of the prison may be better maintained when its officers have to deal with one employer of convicts than when they must keep watch over a greater number. Local distribution, if made in proportion to the industries carried on in the State, would seldom require less than ten or twelve, and might easily need twenty or fifty.

General distribution, if it were possible, would meet most of the difficulties of which I have spoken. Under it there would be little trouble in providing that one branch of business should be followed in one prison, and another in another, until nearly every trade available for convict employment was fairly represented. I have shown why, in my judgment, this cannot be done.

It seems evident, then, that the employments of convicts must be limited to certain branches, and that in order to provide by them for the support of the prisons, either wholly or in any considerable part, they must be mechanical. If the free-hand laborer cannot live in competition with machinery, it is idle to expect the convict to do so. The disadvantages in the situation are all on the side of the latter. The free workman has the incentive of receiving the entire product of his labor, and the reputation he can gain by its quantity or excellence. He has generally a family dependent upon his exertions, and in most cases hopes by success in his business to lift himself or his children to higher social or financial positions. But the convict has no such stimulant. His interest in the character or quantity of his work is confined to his desire to escape punishment for coming short in it. Under the Crofton system, like that adopted in the Elmira Reformatory of New York, he might hope to shorten the term of his confinement very materially indeed by cheerful and faithful service; but such systems are exceptional everywhere, and their adoption with us is still in the future. In most instances he knows nothing of the trade he has to follow when

put to work at it. Generally his previous habits have been such as to give him a decided distaste for steady work of any kind. It is the idle, the vicious, the worthless, those whose constitutions have been broken or enfeebled by intemperate or vicious habits, who make up the mass of our prison population. Such men work only under compulsion, and their service is that of the eye rather than the heart; now and then one of them may do the full work of an average free man, as now and then a slave has equalled his free competitor in performance, but in general the value of convict labor may be set down as little if anything above the price paid for it by contractors—usually about one half or one third a free workman's wages in the same business. The stock is bad, to begin with, and it is idle to expect very good results from it. For such men, mechanical work, as at present conducted, is admirably adapted. The minute subdivision of labor, by which each person is made to do only a small part of any process of manufacture, enables the prisoner in a very few days to become proficient, if he desires to do so. And when it is remembered that by far the greater number of convicts are in prison less than two years, the advantages of such treatment are apparent at once. They can be made to earn the expense of keeping, feeding, and clothing them in this manner; the work is not severe in general; the facilities for massing them upon the limited space of the prison-shops are complete, and the maintenance of discipline rendered easy.

Labor reformers and others, it may be noted at this point, complain that this treatment makes the convict little better than a part of the machine with which he works; that he learns no real trade by which he can support himself on leaving the prison; and that his labor, confined to such a narrow and unvarying routine, is depressing and degrading to both mind and body.

To this it may be answered, that his work is exactly the same as that of the free laborer in the factory outside the prison. The same machinery is used, the same subdivision of tasks obtains, in both cases. No one learns a full trade in the old acceptation of the term any more. Each boot or shoe passes through the hands of a "team" of men, in every great shop, varying in number from four to ten or eleven, each of whom

does but a small part of the work upon it and nothing else, and few take the trouble to perfect themselves in more than one or two subdivisions. As with the shoe trade, so with all the others. The man who stands before a machine, which by a single motion of his arm bores a hole in each of a dozen or twenty brush-blocks, all of which, when set in their proper places, revolve in regular order by the action of the machinery until the whole block is properly pierced, learns only a small part of a brush-maker's trade; but he learns that part quickly, and, by doing nothing else, soon acquires a precision and rapidity of motion almost equal to that of the machine. Skilled labor is a thing of the past in most trades, and the list of those in which it is still necessary diminishes almost daily. A general knowledge of the various divisions of any trade is required now only for the workman who repairs, and these are becoming scarcer every year. The introduction of machinery into manufactures leads inevitably to the concentration of the business into great factories and the minutest subdivisions of labor. If these are evils, they are no worse in the prison than out of it.

As to the desirability of convicts being taught trades during their confinement, by which they may be able to support themselves at their discharge, practice proves that very few indeed of them will follow, when free, the business at which they were engaged in prison. Many of them have a very deep-rooted dislike to everything connected with their imprisonment, nearly all seek work in other departments of industry, and the most the prison can do for its inmates in this respect is to teach them habits of order, regularity, and sobriety, which are the best introduction to any trade, and the surest aids in its pursuit.

But, conceding that mechanical labor is best adapted for prison purposes under existing circumstances, we are met by the complaint of the labor reformers, that in thus narrowing down the list of convict occupations we are creating an unjust and injurious competition with them; that they are by it, in fact, taxed either directly or indirectly for the support of the prisons which break down their business and enable unscrupulous individuals to flood the markets with goods equal to their own in quality, produced by labor for which only a nominal price is paid.

As to the last count in this indictment, after what has been said about the value of convict labor in the preceding pages it is only necessary to add that the estimate these gentlemen insist upon fixing upon that labor, as "fully equal to that of a free workman," is scarcely complimentary to the industrious and intelligent workingmen whom they claim to represent. If any one else but their own leaders should so far forget the respect due to them as to degrade their productive capacity to the level of the vicious and demoralized set from whom our prisons are mainly recruited, the insult would be promptly resented. Alas for the free country whose citizen sovereigns will do no more for themselves and their children than the convict in the prisons will do for the fear of the paddle or boot-heel gag!

That the employment of convicts in mechanical labor does create a competition with those engaged in the same business which may, under certain circumstances, become injurious to the latter may be freely conceded.

All productive labor is competition. We are compelled, every one of us, to compete with some one in some way or other, and there is nothing which convicts can be made to do, down to the most menial services of the prisons, that free persons would not do if they could. If, as the labor reformers assert, "the State has no right to enter into competition with its citizens in the pursuits they have chosen for themselves," the prisons should stop working at once.

Before granting so much, however, it may be well to inquire into the extent of the competition against which so much complaint is made. The accomplished and able chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor found in 1879 an aggregate of 47,769 persons in the prisons, penitentiaries, and reformatories of the United States, whose labor was distributed as follows:

Making agricultural implements.....	602
" boots and shoes.....	6,581
" brooms.....	268
" brushes.....	1,010
" carpets.....	175
" carriages and wagons.....	1,251
" cigars and tobacco.....	510
" clothing.....	2,262
" fur hats.....	593

Making furniture of all kinds.....	2,884
" iron goods.....	3,504
" laundry work.....	315
" leather and leather goods.....	787
" stoves.....	1,687
" wooden goods.....	1,120
As farmers and laborers.....	10,607
In prison duties.....	4,930
In miscellaneous manufactures.....	1,036
Idle, sick, or infirm.....	7,647

Of the 40,122 convicts at work, 15,537 were employed as farmers or laborers, generally under the lease system of the Southern States, and in the prison service; leaving only a competing element of 24,585 in manufacturing pursuits, in which there were, by the census of 1870, 1,297,611 free persons engaged—a proportion of one convict to fifty-three free workmen, or a little less than two per cent of competition taken as a whole. In a few branches, however, this proportion is exceeded, rising to three and eight tenths per cent in boot and shoe making, five per cent in the manufacture of brooms, forty per cent in brush-making, and about ten per cent in fur hats. Thus it will be seen that only two trades have any just reason to fear convict competition—the brush business, which requires but a moderate amount of capital, and the manufacture of fur hats, which demands rather more. If these two trades were excluded from the list of convict employments altogether, and the persons engaged in them distributed among the other branches, the addition to the latter would scarcely be felt. Unfortunately for all parties, the labor reformers have not taken the trouble to gauge the amount and value of convict competition with any kind of exactness.

The convict population of the United States is now about one tenth of one per cent of the whole, and not likely to exceed that proportion very greatly for many years to come if ever. It is possible, by well-regulated prison, reformatory, and preventive measures and systems, to reduce it very far below this ratio, and even as it is there is no real danger in it for American workmen, except in its concentration upon a very few departments of business, as the labor reformers themselves admit that a competition of five per cent is not injurious to the trades they represent.

Such a concentration is possible. The brush and fur-hat business could be absorbed by the prisons entirely. Is it reasonable to suppose that this will be done? Suppose the number of persons in the prisons employed in these trades to be quadrupled, would not the effect be a stagnation as disastrous to the prison industries as any others? Is it in any way likely that the managers of prison labor would go on from year to year manufacturing goods which could not be sold, and which depreciate rapidly in value in the holding? Would there be any advantage to them in so flooding the market that the manufactured goods could only be sold at heavy loss? The prisons are exposed to the competition of every one. No one proposes to protect them in the possession of industries which they have, it may be, introduced and made their own by long practice. No one hesitates for a moment to set up an opposition to them in any business so long as there is reasonable prospect of his succeeding in making a profit by it. Is the State the only body which has no rights that others are bound to respect? Is it, the representative of the whole of its people, the exponent of their united powers, the protector of their rights, to be limited and crippled in the performance of the duties imposed upon it by restrictions which no one thinks for a moment of putting upon himself or any one else?

And is not this idea of claiming protection against competition of any kind singularly un-American? We propose to compete with the whole world. We throw our doors wide open to its labor element and receive it without stint. One hundred and fifty-five thousand skilled workmen of foreign birth are computed to have landed in New York during the last two years, and thrown themselves into competition with the labor of our citizens by birth or adoption, in the trades they propose to follow. Does any one ask for legislation for the limitation of that competition? Our machinery is doing the work which hundreds of thousands of hands would scarcely be able to perform; shall we enact restrictions upon American invention? We pride ourselves upon our labor-saving contrivances, every one of which does work, or saves work, which a man or woman might do and be paid for doing; shall we forbid its competition by legislation?

And, finally: we put upon the State the duty of guarding and restraining persons whose crimes make them dangerous to society. We delegate to it the task of punishing them, and if possible bringing them to repentance and restoration, and both of these ends must be reached through labor if reached at all. Are we prepared to cripple and hinder the agency we have set up for these purposes because it in some measure conflicts with the pursuits the individual citizen chooses to make his own? Is it not worth our while to conclude that it is the business of our prison managers to work out the punishment and the reformation of the prisoners committed to their charge by the best and surest means within their reach, leaving individual interests to take care of themselves? The citizen who engages in business which he finds unremunerative has the privilege of changing it for another at pleasure. The State cannot so easily change either the location or the occupation of her wards. She must keep them safely and employ them in such a manner as to maintain discipline and provide for their support, or she fails in the trust committed to her. And if in doing so she entirely absorbs by gradual process this or that branch of business, no one has any right to complain of her.

This is the conclusion to which we shall ultimately be driven, and the sooner we reach it the better. Every limitation of the manner or means of employing convicts other than the broad general principle that their work shall produce the best results for them and the prison, and through it for the community whose agent and representative it is, is a step in the wrong direction, a blunder scarcely less than criminal.

Here I might stop, but for the fact that in their complaints of convict competition the labor reformers have chosen to concentrate their attacks in great measure upon a single detail of prison management, important it is true, but not important enough, I think, to justify them in pressing it upon us to the exclusion or the injury of vital reforms which might ere this have succeeded, could one half of the energy that has been wasted in assailing the system of contracting convict labor been expended upon them. To most of the labor reformers, and to many others as earnest, and at least as disinterested as they, the contract system is the sum of all villainies in prison manage-

ment; a wrong to the convict, whom it makes the slave of the contractor who has purchased his labor; a wrong to the prison, whose discipline it subverts to the convenience and profit of men who have only a commercial interest in it; a wrong to the employer of free labor, by compelling him to compete in the market with manufacturers who have paid only a nominal price for the labor they employ, and to the workingmen by exposing them to an injurious and degrading competition.

Now it is easy to admit a part of these charges, while others have been more or less fully met in the preceding pages. Let me acknowledge that the contract system is far from perfect, and would probably find no place in a perfect prison system. The error of its assailants, however, is in attacking it, rather than the evils which underlie it, and make it indispensable; in proposing to abolish contracts without first providing the means which would enable us to do without them; without, for instance, separating our prisons from political interference and taking measures to secure fitness and permanency in our prison service. We have none of these things. We seem, in fact, now farther from their attainment than we were thirty years ago. Our prison offices are almost without exception the rewards of political service, and their holders are displaced with every turn of the political wheel. Is it to such agencies as these that we are to turn over the management of great commercial enterprises, in which the ripest experience, the fullest knowledge of the markets, the highest executive ability, and the sternest integrity are necessary to success? For the management of the industry of a thousand or fifteen hundred men is no trifling matter. The agent who has no direct personal interest in its success seldom brings either profit or credit to his employers in such a transaction. And if that agent is to be, as we seem to insist he shall be, a political hack only, what but disaster can result from committing such a charge to him? Yet this would be the first result of abolishing the contract system. The only substitute proposed for it is to work the prisons by State officers for the account of the State. Now we have tried to do this over and over again. We did it in the State of New York for instance, at a dead loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was tried in the Elmira Reformatory under circum-

stances which ought, one would think, to have insured its success, if it could succeed anywhere—freedom from political interference, and a superintendent of long experience and acknowledged ability; tried until the legislature grew weary of appropriating money to meet its annual deficits, and decided that the contract system, under which Sing Sing and Auburn and Clinton prisons had become self-supporting or nearly so, should be substituted in its stead. Its failures in this country have been many and disastrous, its successes very few indeed.

But suppose it were possible to realize from public-account working all that its advocates claim for it. Suppose we could obtain thoroughly trained and entirely capable prison officers—men of probity and honor, with the ability, the commercial talent and experience, and the personal enthusiasm necessary for the highest development of the resources of our prisons—and insure them a tenure of office for life or during good behavior; that we could construct a prison staff as the staff of our regular army is organized, and with the same *esprit de corps*, and that the prisons managed by such bodies should be self-sustaining—what would the manufacturer or mechanic who now complains of convict competition have gained by the change? If the convicts are to support themselves by the products of their labor, what difference to the parties engaged in the same branches of industry whether the State or the contractor employs them? At least as many goods would be made in the prisons under the former as under the latter. Those goods would be sold in the same markets as now, and the competition would be the same in every particular. If the contractor can hold his goods and flood the market with them to the injury of the outside manufacturer, the State agent could do the same, with the entire capital of the commonwealth behind him. The business, if successful at all, must be conducted on business principles, and these are the same whether administered by public officers or individuals.

Neither is it certain that the convicts would gain by substituting public-account working for the contract system. The warden may be, and generally is, a salutary check upon the rapacity or the tyranny of the contractor, but who is to intervene between the warden and the prisoner if the contractor is taken

away? The latter must observe the rules of the prison. The warden makes them and can walk over them at pleasure. Contractors and their agents are no better than they should be, but every act of brutality on their part can be matched or excelled by a similar one perpetrated by the keeper or his aids. If the prisoner is gagged, or paddled, or showered, or if his naked, quivering flesh is scorched with burning kerosene, it is the keeper who does it in every instance. And it is the keeper whom the humanitarians on the one hand and the labor reformers on the other propose to make the convict's taskmaster. Is there the slightest probability in the world that the morality of the State officer, his justice, his humanity, his kindness, will excel that of the contractor? The one has received his office, not because he is the fittest and best for the discharge of its duties, but because he has been an effective instrument in elevating his party to power; the other comes to the prison in order to profit by the purchase he has made of the labor of its inmates. The standard is not likely to be high with either, but the man of business is generally as safe as the politician.

With prisons so officered and controlled, contracts are unavoidable. That grave abuses are frequently fostered by them is not to be denied. But with their aid we can manage to keep our prison industries in some degree of efficiency, even with the loose and faulty administration of inexperienced and unqualified officers; without them the institutions sink into chaos or worse. It should be remembered, in treating this subject, that the question is not between an ideal prison system—that which we hope to see adopted generally at some date not too far in the future—and the contract workings, but between the system of management we now have and are likely to keep, for some time at least, with contracts, and the same faulty and often corrupt concern without them. Having known something of both these alternatives, the former seems to me by far the less evil of the two.

And in justice to the contract system it must be said that most of the evils of which so much complaint is made are not inseparable from it, and disappear entirely under conscientious and capable prison officers. Contractors say, with great unanimity, that the profits of their business depend very largely

upon the maintenance of the discipline of the prisons, and frequently render valuable aid to the keepers in support of it, and it is by no means certain that contracts cannot be so managed and guarded as to be beneficent parts of the best system of prison management attainable for us during the present generation.

However this may be, there can be little doubt that other parts of our prison system should be thoroughly and radically recast before attempting the abolition of contracts for convict labor. We have not, as I have said, yet begun the separation of our prisons from politics; we have scarcely attempted to provide them with officers prepared for their work by special training, and commended to it by fitness only; the classification of convicts according to their ages, sex, and degrees of criminality is still in its infancy among us; fear rather than hope remains the prime and almost the only incentive to obedience in nearly all our prisons; and the idea of making the term of imprisonment largely dependent upon the conduct of the prisoner in most cases, is regarded by many of our best and most intelligent citizens with distrust or aversion. When we shall have settled these fundamental parts of our system of the future we shall doubtless find the contract question has ceased to be troublesome. Till then its agitation is untimely, and a hindrance to reform.

A. S. MEYRICK.

AMERICAN MANUFACTURES.

THE history of American manufactures, in one sense, begins with the establishment of our national independence, inasmuch as prior to that time the policy of England not only discouraged but positively prohibited the establishment of almost all branches of manufacturing industry. In another sense, however, no small or unimportant part of the history of American manufactures lies back of the contest for independence, inasmuch as in the earlier period were developed those traits of the national genius which made our subsequent industrial career possible.

In spite of the jealous and severely repressive policy of England in dealing with her colonies and plantations, the first feeble beginnings of manufacture in New England drew down but slight animadversion.

Sir Josiah Child, the eminent writer on trade, had, even so early as 1670, apprehended the danger, as the spirit of that age deemed it, of a great ship-building industry springing up in the heavily wooded colonies along the North Atlantic shore. "Of all American plantations," he wrote, "his Majesty has none so apt for the building of shipping as New England, none comparably so qualified for the breeding of seamen;" and, he added, "in my opinion, there is nothing more prejudicial and in prospect more dangerous to any mother-country than the increase of shipping in her colonies, plantations, or provinces."

But it was not until 1699 that the authorities at home actually interfered to prevent the development of industry, in the technical sense, in the colonies. In that year Parliament declared that no wool, yarn, or woollen manufactures of their American plantations should be thence shipped or even laden

in order to be transported from thence to any place whatever. In 1719 the House of Commons declared that the erecting of manufactures in the colonies tended to lessen their dependence on Great Britain. In 1731, in consequence of numerous complaints from interested persons, among whom the "Company of Hatters" in London were conspicuous, Parliament directed the Board of Trade to inquire and report with respect to laws made, manufactures set up, or trade carried on, detrimental to the trade, manufactures, or navigation of the mother-country.

Massachusetts proved to be the only important offender, and the sum of her enormities was indeed appalling.

"By late accounts from Massachusetts Bay in New England," say the Board, "the Assembly have voted a bounty of thirty shillings for every piece of duck or canvas made in the province. Some other manufactures are carried on there, as brown holland for woman's wear, which lessens the importation of calicoes and some other sorts of East India goods. They also make some small quantities of cloth, made of linen and cotton, for ordinary shirting. By a paper-mill set up three years ago they make to the value of £200 sterling yearly. There are also several forges for making bar-iron, and some furnaces for cast-iron or hollow ware, and one slitting-mill, and a manufacture for nails.

"... Great quantities of hats are made in New England, of which the Company of Hatters in London have complained to us that great quantities of these hats are exported to Spain, Portugal, and our West India islands. They also make all sorts of iron for shipping. There are several still-houses and sugar-bakers established in New England."

The immediate outcome of this investigation was an act of Parliament passed in 1732, and verily the Hatters' Company had their reward. Not only was the colonial export of hats to a foreign port prohibited, but their transportation from one British plantation to another was prohibited, under severe penalties.

Eighteen years later the griefs of another body of British manufacturers called for remedy from Parliament; and an act of 1750, while permitting pig and bar iron to be imported from the colonies into London, prohibited the erection or continuance of any mill or other engine for slitting or rolling iron, or

any plating forge to work with a tilt-hammer, or any furnace for making steel, in the colonies, under the penalty of £200. And every such mill, engine, forge, or furnace was declared to be a *common nuisance*, and the colonial governors, upon the information of two witnesses upon oath, were required to cause the same to be *abated*.

But while the Americans of the days before the Revolution were thus forbidden to practise any branch of manufacturing industry which might interfere with the market for British produce, the foundations of future manufacturing greatness were being laid where the power of Parliament could not reach them. In a very high sense, the history of American manufactures reaches back beyond the Revolution, for it was in that period that the peculiar industrial character of our people was developed.

It is difficult to write of this subject without producing the impression of exaggeration. There is only one nation in the world to the mass of whose population mechanical genius can be attributed. That nation is ours. In other countries it is only the picked men, a select few, who possess mechanical insight and aptitude, the power of instantaneously, because instinctively, seizing upon mechanical relations, and a high degree of native efficiency in mechanical operations.

With us the rule is the other way: there are few Americans, at least throughout the Northern States, who have not mechanical insight and aptitude in a degree which elsewhere would make them marked men. As a great organ of English opinion has said, "Invention is a normal function of the American brain." "The American invents as the Greek chiselled, as the Venetian painted, as the modern Italian sings."

By some persons the wonderful mechanical developments of our history have been attributed to the influence of our system of patent legislation. Unless I am wholly wrong, while our patent laws have encouraged specific invention and have multiplied a hundredfold the contrivances, great and small, useful and futile, which have been put upon the market, or at least have taken the form of models and been stored away in the government office at Washington, *the power to invent*, which inheres to so remarkable a degree in our people, was created altogether irrespective of and long antecedently to that system of legislation.

It is with us an inheritance; and it is fairly matter of question whether that inheritance has not been impaired rather than increased during the period covered by our patent laws; impaired, first, through the dilution of our blood by foreign immigration, and, secondly, through the relief afforded by increasing wealth from the physical necessities which so stimulated the mechanical faculty in the first settlers upon these shores.

In inquiring into the genesis of this national trait, we note, first, that the country was settled predominantly by men of that race respecting which Prof. Thorold Rogers has said that he has been unable to find any one notable invention for saving human labor originating elsewhere, excepting in the solitary instance of the carding-machine, the invention of a Frenchman. And of this great inventive Teutonic race, it was the most ingenious branch, the English, which contributed chiefly to the settlement of the Atlantic coast.

Secondly, the early settlers of America constituted, in the main, a picked population. The possibilities of gain which reside in breeding from the higher, stronger, more alert and aggressive individuals of a species are well recognized in the case of the domestic animals; but there have been few opportunities of obtaining a measure of the effect that could be produced upon the human race by excluding from propagation the weak, the vicious, the cowardly, the effeminate, persons of dwarfed stature, of tainted blood, or of imperfect organization. The inhabitants of the English colonies, two hundred and one hundred years ago, constituted a population which was more truly selected, in the respects of mental vigor, intellectual inquisitiveness, freedom of conception, and self-reliance, than any other which history has known.

Thirdly, upon a community thus constituted were laid the severe requirements of existence under an exceptionally rigorous climate. The first settlers had brought out with them from the old country, and had transmitted to their descendants, all the desires, tastes, and ambitions proper to a highly advanced society, with but small means for their gratification.

In his admirable review of the doctrine of Malthus, Prof. Senior justly remarks that the true preventive check to population is not the dread of physical privation, but "the fear of

losing decencies." Quite as clearly is it the ambition to gain decencies which evokes most fully the spirit of self-denial and of laborious exertion, and quickens to their highest activity all the powers of the mind. It was the wants of the higher nature, which it was not impossible to satisfy in some increasing degree by labor and pains and forethought, which afforded the most acute stimulus to the scheming, devising, calculating faculty in early American life, out of which, in the course of generations, was developed that inventive power which so clearly characterizes the population of to-day.

To make shifts; to save time; to shorten labor; to search out substitutes for what was inaccessible or costly; to cut corners and break through barriers in reaching an object; to force one tool to serve three or four uses, and to compel refractory or inappropriate material to answer urgent wants—this was the constant occupation of our ancestors. Life was no routine, work was no routine, to them, as it is to the peasantry of every country of Europe; as it is fast coming to be among us to-day. Then, everywhere and at all times it was possible to save something from labor, to gain something for comfort and social decency. And, through such incessant practice, originality of conception, boldness in framing expedients, and fertility of resource grew by exercise in father and mother, and were transmitted with increasing force to sons and daughters, till invention came to be "a normal function of the American brain," the American inventing as the Greek chiselled, as the Venetian painted, as the Italian sings.

This wide popular appreciation of mechanical forces and relations constitutes a most important qualification for success in manufactures. The results of invention, in the shape of perfected machinery, might be imported in the hold of a vessel; but few of those whom the steerage brings us are fit to manipulate, manage, and care for the delicate, intricate, and costly machinery which requires to be used in modern industry. Only those who have a touch of the inventive genius can rightly build the machine, or put it and keep it in working to the highest advantage, with the maximum of effect and the minimum of waste.

"It appeared," said the London *Times* in 1876, speaking

of the Philadelphia Exhibition, "as if there were a greater economy of labor habitually practised in the States; and, in conjunction with this, there was evidence of the more constant presence of a presiding mind, superintending every process of industry.

"The best machine in the world will fail to give satisfaction if there is not an intelligent human being at hand to watch it, to detect the smallest failure in its working as soon as it is developed, and to suggest and supply the means of correcting any miscarriage in its functions. Much of the mechanical work shown at Philadelphia was executed with a fineness which could not have been exceeded *if every man who had a share in its production had originally conceived it.*"

A second condition of our manufacturing industry from which might have been expected to result early and great success has been the abundance of what are popularly called raw materials.

The natural resources of the United States, in field and forest and mine, are far beyond those of any of our rivals, England, France, or Germany, and of all of them combined. Our supplies of coal for heating and for power are the wonder of the world, while our Atlantic coast is dotted with immense water powers. Our iron ores, of the greatest variety and often of high purity, are widely spread over the face of the country; are found in abundance at the least working depths, and, at places, in close juxtaposition to coal and limestone. Besides ores of iron, the United States possess, of useful metals and minerals, great stores of copper, lead, zinc, corundum, quicksilver, asbestos, asphaltum, nickel, cobalt, and kaolin. Our native woods in beauty, strength, tenacity, and elasticity are not equalled by the flora of all Europe, while their variety is equally remarkable. Where England or France has thirty or thirty-five indigenous trees, the United States have exceeding three hundred native woody species, a large part of them excellently adapted to the purposes of the manufacturer. Not less profuse is the wealth of building-stones, slates, and marbles which underlie our soil from New England to Tennessee and Alabama.

Of fibres our soil and climate exhibit a high degree of adaptation to the production of those two which are the chief staples

of the textile manufacture, cotton and wool. In the production of the former of these, whether under slave labor or under free labor, we are practically beyond competition from any field.

With such a wealth of materials upon which to exert mechanical powers so extraordinary, the question naturally arises, Why has not the history of American manufactures been one of uninterrupted success, ever since the achievement of our national independence withdrew forges and slitting-mills from the category of "common nuisances"? Why did not the United States at once take the foremost rank, and maintain their proud position, with increasing prestige from decade to decade? Why is it that, after nearly a century of effort, we are still, with all our lavish endowment of faculties, opportunities, and materials, not the first but only the second manufacturing nation of the world?

We shall not fully answer this question by saying that vast and varied manufactures presuppose more than high mechanical skill and abundant natural resources; that, besides these, there must be the faculty of organization and administration; the ability to co-ordinate the integral parts of a service and to subordinate them all to a single will; the ability to supervise the working of a complicated system, holding each agency in its place and up to its work, sternly repressing all wayward tendencies, and maintaining throughout a widely extended service a strict responsibility to the official head.

This ability, we know, characterizes in a remarkable degree the high-grade Englishman. Wholly devoid of cunning and with precious little tact, in the usual sense of that term, he has yet shown, through centuries, an exceptional faculty of organization, whether in trade, in manufactures, in finance, in military operations, or in colonial administration. Have we failed to inherit this faculty in full degree from our English sires?

Not overlooking examples of a high order of organizing genius in American industry, most conspicuously in the management of our railways, but also notably in many of our Eastern mills and factories, I think it must be admitted that there is a much better chance that a certain body of labor power and capital power, gathered together for a great industrial enter-

prise, will fall under an economical and prudent, yet bold and efficient, control if in England than in the United States.

Yet this cause, important as it is, falls far short of furnishing a complete explanation of our failure to become the first manufacturing nation of the world.

Nor shall we find what is yet lacking of that explanation in the fact that we began our industrial career but a century ago with little capital, without warehouses and factories, without machinery and apparatus; having, indeed, little more than our farms and farmhouses, each with its spinning-wheel, and having, besides, the hand tools of the blacksmith, the mason, the carpenter, and the shoemaker.

Unquestionably the scarcity of capital would have prohibited at the outset, under any conditions in other respects, a rapid development of manufactures; yet such were the industry and frugality of our ancestors, so great their industrial ambition, that, with the high degree of mechanical skill prevailing and with the aid of liberal endowments from nature, the first generation after the Revolution, say from 1790 to 1820, witnessed a vast accumulation of earned and saved wealth; and had the savings out of earnings during the generation following, say from 1820 to 1850, been put into manufactures instead of going into new farms, with all which an extension of the agricultural area implies, our manufacturing capital would by the latter date have amounted to a very pretty sum.

Since 1850 our accumulations of capital have been made at a prodigious rate of increase; but of these accumulations agriculture, not manufactures, has received by far the greater sum. On an average of the period from 1800 to 1820, we covered with population a tract of nearly 10,000 square miles a year; crossed it with roads and bridges, fenced and trenched it, and dotted it over with cottages and barns, with school-houses and churches.

From 1830 to 1850 the extension of the agricultural area was at the rate of 17,500 square miles; from 1860 to 1880 at the rate of 20,000 square miles, annually!

Had we been content with the settled area of 1850, and allowed ourselves to be confined within those limits, we should have had capital enough, to be borrowed at 6 or even 5 per

cent, for carrying on all the shops and factories for which we could have found laborers out of our fast-increasing population. But on the contrary, since the date last mentioned, we have begun the cultivation of 600,000 square miles, or more than the combined area of France, Austro-Hungary, Great Britain, and Ireland. Small wonder that capital has not sufficed both for this work and for an extension of manufactures equal to the expectations of many patriotic citizens!

The ingrained wastefulness of the native American is, doubtless, in some degree, an element of weakness in our manufacturing industry. Whether this quality is due solely to the prodigality of nature in supplying materials, for manufacture or for food, so lavishly that economy in use scarcely seems to be required, or is, in part, the outcome of a certain tendency towards a large and rapid treatment of any subject in which our countrymen may interest themselves, we need not stay to discuss. The fact is undeniable. Make the utilization of waste a problem for his inventive genius to grapple with, and the American will give it consideration; make it the matter of daily care and pains, and he will sovereignly despise and neglect it.

As the Englishman is to the Frenchman, in this respect, such is the American to the Englishman. The genius for petty economies is not his; and, to tell the truth, he does not think much of those who practise them. The influence of this cause on the success of manufactures in the United States has not been slight. Tenderly, sympathetically careful of machinery, the American artisan is habitually indifferent to economy of material.

But while we might well wish for French or Dutch economy in the use of materials, there is one feature of American productive industry—not wholly unconnected, perhaps, with the very fault we have just now commented upon—which it is peculiarly gratifying to an American citizen to observe. This is the high degree of commercial honesty which is maintained by our manufacturers.

How much there may have been in the past to justify the traditional notion that Yankees were dangerously sharp in their dealings it is difficult to say. The sneers and flings of which

the phrase "wooden nutmegs" may be taken as the type were bitter enough to have had some substantial cause.

If so, the change in our moral constitution has been not less marked than the change in our physical constitution since the days when the Yankee was always represented as lank and lantern-jawed; for certainly to-day, whatever may have been true in the past, not only is there no shadow of a reason for charging upon our people any peculiar delinquency in this respect, but it may be asserted with the utmost confidence that in commercial honesty the manufacturers of the United States, as a body, enjoy a proud pre-eminence: specifically, that neither in France, England, nor Germany is it equally safe to buy goods upon representations made, or on the strength of trademarks or ordinary commercial brands, as here.

If we have not yet found a sufficient reason for the failure of the United States to reach the position, as a manufacturing nation, assigned by the patriotic anticipations of our fathers, where shall we search for that reason? I answer that the cause of that comparative failure is found, primarily and principally, in the extraordinary success of our agriculture, as already intimated in what has been said of the investment of capital. The enormous profits of cultivating a virgin soil without the need of artificial fertilization; the advantages which a sparse population derives from the privilege of selecting for tillage only the choicest spots,¹ those most accessible, most fertile, most easily brought under the plough; and the consequent abundance of food and other necessities enjoyed by the agricultural class, have tended continually to disparage mechanical industries, in the eyes alike of the capitalist, looking to the most remunerative investment of his savings, and of the laborer, seeking that avocation which should promise the most liberal and constant support. It has been the competition of the farm with the shop which, throughout the entire century of our national independence, has most effectually hindered the growth of manufactures. A people who are privileged to cultivate a reasonably fertile soil, under the conditions indicated above, can secure for themselves subsistence up to the highest limit of physical well-being. If that people

¹ The United States have, at the present time, but five persons engaged in agriculture for each square mile of settled area.

possess the added advantage of great skill in the use of tools and great adroitness in meeting the large and the little exigencies of the occupation and cultivation of the soil, the fruits of their labor will include not only everything which is essential to health and comfort, but much that is of the nature of luxury.

It is fair and moderate to say that when the American tiller of the soil has subsisted his family up to the highest standard of living known to the peasantry of any country of Europe,¹ he has remaining out of his seven-millionth share of the agricultural produce of the country, after paying for all the commodities and services which are essentially involved in his production, enough to support another family of equal size, which surplus he may use in purchasing for consumption the commodities or services of non-agriculturists according to his taste, or he may devote it to the improvement and development of his farm.

The standard of living among the agricultural community sets, of course, the minimum standard of wages for mechanical labor. In the abundance enjoyed by the agricultural class those participate, by the ordinance of nature, who render mechanical services which can only be performed upon the spot, where producer and consumer are necessarily neighbors. Such are the services of the carpenter, cobbler, blacksmith, wheelwright, mason, house-painter, and plumber.

But those who render to the agricultural classes of this country mechanical services which can be performed without regard to the locality of the consumer, which description includes nearly all of what are known as the factory-industries, have no such privilege. They are not admitted, by any ordinance of nature, to a participation in this abundance. Only the force of law can put their wages into a relation of equality with those of the agricultural population or of the members of the trades just characterized. Otherwise their remuneration, having no necessary relation to the wages of those classes, will be determined by the wages of mechanical labor prevailing in countries where the soil is cultivated under less favorable conditions.

FRANCIS A. WALKER.

¹ Prof. Fawcett states that in the west of England "it is impossible for the agricultural laborer to eat meat more than once a week."

THE ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN HINDOOISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

THE church of Christ, in so far as she realizes her ideal, is an aggressive church. She finds one of the chief reasons of her existence in the commission to preach the Gospel to every creature. She is bound, therefore, to be a proselytizing church, and therein claims to have and urge upon men, not one of many true religions, but the one and only faith which is from beginning to end the doctrine of God. But if this be indeed her mission ; if she is sent forth to attack and contend with hoary-headed systems which have for ages held the faith of millions among the different nations of mankind—it is plain that she ought to know what she is doing. There can be no wise missionary work without knowing with whom or what she has to contend. If through faint-heartedness we may not overrate the strength of our enemies, we can as little through a pious self-conceit affect to ignore or disdain it. The church cannot wisely afford to neglect the study of the erroneous systems of religion which she opposes, because of their supposed weakness and inferiority. As an important illustration of the work to be done in this direction, it is proposed in the present article to indicate in as brief and general manner as possible the doctrinal antagonisms between modern Hindooism and Christianity. Probably no false religion, except it be Buddhism, has equal claims on the consideration of the Christian philosopher or apologist. Whether we regard its inherent character, or the power which it has shown to command and retain the faith of a large part of the human family, it stands to-day as one of the

most notable and formidable antagonists of the church and kingdom of Christ. Such brief consideration of the Hindoo faith as may at this time be possible, may at least suffice to save some from that easy self-confidence which leads one to undervalue the strength of an antagonist, and is often the forerunner of discouragement at slow success, and sometimes even of utter defeat.

The inquiry as to what is modern Hindooism is not to be answered in a word. The religion of the Vedas cannot be said to exist. Modern Hindooism rests rather upon the Puráñas than upon the Vedas. The Puráñas themselves differ from one another in the most uncompromising manner on many of the most important matters of religion. There is no exaggeration in those words of the Mahábharat :

"Contradictory are the Vedas ; contradictory are the Shástras ; contradictory all the doctrines of the holy sages."

The difficulty of our inquiry is scarcely less if we would seek the answer through personal intercourse and conversation with the people of India. The very instincts of the Hindoo, his ideas as to the demands of courtesy, prompt him often to conceal his real opinions when he imagines that they might be repugnant to you, and to profess the most encouraging acquiescence in your statements of religious truth. Moreover, in so far as we do get at the real beliefs of the people, we find a most confusing diversity of opinion. The very naming of conflicting sects of Vaishnavas, Saivas, Kabírás, Sádhs, Sáktas, etc., is bewildering to the inquirer. The sacred books of the people are but little known by those who profess to rest their faith upon them. It is safe to say that if we except a portion of the Bhágavat Purána, the Rámàyan—not the classic Sanskrit work of Valmíki, but the Hindà vernacular poem of Tulsí Dás, which is not professedly reckoned a final authority in religion, has much more direct influence with the mass of the people in North India than all their reputed sacred books. But under the Rámàyan, which recounts the adventures of Ràma, lies a philosophy, assumed where it is not argued, as the basis of all religion. And what is that philosophy ? The Hindoos recognize six systems of philosophy, monistic and dualistic, as Shàstra or of canonical authority. Of these, after a conflict of

centuries, the Vedánta, a system of pure monism, has come to dominate the thinking of the great mass of the people. It is the Vedantic philosophy which has had the power to combine and cement into a kind of unity that confused conglomerate of creeds and cults which makes up the totality of modern Hindooism. In indicating, therefore, first of all, the fundamental principles of the Vedantic philosophy, as contrasted with the doctrine of Christianity, we shall have before us those doctrines which permeate and give vitality and strength to modern Hindooism.

I. First of all, then, the modern Hindoo, in strict accordance with the Vedánta, believes that God is one only. The unity of God is the key-note of his faith. Not only the learned, but the lowest and most ignorant among the people are agreed in this. One may go into any village, where on every side he will see the grossest idolatry, and ask the first man that he meets, how many gods there are, and he will have but one answer : "There is only one God." The Vedantic formula is ever on the lips of those who know no other Sanskrit, *Ekambrah-mam dvitiyānasti*, "Brahma is one ; there is no second." From these words we might at first suppose that Hindooism was at one with Christianity at least in its teaching as to the unity of God. This formula, however, expresses instead the most radical and irreconcilable antagonism of the two systems. For the Hindoo does not mean in such words to affirm that there is no second God, but that there is no second any thing ! Brahma is one because he is all, and all that really is, is Brahma. If we inquire further as to the nature of the Supreme Being, the antagonism between the Hindoo and the Christian doctrine becomes still more apparent. For Brahma is said to exist from eternity to eternity as in his essential nature *nirguna, liti*, "without bonds ;" by which seems to be intended precisely what certain of our occidental philosophers mean when they speak of God as being "unconditioned," or as "absolute." Of God, thus regarded, no predication can be made. He is pure essence, without attributes of any kind. To use a common expression, He is "invisible, imperceptible, formless, infinite and immutable essence ;" which at once is, and was, and ever shall be, and beside which nothing else ever really was, or is, or is to

be. But God is also said to exist as at the same time *saguna*, "with bonds," or with attributes. That is, to render into western phraseology, God exists as conditioned in the universe, and is only to be known by ordinary men as such. To this effect Tulsī Dās, the great poet of the people of North India, has expressed himself : " Both unconditioned and conditioned is Brahma's essential nature ; ineffable, incomprehensible, without beginning and without his like." ¹ And this is the doctrine of modern Hindooism as to the nature of the Supreme Being.

2. Immediately consequent upon the foregoing is the next fundamental dogma of Hindoo philosophy, which concerns the nature of this apparent universe of spirit and matter. What is this world, and what are souls ? To this, the above statements being granted, only one answer of course can be given. If God be the only real existence, then it follows that the soul and the world, as entities distinct from him, do not exist. What they appear to be, that they are not ; and what they appear not to be, that only they are. First, take the case of the soul. I seem to myself to be a person, distinct from the world, from other human persons, and from God. But this is all a mistake. In reality, my soul, as also every other soul, is essential Deity. The common people everywhere speak of the soul as being " a part of God." And yet in the same breath they will affirm that God is *akhand*, "indivisible," whence it follows that each soul is the total Divine Essence ; and that is precisely the strict Vedantic doctrine ! So one may go into any Hindoo village and ask the first peasant that he meets, who God is, and he will to a certainty receive the answer, *Fo boltā hai, wahī hai*; " That which speaks, that same is he." Thus while Christianity assumes the truth of the testimony of consciousness as to personality, Hindooism pointedly denies it.

But granting all this as to the soul, what then is this visible and tangible world ? It seems to be real ; to be also something different and distinct from myself, and therefore not of the Divine Essence. To this question a Pundit will probably answer in a familiar Sanskrit line, *Brahma satyan jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparah*, " Brahma exists truly, the world, falsely ;

¹ *Rāmā�ana, Bāl Kānd.*

the soul is very Brahma, there is no other." The same idea is expressed in a beautiful song of South India, as follows:

" God may be seen spread out in space ; yet I,
Who looked so long, quite failed to catch the sight.
But now, by Sivam, I declare that all
That is, is God ; yet what I see is not.
It and the thousand evils of the world
Are not of God or true. They *Māyā* are."¹

Here, of course, is a contradiction. The world is, and again it is not. This difficulty the pundits try to meet by distinguishing existence as of three kinds—viz., *páramártihika*, *vyāvahārika*, and *prátibhásika*, which terms may best be rendered respectively as "real," "practical," and "apparent." "Real" existence is affirmed of Brahma only, who is the very inner being of all being. "Apparent" existence is illustrated as follows : I see a rope on the ground, and mistake it for a snake ; the existence of that snake is said to be "apparent." It is plainly not a case of absolute non-existence, because there is really something there. But it is not real existence, because that which seems to be a snake is not a snake. Hence the snake exists, but only apparently. The third kind of existence is illustrated by the case of a man who dreams, e.g., that he is trading, and giving and receiving money. That money exists, say they, not assuredly, *páramártikam*, in reality ; nor yet *prátibhásikam*, as in the case of the rope mistaken for a snake, for there is not in this case a reality objective to my own mind. Nevertheless that money exists *vyāvahārikam*, "practically" ; because in my dream I trade with it and it becomes to me an occasion of pain or pleasure as the case may be, like real money. As long as I sleep, that money is to me as if it were real money. So with the existence of the world. It has no existence apart from the Divine Essence, any more than the money of the dreamer has any existence apart from the mind of the dreamer. And yet because I use this world, and receive from it pleasure and pain ; for me it may be said to have a "practical" existence. Many, however, prefer to liken the state of the case to the existence of the snake in the other example given. For there is really something there which is

¹ "Folk Songs of South India," Gover., p. 156.

the occasion of the erroneous judgment, "This is a snake," tho indeed it is not a snake, but a rope. So, it is argued, is the case with the world. There is really something presented to my perception, which something, however, is not a world as something distinct from Brahma, but essential Brahma. Brahma does not indeed become a world, any more than the rope in the illustration becomes a snake. Yet the snake would not have appeared except the rope had been there. And so is the world to Brahma. Thus we have come upon other antagonisms between Christianity and Hindooism. Christianity assumes an essential dualism between matter and spirit, between souls and God. It assumes also that man is what he seems to be—a person. It teaches, moreover, that God is not in any sense the material cause or mere occasion of the existence of the world, but its efficient cause. All this Hindooism denies.

3. Granting, however, all the above positions, the question still remains, Why should the eternal Essence appear under the form of this present universe, rather than any other? Or, more particularly, why the existing distribution of sin and righteousness, joy and sorrow, rather than some other? Why am I what I am? Why do I do as I do and feel as I do, and not otherwise? Why, again, does the good man often suffer, and the bad man prosper in the world? To all these questions, every Hindoo, wise or ignorant, has one all-sufficient and ever ready answer, and that answer is, *karm!* *Karm* has settled every thing. All has been fixed and predetermined, but not as the Calvinist and the Mohammedan say, by God; for it is plain that the unconditioned Brahma, being without attributes and therefore without will, cannot predetermine any thing. All is due to *karm*. And what is *karm*? The word means "deeds" or "actions;" and when the Hindoo would explain all that is or happens by a reference to the predetermining power of *karm*, he indicates thereby, not any free determination in God, nor any blind power external to himself, but a law of subjective necessity; the necessity that actions performed by himself in a previous state of being should bring forth their legitimate and most inevitable result. All Hindoo thinkers agree that the whole universe, material and spiritual, and all that takes place in it, is the effect of actions done by souls as its meritorious

cause. That is to say, for example, I myself, in a former state of existence, whether as man, demi-god, demon, or beast, performed certain actions, good or bad ; and of whatsoever sort they were, they made it necessary for me to be born just when and where and as I have been, and live just the life that I have, in order to reap the fruit of those actions in reward or retribution. Thus this life, with all that is in it, all my perceptions, feelings, and actions, my joys and my sorrows, wealth and poverty, sickness and health, my right deeds and my crimes alike, like a given fruit from a given seed, are the necessary and inevitable result of actions performed in a former state of being, of which it is not pretended that ordinary men have or can have the slightest recollection. And herein we have the doctrine of transmigration of souls, together with its philosophical justification. It has found a sad expression in the following words of a song of South India :

“ How many births are past, I cannot tell ;
How many yet to come, no man can say ;
But this alone I know, and know full well,
That pain and grief embitter all the way.”¹

I do not remember to have met a Hindoo who felt that there was any thing unreasonable in all this. On the contrary, it seems to them the one adequate explanation of the universe, and above all, of the so unequal distribution of happiness and misery. For, inconsistent tho it may be with his pantheism, the Hindoo still has a conscience, and feels that sin and suffering, and especially the suffering of the innocent, must be accounted for. It is accounted for, to his mind, on this hypothesis of the performance of deeds good and bad in a former state of being. Thus if that babe agonize in pain, the Hindoo says, *Pūrv janam kā phal hai*, “ It is the fruit of a former birth ; ” “ No doubt it must have committed some great sin in a former life.” So, on the other hand, if that reprobate prosper in the world, this is thought to be just as plainly the reward of meritorious deeds performed in a former state of being. Thus the inequalities of life, and, above all, the sufferings of the innocent, seem to the Hindoo to demand the doctrine of *karm* as their only adequate explanation. Thus we have reached another of the

¹ “ Folk Songs of South India,” Gover, p. 38.

great contrasts between Hindooism and Christianity. The issue is deep and broad. It is the issue of necessity against freedom. Christianity affirms free agency both of God and man; Hindooism denies that there is such a thing as free agency either in God or in man. All is necessity. Instead of a world created by God as its efficient cause, Hindooism teaches that the world and all in it is the necessary effect of necessary action in the universal spirit. The world is, and is as it is, simply by a necessity of the Divine nature. To inquire further as to the reason of things were as if one should ask why a mango tree produces mangoes. The tree bears its fruit, not freely, but necessarily, after the predetermining nature of the tree. In like manner we bear fruit, not freely, but necessarily, after the predetermining nature of the actions of a previous life.

4. But this doctrine of *karm* brings us face to face with another issue between Hindooism and Christianity, if possible of still broader sweep and more momentous consequence. It is found in the Hindoo doctrine of *maya*. Christianity affirms, in accordance indeed with the very dictates of human nature, the trustworthiness of the normal consciousness of man. This Hindooism dogmatically denies. To us it would seem that all the above doctrines might be at once met and answered by a simple reference to consciousness. Consciousness tells me in language most distinct and unmistakable that I am a person, distinct from all other persons, and therefore from God, as also from the objective world around me. It tells me, moreover, that I am free, and not a creature of necessity. That this is the testimony of consciousness the Hindoo will freely admit, as who will not? But he escapes the conclusion which this would seem to compel by denying the credibility of the witness. That we seem to ourselves to be free personal agents, for example, is said to be due to the influence of *maya*. *Maya* is "illusion." It is that illusion which, to use the Hindoo phrase, the Supreme Being "throws out" in becoming *saguna*, or "conditioned," in the universe. The ideas of personality, of the substantial and separate reality of the objective world, of a personal Creator of that world, of freedom and responsibility, all alike are begotten of *maya* or illusion. If in attempting to meet this position we point to the actions of men, and show

how the very men who profess to hold this most extraordinary doctrine do not, and in fact cannot, act upon it, the villager will at once say, "True, true," and laugh, as if he thought it only very amusing that men should be so inconsistent; the pundit will probably refer his sceptical European friend to the old distinction between *sattà vyāvahārikà* and *pàramàrthikà*, apparent and real existence, and argue after this fashion:—we do act in this world as if it were real, and it is reasonable that we should so act, because it *is* real, *vyāvahārikam*, "practically." But that does not prove that the world is real *pàramàrthikam*. And this is the very power of *maya*, that it causes us to mistake that which has only practical reality for that which is really real. The state of the case, as already intimated, is exactly like that of the dreamer, to whom all seems really real so long as he continues dreaming. But if the captive dream of freedom, it does not follow that he is really free; if, in great distress, the monarch dream that he is not a king, but a slave, he is yet, for all his dream, none the less a king. Just so if in this dream of life I seem to myself to be free, that does not prove that I am really free; if I fancy that I am any thing less than essential Brahma, this cannot alter the fact of my veritable identity with him!

5. And now, led on by an inexorable logic, we confront another of the great antagonisms between the Hindoo and the Christian systems. Christianity affirms and Hindooism denies the reality of an eternal and necessary distinction between sin and righteousness. Hindoo thinkers frankly admit this consequence of their principles, and what is more, in many fearful instances attempt in nudity and licentiousness to give their views on this subject an outward, visible, and loathsome expression. That sin has a "practical" existence, as also righteousness, that sin tends to misery, and may bring the sinner to hell for a season; and that virtue tends to happiness, and may bring the virtuous man to heaven, also only for a season—is by all admitted. This must all be conceded for the satisfaction of conscience, which, in India as elsewhere, tells of sin and warns of retribution. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Brahma is the only real existence and I am myself Brahma, it follows that sin and righteousness exist only in my conceptions,

and the distinction between them is only imagined under the power of illusion, while the heaven or the hell to which they are severally supposed to conduct us, is only a dream within a dream. In point of fact, it is argued that in reality both sin and righteousness are alike evil. For, according to Hindoo assumptions, every action, good or bad, necessitates a future birth and life in which the fruit of that action may be reaped. But personal existence, all agree, is an evil. Its continuance under any form is not to be desired. Therefore that which makes it necessary must also be an evil, even that righteous act which makes it necessary for me to be born again into the world that I may reap its reward. Thus the distinction of right and wrong is not inherent and absolute, but accidental and relative to this present life. The murder or uncleanness which is wrong for me may be right for another person. No idea is more familiar to the common people in India than this. If, for example, the missionary object to the deity of Krishna, the accounts of his unspeakable licentiousness, acts so vile that no man would be justified, even in the eyes of a Hindoo, in repeating them, the disputant will probably refer to a passage in the Bhàgavat Puràna wherein the worshipper of Krishna is commanded not to imitate the deeds to the accounts of which he listens. What was right for Krishna may be, nay, *is*, wrong for us ; and to confirm this doctrine the Hindoo, if in North India, will probably quote from the Ràmàyan the words, familiar to every Hindi-speaking Hindoo, *Sàmarathi kahan nahin dosha Gusàin*, "To the mighty, O Gusàin, is no sin"—*i.e.*, in western phraseology, "might makes right." The same doctrine as to the nature of sin and virtue is expressed in a song of South India as follows :

" To them that fully know the heavenly truth,
There is no good or ill ; nor any thing
To be desired, unclean, or purely clean.

Where God is seen, there can be nought but God.
His heart can have no place for fear or shame ;
For caste, uncleanness, hate, or wandering thought,
Impure or pure, are all alike to him."¹

6. Thus in the next place, while Christianity affirms the great truth of human responsibility, the Hindoo is logically

¹ " Folk Songs of Southern India," Gover., p. 166.

obliged to deny that there is any such thing. Like self-consciousness, responsibility is an illusion. This follows, first, from the denial of a personal God. Grant for an instant the correctness of the Hindoo conception of the Supreme Being, and it is plain that in the nature of the case there can be no such thing as responsibility. That impersonal essence cannot take cognizance of sin and righteousness. Said an old woman in a country village in India to the writer, "What have we to do with God? Our business is with the *devīs* and *devatās* (gods and goddesses)." If that which speaks in me be God, there is no place left for responsibility. And again, even apart from that, if there were a personal God, yet if sin and righteousness be only the fictions of *māyā*, then nothing remains to be responsible for. And even when, over-constrained by the testimony of conscience, the Hindoo will speak as if moral good and evil were to be rewarded and punished by a personal God, still that doctrine of *karm* remains, and is no less fatal to the idea of responsibility. For if I am not free, if all my actions are determined by a law of physical necessity entirely beyond my control, then assuredly I am not responsible for them. Let it be observed again that these are not merely logical consequences attached to the system by an antagonist, which the people will refuse to admit. The Hindoos themselves, both in their authoritative books and in their common talk, argue this very conclusion. In the Purānas, again, and again those guilty of the most flagitious crimes are comforted by Krishna, for example, on this express ground, that whereas all was fixed by their *karm*, and man therefore has no power over that which is to be, therefore in the crime they were guilty of no fault. And so also among the people one wearis of hearing this constant excuse for almost every thing which ought not to be, "What can we do? It was in our *karm*."

7. And now, finally, we come to the last element in the fundamental dogmatic of modern Hindooism—namely, the doctrine concerning salvation, its nature, and the means of its attainment. All among the Hindoos agree that salvation is or should be the great end of life. This sounds well; but what is the nature of this salvation? This will at once appear by a reference to what has been already set forth. This world and

all that is in it is the result of a succession of actions by souls, all which actions are the inevitable consequence of a necessary, self-originated activity in the Divine essence, whereby, to use the Hindoo phrase, Brahm, *lilā karke*, "in sport," evolved his *māyā* or illusory power, producing thereby the semblance of a world. In consequence of this we are all in bondage to this *māyā*. Hence arises the notion of personality and of the objective reality of the world. From this, again, arise desire and aversion, which are the immediate causes of all joy and sorrow, sin and virtue. Salvation must therefore consist in the emancipation of the soul from the bondage of illusion, and consequent realization of the soul's essential identity with God and the unreality of all else than God. But this means simply the cessation of personal existence; and inasmuch as it is by our repeated births that such an existence is continued, salvation must needs consist in deliverance from further transmigrations. Thus as both good works and bad are alike the occasions of births, it follows that salvation from sin is not the end of religion any more than salvation from righteousness. Liberation from conscious existence is "the chief end of man." Again, since according to the theory man is held in this bondage of illusion by "false conception" (*avidyā*) or ignorance, it is plain that knowledge must be the means of salvation from the power of that illusion. And this is precisely the orthodox Hindoo doctrine as to the means of liberation. It is reached by means of knowledge; and that not by knowledge in general, but, specifically, knowledge of the soul's identity with the universal Brahma. This attained, man is then supposed to cease from desire and aversion, as their objects are perceived to have no real existence. Thus at last also he ceases to act, and the cause of transmigration being removed, the weary course is ended and personality is lost in God. But it is granted that the attainment of this transcendental knowledge and consequent liberation at death is exceedingly difficult and rare. In the great majority of cases man leaves this life only to enter on another. Hence, in perfect consistency with the above, the Hindoo believes in lesser and subordinate salvations, more after the analogy of the Christian doctrine. For tho a man may have to pass through ten thousand births before attaining final

liberation, yet of what sort those births shall be, whether into a worse or better state than the present—this is determined, not by knowledge, but by personal merit. Thus the Bràhman saves his philosophy, and yet concedes somewhat to conscience. For altho according to the prevailing philosophy all works are in a sense evil, in that they necessitate another conscious life hereafter, yet crimes are evil in a sense in which other works are not, in that they bring on a painful retribution in the life to come. By an evil course of life a man may be compelled to descend in the scale of being, and by so much his final liberation be deferred. From being a Bràhman he may become a Shùdra, a leper, a hog, or a dog ; he may even be enthralled in a tree or a stone, or reappear in one of “the seven dark hells.” Thus the Hindoo finds a place in his system for that praise of virtue and depreciation of vice to which conscience incites, but which at first sight is so utterly inconsistent with his philosophy. Thus, moreover, he finds a place for all the endless rites and ceremonies of popular Hindooism, its almsgivings, its manifold pilgrimages and cruel austerities. They are all means to salvation, not immediate, but mediate. They are supposed to help to clarify the perceptions of the soul, or to prepare the way for a more favorable birth hereafter, and so in a manner hasten the final liberation through the disenthraling knowledge.

Now, while of course it is not pretended that all the people of India are metaphysicians, or would be able to sketch out this system or any other for themselves any more than people in other lands, yet it is, we believe, strictly true that the pantheistic philosophy we have briefly indicated, has as thoroughly leavened the people and as universally pervades all their thinking on religious subjects as, *e.g.*, the principles of Presbyterianism have leavened the thinking of the people of Scotland. It is the often unconscious assumption of the truth of these false principles which is assuredly the chief, and to any but the strongest faith, the insuperable obstacle to the progress of Christianity in India.

8. But altho this Vedantic pantheism is the most central and vital thing in modern Hindooism, it is not by any means the whole of it. The ideal which the Vedànta sets before men,

in a life of abstraction and rapt contemplation of the soul's identity with Brahma, is quite too far above the practical daily life of the most of men. Man is weak, and conscious of dependence ; conscience, too, even in India, ever and anon lifts up her voice in testimony of a personal God above the world, to whom man must give account. Man has thus everywhere the instinct of prayer. But, according to Hindooism, the really perfect man, he who has learned that mystic formula, *Aham-brahmam*, "I am Brahma"—he, in the very nature of the case, cannot pray. He has risen far above that low, earthly region where men in the bondage of ignorance busy themselves with the illusory distinctions of good and evil, and weary themselves in seeking to propitiate by various rites of worship, imaginary gods. But the multitude have not reached, and, it is admitted, cannot reach this supermundane elevation. Man looks for a God who shall have somewhat at least in common with himself ; who shall have capacities of knowing, feeling, and willing ; a God who shall be accessible to his cries and not indifferent to his wants ; in a word, a God who shall be a *person*. Thus at first sight Brahmanism, with its impersonal Deity, in the presence of this crying want of the human soul, would seem to be without a resource. How can the Brâhman keep his philosophy, and yet hold out to the demand of the soul of man a personal God? But just here appears the marvellous dower of Hindooism in adapting itself to the wants and instincts of the multitude. First of all, then, to the multitude of weak and sinful men, seeking some one to worship and some one to help, Hindooism says, not merely, "*altho* God is one," but "*because* God is one, ye may worship what ye will." For since Brahma is the only being, it follows that all worship, of whatsoever thing or person, and with whatsoever intent directed, really terminates on him. Starting with this broad principle, whereby all idolatry, if the premise be admitted, is philosophically justified, the Brâhman goes on to develop what is probably the most elaborate system of polytheism and demon-worship that the world has ever seen, and finds a place in its pantheon for no less, according to the popular saying, than 330,000,000 different deities !

At the head of this system of deities and sub-deities stands

the famous *Trimúrtti*, or Triad, of Brahmà, Vishnu, and Shiva. But why three? At first, as has been so often remarked, we seem to have the exact counterpart of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But while we need never fear to acknowledge truth because it is found in a false system of religion, in this case the apparent analogy will not bear a close examination. In the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the three equal persons of the Trinity are set forth as existing in certain relations of precedence and subordination, and as severally distinguished by certain properties peculiar to each. In the Hindoo Triad, the three are entirely independent each of the other, and are distinguished by no such peculiar properties. And it is more fatal still to the fancied analogy, that according to the Christian system the Godhead is manifested exclusively in the three persons of the Trinity; whereas, according to the Hindoo doctrine, the Deity is manifested, not exclusively in the three members of the Triad, but in a degree greater or less in all persons whatsoever, and in the Triad only in the most eminent degree. The explanation of the Triad is to be sought, not in the region of Christian theology, but in philosophy. It is apparently as follows. All divine energy in the universe is comprehended under the three heads of origination, preservation, and destruction. The three members of the Triad severally represent these three conceptions. Hence in the Bhágavat Purána the Deity is represented as using the following words: "As Brahmà,¹ I create; as Vishnu, I preserve; as Shiva, I destroy." And yet, on the other hand, as creation, preservation, and destruction may be philosophically conceived as one and the self-same act under different aspects, we find that each of these three functions, in the various sacred books of the Hindoos, is ascribed to each of the three members of the Triad. However this may be in any case, practically, in the three individuals of the Triad, God is presented to the people in the garb of personality. The unconscious Brahma indeed is not to be reached by the cries of men; he is essentially inaccessible to motives of any kind. But Brahmà, Vishnu, and Shiva are

¹ It should be noted that Brahma and Brahmà are not the same. Brahma (in Sansk. neuter) denotes the impersonal, universal being; Brahmà (masc.) the first member of the Triad, as in the context.

accessible to motives, often indeed to very base motives. Yet as persons they seem to satisfy in some poor way the demand of the soul for a personal object of worship ; and these the Vedantist offers to the people as a substitute for the true and living God, and even himself joins with the multitude in their adoration and service. The three members of the Triad have each their female counterpart or Sakti ; and to these —chiefly Vishnu and Shiva, with their Saktis—the practical worship of the great mass of the Hindoos in these days is directed. Either one of these, according to the cult of the worshipper, is regarded as invested with all divine attributes ; and all that exists is regarded as a manifestation of one of these three, as each one of the Triad is in fact only a mode under which men apprehend the *nirguna* Brahma. Thus, in a sublime passage in the Bhàgavad Gīta, Vishnu, incarnate in Krishna, is represented as using such words as the following :

“ I am the cause of the whole universe ;
Through me it is created and dissolved ;
On me all things within it hang suspended,
Like pearls upon a string. . . . ”¹

To which Arjuna responds in adoration, addressing him as

“ The ancient One, supreme Receptacle
Of all that is and is not, knowing all,
And to be known by all. Immensely vast,
Thou comprehendest all. Thou art the all.
To thee earth’s greatest heroes must return,
Blending once more with thy resplendent essence,
Like mighty rivers rushing to the ocean.”²

All this being so, Hindooism teaches that he who would seek the boon of liberation, but is not equal to the way of knowledge, or immediate intuition of the Divine being, may yet attain this blessing meditately through the worship of Vishnu, the “ way of devotion,” or of Shiva, the “ way of works.” As regards the worship of these two deities, while Shiva’s temples, containing always the phallic symbol of the ling, are indeed more common than temples to any form of Vishnu, he certainly holds no such place in the affections of the

¹ “ Indian Wisdom,” Monier Williams, p. 144.

² “ Indian Wisdom,” M. Williams, p. 148.

people. And the reason is not difficult to see. Shiva is a stern and terrible God, "hard to appease, quick to be angry." His delight is to dance in the field of battle among the heaps of the slain, adorned with a necklace of skulls and covered with the ashes of the dead. Or, again, he is the awful prince of all ascetics, remaining fixed in one position for ages in rapt contemplation, awaking from his reverie only to blast to death with a glance of fire the rash disturber of his meditations. No such God could be loved, and he is not. Vishnu, on the other hand, is a God whose usual character is mild and gentle, as befits the preserver of the world. This alone would secure him a larger measure of devotion. But there is a far more potent reason than this for the place which he holds in the modern Hindoo pantheon. That reason is to be found in the celebrated doctrine of the *avatārs*, lit., "descents" or incarnations of Vishnu, whereby from time to time through the ages he is supposed to have appeared for the good of men. Here we have at first sight another striking analogy, but in reality another notable contrast with the Christian system of doctrine. Man longs not only for a God who shall be personal, but a God who shall be incarnate. That longing Hindooism has sought to meet in this doctrine of the *avatārs* of Vishnu. In this we have the chief reason for the popularity of the second member of the Triad. The incarnations of Vishnu are commonly said to be ten in number, of which nine are past, and one is yet to come. Of all these, those of Rāma and Krishna hold by far the highest place in the esteem of the people. No vernacular books are so universally read and valued by the people in North India as the Rāmāyan of Tulsī Dās, and the Prem Sāgar, the former of which describes the life of Rām, and the latter of which—a translation of the Bhāgavat Purāna—sets forth the incarnation and the life of Krishna. Thus if it is by its philosophy that Hindooism holds the hearts of men, it is chiefly by its doctrine of the incarnations that it holds their affections. Let it be remembered, however, that these incarnations are explained in the strictest accord with the Vedantic philosophy. The Hindoo doctrine, therefore, as to incarnation only presents a superficial analogy with the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of Christ.

According to Christian faith, the incarnation of our Lord was sole and peculiar. Neither before, nor since, nor in time to come does Christianity know any thing of any other manifestation of God in the flesh. But the incarnation of Rāma, for example, was not so. Rāma was only one out of ten incarnations. Besides, according to the Hindoo conception, the difference between Rāma and Krishna and any other man is a difference not in essential nature, but in degree. In a greater or less degree all men, nay, all living things, and even things inanimate, are only bodily forms of the universal deity. The *avatārs*, therefore, are only incarnations *par excellence*. The Hindoo incarnations differ still further from that of our Lord in their intent. Christ, we are taught, came to save sinners. But everywhere it is asserted that Vishnu only became incarnate to destroy sinners and to help the good. Thus the Hindoo doctrine touching incarnation resembles the Christian only in the most external and superficial manner. But it is one of the strongholds of the system. If it does not reach to the depths of man's need, it does attract the multitude, who demand a God in an embodied form. Moreover, the several incarnations are adapted to the various tastes of men. In the case of Rāma and his wife Sītā, we have human characters of more than ordinary beauty. On the other hand, Krishna, as set forth in the Bhāgavat Purāna, is the incarnation of violence, licentiousness, and all iniquity, and as such stands a God after the very heart of licentious and evil men. And yet, on the contrary, in the Krishna of the Bhāgavad Gītā we see a character of quite another kind, the type of a lofty and sublime intellectuality. In a word, from among its various *avatārs* Hindooism is able to furnish every man not only a god incarnate, but with a god after his own heart. Add to all the above the unrestricted permission by the Hindoo religion of every manner of demon and fetish worship, and it is evident that we have reached almost the utmost possible extreme of contrast and antagonism between it and the religion of Christ.

Having thus considered the philosophic basis of modern Hindooism and the practical cultus which has been erected upon it, it only remains, in order to complete the contrast

between the two religions, to refer as briefly as possible to the social institution of caste, which completes the structure. The general facts regarding caste are so well known as to make it unnecessary to enter into any great detail of statement on the subject. The original words, *jāti* and *varana*, which are commonly used in the languages of India to denote the caste distinction, both point to an idea which is central to the doctrine concerning caste, that caste is in the blood and birth. Originally four in number, the various castes have been by various causes divided and subdivided, until we now find, under the four general heads of Brāhmaṇ, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shūdra, about eight hundred sub-castes, the members of which cannot intermarry, eat or drink together. Among all these, as is well known, the Brāhmaṇs in their various divisions reign supreme. The Brāhmaṇ is supposed to be the highest manifestation of God on earth. He is commonly addressed by the deluded people as *devtā*, "god": to perform for him a menial service is a high honor; to drink the water in which he has washed his feet is deemed an exalted privilege. He may be a robber or a murderer, but he is none the less to be held in the highest reverence. One in India may see a low-caste man fall down and worship at the feet even of a Brāhmaṇ in chains! From before birth till after death, every orthodox Hindoo must pay substantial tribute to this privileged class. Their commands are to be implicitly obeyed. The Bhāgavat Purāṇa commands all men to "endure even the offences of Brāhmaṇs." To break caste by intermarriage, or even by eating or drinking with one of a different caste, whatever his rank or social position in other respects may be, is in the eyes of most Hindoos a far more serious offence than lying, stealing, or even murder. To use a Bible phrase, "it is confusion." For the offender is reserved the extreme penalty of an ostracism which cuts him off even from the members of his own immediate family. He can only be restored by submitting to penalties so heavy as to deter thousands, who might for various reasons be glad to escape from the restrictions of caste for a season, from ever making the attempt. The never-failing philosophy is brought in to the support of a social arrangement which antedates the philosophy. For what is all this but a conspic-

uous illustration and confirmation of the doctrine as to the power of *karm* in the distribution of good and evil, high and low rank, in this life? If there were no truth in the doctrine of antecedent works and their predetermining power, whence these distinctions?

Such are the general outlines of the system of modern Hindooism. While men in India differ indeed endlessly in matters of detail, in three things the immense majority of Hindoos are quite unanimous. Above all people they are thoroughgoing and amazingly consistent pantheists. In perfect harmony therewith, their religious cultus is polytheistic, while at the same time they can admit every form of religious faith and practice, from a pure speculative atheism to those most debased forms of demon and fetish worship which prevail among the lower classes. Finally, in the social system erected on this foundation, all modern Hindoos, excepting a few reformers and certain heterodox sects, regulate all practical life by the rules of caste. But while these three elements are everywhere found in the religion of the people, they are not all equally essential to the integrity and permanence of the system. It were quite conceivable and possible that under those influences from the west which are at present so powerfully operating in India, polytheism and even caste should at last fall, and yet Hindooism in its most inward character, as a philosophic system opposed to Christianity, remain unshaken. Many a man, indeed, in India to-day worships no idol, and is none the less regarded as an orthodox Hindoo. On some religious occasions all men are released for a season from the laws of caste in respect to eating and drinking, and their caste as a general principle and fact is not thereby touched. The central and vital thing in Hindooism is the pantheistic philosophy which has been set forth. This is the very citadel of the fortress, and until Christianity has met and conquered that, she cannot be said to have conquered Hindooism. One thing should be from this discussion sufficiently clear. Hindooism and Christianity cannot both be true. They are not merely, as many would have it, different presentations of the same essential divine truth. They are not merely different

phases of one universal religion. Words have often misled men, and so it has been in this matter. The Hindoo and the Christian may both talk, as they do, of the unity of God, of an incarnation, of a Saviour, of a salvation, of heaven and a hell ; they may even speak of a new birth, and unite in affirming that the knowledge of God is the necessary means of salvation : but not in a single instance do these terms denote the same conceptions, but, on the contrary, ideas mutually exclusive. If the Christian definition of such terms be the true definition, the Hindoo's is false ; if the Hindoo is right, then we are wrong. It were well, in these days of mistaken charity especially, if this matter were better understood. But if the fact of the antagonism of the two religions be granted, then it must be admitted at once that in Hindooism, Christianity has no ordinary antagonist. As well-instructed Christians, we cannot afford to stand aloof in self-satisfied complacency and contemn Hindooism as a mere congeries of degrading and obsolescent superstitions. Not in Athens, Ephesus, or Rome did Paul find a religion of such power as that which to-day confronts the missionary in India. The religions of Greece and Rome have been born and lived out their day since the Hindoo religion had its first beginnings, and yet Hindooism lives on, and it would be hard to show that in those vital and essential features which have been indicated it presents any notable sign of decay. The Christian, therefore, instead of regarding such a system with indolent or contemptuous indifference, should rather address himself to the study of it with peculiar interest, to learn if possible the secret of its so enduring strength. It is not very hard to discover.

First, as remarked above, Hindooism alone, regarded as one of the polytheistic religions of the world, is able to justify and establish that polytheism upon a firm philosophic basis. It may not indeed be the highest conceivable type of outward religion, but for any who may choose it, if all be God, it is not unreasonable. Of peculiar strength also is the Hindoo opposition to the Christian doctrine of salvation by a vicarious sacrifice. In Christian lands the difficulty with most unbelieving theists is to see the necessity of the atonement in order to the remission of sin. They cannot see why God may not reasonably be expected to release men

from the penalties of sin upon repentance, by an act of sovereign pardon. Atonement seems to be a superfluity. To the mind of the Hindoo the case seems quite different. The idea of any such sovereign exemption of man from the consequences of his own sins is entirely foreign to his thinking. His objection to the doctrine of the atonement is not that it is not needed, but that it is in the nature of the case impossible. According to the doctrine of *karm*, every man must suffer for himself the fruit of the things done in the body. Herein Hindooism has a great advantage over many forms of western unbelief, in that, so far from ignoring or denying the testimony of conscience as to the inexorable demands of the law of the universe for the punishment of sin, it rather reaffirms it with the most solemn and tremendous emphasis.

"Tulsi, the body of man is the field and the will of man is the farmer ;
Sin and righteousness the two seeds ; as thou sowest so thou reapest at last !"

With this great law of our moral nature the Christian doctrine of the atonement seems to be in visible conflict, and thus to the Hindoo commonly the gospel of a salvation by a vicarious death appears to stand self-condemned at the bar of the universe.

Again, to men conscious of sin and apprehensive of a coming retribution, any system will stand commended which minimizes or denies responsibility. This, as we have seen, Hindooism does, on the basis of three propositions—viz., that there is no essential distinction between the soul and God ; that there is no such thing as free agency ; and consequently no necessary and permanent distinction between sin and righteousness. Such doctrines cannot indeed heal, but they are most effectual to narcotize the conscience. They dull and ease the acuter pangs of remorse, and deaden the sense of need of a Saviour. A system which, like Hindooism, is as an opiate to the pain of sin must needs stand strong in the faith of its votaries. Also, again, the doctrine of *maya*, or illusion, does much to make the Hindoo position inexpugnable. To deny or doubt the affirmations of consciousness—e.g., as to freedom, personality, responsibility—were to render the very foundations of human knowledge more uncertain than sand. With

us here is the ultimate appeal in all argument and an end of all strife. But the Hindoo, by denying the dicta of consciousness, and affirming this doctrine of illusion, places himself at once beyond the reach of argument. Every missionary knows to his sorrow how at the last his adversary will always bring forth *maya* as a sufficient answer to any argument and an adequate solution of every difficulty. From this panoply of illusion the keenest arguments glance off like feather shafts from a coat of mail. Still further, it is impossible that a man who has been brought to doubt the testimony of his own consciousness should be otherwise than indifferent to the truth. If the doctrine of *maya* be admitted, the distinction between truth and error vanishes into thin air. If all is error, then there is no room for truth. Truth is but a mere phantom which is not worth the chasing. All things are equally true, or equally false, as you please to take it. Hence, argues the Hindoo always, all religions are alike true, and from God. Christianity is true; so also is Hindooism and Mohammedanism and every other religion. There is only the difference of a name; and if this be so, why should a man forsake the cult of his fathers, only to bring trouble and ruin on himself? It is plain that no temper of mind could well be more unfavorable to the reception of the truth than this. To a man who has come under the deadly influence of this doctrine of *maya*, all argument on whatsoever subject becomes a mere logomachy. It is like the play of fencers, which has no other object than to display the agility and skill of the fencer. As yet another consequence of these same general principles and another element of the enduring strength of Hindooism, we must not overlook the marvellous assimilative power of the system. Logically and historically, it has proven itself able to incorporate into itself every manner of religious ideas and principles and adapt itself to men of every possible taste and capacity. To the philosophic intellect it presents one of the most elaborate systems of philosophy that the human mind has ever wrought out. To the mystic, seeking for union with God, it holds forth an ineffable and essential union with the Deity as the sure result of a life of pious abstraction and meditation. To the ascetic it holds forth the Deity as revealed in Shiva as the

very ideal ascetic, and at the same time the Mahàdeva or great God of men ; at once an awful model for imitation, and a mighty power by the propitiation of whom through austerities man may at last lift himself up to God. To those desiring morality and uprightness it shows the Deity in the form of Ràma Chandra, or the Krishna of the Bhàgavad Gita, whose wise counsels have, not without reason, been sometimes compared to those of the Gospels. To the carnal and licentious it offers as a Deity the Krishna of the Bhàgavat Puràna, whose licentious sports with the cowherdesses are celebrated with song and dance throughout India ; or if any one would seek a still lower depth, yet within the limits of Hindooism, we have it in the nameless worship of the Sakti or female principle, a glorification of impurity as the most immediate means of salvation. Even for the wild fetish and demon-worshipping aboriginal tribes of the country, for the Gond and for the Mair of Ràjputànà, Hindooism has found a place. If they will but cease to eat the flesh of the cow and recognize the supremacy of the Bràhman, they may keep all that they care for in their own primitive religions, and even thereby rise in a future state of being somewhat nearer to the Deity, even to Brahmanhood itself. Finally, any dissatisfied soul would yet escape from the iron bondage of Hindooism into the larger liberty of the truth, yet around him on every side, like a deep moat without a bridge, lies the ordinance of caste. To change his religion is to renounce caste, and this touches him in every point of his outer and inner life. It means to renounce home and friends, even the nearest ; to give up in most cases even the means of a livelihood ; for the high-caste man it means to sink at one step from a position of honor in society to that of a social outcast. Thus by its institution of caste Hindooism has enlisted on its side all man's honorable pride, all his family and social affections, the very instinct of self-preservation which makes a man seek for a maintenance. Nay, for the Bràhman, caste is a part or often the whole of that by which he has his daily bread or amasses wealth. Thus the entire Brahmanical caste must needs regard the levelling truth of Christianity as Demetrius regarded the preaching of Paul at Ephesus. By this craft he has his wealth. He has no

objection, indeed, that any of his clients should worship Christ in his heart, so long as he does not see that by any overt act his own supremacy is likely to be endangered. Then, tolerant hitherto, he is tolerant no longer; and to the apostate who has left his own for another religion he knows to show no mercy.

Is it a wonder that Hindooism has not yielded at once to Christianity? And can the church of Christ reasonably expect to accomplish any great success against Hindooism till she undertake the evangelization of that people with a zeal, faith, and vigor in some proportion to the almost incomparable difficulty of the work? And yet, great as is the difficulty, all in India is not antagonism. Even in those dreary desolations of pantheism one may hear oftentimes voices lifted up for the true and living God, witnessing more or less distinctly to the great truths which Christianity clearly reveals. God has not left himself without a witness, and herein have we hope.

SAMUEL H. KELLOGG.

THE CONTENTS OF CHILDREN'S MINDS.

IN October, 1869, the Pedagogical Society of Berlin issued a circular requesting the masters of the eighty-four established schools of that city to ascertain how many of the children who entered the primary classes that fall had seen and could name certain common animals, insects, and plants, had taken certain walks, visited specified parks, museums, etc. It is more common in that country than in our own to connect songs, poems, reading exercises, and object lessons with the locality with which the child is most familiar, so that not only does the matter of elementary instruction vary considerably with the geographical, zoological, and botanical character of the different towns, and often even with the surroundings of different schools in the same city, but much importance is attached to stated holiday and half-holiday walks which teachers are expected to conduct with their pupils for educational purposes. To "determine the individuality of the children so far as conditioned by the concepts arising from their immediate environment," for statistical uses, was the express purpose of the questions proposed. It was expected that this "entrance examination" scheme, as it was humorously called, would show in a more definite form than ever before the psychic peculiarities of the different school districts of Berlin, upon which, from preliminary tests, locality seemed to exert a surprising influence. Besides a score or so of topographical questions, however—such as the public buildings, squares, chief streets, suburban pleasure resorts, etc.—others pertaining to the home, the farm, objects in natural history, and the aspects of the heavens were added, and finally the children were asked if they had any notion of God, Christ, could tell a Bible story, say a hymn or prayer, or had ever heard either of four of the best known of Grimm's tales. At first many of the children were questioned in classes, till, on account of intimidation in the presence of others, and other errors arising from a desire to appear wiser or not more ignorant than their mates,

etc., it was found that more truthful results were obtained by questioning them in sections of eight or ten, altho this method nearly doubled the average ignorance displayed and quadrupled the work, which with one hundred and thirty-eight questions was no small addition to that already required of the subordinate teachers to whom it was mainly entrusted. Of a little over two thousand children to whom these questions were put reliable results were thought to be obtained from about one half, while some teachers expressed the opinion that even they had no value owing to the haste and not unfrequently the unwillingness with which the work was undertaken.¹

It was with the advantages of many suggestions and not a few warnings from this attempt that the writer undertook, soon after the opening of the Boston schools in September last, to make out a list of questions suitable for obtaining an inventory of the contents of the mind of children of average intelligence on entering the primary schools of that city. All the local and many other of the German questions were for various reasons not suitable to children here, and the task of selecting those that should be so, tho perhaps not involving quite as many perplexing considerations as choosing an equally long list of normal words, was by no means easy. They must not be too familiar nor too hard and remote, but must give free and easy play to reason and memory. But especially, to yield most practical results, they should lie within the range of what children are commonly supposed or at least desired, by teachers and by those who write primary text-books and prescribe courses of instruction, to know. Many preliminary half-days of questioning small groups of children and receiving suggestions from many sources and the use of many primers, object-lesson courses, etc., now in use in this country were necessary before the first provisional list of one hundred and thirty-four questions was printed. The problem first had in mind was strictly practical; viz., what may city children be assumed to know and have seen by their teachers when they enter school; altho other purposes more psychological shaped many other questions used later.

The difficulties and sources of possible error in the use of such

¹ See abstract of these results in the Berlin *Statistisches Jahrbuch*. Vierter Jahrgang. S. 59.

questions are many. Not only are children prone to imitate others in their answers without stopping to think and give an independent answer of their own, but they often love to seem wise, and, to make themselves interesting, state what seems to interest us without reference to truth, divining the lines of our interest with a subtlety we do not suspect; if absurdities are doubted they are sometimes only the more protested, the faculties of some are benumbed and perhaps their tongues tied by bashfulness, while others are careless, listless, inattentive, and answer at random. Again, many questioners are brusque, lacking in sympathy or tact, or real interest or patience in the work, or perhaps regard it as trivial or fruitless. These and many other difficulties seemed best minimized by the following method which was finally settled upon and, with the co-operation of Mr. E. P. Seaver, superintendent of the Boston schools, put into operation. Four of the best trained and experienced kindergarten teachers were employed by the hour to question three children at a time in the dressing-room of the school by themselves alone, so as not to interrupt the school-work. No constraint was used, and, as several hours were necessary to finish each set, changes and rests were often needful, while by frequent correspondence and by meetings with the writer to discuss details and compare results uniformity of method was sought. The most honest and unembarrassed child's first answer to a direct question, e.g., whether it has seen a cow, sheep, etc., must rarely or never be taken without careful cross-questioning, a stated method of which was developed respecting many objects. If the child says it has seen a cow, but when asked its size points to its own finger-nail or hand and says, *so big*, as not unfrequently occurs, the inference is that it has at most only seen a picture of a cow, and thinks its size reproduced therein, and accordingly he is set down as deficient on that question. If, however, he is correct in size, but calls the color blue, does not know it as the source of milk, or that it has horns or hoofs,—several errors of the latter order have been generally allowed. A worm may be said to *swim* on the ground, butchers to kill only the bad animals, etc.; but when hams are said to grow on trees or in the ground, or a hill is described as a *lump* of dirt, or wool as growing on hens, as often occurs, deficiency is obvious. So many other visual and other notions that seem to adults so

simple that they must be present to the mind with some completeness or not at all, are in a process of gradual acquisition element by element in the mind of a child, so that there must sometimes be confessedly a certain degree of arbitrariness in saying, as, except in cases of peculiar uncertainty, the questioners attempted to do, that the child has the concept or does not have it. Men's first names seem to have designated single striking qualities, but once applied they become general or specific names according to circumstances. Again, very few children knew that a tree had bark, leaves, trunk, and roots; but very few indeed had not noticed a tree enough for our "pass." Without specifying further details it may suffice here to say that the child was given the benefit of every doubt and credited with knowledge wherever its ignorance was not so radical as to make a chaos of what instruction and most primary text-books are wont to assume. It is important also to add that the questioners were requested to report manifest gaps in the child's knowledge *in its own words*, reproducing its syntax, pronunciation, etc.

About sixty teachers besides the above four have made returns from three or more children each. Many returns, however, are incomplete, careless, or show internal contradictions, and can be used only indirectly to control results from the other sources. From more than twice that number two hundred of the Boston children were selected as the basis of the following table. For certain questions and for many statistical purposes this number is much too small to yield very valuable results, but where, as in the majority of cases, the averages of these children taken by fifties have varied less than ten per cent it is safe to infer that the figures have considerable representative worth and far more than they could have if the percentages were small. The precautions that were taken to avoid schools where the children come from homes representing extremes of either culture or ignorance, or to balance deviations from a conjectured average in one direction by like deviations in the other, and also to select from each school-room with the teacher's aid only children of average capacity and to dismiss each child found unresponsive or not acquainted with the English language, give to the percentages, it is believed, a worth which without these and other precautions to this end only far larger numbers could yield.

The following table shows the general results for a number of those questions which admit of categorical answers, only negative results being recorded; the italicized questions in the "miscellaneous" class being based on only from forty to seventy-five children, the rest on two hundred, or in a few cases two hundred and fifty:

TABLE I.

No.	Name of the Object or Concept.	Per cent of Children ignorant of it.	No.	Name of the Object or Concept.	Per cent of Children ignorant of it.
1	Beehive.....	80	4	Seen rainbow.....	65
2	Crow.....	77	5	" sunrise.....	66.5
3	Cardboard.....	72.5	6	" sunset.....	53.5
4	Ant.....	65.5	7	" clouds.....	35
5	Squirrel.....	63	8	" stars.....	14
6	Snail.....	63	9	" moon.....	7
7	Robin.....	60.5			
8	Sparrow.....	57.5			
9	Sheep.....	54			
10	Bee.....	52	1	Concept of an island.....	87.5
11	Frog.....	50	2	" a beach.....	55.5
12	Pig.....	47.5	3	" woods.....	53.5
13	Chicken.....	38.5	4	" river.....	48
14	Worm.....	28	5	" pond.....	40
15	Butterfly.....	20.5	6	" hill.....	38
16	Hen.....	18	7	" brook.....	15
17	Cow.....	18.5			
1	Growing wheat.....	92.5			
2	Elm tree.....	91.5			
3	Poplar tree.....	89			
4	Willow.....	89			
5	Growing oats.....	87.5			
6	Oak tree.....	87			
7	Pine.....	87			
8	Maple.....	83			
9	Growing moss.....	81.5			
10	" strawberries.....	78.5	1	Concept of a triangle.....	92
11	" clover.....	74	2	" square.....	58
12	" beans.....	71.5	3	" circle.....	35
13	" blueberries.....	67.5	4	The number five.....	28.5
14	" blackberries.....	66	5	" four.....	17
15	" corn.....	65.5	6	" three.....	8
16	Chestnut tree.....	64			
17	Planted a seed.....	63			
18	Peaches on a tree.....	61			
19	Growing potatoes.....	61			
20	" buttercup.....	55.5	1	Seen watchmaker at work.....	68
21	" rose.....	54	2	" file.....	65
22	" grapes.....	53	3	" plough.....	64.5
23	" dandelion.....	52	4	" spade.....	62
24	" cherries.....	46	5	" hoe.....	61
25	" pears.....	39	6	" bricklayer at work.....	44.5
26	" apples.....	31	7	" shoemaker at work.....	25
			8	" axe.....	12
			1	Know green by name.....	15
			2	" blue by name.....	14
			3	" yellow by name.....	13.5
			4	" red by name.....	9
				MISCELLANEOUS.	
1	Where are the child's ribs.....	90.5	1	That leather things come from animals.....	93.4
2	" " lungs.....	81	2	Maxim or proverb.....	91.5
3	" " heart.....	80	3	Origin of cotton things.....	90
4	" " wrists.....	70.5	4	What flour is made of.....	89
5	Where are the ankles.....	65.5	5	Ability to knit.....	88
6	" waist.....	52.5	6	What birds are made of.....	81.1
7	" hips.....	45	7	Shape of the world.....	70.8
8	" knuckles.....	36	8	Origin of woolen things.....	69
9	" elbows.....	25	9	Never attended kindergarten.....	64.5
10	Know right and left hand.....	21.5	10	Never been in bathing.....	64.5
11	cheek.....	18	11	Can tell no rudiment of a story.....	58
12	forehead.....	15	12	Not know wooden things are from trees.....	55
13	throat.....	13.5	13	Origin of butter.....	50.5
14	knee.....	7	14	" meat (from animals).....	48
15	stomach.....	6	15	Cannot sew.....	47.5
			16	Cannot strike a given musical tone.....	40
			17	Cannot beat time regularly.....	39
1	Dew.....	78	18	Never saved cents at home.....	38
2	What season it is.....	75.5	19	Never been in the country.....	35.5
3	Seen hail.....	73	20	Can repeat no verse.....	28
			21	Source of milk.....	20.5

TABLE II.

NAME OF THE OBJECT OR CONCEPT.	Per cent of ignorance in 150 girls.	Per cent of ignorance in 150 boys.	Per cent of ignorance in 50 Irish children.	Per cent of ignorance in 50 American children.	Per cent of ignorance in 64 kind- ergarten children.
Beehive.....	81	75	86	70	61
Ant.....	59	60	74	38	26
Squirrel.....	69	50	60	42	43
Snail.....	69	73	92	72	62
Robin.....	69	44	64	36	29
Sheep.....	67	47	62	40	40
Bee.....	46	32	52	32	26
Frog.....	53	38	54	35	35
Pig.....	45	27	38	26	22
Chicken.....	35	21	32	16	22
Worm.....	21	17	26	16	9
Butterfly.....	14	16	26	8	9
Hen.....	15	14	18	2	14
Cow.....	18	12	20	6	10
Growing clover	59	68	84	42	29
" corn.....	58	50	60	68	32
" potatoes.....	55	54	62	44	34
" buttercup.....	50	51	66	40	31
" rose.....	48	48	60	42	33
" dandelion.....	44	42	62	34	31
" apples.....	16	16	18	12	5
Ribs.....	88	92	98	82	68
Ankles.....	58	52	62	40	38
Waist.....	53	52	64	32	36
Hips.....	50	47	72	31	24
Knuckles.....	27	27	34	12	23
Elbow.....	19	32	36	16	12
Right from left hand.....	20	8	14	20	4
Wrist.....	21	34	44	9	19
Cheek.....	10	12	14	14	4
Forehead.....	10	11	12	10	7
Throat.....	10	18	14	16	14
Knee.....	4	5	2	10	2
Dew.....	64	63	92	52	57
What season it is.....	59	50	68	48	41
Hail.....	75	61	84	52	53
Rainbow.....	59	61	70	38	38
Sunrise.....	71	53	70	36	53
Sunset.....	47	49	52	32	29
Stars.....	15	10	12	4	7
Island.....	74	78	84	64	55
Beach.....	82	49	60	34	32
Woods.....	46	36	46	32	27
River.....	38	44	62	12	13
Pond.....	31	34	42	24	28
Hill.....	23	22	30	12	19
The number five.....	26	16	22	24	12
" four.....	15	10	16	14	7
" three.....	7	6	12	8	0

The high rate of ignorance here indicated may surprise most who will be likely to read this report, because the childhood they

know will be much above the average of intelligence here sought, as it may all, because the few memories of childhood which survive in adult life necessarily bear such slight traces of its imperfections and are from many causes so illusory. Skeins and spools of thread were said to grow on the sheep's back or on bushes, stockings on trees, butter to come from buttercups, flour to be made of beans, oats to grow on oaks, bread to be swelled yeast, trees to be stuck in the ground by God and rootless, meat to be dug from the ground, and potatoes to be picked from trees. Cheese is squeezed butter, the cow says "bow-wow," the pig purrs or burrows, worms are not distinguished from snakes, moss from the "toad's umbrella," bricks from stones, nor beans from trees. An oak may be known only as an acorn-tree or a button-tree, a pine only as a needle-tree, a bird's nest only as its bed, etc. So that while no one child has all these misconceptions none are free from them, and thus the liabilities are great that, in this chaos of half-assimilated impressions, half right, half wrong, some lost link may make utter nonsense or mere verbal cram of the most careful instruction, as in the cases of children referred to above who knew much by rote about a cow, its milk, horns, leather, meat, etc., but yet were sure from the picture-book that it was no bigger than a small mouse.

For 86 per cent of the above questions the average intelligence of thirty-six country children who were tested ranks higher than that of the city children of the table, and in many items very greatly. The subject-matter of primers for the latter is in great part still traditionally of country life; hence the danger of unwarranted presupposition is considerable. As our methods of teaching grow natural we realize that city life is unnatural, and that those who grow up without knowing the country are defrauded of that without which childhood can never be complete or normal. On the whole the material of the city is no doubt inferior in pedagogic value to country experience. A few days in the country at this age has raised the level of many a city child's intelligence more than a term or two of school training could do without it. It is there, too, that the foundations of a love of natural science are best laid. We cannot accept without many careful qualifications the evolutionary dictum that the child's

mental development should repeat that of the race. Unlike primitive man the child's body is feeble and he is ever influenced by a higher culture about him. Yet from the primeval intimacy with the qualities and habits of plants, with the instincts of animals—so like those of children—with which hawking and trapping, the riding on instead of some distance behind horses, etc., made men familiar; from primitive industries and tools as first freshly suggested, if we believe Geiger, from the normal activities of the human organism, especially the tool of tools, the hand; from primitive shelter, cooking, and clothing, with which anthropological researches make us familiar, it is certain that not a few educational elements of great value can be selected and systematized for children, an increasing number of them in fact being already in use for juvenile games and recreations and for the vacation pastimes of adults. A country barn, a forest with its gloom and awe, its vague fears and indefinite sounds, is a great school at this age. The making of butter, which some teachers, after hearing so often that it grew inside eggs or on ice, or was made from buttermilk, think it worth while to make a thimbleful of it in a toy churn at school as an object-lesson; more acquaintance with birds, which, as having the most perfect senses, most constant motion in several elements, even Leopardi could panegyrize as the only real things of joy in the universe, and which the strange power of flight makes ideal beings with children, and whose nests were often said to *grow* on trees; more knowledge of kitchen-chemistry, of foods, their preparation and origin; wide prospects for the eyes—this is more pedagogic industrial training for *young* children, because more free and play-like, than sewing, or cooking, or whittling, or special trade-schools can be, as well as mere hygienic. Many children locate all that is good and imperfectly known in the country, and nearly a dozen volunteered the statement that good people when they die go to the country—even here from Boston. It is things that live and, as it were, detach themselves from their background by moving that catch the eye and with it the attention, and the subjects which occupy and interest the city child are mainly in motion and therefore transient, while the country child comes to know objects at rest better. The country child has more solitude, and is likely to develop more independence and is less likely to be

prematurely caught up into the absorbing activities and throbbing passions of manhood, and becomes more familiar with the experiences of primitive man. The city child knows a little of many more things and so is more liable to superficiality and has a wider field for error. At the same time it has two great advantages over the country child, in knowing more of human nature and in entering school with a much better developed sense of rhythm and all its important implications. On the whole, however, additional force seems thus given to the argument for excursions, by rail or otherwise, regularly provided for the poorer children who are causing the race to degenerate in the great centres of population, unfavorable enough for those with good homes or even for adults.

Words, in connection with rhyme, rhythm, alliteration, cadence, etc., or even without these simply as sound-pictures, often absorb the attention of children and yield them a really æsthetic pleasure either quite independently of their meaning or to the utter bewilderment of it. They hear fancied words in noises and sounds of nature and animals, and are persistent punners. As butterflies make butter or eat it or give it by squeezing, so grasshoppers give grass, bees give beads and beans, kittens grow on the pussy-willow, and all honey is from honeysuckles, and even a poplin dress is made of poplar-trees. When the cow lows it somehow blows its own horn; crows and scarecrows are confounded; ant has some subtle relationship to aunt; angle-worm suggests angle or triangle or ankle; Martie eats "tomarties;" a holiday is a day to "holler" on; Harry O'Neil is nicknamed Harry Oatmeal; isosceles is somehow related to sausages; October suggests knocked over; "I never saw a hawk, but I can hawk and spit too;" "I will not sing do re mi, but do re *you*;" "Miss Eaton will eat us"—these and many more from the questioners' notes, and the story of the child who, puzzled by the unfamiliar reflexive use of the verb, came to associate "now I lay me," etc., with a *lama*, or of another who was for years stupefied as against a dead blank wall whenever the phrase "answer sought" occurred, suggest to us how, more or less consciously and more or less seriously, a child may be led, in the absence of corrective experience, to the most fantastic and otherwise unaccountable distortions of facts by shadowy word-spectres or

husks. In many of the expressions quoted the child seems playing with relations once seriously held, and its "fun" to be joy over but lately broken mental fetters. Some at least of the not infrequently quite unintelligible statements or answers may perhaps be thus accounted for. Again, the child more than the adult thinks in pictures, gestures, and inarticulate sounds. The distinction between real and verbal knowledge has been carefully and constantly kept in mind by the questioners. Yet except a very few objects in the above table, as e.g. triangle and sparrow, a child may be said to know almost nothing of them, at least for school purposes, if he has no generally recognized name for them. The far greater danger is the converse, that only the name and not the thing itself will be known. To test for this was, with the exceptions presently to be noted, our constant aim, as it is that of true education to obviate it. The danger, however, is after all quite limited here, for the linguistic imperfections of children are far more often shown in combining words than in naming the concrete things they know or do not know. To name an object is a passion with them, for it is to put their own mark upon it, to appropriate it. From the talk which most children hear and use to book language is again an immense step. Words *live* only in the ear and mouth, and are pale and corpse-like when addressed to the eye. What we want, and indeed are likely soon to have, are carefully arranged child vocabularies and dictionaries of both verbal forms and meanings, to show teachers just the phonic elements and vocal combinations children have most trouble with, the words they most readily and surely acquire, their number and order in each thought-sphere—and the attributes and connotations most liable to confuse them. To that work it is believed the method here employed has already furnished valuable material in protocol soon to be augmented and digested.

To specify a few items more fully, the four color-questions were designed to test not color-blindness but the power to use color-names. The Holmgren worsteds were used, from which the child was asked to pick out, not colors like others to which its attention is directed without naming them, but the color named, to which he has no clue but the name. It did not seem safe to complicate the objects of the latter educational test with the

former, so that some of those marked defective in the table may or may not have been color-blind. Excluding colored and Jewish children, both of whom seem to show exceptional percentages, and averaging the sexes, both Magnus and Jeffries found a little over two per cent of many thousand children color-blind. The children they tested, however, were much older than these, and two or three hundred is far too small a number to warrant us, were it otherwise allowable, in simply subtracting two percent and inferring that the remainder were deficient only in knowledge of the color-word. Our figures, then, do not bear upon the question whether the color-sense itself is fully developed before the age of five or six or not. Again, number cannot be developed to any practical extent without knowledge of the number-name. Beyond three, as Wundt's careful experiments show, the eye can apprehend but three of the smallest and simplest objects, unless they are arranged in some geometrical order, without taking considerable additional time to count. As the chromatic scale grades musical intervals or the names we count by graduate the vague sense of more or less, and, later, as visible notes change all musical ideas and possibilities, so figures or number-signs almost create arithmetic. A child who seriously says a cat has three or five legs will pick out its own, e.g. fourth, seat in the fifth row in an empty school-room almost every time by happy guessing, and hold up "so many" fingers or blocks, when, if the number-name five or six were called for and nothing shown, it would be quite confused. In our tests the number-name was sought because it is that which is mainly serviceable for educational purposes. As to the physiological and geographical questions little need be said. Joint, flesh, and vein are often unknown terms, or joint is where the bone is broken, and there are stones in the knees. Within the skin is blood and something hard, perhaps wood. Physical self-consciousness, which is in little danger of becoming morbid at this age, begins with recognition of the hand, then of the foot, because these are the most mobile parts, but has not often reached the face at this age, and blushing is rare; while psychic self-consciousness is commonly only of pain, either internal, as of stomach-ache, or peripheral, of cuts, bruises, etc. The world is square, straight, or flat, and if the other side has been thought of it is all woods

or water or ice, or where saved people or Protestants or anything much heard of but little seen are ; if we go to the edge of the world we come to water or may fall off, or it may be like a house and we live on the top. The first notion of a hill may be of some particular pile of sand, perhaps on the moulding-board, three inches high, or a rubbish-heap in the back yard, or a slant where a sled will run alone ; but a comprehensive idea of hill with opposite sides, tho simpler and easier than most geographical categories, is by no means to be assumed.

If children are pressed to answer questions somewhat beyond their ken they often reply confusedly and at random, while if others beside them are questioned they can answer well ; some are bolder and invent things on the spot if they seem to interest the questioner, while others catch quick and subtle suggestions from the form of the question, accent, gesture, feature, etc., so that what seems originality is really mind-reading, giving back our every thought and sometimes only a direct reproduction, with but little distortion because little apprehension, of what parents or teachers have lately told them. But there are certain elements which every tactful and experienced friend of children learns to distinguish from each of these with considerable accuracy—elements which, from whatever source, take or spring from deep roots in the childish heart, as distinct from all these as are Grimm's tales from those of some of our weakly juvenile weeklies. These are generally not easily accessible. I could not persuade an old nurse to repeat to me a nonsensical song I had half overheard that delighted a two-year-old child, and the brothers Grimm experienced a similar difficulty in making their collections. As many workingmen nail a horseshoe over their door for luck and many people really prefer to begin nothing important on Friday who will not confess to a trace of superstition in either case, so children cling to their "old credulities to nature dear," refusing every attempt to gain their full confidence or explore secret tracts in their minds, as a well-developed system of insane illusions may escape the scrutiny of the most skilful alienist. As a reasoning electric light might honestly doubt the existence of such things as shadows because, however near or numerous, they are always hidden from it, so the most intelligent adults quite commonly fail to recognize sides of

their own children's souls which can be seen only by strategy. A boy and girl often play under my window as I write, and when either is quite alone unconscious words often reveal what is passing in their own minds, and it is often very absurd or else meaningless, but they run away with shame and even blushes if they chance to look up suddenly and catch me listening. Yet who of us has not secret regions of soul to which no friend is ever admitted, and which we ourselves shrink from full consciousness of? Many children half believe the doll feels cold or blows, that it pains flowers to tear or burn them, or that in summer when the tree is alive it makes it ache to pound or chop it. Of 48 children questioned 20 believed sun, moon, or stars to live, 15 thought a doll and 16 thought flowers would suffer pain if burned. Children who are accounted dull in school-work are more apt to be imaginative and animistic.

The chief field for such fond and often secret childish fancies is the sky. About three fourths of all questioned thought the world a plain, and many described it as round like a dollar, while the sky is like a flattened bowl turned over it. The sky is often thin, one might easily break through; half the moon may be seen through it, while the other half is this side; it may be made of snow, but is so large that there is much floor-sweeping to be done in heaven. Some thought the sun went down at night into the ground or just behind certain houses, and went across on or under the ground to go up out of or off the water in the morning, but 48 per cent of all thought that at night it *goes* or *rolls* or *flies*, is *blown* or *walks*, or *God pulls it up* higher out of sight. He *takes it into heaven*, and perhaps *puts it to bed*, and even *takes off its clothes* and puts them on in the morning, or again it *lies under the trees* where the angels *mind it*, or goes through and *shines on the upper side of the sky*, or goes *into or behind the moon*, as the moon is behind it in the day. It may *stay where it is*, only we *cannot see it, for it is dark*, or the *dark rains down so*, and it *comes out when it gets light so it can see*. More than half the children questioned conceived the sun as never more than 40 degrees from the zenith, and, naturally enough, city children knew little of the horizon. So the moon (still italicizing where the exact words of the children are given) *comes around when it is a bright night* and people *want to walk, or forget to light*

some lamps ; it follows us about and has nose and eyes, while it calls the stars into, under, or behind it at night, and they may be made of bits of it. Sometimes the moon is *round a month or two*, then it is a *rim*, or a *piece is cut off*, or it is *half stuck or half buttoned into the sky*. The stars may be sparks from fire-engines or houses, or, with higher intelligence, they are silver, or *God lights them with matches and blows them out or opens the door* and calls them in in the morning. Only in a single case were any of the heavenly bodies conceived as openings in the sky to let light or glory through, or as eyes of supernatural beings—a fancy so often ascribed to children and so often found in juvenile literature. Thunder, which, anthropologists tell us, is or represents the highest God to most savage races, was apperceived as *God groaning or kicking, or rolling barrels about, or turning a big handle, or grinding snow, walking loud, breaking something, throwing logs, having coal run in, pounding about with a big hammer, rattling houses, hitting the clouds, or clouds bumping or clapping together or bursting*, or else it was merely *ice sliding off lots of houses, or cannon in the city or sky, hard rain down the chimney, or big rocks pounding, or piles of boards falling down, or very hard rain, hail, or wind*. Lightning is *God putting out his finger or opening a door, or turning a gas quick, or (very common) striking many matches at once, throwing stones and iron for sparks, setting paper afire*, or it is *light going outside and inside the sky, or stars falling*. God keeps rain in heaven in a *big sink, rows of buckets, a big tub or barrels*, and they *run over* or he *lets it down with a water-hose through a sieve, a dipper with holes, or sprinkles or tips it down or turns a faucet*. God makes it in heaven out of nothing or out of water, or it gets up by *splashing up*, or he *dips it up off the roof*, or it *rains up off the ground when we don't see it*. The clouds are *close to the sky*; they move because the *earth moves and makes them*. They are *dirty, muddy things, or blankets, or doors of heaven*, and are made of fog, of steam that makes the sun go, of smoke, of white wool or feathers and birds, or lace or cloth. In their changing forms very many children, whose very life is fancy, think they see veritable men, or more commonly, because they have so many more forms, animals, faces, and very often God, Santa Claus, angels, etc., are also seen. Closely connected with the above are the religious concepts so common with chil-

dren. God is a *big*, perhaps *blue*, *man*, very often seen in the sky on or in clouds, in the church, or even street. He *came in our gate, comes to see us sometimes*. He lives in a *big palace* or a *big brick or stone house on the sky*. He makes lamps, babies, dogs, trees, money, etc., and the angels *work for him*. He looks like the priest, Fröbel, papa, etc., and they like to look at him, and a few would like to be God. He *lights the stars so he can see to go on the sidewalk or into the church*. Birds, children, Santa Claus, live with him, and most but not all like him better than they do the latter. When people die they just *go*, or are *put in a hole*, or a *box* or a *black wagon that goes to heaven*, or they *fly up* or are *drawn or slung up* into the sky where God *catches them*. They *never can get out of the hole*, and yet all good people somehow get where God is. He *lifts them up*, they *go up on a ladder or rope*, or they carry them up, but *keep their eyes shut so they do not know the way*, or they are *shoved up through a hole*. When children get there they have candy, rocking-horses, guns, and everything in the toy-shop or picture-book, play marbles, top, ball, cards, hookey, hear brass bands, have nice clothes, gold watches, and pets, ice-cream and soda-water, and no school. There are men there who died in the war made into angels, and dolls with broken heads go there. Some think they must go through the church to get there, a few thought the horse-cars run there, and one said that the birds that grow on apple-trees are drawn up there by the moon. The bad place is like an *oven* or a *police-station*, where it burns, yet is all dark, and folks want to get back, and God *kills people or beats them with a cane*. God makes babies in heaven, tho the holy mother and even Santa Claus makes some. He *lets them down or drops them*, and the women or doctors *catch them*, or he leaves them on the sidewalk, or *brings them down a wooden ladder backwards and pulls it up again*, or mamma or the doctor or the nurse *go up and fetch them sometimes in a balloon*, or they *fly down and lose off their wings in some place or other and forget it*, or *jump down to Jesus, who gives them around*. They were also often said to be found in flour-barrels, and the *flour sticks ever so long, you know*, or they *grow in cabbages*, or God *puts them in water*, perhaps in the *sewer*, and the doctor gets them out and *takes them to sick folks that want them*, or the milkman brings them early in the morn-

ing, they are dug out of the ground, or bought at the baby-store. Sometimes God *puts on a few things* or else *sends them along if he don't forget it*; this shows that no one since Basedow believes in telling children the truth in all things.

Not a few children have or can be made to disclose no such ideas as the above, and indeed they seem to be generally already on the ebb at this age, and are sometimes timidly introduced by, *as if, some say*, it is *like*, or *I uscd to think*. Clear and confident notions on the above topics are the exception and not the rule, yet most have some of them, while some are common to many, indeed most, children. They represent a drift of consentient infantile philosophy about the universe not without systematic coherence, altho intimidated and broken through at every point by fragmentary truths, often only verbal indeed, without insight or realization of a higher order, so that the most diametrical contradictions often subsist peacefully side by side, and yet they are ever forming again at lower levels of age and intelligence. In all that is remote the real and ideal fade into each other like clouds and mountains in the horizon, or as poetry which keeps alive the standpoints of an earlier culture coexists with science. Children are often hardly conscious of them at all, and the very questions that bring them to mind and invite them to words at the same time often abash the child to the first disquieting self-consciousness of the absurdity of his fond fancies that have felt not only life but character into natural objects. Between the products of childish spontaneity, where the unmistakable child's mark is seen, and those of really *happy* suggestion by parents, etc., the distinction is as hard as anywhere along the line between heredity and tradition. It is enough that these fancies are like Galton's composite portraits, resultants in form and shading of the manifold deepest impression which what is within and what is without have together made upon the child's soul in these spheres of ideas. Those indicated above represent many strata of intelligence up through which the mind is passing very rapidly and with quite radical transformations. Each stratum was once with but a little elaboration, or is now somewhere, the highest culture, relegated to and arrested in an earlier and earlier stage as civilization and educational methods advance. Belief in the false is as necessary as it is

inevitable, for the proper balance of head and heart, and happy the child who has believed or loved only healthy, unaffected, platonic lies like the above, which will be shed with its milk-teeth when more solid mental pabulum can be digested. It is possible that the present shall be so attractive and pre-occupying that the child never once sends his thoughts to the remote in time and place, and that these baby-fancies—ever ready to form at a touch, and which make the impartation of truth, however carefully put, on these themes impossible before its time; which, when long forgotten, yet often reverberate, if their old chords be struck, in adults to the intensity of fanaticism or even delusion—shall be quite repressed. If so, one of the best elements of education which comes from long experience in laying aside a lower for a higher phase of culture by doubting opportunely, judiciously, and temperately, is lost.

De Quincey's pseudopia is thought by Dr. E. H. Clarke (*Visions*, p. 212) to be common with children; but altho about 40 were asked to describe what they saw with their eyes shut, it is impossible to judge whether they visualize in any such distinctive sense as Mr. Galton has described or only imagine and remember, often with Homeric circumstance, but with less than picturesque vividness. Childish thought is very largely in visual terms, hence the need of object (*anschauungs*) lessons, and hence, too, it comes that most of the above questions address the eye without any such intent. If phonic symbols could be made pictorial as they were originally, and as illustrated primers make them in a third and still remoter sense, the irrational elements in learning to read would be largely obviated. Again, out of 53 children 21 described the tones of certain instruments as colored.¹ The colors, or "photisms," thus suggested, tho so far as tested constant from week to week in the same child, had no agreement for different instruments, a drum, e.g., suggesting yellow (the favorite color of children) to one child and black or red to another, and the tone of a fife being described as pale or bright, light or dark colored, intensity and saturation varying greatly with different children. For this and other forms of as-

¹ In the sense of Bleuler and Lehrmann. See their treatise "Zwangsmässige Lichtempfindung durch Schall," Leipzig, 1881. Also, Lazarus' "Leben der Seele," ii. p. 131.

sociation or analogies of sensation of a large and not yet explored class so common in children, many data for future study were gathered. This was also the case with their powers of time and tone reproduction, and their common errors in articulation, which have suggested other and more detailed researches, some of which are already in progress.

Each child was asked to name three things right and three things wrong to do, and nearly half could do so. In no case were the two confused, indicating not necessarily intuitive perception, but a general consensus in what is allowed and forbidden children at home, and how much better and more surely they learn to do than to know. Wrong things were specified much more readily and by more children than right things, and also in much greater variety. In about 450 answers 53 wrongs acts are specified, while in over 350 answers only 34 different good acts are named. The more frequent answers are to mind and be good, or to disobey, be naughty, lie, and say bad words; but the answers of the girls differ from the boys in two marked ways, they more often name specific acts and nearly twice as often conventional ones, the former difference being most common in naming right, the latter in naming wrong things. Boys say it is wrong to steal, fight, kick, break windows, get drunk, stick pins into others, or to "sass," "cuss," shoot them, while girls are more apt to say it is wrong to not comb the hair, to get butter on the dress, climb trees, unfold the hands, cry, catch flies, etc. The right things seem, it must be confessed, comparatively very tame and unattractive, and while the genius of an Aristotle could hardly extract categories or infer intuitions by classification from either list, it is very manifest that the lower strata of conscience are dislike of dirt and fear. Pure intuitionists may like to know that over a dozen children were found who convinced their questioners that they thought they ought not to say bad words if no one heard them, or lie if not found out, etc., or who felt sick at the stomach when they had been bad, but the soap and water or sand with which their mouths are sometimes washed after bad words in kindergartens, or the red pepper administered at home after lies, may possibly have something to do with the latter phenomenon.

From several hundred drawings, with the name given them

by the child written by the teacher, the chief difference inferred is in concentration. Some make faint, hasty lines representing all the furniture of a room, or sky and stars, or all the objects they can think of, while others concentrate upon a single object. It is a girl *with buttons*, a house *with a keyhole* or steps, a man *with a pipe* or heels or ring grotesquely prominent. The development of observation and sense of form is best seen in the pictures of men. The earliest and simplest representation is a round head, two eyes and legs. Later comes mouth, then nose, then hair, then ears. Arms like legs at first grow directly from the head, rarely from the legs, and are seldom fingerless, tho sometimes it is doubtful whether several arms or fingers from head and legs without arms are meant. Of 44 human heads only 9 are in profile. This is one of the many analogies with the rock and cave drawings of primitive man, and suggests how Catlin came to nearly lose his life by "leaving out the other half" in drawing a profile portrait of an Indian chief. Last, as least mobile and thus attracting least attention, comes the body; first round like the head, then elongated, sometimes prodigiously, and sometimes articulated into several compartments, and in three cases divided, the upper part of the figure being in one place and the lower in another. The mind and not the eye alone is addressed, for the body is drawn and then the clothes are drawn on it (as the child dresses), diaphanous and only in outline. Most draw living objects except the kindergarten children, who draw their patterns. More than two thirds of all objects are decidedly in action, and under 18 per cent word-pictures or scribbles called the *name* of the objects are made to imitate writing or letters, as children who cannot talk often make gibbering, sputtering sounds to imitate talking. The very earliest pencilings, commonly of three-year-old children, are mere marks to and fro, often nearly in the same line. Of 13 of these most were *nearly* in the angle described by Javal as corresponding to the earliest combination of finger and fore-arm movements and not far from the regulation slant of 52° taught in school penmanship.

Each child was asked to tell a verse or story to be recorded verbatim, and nearly half could do so. Children of this age are no longer interested in mere animal noises or rhymes or nonsense-words of the "Mother Goose" order, but everything to interest

them deeply must have a cat, dog, bird, baby, another child, or possibly parent or teacher in it, must be dramatic and full of action, appeal to the eye as a "chalk-talk" or an object-lesson, and be copious of details, which need be varied but slightly to make the story as good as new for the twentieth time. A long gradation of abstractions culminates here. First, it is a great lesson for the child to eliminate touch and recognize objects by the eye alone. The first pictures are felt of, turned over with much confusion to find the surface smooth. To abstract from visual terms to words is still harder. Eyes and tongue must work together a long time before the former can be eliminated and stories told of objects first absent, then remote, then before unknown. Children must be far beyond this before they can be interested in e.g., fairy tales, and stories told interest them far more than if read to them no matter how apt the language. They are reproduced about as imperfectly as objects are drawn, only a few salient and disconnected points being seized at first, and sentence and sequence coming very slowly after many repetitions. Their own little faults may be woven in or ascribed to animals or even plants in a remote way which they themselves will feel at each stage, and the selfish birdie or the runaway squirrel or flowers as kind words may be referred to in case of need as a reserve moral capital. Why do we never teach maxims and proverbs which, when carefully selected, are found so effective at this age and teach the best morality embodied in the briefest and most impressive way?

Of the 36 per cent or 72 children of the table who never saved their pennies, 52 spend them for candy, which growing children need, but the adulterations of which are often noxious. Of toys, big things please them best. A recent writer in Austria fears that school savings-banks tend to call attention too early to money matters, and to cause its value to be dangerously overrated; but to pass the candy by and drop the cents where they are beyond their control for years is much less pedagogic than to save them till a larger and more costly toy can be bought.

There are but 11 questions on which any comparison between the intelligence of the Boston and Berlin children can be made. On all of these except elementary number, where the average is nearly 20 per cent in favor of the Boston children, the figures vary surprisingly little despite local differences and another mode of questioning.

Table I. is based upon about equal numbers of boys and girls, and children of Irish and American parentage greatly predominate; there are 21 Germans, and 19 are divided between eight other nationalities. 14 per cent of all examined did not know their age; 6 per cent were four, 37 per cent were five, 25 per cent were six, 12 per cent were 7, and 2 per cent were eight years old. The returns were carefully tabulated to determine the influence of age, which seems surprisingly unpronounced, indicating, so far as the small numbers go, a slight value of age *per se* as an index of ripeness for school.

In Table II., columns 2 and 3 are based upon larger numbers and upon less carefully restricted selections from the aggregate returns. In 34 representative questions out of 49 the boys surpass the girls, as the German boys did in 75 per cent of the quite different Berlin questions. The girls excel in knowledge of the parts of the body, home and family life, thunder, rainbows, in knowledge of square, circle, and triangle, but not in that of cube, sphere, and pyramid, which is harder and later. Their stories are more imaginative, while their knowledge of things outward and remote, their power to sing and articulate correctly from dictation, their acquaintance with number and animals, is distinctly less than that of the boys. The Berlin report indicates that girls knew the four best of Grimm's tales nearly twice as frequently as the boys, but that in the concepts of God, Christ, and Bible stories the relation was exactly reversed, and proceeds to infer that the more common, near, or easy a notion is the more likely are the girls to excel the boys, and *vice versa*. Save possibly in the knowledge of the parts of the body, our returns do not particularly indicate this. Boys do seem, however, more likely than girls to be ignorant of common things right about them, where knowledge is wont to be assumed. Column 5 shows that the Irish children tested were behind others on nearly all topics. The Irish girls decidedly outrank the Irish boys, the advantage to the sex being outweighed by the wider knowledge of the boys of other nationalities. Whether, however, the five- and six-year-old Irish boys are not after all so constituted as to surpass their precocious American playmates later in school or adult life, as since Sigismund many think "slow" children generally do, is one of the most serious questions for the philosophical educa-

tor. Column 6 shows the advantage of the kindergarten children, without regard to nationality, over all others in a striking way. Most of the latter tested were from the charity kindergartens, so that superior intelligence of home surroundings can hardly be assumed. Many of them had attended kindergarten but a short time, and the questions were so ordered that the questioners who had a special interest in the kindergarten should not know till near the end of their tests whether or not they had ever attended it. On the other hand, a somewhat larger proportion of the children from the kindergarten had been in the country. Yet on the whole we seem to have here an illustration of the law that we really see not what is near or impresses the retina, but what the attraction is called and held to, and what interests are awakened and words found for. Of nearly thirty primary teachers questioned as to the difference between children from kindergartens and others, four saw no difference, and all the rest thought them better fitted for school-work, instancing superior use of language, skill with the hand and slate, quickness, power of observation, singing, number, love of work, neatness, politeness, freedom from the benumbing school-bashfulness, or power to draw from dictation. Many thought them at first more restless and talkative generally—a trifling and transient fault.

There are many other details and more or less probable inferences, but the above are the chief. The work is laborious, involving about fifty thousand items in all; and as but few of the Berlin methods or results except statistical tables have been published, these results are it is believed to be in some degree the first opening of a new field, which should be specialized and single concept-groups subjected to more detailed study with larger numbers of children. It should also be applied to older children and youth, as the writer is already attempting to do. The difficulty is to get essential points to test for. If these are not characteristic and typical, all such work is worthless. We believe that not only practical educational conclusions of great scope and importance may be based on or illustrated by such results, but, tho deeply sensible of many sources of inaccuracy which may limit their value, that they are of great importance for anthropology and psychology. It is characteristic of an educated man, says Aristotle in substance, not to require a degree of scientific ex-

actness on any subject more than that which the subject admits. As scientific methods advance not only are increasingly complex matters subjected to them, but probabilities (which guide nearly all our acts) more and more remote from mathematical certainty are valued.

Steinthal tells an apposite story of six German gentlemen riding socially in a coupé all day, and as they approached the station where they were to separate one proposed to tell the vocation of each of the others, who were strangers to him, if they would write without hesitation an answer to the question "What destroys its own offspring?" One wrote, Vital force. "You," said the questioner, "are a biologist." Another wrote, War. "You," he said, "are a soldier." Another wrote, Kronos, and was correctly pronounced a philologist; while the publicist revealed himself by writing Revolution, and the farmer by writing She-bear. This fable teaches the law of apperception. As Don Quixote saw an army in a flock of sheep and a giant in a windmill, as some see all things in the light of politics, others in that of religion, education, etc., so the Aryan races apperceived the clouds as cows and the rain as their milk, the sun as a horse, the lightning as an arrow, and so the children apperceive rain as God pouring down water; thunder as barrels, boards falling, or cannon; heaven as a well-appointed nursery, &c., &c. They bring more or less developed apperceiving organs with them into school, each older and more familiar concept gaining more apperceptive power over the newer concepts and percepts by use. The older impressions are on the lurch, as it were, for the new ones, and mental freedom and all-sidedness depends on the number and strength of these appropriating concepts. If there are very few, as with children, teaching is, as some one has well said, like pouring water from a big tub into a small narrow-necked bottle. A teacher who acts upon the now everywhere-admitted fallacy that knowledge of the subject is all that is needed in teaching children pours at random on to more than into the children, talking to rather than with them, and gauging what he gives rather than what they receive. All now agree that the mind can learn only what is related to other things learned before, and that we must start from the knowledge that the children really have and develop this as germs, otherwise we are showing objects that

require close scrutiny only to indirect vision, or talking to the blind of color. Alas for the teacher who does not learn more from his children than he can ever hope to teach them! Just in proportion as teachers do this do they cease to be merely mechanical and acquire interest, perhaps enthusiasm, and surely an all-compensating sense of growth in their work and life.

From the above tables it seems not too much also to infer—
I. That there is next to nothing of pedagogic value the knowledge of which it is safe to assume at the outset of school-life. Hence the need of objects and the danger of books and word-cram. Hence many of the best primary teachers in Germany spend from two to four or even six months in talking of objects and drawing them before any beginning of what we till lately have regarded as primary-school work. II. The best preparation parents can give their children for good school-training is to make them acquainted with natural objects, especially with the sights and sounds of the country and talk about them, and send them to good and hygienic as distinct from most fashionable kindergartens. III. Every normal-school pupil should be required, as an essential part of his training, and every teacher on starting with a new class or in a new locality, to make sure that his efforts along some lines are not utterly lost, should undertake to explore carefully section by section children's minds with all the tact and ingenuity he can command and acquire, to determine exactly what is already known. IV. The concepts which are most common in the children of a given locality are the earliest to be acquired, while the rarer ones are later. This order may generally be assumed in teaching as a natural one, e.g. apples first and wheat last (Cf. Table I.). This order, however, varies very greatly with every change of environment, so that the results of exploration of children's minds in one place cannot be assumed to be valid for those of another save within comparatively few concept-spheres.

The writer is under special obligations, first to Mrs. Quincy Shaw, who founded and supports the comprehensive system of charity kindergartens in Boston, and also to Miss L. B. Pingree, their superintendent, and to the special questioners Miss S. E. Wiltse, Miss L. H. Symonds, Miss E. M. Parker, and Miss C. Scandlin.

G. STANLEY HALL.

MODERN COMEDY.

TO assert that modern English comedy owes more to Molière than it does to Shakspere is likely to give a shock of surprise to the general reader. The current accounts of the course of English dramatic literature have nowhere set forth this fact fully: the ordinary critic of the English drama either ignores it or is ignorant of it; yet it is a fact, and not a paradox.

The influence of Shakspere on modern English comedy, on the comic plays acted in England during the past two centuries, is indisputable, of course, but it is less in quantity and less in quality than the influence of Molière. It would be an easy task to go through the list of the successful English comedies acted since the death of Shakspere and to pick out the plays, like Tobin's "Honeymoon" and Knowles's "Hunchback," written consciously in the imitation—however remote—of the Shaksperian manner. It would not be easy to name half of the English comedies whose form and substance had been unconsciously moulded by the example of Molière. The explanation of the seeming paradox that the comic dramatists of England have been more beholden to the greatest dramatist of France than to the greatest dramatist of England is not far to seek. Indeed, it lies in a nutshell. Modern English comedy is not made on the model of Elizabethan comic drama, and it is made—immorality apart—on the model of the Restoration comic drama. Now the comic dramatists of the Restoration—immorality apart—were the children of Molière. Between the Elizabethan dramatists and the dramatists of the Restoration was a great gulf; they did not think alike; they did not feel alike; and the larger manner of the earlier writers was hopelessly impossible to the younger. (Dryden is an exception; and Dryden is in essen-

tials a betarded Elizabethan; at times he ventured to draw from the nude, and some of the naked wildness of mankind got into his work; but he stood alone and lonely among his contemporaries, who had no feeling for the nakedness of things and whose men and women were all clothed and in their right mind.) The vigorous outline and the bold stroke of the Elizabethans were not only impossible but even repugnant to the Restoration writers, corrupted as they had been by the pseudo-classic revival at the French court. They were no longer large-minded enough to take in the greater beauty of mighty Elizabethans. Yet they were men of understanding and taste, and they could appreciate to the full the delicacy and restraint and concentration of the new French comedy, which Molière had marked with his image and superscription. Unfortunately for themselves, when they borrowed the point of view of the great Frenchman they forgot to borrow his sobriety and his self-respect. They were wholly lacking in the skill which enabled him to treat with delicacy and without offence a risky subject—and there are few subjects more risky than that of the "Amphitryon," for example. Where Molière glided gently and with skilful step, his imitators trod clumsily and crushingly; and it is small wonder that they soon found themselves in the mire. They had a keen wit and a lively humor and a fertile invention, aided when it flagged by reminiscences of France; but they had no moral taste, no decency; and their plays have decayed rapidly for want of what would keep them sweet. But as manners and morals improved, these plays of the Restoration writers began to be thrust from the stage into the closets of librarians, until there is not a single comic drama of that period holding the stage to-day. The playgoer of the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century has no chance to see acted any comedy of Etherege, Dryden, Shadwell, Congreve, Farquhar, Wycherley, or Vanbrugh; and he could hardly sit through the performance if he had.

It is true also that no play of the Elizabethan period—save Shakspere's and a single piece by a single one of his contemporaries—keeps the stage. It may be that we should be as much shocked by the brutal violence of the minor Elizabethans as by the brutal indecency of the minor Restoration writers. The fact remains that the playgoer of to-day can never hope to see acted

any play of Marlowe, Ford, Beaumont and Fletcher, Webster Heywood, Ben Jonson, Chapman, or Shirley, altho he may possibly by great good luck get a chance now and again to see Massinger's "New Way to Pay Old Debts." These plays have died hard. There is still alive an American actress who likes to act the "Duchess of Malfy," a tissue of freezing horrors. There were three or four other of the plays originally acted under "Eliza and our James," which Macready tried vainly to warm over when he was at the head of one of the two great theatres of London. There were barely a dozen of them which survived to the end of the last century, and which have therefore got themselves embalmed in Mrs. Inchbald's "British Theatre" and the kindred collections. Among the plays still acted at the beginning of this century are Ben Jonson's "Alchymist" and "Every Man in his Humor," Beaumont and Fletcher's "Rule a Wife and have a Wife" and the "Chances," Shirley's "Edward the Black Prince," and Massinger's "City Madam," in an alteration of which, under the title of "Riches," Kean used to act. To-day Massinger's "New Way to Pay Old Debts" and perhaps six out of Shakspere's twelve comedies are all we have to represent the comic drama of Shakspere and his contemporaries. It is true that now and then a venturesome manager may risk a little money in mounting one of the other comedies of Shakspere, but the experiment never meets with popular approval and the revived play never lives with its own life; it has been only galvanized into existence; and as soon as the unnatural stimulus is withdrawn it falls back into its coffin.

Thus it appears that the Elizabethan dramatists—with the imposing exception of Shakspere—and the dramatists of the Restoration have alike disappeared from the contemporary stage. But while the earlier drama has passed and left no sign, the later has imposed its form on all the dramatic writing which has followed it. Neither the serious nor the comic work of Shakspere and his contemporaries is a potent influence on the drama of to-day. More's the pity, may say the critic; but the fact is a fact, none the less. Some of the tragic writers of the last century, Otway and Southerne and Rowe, for instance, reveal plainly enough their obligation to their great predecesors; but popular as were "Venice Preserved" and "Isabella" and "Jane

Shore" in their day and for many a long day afterward, they are popular now no longer. The sole surviving relics of Elizabethan imitation in plays which keep the stage are in Sheil's "Evadne" and in one or two of the dramas of Sheridan Knowles; and even in these the imitation is little more than skin-deep.

In comedy the case is quite as plain as in tragedy. After we have noted Sheridan Knowles's "Love Chase" and Tobin's "Honeymoon"—which is imitated rather from Garrick's "Katherine and Petruchio" than from Shakspere's own "Taming of the Shrew"—mention has been made of all the comedies now acted which recall even faintly the method and manner of the master. It is indeed a very strange thing that the delightful comedy of Shakspere, the wonderful woodland wit of "As You Like It," and the rich and rollicking humor of "Twelfth Night"—a wit and a humor ever charged with poetry, and as free and as fresh in this nineteenth century as in the sixteenth—has had little or no imitation from any of the long line of comic dramatists who hold their own briskly and brilliantly in the records of English literature. But so it is. The comedy of Shakspere has been almost without influence on the rest of English comedy. To find its true successor we must needs cross the Channel to France and consider carefully the very curious likeness of certain of Musset's comedies, "On ne badine pas avec l'amour" for example, or the "Chandelier," or the "Caprices de Marianne." It is the comparison of a little thing with a great, no doubt; yet is not Mr. James right when he detects in the *quality* of Musset's fancy something that reminds him of Shakspere? Surely if any one is curious to know how things have gone on in that Bohemia which is a desert country by the sea, he can do worse than devote himself to the dramas of Musset, and he will find in them at least a trace of the lyric sweetness which makes us all long to blaze our way through the forest of Arden.

The comedy of Ben Jonson, of which "Every Man in his Humor" is the consummate type, has had as little influence on its present successors as the more ethereal and poetic comedy of Shakspere. The comedy of "humors," of the powerful presentation of comic character and the pushing of characteristics to the very verge of caricature, made a better fight for the right to

exist than any other dramatic form of the time. Even after Etherege with his "Comical Revenge; or, Love in a Tub" had set the example of a simpler and more effective development of character in emulation of the comedy of Molière, even after Etherege had been followed by Dryden and by Congreve, Vanbrugh, Wycherley, and Farquhar, not only did the comedies of Jonson continue to be acted, but later writers—like Shadwell—still imitated his exhibition of "humors." Altho the school died hard, die it did at last,—but for a time only. Perhaps there was in it some element consonant with national characteristics. It was not seen again in English literature until Smollett began to write novels suggested by the French "*Gil Blas*" (itself greatly indebted to the Spanish). Smollett's humor was both broad and elaborate, and it had a certain rough resemblance to Ben Jonson's. It was Smollett in all probability who exerted a baleful influence on George Colman the Younger, whose very comic and very careless plays are filled with characters so sharply outlined as to be almost silhouette caricatures. Smollett's greater rival, Fielding, brought up on Molière, has been followed by Sheridan. In our century, again, the comic formulas of Ben Jonson and Smollett have been expanded by Dickens, whose influence was felt at once on the contemporary stage. Thackeray, on the other hand, traces his descent through Fielding from Molière. The two schools are irreconcilable, and between them is an irrepressible conflict. The comedy of the present day is in some measure a compromise between the opposing schools. The form of the better class of comedy is Molièrenian and all of the higher and important characters are cast in the Molièrenian mould, while the lower characters, the comic servants and scolding women, are likely to have some survival of the "humors" of Ben Jonson and of the kindred caricatural methods of his followers Smollett and Dickens.

The reason why the influence of Molière is more potent on the form of English comedy than the influence of Shakspere is not far to seek. It is that Molière represents a later stage of the development of playmaking. Now playmaking, as M. Taine reminds us, is as susceptible of improvement as watchmaking. In outward structure the plays of the great French dramatists who wrote

under Louis XIV. are more symmetrical and better built than the plays of the great English dramatists who wrote under Elizabeth and James I. Not only is the external form simpler and clearer, but the internal unity is in general more marked. It is hard to say just what is the subject of many Elizabethan dramas; there is never any difficulty in declaring at once the subject of any drama, comic or tragic, by Corneille, Molière, or Racine. The English play is often rough and rugged even when it is not formless and shapeless. The French play is always smooth and sharply outlined and logically complete. The English poet gives us only too often an inchoate and incongruous mass of poetic matter, a rude lump of ore, from which we must disengage the precious metal as best we may. The French poet is not as rich and he is not as free-handed; he fuses his ore and refines his gold and beats it thin and polishes it and fashions it curiously. In looking at the English drama of the Shaksperian epoch, the prevailing impression one gets is an impression of main strength, of rude vigor, of native wildness and profusion. In looking at the French drama of the Molièrean epoch, the prevailing impression is an impression of firm and delicate art. To write in the Elizabethan manner is tolerable only in those who have the lofty stature and giant grasp of the Elizabethans. Ordinary mortals will do better if they avail themselves rather of the safer and more orderly methods of the three dramatists who have given its greatest glory to the reign of Louis XIV. To say this is of course to acknowledge the superiority of the English dramatists in point of vigor and originality over the French. In mere mass of native ability it may fairly be called indisputable that the writers around Shakspere were greater than the writers around Molière. And due exception must also be made of the benumbing effect of a blind obedience to stringent rules deduced from a misunderstanding of the deeds of the Greek tragedians and of the words of the Greek critics. The French, in their high regard for law, bound themselves with the chains of a pseudo-classicism, and in due time the life was choked out of their dramatic literature—to be restored only in this century by the application of the heroic remedies of the Romanticists. But even in France comedy was far more vigorous than tragedy. While there is a long stride from Corneille and Racine to Victor

Hugo, Molière was followed by Regnard, Marivaux, Lesage, and Beaumarchais. In England the imitation of French tragic models was short-lived, while the use of French formula of comedy, expanded to suit English tastes, continues to this day.

The improvement in playmaking, of which M. Taine speaks, coincides with the changes in the physical conditions of the stage. Molière began to write half a century after Shakspere ceased to write; and in that half-century many and marked changes had taken place in the arrangement and constitution of the theatre. Shakspere acted in a theatre bearing a very close resemblance to the court of an inn—from which indeed it was an evolution: his plays were performed on a little stage before a row of boxes and a turbulent throng standing and brawling in the pit, scarcely sheltered from the sun and rain. Molière acted in a theatre, well roofed, water-tight, made over from a tennis-court; and his plays were performed before and between rows of seated courtiers, often in the presence of the courteous king. The stage appliances of Shakspere's time were so few and scanty as to be almost wholly absent; the change of scene, for example, was indicated by the change of a placard hung on the curtain which served as a background. The stage-machinery which Molière could command and of which he made use in the "Fes-in de Pierre" was elaborate and differed but little from that now available. In fact the difference between the theatre as organized in the time of Shakspere and the theatre as organized in the time of Molière is enormous and radical; whereas the difference between the theatre as it was organized in the time of Molière and as it is organized to-day is unessential and trifling. The physical conditions of the stage under Shakspere are altogether other than those of our time, while the physical conditions of the stage under Molière are substantially identical with those of our time. Therefore is it, in great measure, that the only English comedies which have survived fitly are those influenced by the art of Molière and made according to his formula and in accord with the environment of to-day.

That the merely mechanical part of playmaking is susceptible of improvement can scarcely be doubted by any one who takes thought on the matter. We hold a dramatist to far stricter accountability nowadays than did our forefathers.

Shakspere, for example, concerned himself but little with the originality or the exact probability of his incidents; he repeated his tricks and devices with the utmost freedom; his thoughts were elsewhere; and he spent his strength on his men and women and not on the accidents which might happen to them. And altho in Molière's time the art of construction had made many advances, yet Molière himself was careless about his *dénouements*, about the untying of his knots, and he was wont indeed to cut them with a single blow. In our own day the dexterity of Eugène Scribe and of the two Dumas, father and son, has shown that the end is not yet. The improvement, however, is always along the lines laid down by Molière, and does not attach itself to essentials but only to the more ingenious combination and intertwining of incident. To bring this steady amelioration of the methods of the dramatist sharply before the reader, it is necessary only to compare two plays performed in the city of New York during the past season. One was the well-known "Honeymoon" of John Tobin, originally acted in 1805; the other was "Young Mrs. Winthrop," the latest work of Mr. Bronson Howard, the foremost of living American comic dramatists. Consider for a moment the directness and simplicity of Mr. Howard's play and contrast its straightforwardness with the bunch of broken threads which are tangled to form the story of Tobin's comedy. There is no need to compare the actual and essential literary value of the two plays. Tobin is as clever in dialogue as Mr. Howard, he has perhaps quite as much insight into human nature and perhaps a little more power to depict character, and he has the gift of poetry, which is denied the American dramatist; but it is plain that he did not know his trade as Mr. Howard does know it.

There are those, confirmed praisers of past times, who will protest, no doubt, against any comparison of an accepted classic of English comedy like the "Honeymoon" with a brand-new play of to-day like "Young Mrs. Winthrop." There are those who do not acknowledge that anything now to be seen on the stage is worthy of serious consideration. There are those who believe that the comedy of this century is wholly inferior to the comedy of the last century, and who would refer you to the so-called "Old Comedies" for proof that the stage of our time

cannot for a moment compare with the stage of times gone by. There are those who believe the drama to be in a dreadful decline. There are those, finally, answering fully to Douglas Jerrold's definition of a Conservative as "a man who will not look at the new moon out of respect for that ancient institution, the old one."

This allegation of the decline of the drama, often to be seen in print and heard in talk, is an instance of the willingness of people to grasp a glittering generality to save the trouble of thought. The word "drama" is very comprehensive, and before we can discuss the question as to whether the drama has declined or not we must first define what we mean by the "drama." Plainly it is not the theatre in general which is intended in this use of the word, for nothing is more notorious than the fact that the theatre has made enormous progress in all that pertains to its physical conditions, in architectural splendor, in decorative variety, in the accommodation of an audience, in the beauty of scenery, in the richness and accuracy of costume, in all the thousand and one details which serve to set off and heighten the effect of a theatrical performance; on the contrary, it is this very lavish elaboration of detail which the melancholy critic uses as a proof of decadence. It is almost equally plain that those who refer to the "decline of the drama" do not mean to declare a falling off in the histrionic art, for there never was a time when the art of acting flourished more freely and abundantly than it does now; there never was a time when there were more good actors than there are now; there never was a time, indeed, when the average of acting was higher than it is now—in so far as it is possible to reconstitute from the records of the past some image of a thing as evanescent as acting, for comparison with the present. It may be that there are not as good companies of actors now as there were half a century ago, when Covent Garden, Drury Lane, and the Haymarket, in London, had the pick of the English profession, and the Park Theatre in New York and the Chestnut Street Theatre in Philadelphia had companies only little inferior to those engaged at the three great London houses. Circumstances nowadays have unfortunately made it more profitable for a popular actor to make a stroller of himself than for him to unite with his fellows in

forming a strong company. Surely, however, no inhabitant of a city like New York, in which within a year occasion has been given to observe the *Daughter of Roland* of Miss Mary Anderson, the *Cassius* of Mr. Lawrence Barrett, the *Brutus* of Mr. John McCullough (in Payne's play, not Shakspere's), the *Bardwell Slote* of Mr. William J. Florence, the *Colonel Sellers* of Mr. John T. Raymond, the *Rip Van Winkle* and *Bob Acres* of Mr. Joseph Jefferson, the *John Rantzau* of Mr. J. H. Stoddart, the *Mark Antony* of Herr Ludwig Barnay, and the *Othello* and *Lear* of Signor Tomaso Salvini,—no man, woman, or child who has been granted the power to see these remarkable performances within the six months of a single season has any right to declare a decadence of the art of acting.

The fact is that the phrase "the decline of the drama" can fairly be held to apply only to a decline in the drama itself, in the play acted, in the written and spoken word. Used thus, the phrase becomes distinct, and it has some meaning and some truth. Certain kinds of drama, certain departments of dramatic literature, have not only declined, they have practically disappeared. First and foremost is the tragedy. No tragic play of the last forty years has yet proved its right to exist and to survive. The taste for tragedy in the public has died away as either the cause or the consequence of the dirth of tragic writers. After all, as the Frenchman said, it is so easy *not* to write tragedies in five acts. And the modern romantic and pictorial drama, the bastard offspring of tragedy on one side and of the rude and rough melodrama on the other, has strangled its parents and rules in their stead. The transformation marks a complete change in public taste far more than it marks a decadence in dramatic literature.

The subject of the present pages is comedy; and those who venture on the cuckoo-cry that the drama is in a decline are prone to cite the so-called "Old Comedies" against any admirer of more modern comic work. Now what are the "Old Comedies"? And which are the "Old Comedies"? They are a score or so of comic plays written by various English dramatists at intervals during the hundred and fifty years intervening between 1700 and 1850, and distinguished from among

the thousands of other comic dramas written during that century and a half by the fact that they have had vitality enough to keep the stage. In all departments of literature there is a struggle for existence, and the acknowledged classics are the results of the survival of the fittest. It is by the same process of natural selection that twenty or thirty "Old Comedies" have been picked out of the thousand or two which were acted contemporaneously with them. It is with these picked and proved troops that the new English or American comedy is measured; and it is from a hasty comparison of the best of the past with the average of the present that the decline of the drama is declared. The unfairness of the proceeding needs no comment. When beneficent Time has thrashed out the dramatic literature of our day it will be possible to winnow comic plays written by men now living, which in due season will take their place among the "Old Comedies," and which will then hold their own against all but the very best of their companions. And as the best of the comedies of our day are not unequal to the best of the comedies of the past century and a half, so the worst of the plays of our day are not worse than the worst of the plays of the past. The ordinary playgoer speaks of the plays of the past with respect because he is ignorant about them and takes the unknown for the magnificent. The ordinary reader lacks courage to attack the immense mass of the plays of the past. There was in the library of the Reverend Mr. Arthur Dimmesdale a ponderous tome which the historian of the erring clergyman's struggles deems to have been "a work of vast ability in the somniferous school of literature." There is in the library of every dramatic collector a series of collections of little volumes containing some few chosen samples of the plays of the past; and the contents of these little volumes are of a certainty closely akin to the contents of the ponderous tome, in that they all have a powerful soporific virtue. And these little volumes contain less than one in twenty of the plays actually acted: they contain only the more readable specimens.

Nearly ten years ago Mr. W. S. Gilbert made an examination of the voluminous "Account of the English Stage from 1660 to 1830," written by the Reverend Mr. Geneste and con-

tained in ten solid volumes. He found that between 1700 and 1830 nearly four thousand dramatic works of one kind or another were produced in England; and he declared that of these four thousand plays of all kinds produced in the course of one hundred and thirty years, "three thousand nine hundred and fifty are absolutely unknown, except by name, to any but professed students of English dramatic literature. Of the remaining fifty, only thirty-five are ever presented on the English boards at the present day; of these thirty-five, only seventeen are works of acknowledged literary merit; and of these seventeen, only eleven can claim to rank as standard works." That is to say, that during the hundred and thirty years when the drama in England, if not at its best, was at least the centre of literary interest and more important and more profitable than any other department of literature, only once in about ten years, on an average, was a play produced which by some union of popular attributes with literary quality has managed to survive to the present day. Only one play in ten years! Since 1830 have we not seen produced on the stage plays worthy to survive the century and likely to accomplish that difficult task more often than once in ten years?

We give ear to the picked plays of the past, and we give no thought to their innumerable companions "all silent and all damned." We see the comedies carefully culled by time, and we do not see their unlovely companions all faded and gone. We look abroad on the theatre of our own time, and the weeds have sprung up with the flowers, and they are far more numerous than the flowers, and they hide the flowers from us; and many are wont to deny that there are any flowers at all. But the managers of the theatres in the year 1983 will probably find little difficulty in picking out of the ten thousand plays produced in England and America between 1800 and 1900 at least ten equal in quality to the average of those which now survive from among the plays written between 1700 and 1800.

It is not a hard task to make out a list of the so-called "Old Comedies," and the examination is not without interest. Mr. Gilbert did not go further back than 1700; and as has already been said in the present paper, there is only one play older than 1700 which still holds the stage—except Shakspere's. This

one play is the “New Way to Pay Old Debts” of Massinger, acted at the Phoenix in Drury Lane and published in 1633. For seventy years after 1633 no English comedy was acted which keeps the boards nowadays. After 1703 they come a little more closely together; and it is perhaps best to draw up a chronological list of them, giving the name of the author and the title of the comedy.

- 1703—Colley Cibber’s “She Would and She Would Not.”
- 1709—Mrs. Centlivre’s “Busybody.”
- 1717—Mrs. Centlivre’s “Wonder! a Woman Keeps a Secret.”
- 1759—[Garrick’s?] “High Life below Stairs.”
- 1761—Colman’s “Jealous Wife.”
- 1762—Foote’s “Liar.”
- 1766—Garrick and Colman’s “Clandestine Marriage.”
- 1773—Goldsmith’s “She Stoops to Conquer.”
- 1775—Sheridan’s “Rivals.”
- 1777—Sheridan’s “School for Scandal.”
- 1779—Sheridan’s “Critic; or, a Tragedy Rehearsed.”
- 1780—Mrs. Cowley’s “Belle’s Stratagem.”
- 1792—Holcroft’s “Road to Ruin.”
- 1794—O’Keefe’s “Wild Oats.”
- 1797—Colman the Younger’s “Heir-at-Law.”
- 1801—Colman the Younger’s “Poor Gentleman.”
- 1805—Colman the Younger’s “John Bull.”
- 1805—Tobin’s “Honeymoon.”

From 1805 to 1830 no comedy was produced of sufficient vitality to have come down to us. But between 1830 and 1860 several plays were produced which by common consent are included among the “Old Comedies.” These are:

- 1832—Knowles’s “Hunchback.”
- 1837—Knowles’s “Love Chase.”
- 1840—Bulwer’s “Money.”
- 1841—Boucicault’s “London Assurance.”
- 1844—Boucicault’s “Old Heads and Young Hearts.”
- 1852—Reade and Taylor’s “Masks and Faces.”
- 1855—Taylor’s “Still Waters Run Deep.”

Here, then, we have twenty-five plays written and acted between 1705 and 1855, a space of a century and a half. These are the “Old Comedies,” and they are the survivors out of at least five thousand dramatic pieces of one kind or another. Of

course this list of "Old Comedies" is not absolutely identical with that which would be drawn up by any other student of the stage. As a matter of fact, probably no two persons would agree on exactly the same twenty-five "Old Comedies;" nor would another writer inevitably limit the number to precisely the quarter of a hundred. Due allowance must be made for the personal equation. As yet the canon of the "Old Comedies" has not been closed and declared by any council. The present list, however, is my doxy, and I do not believe that your doxy would differ greatly from it. Any list would probably contain at least twenty of these twenty-five. And as no list can be promulgated by authority, the one given above may serve as well as another.

One of the first remarks one feels called on to make, after considering this list of "Old Comedies," is that there has been no decline and falling off in the comic drama as here represented, and that—excepting always the plays of Goldsmith and Sheridan, two exceptional dramatists—the comedies written in this century are quite equal in literary value and theatrical effect to the comedies written in the last century. Without going again into this quarrel of the ancients and moderns, it may be said safely that the five latest plays on this list are not inferior to the five earliest. Lord Lytton's "Money," Mr. Boucicault's "London Assurance" and "Old Heads and Young Hearts," Messrs. Reade and Taylor's "Masks and Faces," and Mr. Taylor's "Still Waters Run Deep," taken together are quite as interesting a quintet as Colley Cibber's "She Would and She Would Not," Mrs. Cowley's "Busybody" and "Wonder" (Townley's or Garrick's) "High Life below Stairs," and Colman's "Jealous Wife." Artificial as are "London Assurance" and "Old Heads and Young Hearts," they are not more artificial than "She Would and She Would Not" or the "Busybody," and they are quite as lively and as bustling and as full of the rattle and snap of epigram and equivoke. In Cibber, indeed, the characters are wholly external and the superficial movement does not completely mask the essential emptiness; while in *Jesse Rural* Mr. Boucicault has drawn with many caressing and tender touches a type of simple and gentle goodness not unworthy of Goldsmith, by whom, no doubt, it was suggested.

And the "Jealous Wife," fine and strong as it is, can hardly be held more direct or vigorous than "Still Waters Run Deep," —altho here the superiority of style lies with the elder writer. It cannot be denied that there has been of late years a falling off in the drama of poetic ideals and resolute elevation, from which the popular taste seems in some way to have turned; but it may be denied most emphatically that there has been any falling off in comedy itself.

The real cause of much of the talk about the decline of the drama is to be sought in the changed position of dramatic literature as compared with the other departments of literature. In Shakspere's time the drama was the vent for the irrepressible outbursts of the national awakening. Under the Restoration, under Queen Anne, and down to the beginning of this century, the stage was to the aspiring writer the shortest way to fame and to a fair share of fortune: the drama was the form of literature most in view and held in highest respect. It might almost be said that it was the drama first and the rest nowhere. But with the brilliant successes of Scott and Byron as poets, and with invention of the modern novel by Scott, all this changed. It was as easy for the young writer to attempt a long poem or a novel as to compose a tragedy or a comedy; and the drama, from being the only form of literary endeavor in fashion, took a second or a third place and soon ceased altogether to be fashionable. And this sudden success of rival forms of literary art was coincident with a sudden increase in the number of theatres and a consequent multiplying of the number of plays produced. The average of merit in a stage-play fell at once. The mere mass of contemporary pieces kept the contemporary critic from seeing that the best of them were in no way inferior to the best of the past. And the contemporary critic knew that there was no man writing for the stage the intellectual equal of Scott or Byron, and he preferred to give his best attention to the literary work least worth attention. A glance at the table of dates in the list of "Old Comedies" given above will show that between the "Honeymoon" in 1805 and the "Hunchback" in 1832 no comedy was acted of sufficient force to have survived. This interregnum corresponds roughly with the reign of the Wizard of the North, the unknown author of "Waverley," who, by

some mystic spell, held the hearts of all readers for a quarter of a century. It is this time which marks the deposition of the drama from the first place in the favor of the literary class to a third or fourth place.

Another remark called forth by a consideration of this list of "Old Comedies" is that altho English comedy is very lively, far livelier than French, for example, fuller of bustle and gayety and far nearer to farce, it is not lacking in a substantial morality. Probably no one of these twenty-five "Old Comedies" was written with conscious moral purpose and to declare the viciousness of vice and the virtuousness of virtue; and no one of them obtrudes any other moral than the ever-admirable moral of a healthy life and of the duty of gayety and innocent mirth. Assuredly none of these comedies is fit to serve as a subject of Sunday meditation. It was Goethe in his old age who said, "It is strange that with all I have done, there is not one of my poems that would suit the Lutheran hymn-book." With the exception of Mr. Boucicault's two plays, which were the work of an old heart and a young head, and which are hard in tone and therefore not altogether wholesome, there is no one of these plays which any girl might fear taking her mother to see. There is no one of them which leaves a bad taste in the mouth. There is no one of them which will give you a troubled conscience at night or a troubled head in the morning. There is no one of them which will not give a hearty laugh and a few hours of pleasant amusement.

To ask more than this is to ask too much. "Veluti in speculo" and "Castigat ridendo mores" are good enough mottoes for a drop-curtain, but they are not to be taken seriously as part of the code of criticism. We look in the mirror—and we see our neighbor's failings and our neighbor's faults. The comic writer laughingly castigates manners—and we laughingly see the lash fall on our neighbor's back. "There are now quite as many Celimènes, Alcestes, Arnolphes, and Tartuffes as there were in Molière's time," says the younger Dumas, one of the masters of modern comedy; "we each of us recognize them, but they do not recognize themselves." In other words, comedy corrects no one; and, of a truth, correction is not the true mission of comedy. Conceding that Shakspere's "Taming of

the Shrew" never cured a virago or Molière's "Avare" a miser, so much the worse for the virago and the miser; it is enough for comedy that it confirms the healthy in their health. So Lessing, the foremost of German moralists, tells us; and he adds that Molière's "Avare" is instructive to the extravagant man, and Regnard's "Joueur" to the man who never gambles: "the follies they themselves have not, others may have with whom they have to live." Perhaps no better words can be found with which to close this paper than those of Lessing on this very subject: "Comedy is to do us good through laughter, but not through derision; not just to counteract those faults at which it laughs, nor simply and solely in those persons who possess these laughable faults. Its true general use consists in laughter itself; in the practice of our powers to discern the ridiculous, to discern it easily and quickly under all cloaks of passion and fashion; in all admixture of good and bad qualities, even in the wrinkles of solemn earnestness. . . . A preservative is a valuable medicine, and all morality has none more powerful and effective than the ridiculous."

J. BRANDER MATTHEWS.

GRAMMAR AND AESTHETICS.

MINUTE specialization is one of the prominent features of modern science. It is not peculiar to modern culture. Subdivision of the professions is as old as the pyramids. In the Athens of the best times there were those who made their living by the manufacture of hair-nets. An epigram of Martial informs us that there were surgeons in Rome who limited their practice to the effacement of the scars that disfigured the persons of branded slaves. But the narrowness of a handicraft is different from the narrowness of an intellectual pursuit, or rather an intellectual pursuit is reduced by this narrowness to a handicraft; and in this second half of the nineteenth century the joyous and adventurous swing of the human mind through the range of knowledge and science which marked the first half has been quieted down to a sober pace, not to say a treadmill gait. The line along which the earlier investigators flamed is now traversed by the solitary track-walker, who turns his lantern on every inch of the ground, and travel is often interdicted on account of the insecurity of the road. So much the better for those who are to come after us, but meanwhile life is lonely for the explorer. For times come to every such man when he feels an imperious necessity of justifying himself to them that are without, of seeking a larger audience than the narrow circle of his disciples and associates. True, the utter failure to come to an understanding with the rest of the world often sends the student back to his special work with a determination never again to tempt any communication with his fellows except on the most ordinary topics of social converse, and to lead his intellectual life alone. The old jarring contrast between the man of practice and the man of theory makes itself felt in every fibre of

a nature that, by its daily and hourly occupation, is made sensitive to the slight vibrations that are unheeded by the so-called men of the world, the men of affairs. One of the most famous pictures of this contrast has been drawn by Plato in his "Theætetus." Thales is the type of the philosopher, the thinker, who falls into a well while star-gazing, and is laughed at by his merry Thracian maid-servant for not seeing that which is before his feet. Your antique scholar, like your modern, goes mooning about the city. He does not know the way to 'Change; he cannot tell you where the court-house is or the city hall. He is a stranger to clubs and parties and dinners and banquets. He is profoundly ignorant of family history and family gossip. He is such a university man as the London *Times* described a few years since: "at sea he is a landlubber, in the country a cockney, in town a greenhorn, in business a simpleton, in pleasure a milksop." We all know the man, altho in the movement of modern life the type is becoming less common even in Germany, once the *habitat* of intellectual oddities and unpractical dreamers. The empire may possibly be responsible for the change, but certain it is that such a figure as Freytag's Professor Raschke, in the "Lost Manuscript," will soon be as extinct as the dodo.

Still, while the external differences are more and more effaced, and the professor is not singled out by his manners and his conversation, the inner dissidence will remain, and may perhaps increase with the advance of specialization. The professor, the student may become more like the rest of the world, but the heart of his life will be more remote from the bulk of mankind than was the case with the ancient scholar, whose range of sympathies was necessarily wide. Then to come back to Plato's philosopher, his ideal sage is utterly indifferent to the praise or blame of the world. In the modern specialist we often find a sensitiveness which is bred by the special studies themselves. Every one cannot attain to the philosophic calm which is, in the last analysis, philosophic selfishness, and which makes us resentful when we think of Plato and of Goethe. With Shakespeare we do not quarrel any more than we do with the nature of things. And so it is hard for one who is always seeking to find or to frame the key to the beautiful when the conviction is borne in

upon him that the more successful he is in his quest, the more certain he is to be set down among the mere locksmiths who are not suffered to enjoy the treasures which their patience and ingenuity have disclosed. The fewest have the divine faculty of imagination which is necessary to intellectual sympathy. A vivid representation of the conditions of another's life is possible only for chosen souls. Hence much blundering in all manner of missionary effort. The specialist at once loses himself in technicalities which the outsider cannot follow. To popularize without vulgarizing is one of the most difficult of arts. Nor is the specialist in his turn much comforted by those who, recognizing in him the specialist, patronize him by a real or simulated interest in his line of work. The Grecian does not like to be told that his interlocutor used to be fond of Greek when he was at college and still keeps it up after a fashion. This is in its way almost as bad as the threadbare, and, because threadbare, uniformly successful, jest about Greek roots. And so, between the condescension of those who wish to make some acknowledgment of the value of the special work and the rudeness of those who repeat the trite jokes of the outside world, the scholar, the student, the investigator withdraws into himself, himself disheartened despite philosophy, and the world possibly the poorer.

Now of all the special lines of work, among the most arid to the average mind is that of grammar. By grammar is not meant the "science of language," so called. The success of various popular exhibitions of this department shows that it is possible to interest a very wide circle in the curious facts and glittering theories that lie on the track and encompass the circuit of these studies. What I mean is grammar proper, that very grammar, carried to a higher power, which is the detestation of most youthful minds. No study more fascinating to those who are addicted to it; none more repulsive to the natural man. The average child hates parsing worse than he does arithmetic. Of course the attitude of the modern mind towards grammar is different from that of the ancient nations, for grammar is an inheritance with us, to them it was a slow growth; it has passed into our mental processes, to them it was a process apart. Still scientific grammar in its strictest sense is a horror even to a large class of people of cultivation. The average literary man cor-

dially dislikes the grammarian—or heartily despises him ; and as grammar becomes more and more detailed, as phonetics develop more and more, and syntax assumes more and more the alluring shape of a census-table, there is increasing danger lest philology shrivel up into mere statistic, and æsthetic be relegated to the mere *dilettanti*.

Phonology has grown into a science which threatens to overshadow the rest of philology. There is no possibility of withholding from the school of the “junggrammatiker” the tribute of admiration for the thoroughness of their method, which brings phonetic phenomena under rules of sharp physical consistency ; but one wishes a second life for this new line of work, as Lobeck did when he declined to go into Sanskrit. The theory of formation, instead of being simplified by the advance of science, has become greatly complicated, and the frank objective way in which facts are put remind one very much of the early machinery of grammar. The ancient grammarians divided the Greek declensions into “parisyllabic” and “imparisyllabic”—one of those inorganic arrangements that contain a germ of organic truth. Needless to say such a division was practically of no moment. The cases went their own sweet way, and well-meaning attempts to reduce the inflexions to order resulted in a formidable list of declensions. The reduction of the Greek declensions to three, and ultimately to two, was considered a great advance in the early decades of this century. Now that has proved to be a failure as far as simplification goes, and advanced grammar follows mechanically the endings of the stems. So we oscillate from diversity to unity, from unity to diversity again. Syntax has divorced itself from logic. All the grand generalizations in which the first scientific grammarians indulged have been abandoned. It is no disgrace to decline giving a definition of case or tense or mood. It is only a wise reserve. Your modern grammarian is statistic-mad. It is useless to tell him that statistic is nothing unless it embody some idea. The plan is to get all the empty shells ready in case a soul should be found to occupy them. Arrange your facts in some orderly manner, no matter how mechanical, and the seeing eye will discern vital principles. To an outsider this study—some might hesitate to call it a study—seems incredibly dull;

work that ought to be assigned to a *servus litterarius*, even if he were as brainless as Caravella, the author of the "Index Aristophanicus," that marvel of patience and stupidity. Cruden, the author of the Concordance, was another semi-idiot. And yet questions of a higher nature are constantly rising in the midst of such work, questions that cannot be delegated to inexperienced and thoughtless compilers; and there comes to the writer the grim consolation that whatever befalls the theory, the facts will stand. Veitch's "Greek Verbs, Irregular and Defective," will always be of more real value than most of Gottfried Hermann's grammatical theories; and there is much more in Veitch than a mere collector. But at times even the most determined statistician grows weary. He repeats to himself the warning that he must not theorize before he gets all the facts together. The hod may be a model hod, and the bricks without flaw; still the question will come up, Are we never to use mortar, even if it be untempered mortar?

Such is the present condition of grammar. It shows a strong tendency to assume the mathematical formula. Outsiders ask, What is the use of this array of figures? The answer is mainly negative, at least in the present stage of inquiry, and insiders themselves show here and there impatience. Grammar is becoming a dry and thirsty land, and the grammatical Achsah may well say, "Thou hast given me a south land; give me also springs of water."

Meanwhile æsthetic criticism is going its own way, a "primrose path of dalliance" with fine substantives, superfine adjectives—a path which is apt to lose itself in mere finical fault-finding or sympathetic phrase-mongery. The critics of our day are not the failures that Lord Beaconsfield's apophthegm would make them out to be. Like many other strictures of that cynical statesman, this does not apply to the present time; it is purely retrospective. Our foremost critics are our foremost producers, and the man whom many would consider the first critic of our time is acknowledged to be one of the best writers of our time. No man's style is more envied than Matthew Arnold's, and that by those whose envy is a compliment. Still there is a widespread distrust as to the ultimate value of all the æsthetic criticism of the day, sympathetic or other. The antique

critic, as we shall see, went into tangible details. He left a margin for unreasoned perception, for direct intuition, but his grounds are for the most part susceptible of test. Even the robust critic of the Johnsonese school is comprehensible, is refutable, if need be. Not so the supersubtle genius of the present day. He poses a line of poetry and then poses himself before the line, and if you do not see all poetry in that line, or do not hear all poetry in that line, you are blind and deaf. So Mr. Arnold in his introductory essay to Ward's "English Poets" gives a series of test verses for the appreciation of higher poetry. His Dante line is

"In la sua volontade è nostra pace."

His Chaucer line is

"O martyr souded in virginitee."

He strikes these chords very deftly; he repeats these verses as a supernal melody. Who knows what mood is associated in his poetic brain with that melody? The overtone is perhaps what he hears. If any ordinary mortal like the present writer should set up another verse, say

"La creatura ch' ebbe il bel sembiante,"

Mr. Arnold and Mr. Arnold's admirers might see, might hear nothing special in that; and yet perhaps something could be said for a verse which concentrates all the doom of Lucifer, as for

"In la sua volontade è nostra pace,"

and many a Chaucerian scholar may have his favorite instead of

"O martyr souded in virginitee."

But any one who attempts to mediate between two extremes is in danger of being torn to pieces by the wild horses that he is attempting to yoke together; more furious and unbecoming controversy than has of late raged between poets and philologists would be hard to find in the unpleasant annals of the quarrels of authors; one would not like to have his patronymic travestied, or to be shown up as a dullard and pedant;¹ and yet

¹ Swinburne's name has been turned by one of his opponents into Pigsbrook; and the poet in one of his mildest passages speaks with characteristic alliteration of "the blackguard's loaded bludgeon of personalities," "the dastard's sheathed dagger of disguise."

with the full consciousness of the risk, he who is a lover of grammatical as well as of literary study can hardly refrain from making at least some effort to show how stronger hands than his may yet succeed in the work of reconciliation. There are men, and those not a few, who have at once the liveliest delight in the observation of grammatical phenomena and the keenest appreciation of literary beauties. Do these faculties work side by side without any correlation? It was said of Faraday that he had two lives which he kept apart; that he shut his laboratory when he went into his oratory. Is a similar statement true of the scholar? Is his enjoyment of the literary side of his work entirely independent of the scientific side? Are contemplation and analysis completely divorced? Every one who has attempted the close grammatical study of a supreme work of art knows how hard it is to keep steadily at the task when the passion of the piece grows strong. The notebook ought to drop from the hand when Odysseus stands forth revealed. Then, like the hero, the reader strips off the rags of grammar and goes into the fight.¹ But for all that the notebook should be picked up again, and the patient assemblage of facts resumed. In art nothing is small; and how fully this was appreciated in antiquity is shown by the study of the literary judgments of the great critics of antiquity. Antique criticism took into account much that we relegate to the grammar, even now that grammar is becoming more and more unästhetic. Shall we not avail ourselves of the more exact methods of these days to secure a more objective standard of criticism? The attempt, as has been said, is dangerous in the extreme. The moral inferences, so to speak, which have been drawn from grammatical peculiarities in languages, dialects, periods, departments, individuals, are partly shadowy, partly hazardous, and yet not only is the problem fascinating in itself, but after all it is a fair problem. It may never receive a complete answer. This in the nature of things is impossible. The elements are too varied, too subtle. But it is susceptible of an approximate answer, and in time the outline of a system will be fixed. Between the salient points there will be room enough for the play of æsthetic fancy,

¹ αὐτάρ ὁ γνωριώθη ῥακέων πολύμητις Ὁδυσσεύς.

and fine writers can add arabesque to arabesque, but the structure itself will be essentially fixed.

If a better, a more objective æsthetic should be the outcome of grammatical study, this would only be a completion of the cycle. For grammar began with æsthetic. This can be shown historically, altho it is not necessary to go back to written records. If we wish to reproduce the past, it is only necessary to go down to a lower stratum, and the attitude of the uncultured mind toward language would give ample confirmation of this position. The artistic sense survives in the people to whom language ultimately belongs, and not to the makers of books. Doubtless the artificial language finds its way among the people. What is artificial, nay, what is individual in one generation becomes popular, becomes national in another. Yet it must be remembered that in the main, nay, in almost every fibre, the people owns the language, not king or queen, and in any natural scheme of grammar the unsophisticated classes are to be consulted. This widens the sphere of observation from the imperfect registry of manuscripts and the seclusion of the study to the living utterance and the open air of popular life. In this larger field we learn the immense importance of phonetics. What we analyze with so much care, the body of sound, is to the people as pronunciation, the main thing. Every one who has lived in foreign parts has had mortifying experience to record on this score. If one's intercourse is limited to the cultured classes, to those who have much to do with strangers, there is no great difficulty about making one's wants known. But with the masses the pronunciation is the great thing. Inflection may be twisted and syntax rent in sunder so long as the color of the sound is preserved. The lack of a familiar gasp or a special click, the failure to reproduce the intonation of a sentence, will make the foreigner unintelligible to the masses. Departure from the standard is visited with mockery. It is considered unbeautiful, it is the violation of a norm. Not that the people is unobservant of other defects, but of none is it more keenly observant than of this. The study of dialect is destined to lead to important results in this direction, but there are fields that lie untilled about us. If philologists lived more in the world, they might make valuable additions to the study of lan-

guage by noting the criticisms of the masses, and by finding out the sensitive points of the popular tongue. Perhaps there is less opportunity in this country for such observation, because language has been more levelled here than elsewhere, and the process is still going on; and yet there is opportunity enough. The advance of phonetics will enable us to register pronunciation more exactly, and we shall not be satisfied with such rude representations of sound as we find in the current spelling of Yankee, Southern, Western, or negro dialect. To him who has ears to hear and mind to reason there is a vast field open in the domain of every-day speech. Omnibus, street-car, railway, not a journey that takes us out into a new stream of collinguals but may furnish new specimens for our exhibit. The student of linguistic may go on an expedition for such a purpose with as clear a conscience as a mineralogist or a botanist.

It has just been said that the phonetic or, if you choose, the orthoepic side is that which strikes the popular mind most, and it might be worth while to examine early and unsophisticated representations of barbarous speech with a view to ascertaining the truth of this position. By "sophisticated" is meant grammatical. One who has learned his own language under the pressure of grammar is not a fair judge, and our material must be sought in pre-grammatical or extra-grammatical spheres. So, for instance, Aristophanes' representations of barbarous Greek have a philological, a grammatical interest. True, in his *Acharnians* the mock-Persian speaks a mock-Persian that bears as much relation to the true Persian as some of our mock-German-English ballads bear to real German-English. No German makes some of the mistakes that are attributed to all Germans. So this coarse work is fitly assigned to a coarse impostor in the *dramatis personæ*. But when Aristophanes himself represents the lingo of the Scythian archer in the *Thesmophoriazusæ*, the work is much finer, and, so far as we can judge, quite on a level with any modern reproduction of the speech of foreigners, aided, as our reproduction is, in a measure, by the familiar categories of grammar. And it must be remembered that there was no such thing as grammar proper in the time of Aristophanes. He himself made merry over the categories, now most familiar to us, that were suggested by the thinkers of the time. False genders,

false cases, to the ear of Aristophanes must have been little more than mistakes in pronunciation. Viewed in this light, Aristophanes' representation of dialectic or barbarian Greek gains a new interest. The wonderful reproduction of musculature in Greek statues has led some to suppose that Greek anatomical studies were further advanced in the time, say, of Pheidias than tradition would have led us to suppose. The Greek divined the muscle under the skin. So Aristophanes, in his representation of the Greek of the Scythian archer or policeman of Athens, goes through every grammatical category, as if he were a trained observer. The barbarian drops his final consonants, simplifies his diphthongs, puts *tenues* for *aspiratae*, evaporates his *h*'s, substitutes dative for accusative, and gets his genders wofully mixed. And with more art than many modern imitators of foreign speech, Aristophanes preserves here and there a group of correct Greek. Now all the grammar known to the most cultivated Athenians of that time pertained to the phonetic side of the language, and Aristophanes felt the barbarian blunders in syntax not otherwise than he represents Socrates to have felt the uncultured pronunciation of Pheidippides when he is brought to him for training. The differentiation belongs to a later period.

But the attitude of the ungrammatical mind toward grammar is too difficult a study to be attacked in passing, and it will be more profitable to show by some statements and illustrations the antique connection between grammar and æsthetic, and to give some hints as to a scientific restoration of their joint action.

The great difficulty, as has already been hinted, consists in drawing the line between grammar and rhetoric. The *syntaxis ornata* of the older grammars is pure rhetoric. Grammar as a regulative art, and as such it was considered until of late years, really takes up one side of rhetoric—correctness; and if there is any overlapping in the following exhibit, let it be forgiven.

Grammar rises after the decline of literature. It is originally retrospective, except when it has been passed on from nationality to nationality as the grammar of the Romans from the Greek, and modern grammar from Latin. It is always associated in its origin with interpretations either of an earlier monument of literature or of foreign speech, including dialectic

variation. Grammatical study arises from the necessity of expounding to later generations some great work that has made its language the norm for the period or for the department. The language of every-day life resists the analysis longest. It is astonishing to see how many centuries of thought and controversy were needed to settle the categories that every school-child knows after a fashion. The nomenclature of our grammar shows a long process of philosophical fermentation. Some of it, indeed, was not settled until a period long subsequent to the death of the antique world, and the consciously grammatical speech of the cultivated, which is in fact the great *gnomon* of cultivation everywhere, is a strange result of tradition and study.

There may have been, let us grant that there must have been, a time when every element in such a language as the Greek had its felt force; but there is no written record of that period, and ages before our first *data* the sharp lines had been rounded and the simple functions complicated. To maintain, as has been done, that every people thinks something not only at every utterance, but at every element of that utterance, is going too far—certainly too far for the resonance or “ding-dong” theory of language. Out of conscious composition, according to the dominant view, we pass into a feeling of total effect and general relation. At any rate, this is the condition in which we find language before the grammatical period, and the dawning of what we should call grammar lights up first the æsthetic side. The music to which the language is set, in other words the accent, attracted the attention of the Greek before anything else. “Acute” and “grave” were old in the time of Plato, and it is significant that the first element which the artistic Greek noted was the last to receive scientific treatment at the hands of modern grammarians. Modern grammarians were content to repeat the pretty saying of the ancients that “accent is the life-breath of the word,” and were very far from recognizing its far-reaching influence. To the same artistic side belongs the recognition of the power of the different letters—letters—for the ancients did not emancipate themselves from the external symbols, and even modern philologists have not all succeeded in keeping symbol and power apart. Every cultivated Greek, as early as the end of the fifth century B.C., knew the divisions

which are still popularly made in the "letters," and Plato draws his illustrations freely from this sphere as something familiar to all the personages of his dialogues.

But if we look further, we shall find in the heyday of Attic literature no genuine grammatical development. "Noun" and "verb" were used, it is true, but not in their strict grammatical sense. The moods were appreciated but not defined; the first crude attempt was purely rhetorical. Cases were unknown: if the Scythian archer used dative for accusative, the Greek of that time could only feel that he was wrong. Plato makes sharp distinctions between the tenses—distinctions which modern grammarians, at least until of late years, did not take in; he draws a fine line in the "Euthyphron"¹ between the participle as participle and the participle as predicative adjective; but subtle as Plato was, he could not have formulated his propositions grammatically. But it is not necessary to sketch the development of technical grammar, to point out what Aristotle contributed, what the Stoics, what the Alexandrians. It is sufficient for the present purpose to note that it was soon divorced from science and became a purely regulative art. The early observers who marked the difference between vowel and consonant were truly scientific. Not so those who collected glosses and barbarisms and solecisms for the interpretation of the earlier poets, for the training of youthful Hellenists. The diligence and acumen of the long line of grammarians are not to be underrated, and yet we find only here and there a mind that thinks a truly scientific thought as to the functions of grammatical forms. And so it continued down to times that are very near our own. Grammar was and is still to many the art of reading, writing, and speak-

¹ This is not the place to interpret a Platonic passage. Suffice it to note that Plato is equal to grammatical distinctions that sorely puzzle his commentators if they are not of a grammatical turn. Grote says on the passage referred to ("Euthyphron," 10 A-D.): "The manner in which Socrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. The difference between the meaning of *φέρεται* and *φερόμενον* έστι is not easy to see"—nor does Grote see it, and, not seeing it, naturally considers it over-subtle. Jowett, being a professed Grecian, which Grote was not, explains the passage thus: "The next objection . . . is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (*φιλον*) and the participle (*φιλονμενον*), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (*φιλονμενον* and *φιλεῖται*)."
Can anything be more deplorable than such a hit-or-miss alternative?

ing correctly, not the exhibition of the structure and growth of language.

As an art grammar entered largely into antique æsthetic criticism. The ancient models were studied with a view to imitation, and the analysis extended to every element of discourse. Nothing that had been recognized as characteristic was overlooked, and no modern criticism can compare with this microscopic dissection. Few but professional philologists push their studies into the domain of the Greek and Roman rhetoricians, and even these are apt to become impatient with what must seem at first to be fanciful detail, or at best only applicable to the forms of the classic languages. But while we may consider this study tedious in itself and futile in its aim as a regulative art, there is much to be learned from the old rhetorical use of grammar as an *organon* of æsthetic appreciation. The ancient rhetorician took into account phonetics, word-formation, syntax, periodology, all from a purely subjective point of view. Now all these matters fall under the observation of the scientific grammarian, all are subjected to rigid measurement and computation. We know the proportions in which the different vowel-sounds appear in given monuments of literature ; we know what sequences, what combinations of sounds certain languages will tolerate, the emergence and the disappearance of such and such terminations, the growth and limit of case-use, tense-use, the extent of section, member, and period ; and while it is not proposed to make a mathematical æsthetic on the basis of grammar, it may be possible to remove some part of criticism out of the range of mere sensibility and opulent phraseology. A type of the system to which we may look forward in the remote future is presented by the recent advances in the study of antique metres. Before the development of the new system of antique metres, or rather the rediscovery of the old system, the construction and recitation of lyric measures in Greek and Latin were left very much to individual taste and feeling. Whether a man read an ode of Horace or an epinician of Pindar or a chorus of Sophocles well or ill was a matter between the reader and his audience, if not between the reader and himself. There was no standard. The result was not absolutely satisfactory ; appreciation of the rhythm was confined to a few ; and

the admiration was conventional, and nothing is more deadening to the sense of the beautiful than conventional admiration, from which, it may be said by way of parenthesis, the study of the classics has suffered more than from all other troubles put together. Now that the great principles which regulate the movement of antique rhythm are brought within the comprehension of every student, now that we can trust to the correcting finger as well as to the less certain ear,—*si modo digitis callemus et aure*,—the enjoyment is surely not less real, not less deep, because it is both so much more exact and so much more explicable. Of course it is not maintained that any such system can be perfected for the relations of grammar and literary art. Much detail is yet unsettled even in metrical study, and the problem before us is, one might almost say, infinitely more complicated. Still the task is not hopeless, and altho it has never been approached in a systematic way, partial results and undesigned successes show what may yet be accomplished.

It has just been said that the ancient rhetoricians, who were the æsthetic critics of antiquity, went into a much more minute analysis of their authors than would be tolerable now; and as the object of this paper is to vindicate minute grammatical study with a view to æsthetic result, it may not be considered irrelevant to call up the grammatical points which are to be found in one of the various *critiques* by the famous rhetorical writer Dionysius of Halicarnassus. This great critic was in some respects an unfair and pedantic judge, yet his writings deserve all the close study which they have received of late years. Minute he is, but not arid, and there are passages in his rhetorical works which would not be unworthy of Mr. Pater or Mr. Symonds.

In his admiration of Demosthenes, Dionysius seems to have gone to the extent of underrating all other Greek writers in order to heighten the stature of his idol, who in his judgment overtopped them all, avoided all their defects, and combined in culmination all their merits. Yet he has keen insight, just tact, and in the merely sensuous side of his criticism, that which pertains to rhythm and color, we must still be content to learn of him. Now Dionysius' judgment of Thucydides is thought to be singularly harsh, and it is adduced here only to show first what the categories are which antique criticism thought it right

to bring in, and then to ask whether some of these categories are not such as may be satisfactorily filled by the processes of modern grammar. Not that it will be thought necessary to give an analysis of the long essay which Dionysius has devoted to Thucydides. He himself has gathered up in a shorter tract what he considers the peculiarities of the style of the great historian, and from a summary of this we may cull the grammatical elements.

According to Dionysius, Thucydides went deliberately to work at a new style of his own, one that was neither pure prose nor absolute poetry, yet blended out of the two. It must be noticed that the ancient critic writes of Thucydides as many modern critics have written of Carlyle—not as tho his style were the man, the expression of his individuality, but a mechanical contrivance, with a deliberate view to novelty of effect. How far the ancient critic and the modern are right this is not the place to inquire, altho Carlyle almost makes confession of conscious mannerism in his *Reminiscences*, one of his best or at all events one of his most characteristic productions. By the way, some one with a turn for computation has counted the parentheses in the *Reminiscences*, and it is much to be wished that the same observer had watched the rise and growth and general norm of parentheses in Carlyle, so that this paper might have received an additional illustration from a familiar region. Was parenthesis a designed peculiarity of Carlyle, which afterwards passed over into blood and bone? Were the characteristics of Thucydides so many evidences of artistic purpose as Dionysius would have us to believe? It would be a capital mistake to attribute full consciousness to the greatest writers, and the value of the study discussed in this paper would be much diminished by such an assumption. Dionysius, it must be remembered, looked upon his author with the eyes of a rhetorician, who is in search of a norm for practice. This study has to do only with the appreciation, not with the creation, of works of literary art.

Dionysius, then, treats Thucydides as an innovator, not by virtue of a native necessity, but in the interest of striking effects. As to his phraseology, his selection of words, Thucydides uses tropical expressions instead of literal, glossary vocables instead of current words, archaisms instead of the common and familiar

language of his contemporaries. This is another charge freely made against innovators of our day, both in prose and poetry. True, it is one that does not come fully within the scope of grammar, but the next set of peculiarities is strictly grammatical. Some scholars have gone so far as to call English a grammarless language. Some have claimed a similar character for Thucydides, or at any rate have said that Thucydides is not to be judged by the rules of ordinary grammar, and so can never be called ungrammatical because he is not holden of grammar. Dionysius goes further and makes him antigrammatical, as one who deliberately sets himself to disappoint the grammatical sense of his reader. As there was no technical grammar in Thucydides' time, this designed discord must have been brought about by feeling rather than by reasoning; and while Thucydides might have understood his critic when he says that the historian loves to expand a word into a sentence, and again to contract a sentence into a word, he would not have understood so well, if at all, when the critic says that he makes verbs out of nouns, and nouns out of verbs; shifts actives and passives; exchanges singulars and plurals; blends feminines with masculines, masculines with feminines, both with neuters, to the utter confusion of natural sequence; deals in daring constructions according to the sense; is no respecter of grammatical persons; is lavish in the exchange of tenses, and behaves generally in a manner that in a lesser author would be called solecistic. He indulges in abstracts for concretes, and concretes for abstracts, he lets parenthesis in as a flood,—a Carlylese trick, as we have seen,—and so his sentences become twisted and hard to disentangle. It will be noticed that the critic runs his categories together, as we should say; for to Dionysius periodology was a much more important thing than it is to us. It would carry us too far to explain the other strictures on the Thucydidean style—as to the build of the sentence, the equalization of the members, the jingle of the clauses, the play on words, the balanced antitheses. What is important for us to notice has been verified—the large part that grammar, pure and simple, plays in this characteristic. Now Thucydides is confessedly an extreme, as much an extreme as Carlyle, and we must expect to find every peculiarity exaggerated in him; but it is by these

extremes that we learn the outline. The insight into finer distinctions comes only after multiplied observations. Hence a notorious case has been selected. It is not supposed for a moment that even in modern literary criticism grammatical peculiarities have not been noted, but they have not been systematically studied, and there has been little serious attempt to get at the moral, the æsthetic value. This value, recognized by the ancient critics in a general way, is susceptible of more exact ascertainment,—thanks to the exhaustive methods in vogue,—and such an ascertainment is the highest as it is the most refined result of grammatical study. Dionysius has elsewhere, as, for instance, in a remarkable and valuable treatise on "Composition,"—that is, the arrangement of words in the sentence,—gone largely into the euphonic side of literary art, the sequence of sounds and the artistic effect of the combination of the phonetic elements. This, too, is grammatical, or at all events borders on the sphere of grammar, and with the advance of phonetics we may expect here also sharper formulæ and clearer results. The symbolism of sound is, it is true, a most treacherous subject of investigation, and, looking at the fantastic tricks that have been played with the correspondence of sense and sound in ancient as well as in modern times, it is well to be cautious. The permeation of the "lightning letter" *i* (pron. *ee*), the hissing hate of the repeated *s*, the dull obstinacy of the dental, and the loving lapse of the liquid,—all this symbolism has had a fascination for minds of a certain order from the beginning; and those who are intolerant of such fancies in others fall into similar fancies themselves. A man who will sneer at the symbolism of Homeric verses as expounded by the old interpreters will not hesitate to recognize moral and æsthetic elements in the vowel register and consonant range in various dialects of the same language. How far fancy can be excluded and science be introduced is a problem which the advance of phonetics must solve. It may be the dream of a pedant to suppose that the æsthetic appreciation of an author as an artist can be furthered by the tabulation of his vowels and his consonants; and yet, inasmuch as quite as subtle an element, the sufferance of the *hiatus* has done good service as a criterion of genuineness, and to a certain extent as a criterion of style, it is not well to reject with

scorn the possibility of a successful application of these delicate tests. Physical science has of late years in all its departments made marvellous advances in the invention of instruments of precision. Everything is weighed, counted, registered, to the nicest exactitude: but weighing, counting, registering, all signify something. Shall grammatical weighing, counting, registering signify nothing? Leave the largest possible area for convention. If there is but one word to express an idea, the individual taste must accept that word, whatever its phonetics; but is there not a margin of choice which is sufficiently susceptible of mensuration to be characteristic? May not phonetics come in here, even in a language apparently so careless in this respect as the English? The love of variation is a marked natural peculiarity of English style; it was loudly proclaimed by the translators of the Authorized Version. Do we not find the same principle at work in the phonetics of our literature, our written art? Poets have occasionally noticed some points. So Coleridge somewhere remarks on the disagreeable effect of blended assonance and consonance—such a sequence of rhymes, for instance, as *rose, grown, blows, cone*, being offensive to the ear by the want of contrast.¹ But poets do not often make their combinations scientifically; they group sounds as florists group flowers, by the complementary sense, and leave the scientific appreciation to others. Professor Sylvester's essay on the "Laws of Verse" shows the fruitfulness of this method as applied to poetry. For artistic prose little has been done either on the appreciative or on the regulative side.

Periodology belongs to the music of style as well as the sequence and combination of sounds. This also falls within the domain of grammar at least in its elements. The importance of periodology in the estimate of antique composition has of late

¹ In his "Science of English Verse," which is a contribution to the phonetic and musical side of style, the late Mr. Sidney Lanier has laid down as one of the laws of rhyme: "Avoid neighboring rhymes which are very nearly alike in tone-color. For example, if two lines rhyme with 'name' and 'fame,' do not have the two next lines rhyming in 'vain' and 'stain,' or similar near shades of vowel-color. The result is like two contiguous shades of pink in a dress: one of the rhymes will seem faded." Elementary and obvious as such a rule may seem, it must have been new in Coleridge's time.

years been fully recognized, thanks to a renewed study of the ancient authorities. The symmetrical structure of the oratorical period, the proportion of its members, the distribution of its feet, all these matters now enter into characteristics of style, and become important for questions of individual development as well as of genuineness. It is not necessary to insist on the self-evident fact that in this region of æsthetics minute statistic and careful measurement are not only possible but are susceptible of valuable application.

The term syntax in its modern use is so vague that it runs over freely from the grammatical to the rhetorical side of the study of language, and yet even in the narrowest sense in which it can be taken, the theory of construction, it may have an æsthetic value. It is not a matter of indifference as to the æsthetic effect of composition what the dominant constructions are—and there is yet open a wide field of observation in this direction. Sporadic remarks are found in grammars and commentaries, but much more remains to be found out and brought into tangible shape. For great departments and great periods of literature some of these observations are of more importance than pages of exclamatory admiration. We contrast the epos of Greece with the epos of Rome. One grammatical difference sums the whole matter up. No historical present in the one, while the historical present abounds in the other. Nothing more is needed for him who appreciates the range of grammatical phenomena. The wide sphere of the dative in Latin poetry is another such significant fact. Now as the examination of the usages of different periods and different authors becomes more exact, more detailed, we shall find a potent meaning in much that seems to us indifferent now.¹ The writer's consciousness

¹ "La plus belle tâche que puisse se proposer la critique, c'est de repenser avec clarté ce que la génie a conçu plus ou moins confusément, et, semblable à Mercure, de se faire près des hommes l'interprète des dieux. Voilà pourquoi je ne me laisse point arrêter ou troubler par l'objection commune : 'Vous prêtez aux poëtes des intentions qu'ils n'ont pas eues.' Qu'importe qu'ils ne les aient pas eues, si elles sont dans leurs œuvres ? Tout ce que l'étude peut y découvrir, la critique a le droit de le développer avec une abondance, une largeur d'analyse vraiment illimitée ; elle ne risquera guère de s'égarter si elle est sympathique et respectueuse et elle ne doit craindre en aucun cas d'épuiser le sujet," etc. (Paul Stapfer, "Shakespeare et l'antiquité," i. p 316.) The same line of defence

would make the study of less interest, of less value to us who follow the appreciative rather than the regulative side. But in this unreasoned choice, if the expression be not an absurdity, the characteristic often lies. When we compare two authors, we are apt to look chiefly at the range of thought and the vocabulary. Periodology is considered only in its extremes; euphony is not brought to any scientific test; and syntax is not studied except in its monstrosities. Ask an ordinary student, "What is the difference between the style of Addison and that of Johnson?" Would the answer be anything like the one given by the shrewd observer who says: "One of the chief points of contrast in their style lies, I apprehend, in the easy and natural recurrence in the former of the verb, and the artificial preponderance given in the latter to the noun. Since Dr. Johnson's time the substantive has been gaining ground; the infinitive mood, the gerund, and the compound participle have been in the same proportion suppressed in many works of which the composition is highly elaborate. As far as unstudied writings may be expressed in set phrase, the usurpation has extended even to these"? This is a grammatical observation of wide reach and capable of ample illustration; yet those who are outside of grammatical study would see in the collection and registration of such facts nothing but the senseless toil of the pedant. Of course much depends on the texture of the language; statistics that would be valuable in Greek would be worthless in English, and it requires a certain clearness of vision to see what are true analogies. Yet with just limitations it is true that the statistic of construction does serve to fix the characteristic of style not only in periods and departments, but also in individuals. Given, for instance, a certain conditional combination in Greek; determine the frequency of its occurrence in comparison with another conditional in various departments and in a series of authors, and it will be found that in that one category we have a sharp index of character. The tragic poets will employ the severer conditional in larger proportion than prose writers, and as compared with one another the nearer they approach the standard of

applies to grammatical analysis. Sophocles could not have given a reason for his use of the negative; and Mr. Bryant's grammatical explanation of *shall* and *will* in his "*Thanatopsis*" seemed to me faulty, when I read it.

every-day life the smaller the proportion becomes. Comic poetry stands in this respect on the same level with prose, and prose in emergency rises to the level of tragedy. It is true that there is more exciting reading than a table of decimals, but those decimals have after all a meaning ; and if a lodgment has been gained for the thought that all the minute grammatical research of the present day may be made available, and is to be made available, for literary criticism, for æsthetic appreciation, something has been done in vindication of the much-abused fellowship of grammarians—the “corner-hummers,” as the Greek epigrammatist¹ contemptuously calls them. That it is possible to forget the end in the means, that there are those who never go beyond the collection of facts, is most true; but there are others, and those not a few, who while they put aside the mere dilettantism of æsthetic phrase-making are not insensible of the total effect, and while they use the measuring-rod are not blind to the chambers of imagery—to cherubim and palm-trees and lions (Ezek. ch. xli.). Music and architecture rest on mathematics; and no one denies to the votaries of music and architecture the due appreciation of their arts because of counterpoint, because of studies as to the strength of material. The very love for art forbids the neglect of any detail, and the quest of some principle, the effort to get exact expression for every manifestation of spiritual life, is not unworthy of the highest intellectual faculties. Wherever there is true art there is law, however it may hide itself under the facts, and this recognition of law lifts the study of literary art out of the domain of elegant trifling and carries it into a region where art and science meet.

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

¹ γωνιοβόμβυκες, μονοσίλλαβοι, οἵσι μέμηλεν
τὸ σφίν καὶ τὸ σφῶν καὶ τὸ μίν ἡδὲ τὸ νίν.

ART IN AMERICA IN 1883.

ALTHO under the ebb and flow of the art-life in America there is, no doubt, a steady current of progress, yet, for the chronicler, it would have been better had he been asked to make report of what he saw in the year of grace 1878, rather than of what is going on about him in the world of to-day. To a superficial eye it would seem as if, in the year just now beginning, art were, if not positively declining, then standing still—at all events no visible progress making, and discouraging signs plenty, both as to the condition of the public mind on the subject of art and as to the condition of the studios. In 1878, however, the field gave promise of a rich harvest; it may be asserted without fear of gainsayers that the first exhibition of the Society of American Artists held in that year marked a distinct era in the history of art in this country; it was the first answer American artists had made to the strivings of heart excited by the Centennial Exhibition, where a picked collection of American pictures was seen for the first time in our own country side by side with pictures from the countries of the Old World, and the jejune condition of our art as a whole made thereby uncomfortably manifest. All was Europe and water: more Europe in one picture or statue, more water in another, but all borrowed; the exceptions so few which smacked of the native soil and air as hardly to be worth counting. But, in the midst of our discontent, we hailed the return home of several artists belonging to the colonies of Paris and Munich who raised our spirits with the sight of their vigorous and manly pictures; then came the exhibition of the Society of American Artists, and for the first time there was awakened in this country a real living interest, outside of the artist-circle, in art-questions. The younger art-

ists had gone off, nearly in a body, from the Academy, and this exhibition was at once their challenge to the elder body and their justification of their action to the public. The movement naturally drew to their side the greater part of the young and enthusiastic of both sexes: the Amazonian contingent was considerable in numbers and far from contemptible in talent; in the exhibition the women appeared on equal terms with their brothers in art, and tho they have not as yet accomplished anything considerable in the field of art proper, yet they have done their full share in the later development of the minor, and the so-called decorative, arts.

But, as was to be expected, the honors of the new day belonged to the men, and the names of Shirlaw, Duveneck, William M. Chase, Alden Weir, Francis Lathrop, Wyatt Eaton, Will. Low, Bunce, Augustus St. Gaudens, Olin L. Warner, suddenly usurped the public attention to the exclusion for a time of even the best of the Academicians. The works of the new men were so fresh, so strong, so interesting, that, for a time, we did not see their defects, and did not care to see them. Their dash and unexpectedness made the Academy seem tame, and we heard all this tameness summed up in the newly invented stigma, "the Hudson River School," with which our pastoral and chromo-lithographic art, till then firm-seated in the popular heart, was now daily pestered by the confident lovers of the new. And, in truth, it was time for the Hudson River School to at least begin to die. It had played its part, and played it well, but it lingered on a stage where Irving and Paulding and Bryant and their disciples had acted a similar part in our spring-time literature, and had said Farewell, and now in art also we were ready for a new set of players. It was not possible to regret the change. Nothing more alien to what is recognized as art everywhere, outside of England at least, has ever existed anywhere, than the now defunct or moribund school of landscape once so much delighted in as the American school, but now so slightly spoken of as the Hudson River School. It has a historical value, and specimens of it deserve to be collected in the museum of the future as characteristic of the pleasant and peaceful if a trifle tame and tedious days "before the war." Nevertheless the hope may be expressed that in the museum of

the future it will not be thought necessary to collect these specimens by the gross as has been done in the case of two of the most amiable representatives of this school, Mr. Wm. T. Richards and the late Mr. Kensett. Historical value of a certain mild sort it may be allowed these pictures have; but artistic value they never had, nor can any turn in the wheel of Fashion or of Fortune ever make them seem artistic to a future generation. This was assuredly not wholly the fault of the men themselves; it was in great part the fault of their time. It is not wholly the merit of the new men that they are interesting. In the stir and rush and hurly-burly of these exciting days of revolution, when we are getting ripe for the new politics, the new religion, the new social order—

"The parliament of men, the federation of the world"—

everything that is in harmony with the time becomes interesting. And the new men being all young are necessarily in harmony with the new time. If one wishes to feel this difference to the full, let him go directly from the Academy exhibition of this year to that of the Society of American Artists. It is hard to believe that the two collections could have been got together in the same city. In the Academy by far the greater number of the pictures are of the tame, perfunctory, merchantable type with which these walls have so long made us familiar. There are scarcely a dozen pictures here in which the lover of art, the artist, the poet, or even the man or woman of ordinary culture, can take more than a momentary or accidental pleasure. It is true, as is generally conceded, that the present Academy exhibition is an uncommonly poor one, altho its badness—for its poverty has nothing negative about it!—is not of the kind that we expect on casting up our eyes, on mounting the stairs, to the large picture by Mr. Robert Hinckley, "Alexander at Persepolis," nor what one fears it may turn out on catching a glimpse of Mr. J. H. Beard's "Race for Life." Perhaps if more of the contributors to this exhibition had sent in pictures of this type we should have had a livelier time of it, and not have been in danger as we now are of going to sleep on the lounges after a footsore search for something to stir our intellects. Even artists whose general merit is undisputed seem to go wrong when they paint for the

Academy. Mr. Winslow Homer, one of the few artists who, in spite of his foreign training, has always kept his individuality clear and distinct, and whose work always has a home-flavor, is strikingly inferior, as seen in this gallery, to himself as he appeared in the late water-color exhibition. But in fact he does not belong here at all, and we are always tempted to ask—with a twist to the question—when we find him in these desiccated rooms, "*Que diable fait-il dans cette galerie?*" And Mr. Millet, who has by an unlucky chance hit upon a subject that breeds endless comparisons with Mr. Dewing's "Prelude," does certainly not come up to his own standard in his queerly named "The Story of *AEnone*"—pseudo-Greek and awkward girls in a row on a bench reading, or listening to, any story from any book. But 'tis not my errand to discuss the Academy exhibition; everybody who cares for pictures as pictures knows how low the standard is, and knows too how honestly the Academy makes no effort to alter it or to get beyond it. And the public furnishes a class of people who are satisfied with the kind of goods provided, and who would feel lost and discontented if they did not find in the Academy rooms the soporific atmosphere to which they have always been accustomed there.

In the exhibition of the Society of American Artists we find a totally different state of things. Here the look of the walls suggests, if anything, defiance to purchasers rather than a bid for their favor. If there should be anything that the elect are at once seized with a mad desire to buy, it is sure to have been sold before it was sent in; and, as a rule, the pictures are such as appeal only to people who have been used to see and admire pictures that are pictures. In the present exhibition a fine Velasquez loaned from his rich collection by a generous lover of pictures has been hung by the Society for the avowed purpose of setting up a standard, more of course for the artists themselves than for the public; and tho the pictures this year, taken altogether, are not equal to what we have seen in this Room in other years, yet Velasquez seems, nevertheless, at home here, like an elder brother among his younger brothers. But what would a picture by Velasquez, or by any one of the masters, do with itself in the Academy? It would feel sadly out of place, and every one who saw it would detect the incongruity.

The curious point to notice is that the Academy, thought to be so conservative, and declaring itself to be so, is yet in reality out of sympathy with the older art, and alien to the great schools, in its whole practice. It cannot be called an innovator; for that, ideas are necessary, and no one ever accused the Academicians, as a body, of having ideas. Their boast is that they have none. They laugh at the new school for having them, or for thinking that they have them, and they keep their doors rigorously shut on all applicants for honors who cannot show an entire freedom from all revolutionary notions. The Academy therefore cannot, as I have said, be called an innovator, but, as no body of men, any more than an individual, can stand still, it follows that, as the Academy is not advancing, it must be going backward, and this it is certainly doing year after year. I do not know a single Academician, nor an Associate, whose work this season shows any improvement on what he has done in the past. If the exhibition were made up wholly of the work of members it would be indeed an unendurably dull display. It is only saved by a dozen or so small pictures at the hands of novices, or of persons little known to fame; it owes no debt to any painter with a national reputation.

The Academy is the shrine of an old ceremonial religion, and would be a wholly depressing place were it not that a few young acolytes have adorned its rusty altars with a vase or two of fresh flowers. The exhibition as a whole represents the decay of old principles, the service of models which are no longer seen with the quick eyes of youth, but are only dimly reflected in the memory, and have long ceased to exercise a living, stimulating influence on the practice. Its light still flickers before the image of Art, but, where it once lighted the traveller on his way, it can scarcely be seen in the electric light of to-day.

The new men, on the contrary, are for the most part men who have come home fresh from the quickening study of the great Italian, Spanish, and Dutch artists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and from the companionship of students and artists in various parts of Europe who are moved by the same enthusiasm for Velasquez, Titian and Veronese, Rembrandt, Franz Hals, and for the moderns who have themselves been inspired by these masters. The heroes of the men who

make the real stuff of the Society of American Artists—for there are men in this society who do not naturally belong to it—are no longer Delaroche and Horace Vernet, Landseer and Maclise; no, nor even Millais and Leighton, Alma Tadema and Tissot. They worship Delacroix, and Rousseau and Troyon, and Jean-François Millet, and Corot, and Vollon, and Courbet, and Manet, with the Dutchmen,—Mettling, Hill, the brothers Maris, Mauve, and a small school of water-color painters whose drawings make all other water-colors look washed out or crude or muddy in the comparison.

For a knowledge of many among these moderns the public of our Eastern cities owes a great debt to a singularly interesting man who came among us about six years ago, and who has had more influence in shaping public taste in the direction I have just indicated than even the artists themselves whom I have named. Mr. Daniel Cottier is a man so shy of obtruding himself upon the public notice that I must run the risk of offending him by speaking as I do, because it is simply impossible to leave him out in reckoning the factors of our present growth or even in stating the new conditions at which we have arrived. Just as Boston, and then New York, owes her knowledge of Courbet and Millet to the late Wm. M. Hunt, so does New York, and then Boston, owe to Mr. Cottier her knowledge of Monticelli and Michel, Mettling, Mauve, Stacquet, and I may say Corot,—for out of Mr. Cottier's rooms have gone the best examples of Corot that have been seen here, and he still owns in the "Orpheus" one of the finest pictures that Corot ever painted. He owns, too, the original of Millet's "Sower," the greatest work of that giant among moderns, and of all the artists I have named above he has or had examples showing them at their best. As for the others, leaving out Courbet, Millet, and Corot, unquestionably the greatest, they were to all intents practically unknown to us before Mr. Cottier opened his rooms in this city and fired first a few, and then more and more, with the generous enthusiasm he himself feels for these inspiring works. Many of us had long found the Bouguereaus, the Gérômes, the Tademas, aye, and the Meissoniers, with all the literary crowd of their followers, freaks, and variants,—the anecdoteists, the archæologists, the new Greek (very new, and very little Greek!),

and the bric-a-bracs,—dry and savorless food, and it seemed to us that since we saw the great men of old in their proud rooms in England, France, and Italy—their National Gallery, their Louvre, their Uffizii—we had seen no pictures worthy to be called pictures till we saw these that Mr. Cottier brought us. Here were Millet's prophets and sibyls clad in the weeds of peasants, and making drudgery divine in the farm-yards and pastures of France; and Corot's fairy-lands, whether lit by moon or sun who can tell us? And Monticelli singing us old tales of chivalry and of pleached bowers, and of the fountain of youth, and of "*La Belle Dame sans Mercy*," as Keats and Boccaccio sang them, with Orient colors for the poets' Orient words.

Here, too, was Georges Michel "Pictor Ignotus," sitting day after day in his seat on Les Buttes Montmartre, and painting always the one landscape, with such grandeur of feeling and such pictorial power that we are contented never to have him change the scene. The Michel bought of Mr. Cottier by Mr. Williams of New York is certainly one of the most impressive of modern landscapes: Titian or Rembrandt alone could have rivalled it. Yet, until this picture came here, the name of Michel was virtually unknown in America. It was not, however, the mere bringing over of these pictures that entitles Mr. Cottier to an honorable place in the list of influences that are revolutionizing the feeling for art in this country. Mr. Cottier has been one of the most eloquent and unwearied persuaders to the love of art that we have had among us, and he has been as strong and earnest in his advocacy of whatever he has found good in our own art as of what he has found elsewhere. He is not only a man of convictions: he is a man with the finest perceptions, the most generous instincts, and he loves art too entirely and too unselfishly to allow of his being blinded by national prejudices. One room full of such pictures as he brings over, with what he finds here—and he has sharp eyes to find what is good—with him to expound them, and to inspire the young artists with a love of them, is worth far more in our education than twenty Academies.

Almost at the same time with Mr. Cottier's came the colony from Paris and Munich, and the establishment of the new Society

soon followed. Then came the Art-Student's League, the best, indeed the only, school for artists in this country, with all its deficiencies; and on its model, schools have been started all over the country which are sure in time to bear good fruit.

The value of the League to students lies chiefly in the fact that it is not conducted by "professors" and "drawing-teachers," but by artists actively engaged in their profession, and giving to their pupils the results of their own practice. Nor is the management of the school in the hands of any clique or set: the heads of the departments are changed at reasonable intervals, and life and variety are here, to the exclusion of dogma and routine. Outside the League there are other advantages offered to those who wish to study in surroundings less collegiate, in the studios of artists of such proved capacity as Mr. Wm. M. Chase and Mr. J. Alden Weir. Mr. Geo. W. Maynard, an artist of merit, has charge of a class in painting at the Cooper Institute. Even supposing that few painters of exceptional skill are produced by this studio-training, there can be no doubt that the time of the pupils is well spent both for themselves and for the community. Their masters are themselves men who have studied hard in a severe school, and who know how to teach. They give their pupils a sound knowledge of art-principles, and the walls of their studios, hung with good copies and with better originals, educate by daily familiarity with excellent examples.

The Society of American Artists, the Cottier pictures, and the Art-Students' League are missionaries in a field full of incitements to hope, and they have allies in plenty. In the field of wood-engraving it may be said that nowhere at present does there live a man who can at all compare with Henry Marsh, who, had he lived in Dürer's time (but how to fancy such a pure product of the nineteenth century back in the fifteenth!), would not have taken his place among the Little Masters, but would have been folded in the arms of Albert himself as a brother beloved. We have other engravers who deserve well of their country, but Mr. Marsh can do certain things as they never were done before: his work is as original in its method as it is beautiful in its effects. I believe that the few "proofs" that exist of his finest blocks will some day be a prize contended for. They ought not to be allowed to run the risk of dispersion. The work of developing the art of wood engraving in this country, by

employing the best engravers, and by offering such rewards as excited an era-making rivalry in the profession, was undertaken, as all the world now knows, by "Scribner's Magazine," now "The Century." The best that can be done by our best men has appeared in its pages, but a worthier boast is that it has done so much to raise the standard higher and higher; that it is never contented with what it has done, but will always obstinately be "aiming at the sun." "Harper's Magazine" has followed nimbly enough in the path pointed out to it by the younger magazine, but it is always behind its teacher because it will not take the necessary pains with its printing.

In the decorative arts much is doing among us which is interesting, but there is a lull at present in the most important field; the decoration of public buildings and churches, the example set by Trinity Church in Boston and by the Capitol at Albany, not having been followed as it might have been hoped it would be. Unfortunately the work done of late has been confined for the most part to private houses, where it can do the general public no good whatever, since it is not to be seen. The most of this decoration, however, has small relation to art proper, the cases being very few where painting and sculpture of other than a merely refined upholstery order have been employed. In the so provincially styled "palaces" of our very bourgeois nobility the strife is only as to who can get the costliest ornamentation on his walls, and one hears a ceiling in a plain citizen's "State Dining-room" (Listen! shade of Abigail Adams surveying your week's wash drying in the "East Room" of the White House! Listen! and smile a genuine republican smile at the snobbishness of our day and generation!)—one hears this ceiling lavishly praised for no better reason than because marble and onyx, bronze and ivory, and mother-of-pearl have been employed in carrying out the designer's scheme. But this is the art of barbarians—true art is smothered to death under this parade. The Italians in their good time knew how to make ceilings and walls beautiful with nothing better than Angelo and Raphæl and Correggio had to offer, but then the rich men of that time knew how to set artists at artists' work. So far as I know, only one house in this city has set the example of making all its decoration subordinate to the painting of an artist. Its beautiful rooms are so arranged that one of the best of our younger painters, Mr.

Francis Lathrop, has had a field at his disposal for the exercise of his charmingly poetic art. The house, delightfully designed no less for comfort than for elegance, and furnished with a sensitive eye to harmony of color and form "all perfect, finished to a finger-nail," is yet seen to be separated from the eager herd of "decorated" houses just by the prominence given by its fair president to the artist's work, which he has made lovely with nothing costlier than his every-day brushes and colors, seasoning these well, however, with a sparkling dash of brains.

In other directions, such as stained glass and embroidery, we shall no doubt do beautiful things when we have got over our infantine delight at our successes, and have come to the sane conclusion that after all the practice of the old men was not so altogether ridiculous as a few callow young men and maidens would persuade themselves and others that it was. When we have passed the point where an overloaded piece of embroidery can be triumphantly declared to be "the most magnificent piece of work, without question, that exists to-day *in the world*," and when a crowd of silly people are to be found to assent to the praise; when we can hear the kaleidoscopic, in-consequence of the stained glass that is now the rage, rated at its true value, mere gewgaw prettiness, without artistic or intellectual character; and when architects refuse to let the entrances to the houses they design, nay, the whole façade, be ruined by the loss of its most important feature—the expressiveness given by the dark of a window properly glazed—owing to the use of this tiresome "opalescent" glass (one of the silliest fads of the "decorative" school of the day),—when, in fine, we have worked off some of this effervescent delight in our new toys, and have come back to first principles, there can be no doubt we shall see the higher art of our pictures and statues supported by a great perfection in the minor arts. Just now we are overdoing almost everything—

"My heart leaps up when I behold
A Quaker lady nigh."

And a Quaker room with furniture innocent of carving or mouldings and with one really good picture on the wall would be a relief to-day in the midst of this riot of upholstery.

CLARENCE COOK.

THE MOST RECENT PHASES OF THE TARIFF QUESTION.

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE second session of the last or Forty-seventh Congress will undoubtedly stand in the fiscal and political history of the United States as marking a transition-period in the sentiment of the country in respect to the tariff question of no little economic and political importance. With the termination of the war and its requirement for vast expenditures, it might naturally have been supposed that the whole of the vast and onerous system of taxation which the war made necessary would have been promptly reconstructed with a view to the entire abandonment or extensive reduction of no small number of its burdens; and in the department of internal revenue this was indeed done, but very slowly. But in the matter of taxes upon imports, from which the largest proportion of the national revenues, and the largest sums ever collected by any nation from such sources, are derived, not only has there been no reduction whatever in the average rates imposed during the war, but on the contrary, and in the case of very many articles, the taxes have been very largely increased. That such a course of fiscal policy, or "*the maintenance of war-taxes in time of peace*," as it has been fittingly termed, should not fail to encounter some considerable measure of popular disapproval might also have been naturally supposed; for the popular mind, altho knowing little and caring less concerning economic matters, nevertheless moves pretty promptly and directly to the conclusion that there is an intimate connection between high taxes and

an increased cost of living and of production. But, singularly enough, this sentiment of disapproval has, until a very recent period, been comparatively limited. In the first place, the masses, finding it easy, through the great natural resources and rapid development of the country, to obtain employment and a living, and being also naturally disinclined to reason on such subjects, have either allowed themselves to remain indifferent or to be easily persuaded into the acceptance of any opinions or assumptions that might be plausibly urged upon them. While, in the second place, the so-called manufacturing interests of the country, accepting almost universally the proposition that the maintenance of high taxes upon the importation of nearly all foreign products, and the abandonment of all federal taxes upon all similar or competing domestic products, were essential to their prosperity, have through their intelligence, social position, and large command and use of money wielded an influence in behalf of their faith so irresistible, that the prediction has often been expressed that nothing could prevail against it until natural circumstances forced its representatives to radical differences of opinion among themselves.

The business of dissent from the tariff policy of the federal government since the war has therefore been mainly relegated (one meaning of which term is "to banish") to a comparatively few persons, and those mainly clear-headed and enthusiastic young men, who, as has always been the case in every other movement in the world's history for the extension of human liberty, have had but the minimum of personal grievance to complain of, but whose motive and inspiration, impelling to work and sacrifice for the cause they advocated, was simply the love of truth and right, for the truth and right's sake. To men whose opinions about the tariff are controlled mainly by their pocket interests, and indeed to all who have been educated to believe that government—which never has anything in the way of money or property but what it has previously taken from the people—can create national prosperity by arbitrarily taking the result of accumulated labor from one man and arbitrarily giving it to another, such motives appear absurd and incredible; and in default of any other motives that would seem reasonable to those thus reasoning, the hypothesis of

organized corruption and thorough disloyalty to American institutions has been resorted to, proclaimed, and extensively accepted. Hence the statements first made, it is believed, by Horace Greeley and H. C. Carey, and since positively repeated and enlarged upon by such men as W. D. Kelley, Cyrus Hamlin, president of Middlebury College, Vermont, John L. Hayes, late President of the Tariff Commission, and many other lesser lights, that the leaders of the cause of "free trade," "tariff for revenue only," and "free ships," and the repeal of our navigation laws, receive their inspiration and were bought up to do their work through "British gold;" and that organizations for the purpose of raising and disbursing funds for such purposes in the United States—as, for example, the Cobden Club—regularly existed and were successfully operated in Great Britain. Such statements and assertions up to the present time have seemed too silly to require anything in the way of positive challenge and denial; but when a recurrence to and a general use of them still constitute a marked phase of the current tariff discussion, and seem likely to continue, it may be well to here state, for the special benefit of those whose character and self-respect, in spite of most decided opinions and prejudices, will not allow them to deliberately falsify, first:

That the transmission on the part of any organization or individual in Great Britain or Europe to the United States of money or credit, to the extent of a single dollar, for the purpose of aiding any free trade or anti-protection movement in the latter country is not known to any American representative of such movement to have ever occurred; and the receipt of any such aid by any journal or organization advocating free trade in the United States, or by any person officially connected with such organization, is not only here unqualifiedly denied, but the ability on the part of any one to furnish a scintilla of evidence to the contrary is also here positively challenged and disputed. And secondly, as respects the Cobden Club, which is declared and extensively believed by protectionists to be a foreign propaganda of free trade of wonderful activity, and the organization through which large sums of money are constantly raised and disbursed for influencing public opinion in the United States, the following statements are further submitted. This club was founded in

1866 with the object of encouraging the growth and diffusion of those economic and political principles with which the name of Richard Cobden is associated, and which are also briefly but comprehensively expressed in the motto which the club has adopted and caused to be engraved upon its seal; namely, "*Free Trade, Peace and Good Will among Nations.*" Altho the headquarters of the Cobden Club are in London, it enrolls among its members nearly all the leading economists and statesmen of Europe: as, for example, Gladstone, Bright, the Duke of Argyle, Sir John Lubbock, Sir Charles Dilke, Robert Giffen, Thomas Brassey, and James Caird, of England; Léon Say, Leroy Beaulieu, Jules Simon, Henri Cernuschi, and Maurice Block, of France; Schulze-Delitzsch and Karl Blind, of Germany; Emilio Castelar, of Spain; Frère Orban and M. Laveleye, of Belgium; Prof. Cossa, Quintine Sella, and Marco Minghetti, of Italy; and in the United States, Pres. Woolsey, Anderson, Gilman, and Gen. Walker; Geo. Bancroft, Edward Atkinson, C. F. Adams, Jacob D. Cox, H. W. Beecher, E. N. Horsford, E. P. Whipple, and Hugh McCulloch; while on the roll of deceased members are found the names of Baron Bunsen, Count Corsi, Léon Gambetta, Michel Chevalier, James A. Garfield, John Stuart Mill, L. F. S. Foster, Charles Sumner, H. W. Longfellow, R. W. Emerson, Samuel Bowles, W. C. Bryant, Francis Lieber, Isaac Sherman, Amasa Walker, Samuel Ruggles, Wm. Lloyd Garrison, and others: the name of any one of whom is sufficient proof that no organization in which it was voluntarily, continuously, and sympathetically enrolled, could be anything not in the highest degree honorable and open in all its transactions to public inspection. The receipts and expenditures of the Cobden Club are annually audited and published in detail in the leading journals of England; and its total income for the carrying out of its plans has never been as much in any one year as \$15,000; with the single exception of 1881, when a special publication fund of \$8860 was contributed, and of which \$5140 was appropriated for the publication and distribution of works on "Systems of Land Tenure." From the regular receipts are defrayed the expenses of an annual dinner of the members; the salaries of a secretary and clerk; the expense of medals which the club annually awards for the best essays on any subject connected with political

economy by the students of various leading colleges in the world (Harvard, Yale, and Williams, in the United States); and the publication and distribution of a great variety of books and tracts on many subjects, additional to those pertaining specially to free trade.¹ When, therefore, Hon. W. D. Kelley, M. C., declared, in the political campaign of 1880, that the Cobden Club had raised and transmitted to the United States more than a million of dollars for influencing the national election of that year; and the Rev. Cyrus Hamlin, a minister of the gospel and president of a New England college, writes in the Journal of the American Agricultural Association for November, 1882, that the Cobden Club "*has expended vast sums during the last twelve or fifteen years to incite our (American) farmers against the government and our manufacturers;*" and that "*millions of copies of an appeal to American farmers were issued*" (by it) "*and distributed all over the land,*" it is certain that these gentlemen, if they claim to be men of honor, have placed themselves in a position not a little embarrassing and dishonorable. For they either knew or did not know whereof they affirmed. If they knew, then they were guilty of uttering unqualified and intentional falsehoods; and if they did not know, they used words without meaning, and recklessly, if not intentionally, deceived their hearers or readers.²

¹ The following is a more detailed exhibit of the income of the Cobden Club since its organization, as derived from its official reports: For the seven years from 1866 to 1873 the total income was £8204 (\$41,020), or at the rate of \$5857 per annum; 1878, £1529; 1879, £1825; 1880 (the year of the U. S. Presidential election), £2557; and for 1881, £4163, of which £1028 were appropriated to the publication of works on the subject of land-tenure. Among other works published or distributed by the Club during this same year, when, according to Judge Kelley, a million of dollars was appropriated to the United States, were Caird's "Landed Interest;" Maclehose's "Value of Political Economy;" Watterson's "British Commerce;" "The Financial Reform Almanac;" Apjohn's "Cobden and Bright;" Potter's "Workman's Views of Free Trade;" Krebs's "Working-man on Reciprocity;" together with reports of meetings, lists of members, accounts, etc. etc.

² As further illustrating, notwithstanding the above exhibit, the extent to which the Cobden Club has been effectually used as a "bogie" in the United States for the raising of money and the controlling of votes in support of high protection, attention is also asked to the following extract from the Report of the American Iron and Steel Association for the year 1881: "During the Presidential and Congressional campaign of last year" (1880) "the Cobden Club of England

Recurring to the assertion before made, that the last session of the last or Forty-seventh Congress marks a transition-period of permanence and importance in the sentiment of the country on the tariff question, the following review of the situation would seem to forbid any other conclusion.

Nothing is more sensitive to changes in public opinion than the American politician, or more quick to respect them than the Federal Congress; and the circumstance that Congress at its last session devoted most of its time to a consideration of a reform of the tariff, and that the political party dominant in both Houses did not dare to adjourn without taking some action upon it, even tho such action, as it turned out to be, was little more than a pretence, is certain proof that the tariff, from a merely political point of view, cannot longer be treated, and as in former years, with political neglect and indifference.

Again, no one who has given the subject any attention has any doubt that the United States has at present more active capital, machinery, and labor engaged in the so-called work of manufacturing than is necessary to supply any present or immediate prospective demand for domestic consumption. And as general evidence confirmatory of this position, citation may be made, *first*, of the general and increasing complaint on the part of American manufacturers of *over-production*; in connection with which attention is here asked to the very significant fact recently brought out by the N. Y. *Public*, namely, that while the domestic exchanges for the past year (1882) show a very marked increase as respects the manufacturing centres of the country, the exchanges at the great distributing centres on the other hand show a marked decrease, with accompanying heavy losses and shrinkage in business. *Second*, the interruption of great branches of domestic industry, of which examples are to be found in the recent suspension of the entire business of

threw off all disguise, and sought directly to influence the free expression of the popular will in many States by circulating large quantities of English-printed books and pamphlets which outrageously misrepresented the effects of our protection policy," etc. This association promptly undertook the work of counter-acting this movement of the Cobden Club, and a series of protective tracts, embracing over half a million copies, was printed and circulated in the wake of the free-trade publications."

cotton manufacture in Philadelphia and vicinity; of the discontinuance in all or great part of the India-rubber and gunny-bagging manufacture; of the reduction of sugar-refining industry to about 60 per cent of its existing capacity; and the suspension or failure of some of the most important iron-furnaces and rolling-mills of the country. And *third*, the actual or attempted reduction of wages in almost every department of domestic manufacturing industry; the recent united effort for this end of the representatives of all the iron-works west of the Alleghanies being especially noteworthy.

Next, a large amount of evidence to the same effect of a more specific character, and in the highest degree interesting and instructive, has also recently been made public. Thus, during the past winter, a resolution was introduced into the Legislature of Massachusetts urging upon the representatives of that State in Congress "*the importance of reducing the national taxes and the propriety of abolishing as fast as possible (without too great injury to vested interests) the taxes upon imports, except so far as may be necessary for a revenue to meet the prudent and economical expenses of the government.*" Had such a resolution been introduced into this body five or ten years ago it would probably have been received with almost as much of surprise as a resolution in favor of the re-establishment of domestic slavery, and would probably have been as unceremoniously treated. And as it was, had the committee to whom the resolution was referred been governed solely by their private opinions, a majority, it is understood, would have summarily voted "leave to withdraw." But under the circumstances a full and respectful hearing, extending over some weeks, was granted to all interested. And to this hearing came, among others, Mr. Howard M. Newhall, one of the leading shoe-manufacturers of the famous Massachusetts shoe-manufacturing town of Lynn, who gave testimony of such a startling character that any discussion of the subject would be incomplete that failed to embody its nearly complete statement as reported.

"I have come before this Committee," said Mr. Newhall, "to present a few facts in regard to one specific branch of business interest—a protected shoe industry. The shoe industry is the most thoroughly American in its parts of any of our great industries. A few years before 1860 few

would have dared to predict that a shoe could ever be made by machinery, or that in a quarter of a century there would be so many people employed in making shoes by machinery as to render the American market altogether too small for their industrial capacity. Yet such is the fact. In Lynn alone the capacity is three hundred thousand pairs of shoes per week, and Lynn is only one great representative of a great many shoe-manufacturing centres in New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and the West. This is its present capacity, but the power of enlarging this capacity is unlimited. This whole system could be duplicated and reduplicated if necessary within a short term of years. With such facilities it is very natural that the business should soon outgrow the home consumption. Where a few years ago it took nine months in each year to shoe this country, it now takes but six months, and, with the present increase of factories, a few years hence it can be done in less than that time. Of course the increase of capacity engenders competition among the manufacturers, and there is a constant incentive to underbid the market to secure trade. As in all trade, a low price (often quoted) "sets" the market, and in order to meet the market articles have to be made cheaper at the expense of the operatives. If the materials used to make a shoe go up in price, labor always has to go down. Strikes result, as that seems to be the only way the laborer can protect himself from the encroachment of the employer. In a general strike in a shoe-manufacturing centre the operatives often gain temporary advantage, but with a supply greater than demand it cannot long continue. A shoe-factory is what might be called "portable," and when a manufacturer cannot have his own way in one locality he goes where he can. When he finds he cannot make shoes cheap enough in some great centre, he finds some quiet country town where he starts a factory and is able to make shoes at less price. His city competitor is deprived of just so much work, and is obliged to ask of his employés a reduction in wages if they wish to save their work from going away. The general sequence of a strike, then, is the establishment of country factories, so called, and the sequence of country factories is a forced reduction in wages. Every time this programme has been repeated in the last few years it has left wages on a lower basis."

"Gentlemen, do not blame the manufacturer for trying to meet the market, or blame the operative for resisting a reduction in wages. It all goes to show that the supply is greater than the demand, and that our market is not large enough. Perhaps you may wonder how and where we are "protected" in our shoemaking. I will mention two or three articles specially, and speak of the others generally. Take, for instance, serges or lasts. The average duty on the serges or lasts used in the manufacture of shoes is 85 per cent. And how many factories do you think are protected by this enormous duty? I know of only two—one at Oswego, N. Y., the other at Woonsocket, R. I. I may be in error, but these are all which have been named to me, altho I have made diligent inquiry. As another instance, take that well-known article, French kid,

or, in fact, kid of any foreign make. Kid requires a duty of 25 per cent on the average. French kid costs all the way from \$18 to \$45 per dozen skins, according to the quality. An average skin would cost about \$30 per dozen, and each skin would cut about one pair of shoes. Hence the prospective penalty for wearing soft, pliable French kid shoes is sixty cents before the process of making the shoe has begun. This appeals to our own pockets, but in its broader sense we are at just sixty cents' disadvantage in competition with the rest of the world in that grade of shoe. The light, pliable glove-calf of foreign manufacture is taxed by a duty of 20 per cent. I have selected the serges, kid, glove-calf, which perhaps form a sufficient variety to illustrate the argument. In the warm climates where we must push our foreign shoe-trade, those of the inhabitants who wear shoes require just these very kinds of shoes which have been mentioned. American calf, goat, or grain is too heavy for use in warm countries, and if we are to compete with foreign manufacturers we need every advantage of competition. Cottons, nails, tacks, buttons, thread, all have to be used in the make-up of a shoe, and they are protected. The iron from which we make our machinery is protected. If, as is facetiously said, we make shoes of paper, that is protected too. In short, you have paid a duty on nearly every component part of the shoe which you are now wearing on your foot."

"America is the home of the shoe-trade. Almost every other large manufacturing business was imported, and mechanics had to be taught by men who were paid to come here and teach them. But the Yankees invented their own shoe-machinery, and no one had to be imported to teach them how to run it. The best educated factory population in New England is that found in your "shoe-towns." They are thrifty, strive to own their own homes, and represent the very best side of a working population."

"Perhaps you may ask what may be the general opinion of the Lynn shoe-manufacturers on any question looking toward a modification of the tariff. There has been but one organized effort to test their opinion, and that a short time since, when an effort was made to increase the duty on India skins from 15 per cent to 25 per cent. A petition was sent to Washington, very generally signed by the shoe-manufacturers, protesting against any increase; and from this we may judge that they are alive to the fact that their next move is toward reduction.

"A removal of duty from all articles used in the manufacture of a shoe would be an advantage to employer and employed. Why, up in Canada, and in the provinces, they have been obliged to protect themselves from American shoes by a duty of 25 per cent; and even tho we are having to pay a tariff on importation and exportation we are sending as many shoes into Canada as ever. This alone proves what our shoe-manufacturing industry is capable of achieving if it can have a chance. There is no other country knows how, or could make shoes as fast and as cheap as the Yankees, and all we need is one end of the bargain. If we are able to sell

our goods when protected and protected against, if half the disadvantage we now stagger under were removed, we could soon push ourselves into a place where the world's buyers could not afford to purchase from any other market."

During the year ending March 1, 1883, 62 new paper-mills have gone into operation, and 37 additional were in course of construction. The *Paper-Trade Journal* thus reports the opinions concerning the prospect ahead of certain leading members of this department of manufacturing industry: Wellington Smith, of Lee, Massachusetts, thinks the present supply of paper in the United States is in excess of the demand; that prices are lower than last year, and that his mills find it necessary to suspend one, two, or three days in the week in dull times, "giving the help something to live on and keeping the organization complete." But as the *Springfield Republican* in commenting on this state of affairs significantly remarks, "if this remedy is resorted to frequently, this condition is likely to become chronic and somebody projects a new mill to do the very work which ought to be done in the idle 'one, two, or three days' of the existing mills." William A. Russell, a leading paper-manufacturer and a representative of Massachusetts in Congress, says that low water has restricted production heretofore, but "when the old mills are turning out their full product, and this new product is placed upon the market, we are to see a crowded and restless time among manufacturers." He thinks that even the pulp-makers, "with 15 new pulp-mills started during the past year," "will find difficulty in marketing their pulp in the immediate future."

A comparatively few years since the India-rubber manufacturers operated their mills full time all the year through. Consumption within the last three years is said to have doubled, and to have attained a present annual value of \$38,000,000. But the capacity of the mills in existence at the same time is also reported to be equal to supplying an annual domestic consumption of full \$60,000,000; and there being no such demand, the manufacturers have gladly taken advantage of a "corner" in their raw material to almost entirely suspend production.

Gunny-cloth is the name given to a coarse textile used largely

for cotton baling and other bagging, and manufactured from the coarse, cheap fibre of the butts, or lower part of the stalk of the plant that yields the so-called "jute" fibre. As the jute plant has thus far been successfully grown only in India, and as labor in that country is in most plentiful supply, at rates of wages which even in the much-talked-of "pauper countries" of Europe would be considered as insufficient, it would seem, reasoning *a priori*, utterly hopeless to expect that any manufacturer could ever successfully make gunny-cloth in the United States, even if he were not under the necessity of transporting his raw material twelve thousand miles, or half round the globe, and of paying a duty on its arrival of \$6 per ton. And yet through the invention and application of machinery with which the hand-labor of India cannot compete¹ this has been done to such an extent that the United States now practically manufactures its own gunny-cloth, and the importation of this article from India, which was formerly very great, has become compar-

¹ The following story, which comes to the writer as strictly authentic, strikingly illustrates the nature and economic effect of this new application of machinery, and it also constitutes a demonstration of the falsity of the popular assertion and belief that it is the comparative rates of wages in different competing countries which determines the comparative cost of production and the necessity of tariff protection.

Some time since a gentleman, manifestly of oriental lineage, appealed for leave to inspect the operations of one of the large gunny-cloth manufactories in the vicinity of New York. He was courteously admitted, when the following conversation ensued:

Oriental—I have come all the way from Calcutta to find out why you Americans no longer import my bagging as you used to, but instead of it import the jute butts and make the bagging here; I don't understand it.

Manufacturer—Because we can manufacture cheaper here than you in Calcutta.

Oriental—How can that be? What does that weaver earn a day?

Manufacturer—About a dollar and a half. It is heavy work.

Oriental—Well, weavers in Calcutta work for less than a tenth part as much.

Manufacturer—Yes; but what does it cost you to weave your bagging per yard?

Oriental—About three cents.

Manufacturer—Well, that weaver's work costs half a cent a yard, and we can make a better article than the imported cloth with a less weight of fibre. That is the difference between our machinery and yours. Now do you see it?

Oriental—I see that I have come all the way from Calcutta to find out that I am a fool not to have seen it before. Good-morning.

atively unimportant; the decline in imports of gunny-bagging having been from 18,800,000 lbs. in 1872 to 2,490,000 lbs. in 1882; and of gunny-cloth, not bagging, from 32,000,000 lbs. in 1867 to 226 lbs. in 1882. On the other hand, the importation of jute butts (the raw material) increased from 157,000 bales in 1874 to 320,174 in 1882. The success which attended the efforts of those who originally embarked in this manufacture was such that others have been rapidly tempted to engage in it, so that there are now about 30 manufactoryes of gunny-cloth and cotton bagging in the United States, with a reported capacity of producing 50,000,000 yards a year, or a quantity sufficient to bale a crop of cotton 2,000,000 bales larger than has as yet been produced. Under such circumstances the manufacturers are especially troubled with "over-production." The stock on hand is reported to be enormous: some mills have failed; others have shut down temporarily or permanently; while the sense of a general meeting of manufacturers recently convened in New York was to voluntarily close all their mills until the present stock on the domestic market is greatly reduced or exhausted.

Now these and many other similar illustrations which might be further adduced, did space suffice, demonstrate beyond all question that the present most urgent and most important question of the hour—a question that admits and will demand consideration alike from a political, economic, moral, and social standpoint—is, How shall an extension of markets for the products of our industries be attained? For in default of such a result our manufacturing operations cannot be continued with full activity without glutting the home market with their products; which in turn must force a suspension of business, entail serious losses on employers, and restriction of opportunity for employment and reduction of wages to employés. And it is just this result and state of things which now characterizes the manufacturing industries of the country, and which, under our existing national fiscal policy, is certain to continue. Every manufacturer knows instinctively that if he could produce and sell with greater cheapness he could sell more largely, and so acquire larger markets for his products both at home and abroad. There is no limit to the consumption of desirable commodities, if the price of such commodities is brought within the ability to purchase of those

who desire to consume. There can be, furthermore, no such thing as their overproduction, so long as any backs are bare, stomachs empty, and bodies cold; but there is such a thing as imperfect and faulty distribution of desirable products of labor, growing out of artificial or avoidable impediments such as taxes, selfishness, ignorance, and imperfect methods and instrumentalities of production.

But how shall the American manufacturer produce cheaper (or at least as cheap as his foreign competitor) in respect to many articles for which he has the greatest natural or acquired advantages, and so solve to a great extent the difficulties which now environ him? There are but two ways (it being taken for granted that he is not deficient in the invention and use of machinery).¹ He must have cheaper raw materials, the crude forms of the metals, coals, fibres, dye-stuffs, chemicals, unmanufactured wood, etc., or he must have cheaper wages, or labor.² But the former, a tariff like that recently enacted (which levies taxes for purposes other than revenue) *ordains that the American manufacturer shall not have*; (as is strikingly illustrated, for example, in connection with the exhibit above given of the present condition of the domestic gunny-cloth manufacture, by the recent refusal of Congress to take off the duty on jute butts); so that there remains to him the only other alternative to a curtailment or suspension of business, namely, that of reduction of wages. And this is what the American manufacturing employer is now everywhere trying to effect, and what the employé everywhere is instinctively resisting. But what chance has the latter to succeed in this contest, with some six to seven hundred thousand new laborers coming into the country every year from other countries, while the whole number of laborers *primarily engaged*

¹ In view of reports of American consuls that large quantities of old woollen-machinery, which English manufacturers have discarded are continuously bought for the price of old metal and exported to the United States for manufacturing use, perhaps the assumption is not fully warranted.

² It would seem as if the talk of the necessity of having cheaper transportation in general was coming to an end when leading American railroads report that they can carry freight at half a cent a ton a mile and make a profit on the transaction; and when the cost of the ocean transport of fresh meat from the United States to England has recently been as low as one cent per pound, or, including insurance commissions, transport, and sale, not in excess of two cents per pound.

in all the manufacturing industries of the country is returned by the last census at only 2,738,895? American workingmen ought, therefore, to clearly understand (and as there is no logic so convincing as scant wages and restricted opportunities for employment, it is only a question of time when they will understand) that however it may have been in the past, when manufactures were comparatively few, now that they are so numerous, if they are to be kept in full operation they must produce more than the country can possibly consume. *A high tariff, under present conditions, therefore, necessarily means low wages.* Undoubtedly some, whose prejudices and interests will not allow them to see what they do not want to, may ridicule such a conclusion. But there is no escape from it; because a high tariff—under which exemption from taxation is the exception—increases the cost of all raw material, tools, and machinery; and to manufacture cheaply, as before pointed out, the capitalist employer using high-priced raw materials, tools, and machinery must reduce wages, or stop through limitation of his market. And when the masses of the American people do once understand this inevitable drift and result of our national fiscal policy, the tariff, instead of becoming a less important issue in American politics, will become the question above all others predominant; and protection of the kind taught by the Pennsylvania school will go down as rapidly as slavery before the uprising of the people, and perhaps with a convulsion financial and commercial.

In no part of the country are opinions akin to those above expressed, or an antagonism to the old-time notions about protection, more rapidly gaining ground, than in New England, especially in Massachusetts, as is illustrated by the evidence respecting the condition of the shoe-manufacturing interests as above given. And when one considers the special interests and position of New England, the wonder is not that such a change in public sentiment is now manifesting itself, but rather that it has not come before. New England has no “raw materials” for her manufacturing industries, using the term in the popular sense. She has no home-supplies of coal, of the metals, of fibres, of chemicals, and of dye-stuffs, and comparatively little lumber. Nearly all of these essentials to successful manufacturing can be obtained in many localities outside of her borders cheaper and

more readily than within her territory. Heretofore the skill and intelligence of her people and her comparatively abundant capital have been to her a protection against these disadvantages. But this protection is now rapidly disappearing. There are just as good Yankees to-day outside of New England as within New England. They have gone from her cold climate and sterile soils to places where the raw material which they desire for manufacturing production is cheaper; and they have carried with them their machinery and the knowledge and ability necessary to make the best use of it. These emigrants from the place of their nativity do not propose to go back to New England to buy anything, which under the protection of the cost of transportation and cheaper raw materials, they can afford to produce themselves; and they mean to supply the localities in which they have established themselves—the South, the valley of the Mississippi, the Northwest, and the Pacific States—with the results of their local industries in these sections of the country. Within the past month a wail has gone up from New England cotton-manufacturers that unless the railroads reduce their South and West bound freights they cannot compete in the manufacture of the coarser cottons with other domestic competitors located out of New England; and every steamship which now sails out of the ports of Charleston, Wilmington, and Savannah is in no small part loaded with cotton fabrics in place, as formerly, with cotton fibres exclusively.¹ Some three years ago ex-Gov.

¹ The following extract from a recent number of one of the most ultra high-tariff journals of New England (the Boston *Traveller*) will be read with interest in connection with this matter:

"The cotton manufacturing in the South is as yet in its infancy, it is nevertheless becoming rapidly apparent that New England must not be too sure of retaining a monopoly of this branch of manufacture. A sharp competition already exists, not only for the trade in sheetings in the cotton States, but Southern cottons are now entering the markets of the Southwestern States, and the New Englander finds himself confronted in all the leading markets of the Mississippi valley with sheetings and shirtings in no way inferior in quality to those manufactured by himself, and which are offered at a less price than he, to make his customary profit, can possibly afford. Instead of a possible competition twenty-five years hence, the danger which threatens the New England manufacturer is already imminent. . . . The Southern mills are not yet producing the finer qualities of goods, but, remembering the history of the last ten years, it is not safe to assume that with the same machinery that is used in the North they will not successfully do this within the next ten years."

Cheney of New Hampshire, in an address before a local association of cotton manufacturers, called attention to the fact that when cotton-mills now burn down in New England they are not rebuilt; and at the present time, it is reported, that, with one exception of an annex, there is not a single new foundation of a cotton-mill now going in.

There is much in the present and prospective industrial and commercial condition of this country which is analogous to that of England just prior to her decision to abandon the protective policy, which she had maintained for centuries; and those who have the time and opportunity will find much to interest and instruct in examining the history of this period, and especially the speeches of Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons and in the spring of 1842. Sir Robert Peel, as is well known, was not one of the original English free-traders, sympathizing at the outset with Cobden, Bright, and other leaders of the new movement, but, on the contrary, was personally in antagonism with them, and a comparatively late convert to liberal commercial opinions. That the strong current of public sentiment in opposition to the further continuance of the corn-laws, which was then everywhere manifesting itself in England and even threatening revolution, had something, perhaps very much, to do with influencing his opinions in respect to the desirability of a change in the long-established fiscal policy of his country, may be conceded; but, at the same time, Sir Robert Peel's whole life and character, and especially his subsequent history, showed that while he ever knew how and when as a statesman to conform to expediency, he was too much of a man to allow expediency to ever become a permanent and predominant basis for his public action; and one therefore must seek for some other motive in explanation of his conduct in radically and rapidly abandoning his long-cherished protection opinions in the spring of 1842, and in the undeviating support which he afterwards gave to the principles of free trade. And this motive is thus set forth by his biographer, Thomas Doubleday, who, after remarking (see "Political Life of Sir Robert Peel," vol. ii. p. 380) "that the arguments of the apostles of free trade had made a deep impression upon the mind of the minister," goes on to say that, "*with a population then increasing at the morbid rate of about a million in the short*

space of three years, he (Sir Robert Peel) had manifestly become penetrated with the conviction that to find employment for the numbers that might in no long time demand it, and in a way not to be resisted, some large extension of foreign trade must in some way be created." And Bulwer, in his monograph of Peel's career as a statesman, speaks of his being impressed with the fact, which ought to be also pregnant, at this time especially, with meaning to the working men and women of the United States, that *the wages of the workman could not be made higher or more remunerative by making his food dearer.* In bringing forward his scheme for recasting the British tariff in May, 1842, Sir Robert Peel accordingly, while greatly simplifying the customs acts by abandoning the duties on many minor articles, sought more particularly to accomplish, and did accomplish, first, the cheapening of the living of the British people by abandoning or reducing the duties on imports of food; and secondly, the cheapening of the cost of production to British manufacturers by entirely removing the duties on drugs and dye-stuffs and greatly diminishing the duties on the import of many other articles essential to manufacturing. And his great speech of the 10th of May, 1842, explaining and defending his new policy, abounds in practical illustrations which are almost identical with those which are now to be found in the present commercial and industrial experience of the United States. Thus, for example, in speaking on the subject of the then British duties on metals, he says:

"There is no part of the tariff in which we can make more important changes, than in that which relates to the reduction of duty on ores. Whether I speak of iron, lead, or copper, in my opinion great advantage to the commerce and manufactures of this country will result from permitting the entry of these important articles at a much more diminished rate of duty than at present. Let me take the case of copper. At present you cannot import and smelt foreign copper for internal use. You have greater advantages than any other country possesses with respect to coal, and you can apply that coal with great advantage to the smelting of foreign copper; but when it is smelted you cannot make use of it for the purpose of home manufacture, and you send it to France and Belgium to be manufactured. What is the consequence? Why, that those foreign countries can come into the markets of Europe, undersell you in copper, in bolts for the fastening and copper for the sheathing of ships, and in a variety of other articles made of copper and brass."

And he then further points out "that as ships can be fastened and coppered on the Continent at a much cheaper rate than in this country" (England), a very serious disadvantage in the way of the growth of British shipbuilding had been created.

To those familiar with the workings of our existing tariff it seems hardly necessary to point out that the United States in 1883 has almost exactly the same experience in respect to copper that Sir Robert Peel declared was proving so injurious to Great Britain in 1842 ; that is, we do not permit foreign ores of copper to be taken from Chili and other nations in exchange for our agricultural implements and textiles ; we do not allow such ores to be smelted with our coal and our labor, and in fact have actually destroyed great smelting establishments that flourished before the tariff of 1861 ; we have destroyed the shipping that formerly made such exchanges, and we give a bounty to foreign competitive copper-manufacturers by so shielding the proprietors of our rich mines from healthy competition, that the latter regularly sell the excess of their product over domestic requirement for a lesser price in foreign countries than they will sell in their own country.

Again, on the subject of oils, Sir Robert Peel, after pointing out that British manufacturing industry was then exposed to great disadvantages on account of the high prices of oils, more particularly spermaceti-oil, and that in consequence he proposed to greatly reduce the duties on their importation, went on to say :

"We shall then introduce the product of the American fisheries in competition with our own fisheries, and prevent the price of oil in this country from reaching an extravagant amount. I hope, sir, that I am not needlessly detaining the House, but I want to establish by proof a position, of the truth of which I feel confident, that the general result of this" (reduced) "tariff will be to give a new life and activity to commerce and to make a reduction of those charges which are now incurred by residence in this country. A very short time since the price of spermaceti-oil in this country was from £60 to £70 per ton, but lately it had risen to £95 and even £111 per ton ; and the manufacturer who required that oil had no alternative but to consume olive or other vegetable oils which did not answer his purpose so well, or pay an extravagant price as compared with the price of that oil in the United States. There are no oils that can be substituted for it without disadvantage, and yet we have to carry on a formidable rivalry with the United States in some branches of manufac-

ture with the disadvantage of having to pay 8s. per gallon for oil which in America is sold for 4s. per gallon—a difference of 100 per cent."

So much, then, for one of the most recent and most important phases of the tariff question. An examination of it, such as in part has been here given, ought to abundantly satisfy us that the country has become too big to endure anything in the way of commercial and industrial restrictions except such as are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the state. In fact the people of this country, more especially those of New England, would seem, from the evidence above submitted by the representatives of the Lynn shoe and other manufacturing interests to have come to a "parting of the ways" on the question of their future tariff policy. They may decide in favor of a continuance of such a policy as aims to protect their leading manufacturing interests by duly enhancing the cost of all the elements that enter into them, and learn through costly experience that such a decision means the fiercest of domestic competition, the limitation of markets, and the restriction of industrial growth. Or they may decide to favor a tariff which, while primarily levied "for revenue only," will at the same time discriminate in favor of and fully protect home industries by removing all unnecessary obstructions to their extension, and so gain for the country such control over the markets of the world as the skill and intelligence of its people fully entitle them to enter upon and possess.

In a subsequent article it is proposed to ask attention to other equally recent and no less important phases of the tariff question.

DAVID A. WELLS.

ON THE EDUCATION OF MINISTERS.

WHAT I am about to write is applicable to the Protestant ministry only; and for the most part I have in mind only the Protestant ministry in this country, altho many of the facts and principles on which I shall dwell have the same significance in Europe that they have here. Let me protect myself at the start against three possible misconceptions: First, In urging the need of an ampler education for the ministry I do not mean to maintain by implication that there is no need of uneducated ministers. There may be use in the world for devout, uninterested exhorters; but clearly it is not the business of universities and theological seminaries to provide such a class of men, and an unlimited supply of such preachers would not meet in the least the need of well-trained ministers. Secondly, I am quite aware that men of genius are independent of systematic training and instituted education. They educate themselves; they are impatient of the easy highway, and, leaping the barriers which common men find insurmountable, they rush to the goal of all training—power. But neither the ministry, nor any other learned profession, contains many geniuses: not one man in a thousand in any profession has even a spark of that divine fire. The practical question always is how are industrious and faithful men of good natural parts to be so trained and equipped as to give them intellectual and moral superiority. Thirdly, If in this paper I say nothing about the sensibility, earnestness, and piety which should characterize the minister, it is not because I do not know that these qualities are essential to the success of his work. I propose to deal only with the surroundings and mental furnishing of the minister, not with his inspiration.

My subject, thus limited, may be conveniently stated in two propositions, as follows: I. The position and environment of

the Protestant minister have changed fundamentally within a hundred years. II. To fit him for his proper place in modern society much greater changes ought to be made in his traditional education than have heretofore been attempted.

I. Not many centuries ago the clergy were the only men who could read and write; only one century ago they were a large majority of all the men who could be said to lead intellectual lives. In the ten years from 1761 to 1770 the percentage of ministers among the graduates of Harvard College was 29, of Yale 32, and of Princeton 45. In other words, one third of all the educated men were ministers. In the six years from 1871 to 1876 the percentage of ministers among the graduates of the same institutions was in Harvard $5\frac{1}{2}$, in Yale 7, in Princeton 17; that is, not more than one in thirteen of the graduates of these colleges became a minister. I lately published a table which exhibited the occupations of 1226 recent graduates of Harvard College. It appeared from this table that two thirds of the whole number had entered professions which may be called learned, namely, law, medicine, theology, the scientific professions, and teaching; but of these two thirds only one man in thirteen was a minister, and the other twelve count themselves fully his equal in intelligence and capacity. If, however, we would fully appreciate the very different competition, so to speak, to which the minister of to-day is subjected from that to which his predecessor of one hundred years ago was exposed, we must go quite beyond these statistics, and consider the undeveloped condition a century ago of the other professions called learned, and the absence of what we now call the press. No public provision was then made for systematically training men for any profession except the ministry. A youth who aspired to be a lawyer or physician could only put himself under the instruction of some established practitioner. The class of men and women who now teach in high-schools, academies, and private classical schools did not exist at all. The scientific professions were not so much as conceived of. The practice of the law related chiefly to real-estate disputes and the collection of debts by the process of imprisonment—except of course that a few eminent men, who lived in or near the maritime ports, got a better business out of shipping or politics. Medicine was an

empirical art; and altho it was practised by a few men of great natural powers, the barber-surgeon and the ignorant midwife were by no means extinct. Most important of all in this comparison, the modern newspaper, the periodical, and the cheap book did not exist. The weekly sermons and prayer-meetings were almost the sole intellectual exercises of our ancestors in the last century, except for the very few who could afford the costly luxury of books. In our time, four days' labor of one man will pay for more reading-matter than an ordinary farmer's or mechanic's family will care to read in a year: namely, a local paper, a religious paper, a magazine, and some cheap editions of current books. The minister in the quietest village, as well as in the manufacturing town and the great seaport, is in competition with this new teacher, the press, which by the regular and frequent public mails delivers its lessons in every household. It is very clear, then, that the competitors of the minister for consideration and influence have increased extraordinarily in number and power during the past hundred years.

Let us next consider how very different the condition of society is to-day from its condition when Channing was born (1780), and how deeply the great social changes which have taken place since the Revolution have affected the work of the ministry. The principle of association for purposes of business, charity, worship, instruction, or pleasure has been so extended that the extension amounts to the introduction of a new principle. There were partnerships, and in rare cases companies, for business purposes in older times, but no corporations in the modern sense. The church was upheld by the only body corporate, namely, the state. The noun "operative" was not in the dictionary at the time of our Revolution, that mode of human life not yet existing. There was no continual discussion of such social evils as intemperance, prostitution, divorce, and pauperism, and no associated action in contending against these evils. The distinction between rich and poor was far from being as wide and deep as it is now among us. Our forefathers acted as if they had received and acquiesced in the doctrine of the survival of the fittest a century in advance of its discovery; the sickly among them died, the insane languished or raged in hopeless confinement, and the poor and shiftless went hungry and

cold. No philanthropic notions confused their clear views about the judgments of God and His afflictive providences. No sanitary science disquieted them with suggestions that results which they attributed to the wrath of God might with greater probability be ascribed to the negligence of man. How profoundly changed are the beliefs and expectations of the public on all these subjects! There is no social problem to-day, however difficult, upon which the minister is not expected to have his mind made up, and to be ready for action. Yet the evils to which these problems relate are extraordinarily complicated in their origin and development, and the remedies for them are notoriously difficult to devise and apply, slow-working, and hard to follow out in practical operation. Sentiment is a very unsafe guide in these matters; and the coolest philosopher, acquainted with political economy, medicine, and the history of legislation on behalf of public morality, will be often at fault. All these difficulties which beset the minister of to-day are of recent origin; in this country they hardly antedate the present century. When our grandfathers were in their prime the sciences of chemistry, zoölogy, and geology were in a very rudimentary condition, while electricity had hardly been discovered; moreover, no natural science had been as yet popularized. The word attributed to God had not been critically compared with His works.

Thirdly, we are to observe that the temper of the public mind has undergone a wonderful change, within a century, upon several points which vitally affect the clerical profession. In the first place, the weight of all authority has greatly diminished, and the sources of recognized authority are quite different from what they were a century ago. The priest, like the secular ruler, has lost all that magical or necromantic quality which formerly inspired the multitude with awe; and the divine right of the minister is as dead among Protestants in our country as the divine right of kings. The authority of the minister is now derived from the purity and strength of his character, from the vigor of his intelligence and the depth of his learning, and from the power of his speech. Candor, knowledge, wisdom, and love can alone give him authority. His cloth, his office, and his sacerdotal quality no longer command in themselves the respect they

once did ; forms, rites, and ceremonies may protect him from rude assault, but can give him no particle of power. Again, the people in these days question all things and all men, and accept nothing without examination. They have observed that discussion often elicits truth, that controversy is useful on many difficult subjects, and that in some circumstances many heads are better than one ; hence they have learned to distrust all ex-cathedra teaching, and to wait for the consent of many minds before giving their adhesion to new doctrines. We hardly realize how very recently the masses have acquired these invaluable habits, or how profoundly these habits have affected the position of the minister. To the modern mind the exemption of the minister from instant debate carries with it a loss of influence. The lawyer daily encounters his adversary, the business man his competitor, and the statesman his political opponent : but no one answers the minister ; and the people think that a protected man may not be a strong man. Thirdly, political ideas have had in this century and this country a strong influence upon theological ideas. The old monarchial and military metaphors which have long been used to set forth the nature of God are less satisfying in our day than they were once ; for king, prince, conqueror, and lord of hosts are less majestic titles than they used to be. The grand and beautiful image which rises before our minds at the words "our country" is seen to be an immeasurably worthier object of devotion than any human potentate, and a better symbol of the infinite God. In the brief period since the welfare of the many came to be recognized as the prime object and only legitimate aim of human governments, men's ideas have changed considerably about the government of God. When men perceive that popular governments are possible, and that such governments have been able, even in the course of the few generations during which the right ends of all government have been recognized, sensibly to improve the condition of great masses of mankind, they naturally begin to doubt if men be totally depraved, and if the main object of God's government from eternity to eternity has been the welfare of an elect few of only one species out of the many kinds of creature that joy to live upon this earth ; to question the authenticity of alleged revelations which are said to contain

such doctrine, and to distrust religious teachers whose tenets seem to be so at variance with the cherished political convictions and hopes of the people. In former times religion, with mistaken views of its own function and that of government, bolstered arbitrary power; in our day the principles of free government are undermining the false tenets of religion, but not the true. The Protestant ministry as a whole will not recover their influence with the people of this country until the accepted dogmas of the churches square with the political convictions of the people. This intimate connection between the religion of a people and their politics is no new thing: it is to be seen in the history of all great peoples; and it is likely to continue to manifest itself, "religion," as Lord Bacon says, "being the chief band of human society."

We come now, in the fourth place under this head, to the most potent cause of change in the relative position of the ministry within this century, namely, the rise and development of physical and natural science. The immense acquisitions of actual knowledge which have been amassed in this new field, the great increase of man's power over nature, the consequent changes in each man's relation to his fellow-men and to the physical earth, including the wonderful expansion of his interests and sympathies, his emancipation from superstitions, and the exaltation of his prospects and hopes, are all facts of the utmost moment to the race; but it is not these facts, tremendous tho they are, which most concern us in the present discussion. The important point for us now to observe is that, during the growth of natural science, a new method or spirit of inquiry has been gradually developed, which is characterized by an absolute freedom on the part of the inquirer from the influence of prepossessions or desires as to results. This spirit seeks only the fact, without the slightest regard to consequences; any twisting or obscuring of the fact to accommodate it to a pre-conceived theory, hope, or wish, any tampering with the actual result of investigation, is the unpardonable sin. It is a spirit at once humble and dauntless, patient of details, drawing indeed no distinction between great and small, but only between true and false; passionless but energetic, venturing into pathless

wastes to bring back a fact, caring only for truth, candid as a still lake, expectant, unfettered, and tireless.

“ Work of his hand
He nor commends nor grieves:
Pleads for itself the fact;
As unrepenting Nature leaves
Her every act.”

The achievements of scientific inquirers, animated by this spirit of sincerity and truth, have been so extraordinary within the past sixty years, and this candid spirit is in itself so admirable, that the educated world has accepted it as the only true inspiration of research in all departments of learning. No other method of inquiry now commands respect. Even the ignorant have learned to despise the process of searching for proofs of a foregone conclusion. Apologetics have ceased to convince anybody, if they ever did. Thus the civilized world has set up a new standard of intellectual sincerity, and Protestant theologians and ministers must rise to that standard if they would continue to command the respect of mankind. How different was the situation of the profession when diplomacy was the only other learned calling! Even the legal profession, as it was gradually differentiated from the clerical, made no such sharp requisition of mental honesty and independence. It is the electric light of science which has made white and transparent the whole temple of learning. These remarks imply that ministers, as a class, and as a necessary consequence of the ordinary manner of their education and induction into office, are peculiarly liable to be deficient in intellectual candor; and that is what I, in common with millions of thoughtful men, really think; and I think further that this belief on the part of multitudes of educated men, most of whom are silent on the subject, is a potent cause of the decline of the ministry during the past forty years. The fault is quite as much that of the churches or sects as of the individual ministers; for almost every church or sect endeavors to tie its members, and particularly its ministers, to a creed, a set of articles, or a body of formulas. These bonds are put on by most ministers at an early age, and must be worn all their lives, on peril of severing beloved associations, or perhaps losing a

livelihood. The study, reading, and experience of fifty years are supposed to work no essential change in the opinions of the youth. The creed or the articles may be somewhat vague and elastic, but cannot honestly be stretched much. Now the lay world believes in the progress of knowledge, because it has witnessed progress; and it is persuaded that there must be incessant progress in theological science as well as in all other branches of learning. It does not see metaphysicians, physicians, historians, chemists, zoölogists, or geologists committing themselves in youth to a set of opinions which is to last them a lifetime, or even a day; on the contrary, they see all these classes of scholars avowedly holding their present opinions subject to change upon the discovery of new facts or of better light upon old facts, and as a rule, actually modifying their opinions in important respects between youth and age. Indeed, fixity of opinion is hardly respectable among scholars. If it be said that there can be no progress in theology, because revelation was a fixed historical quantity, the answer is that revelation like creation must be fluent; or, in other words, that the interpretation of revelation to the mind of man must be like the interpretation of creation, ever flowing, shifting, and, if the mind of man improves, improving. No other profession is under such terrible stress of temptation to intellectual dishonesty as the clerical profession is, and at the same time the public standard of intellectual candor has been set higher than ever before. This is the state of things which deters many young men of ability and independence from entering the profession, and causes the acknowledged dearth of able ministers. Doubtless public opinion is not perfectly just to the profession, and doubtless the evil which deters young men of promise from entering the ministry is less grave than they think it to be; but the serious facts remain, namely, that public opinion among laymen is adverse to the profession on this point, and that young men of force are deterred by the sight of this evil from entering it.

Finally, it is to be observed that the position of a minister is less stable and his livelihood less certain than it was in the last century. His hold upon his congregation is now purely personal, and is quite unsupported by the state or by any ecclesiastical authority. On the other hand the average pay of

ministers is now larger in proportion to the prices of prime necessities than it was in the last century, and there are many prizes in the profession of large value as regards both money and consideration. In view of these numerous prizes and the small competition for them, the profession is not unattractive pecuniarily. It is not the average earnings in any learned profession, but its few prizes, which induce ambitious young men to enter it.

In 1824 Channing said at the ordination of his colleague, "The communication of moral and religious truth is the most important office committed to men." Forty-five years ago next summer Emerson said to the senior class of the Harvard Divinity School, "To this holy office you propose to devote yourselves. I wish you may feel your call in throbs of desire and hope. The office is the first in the world." The opinion expressed by these two seers rested simply on observation, reason, and experience; they pronounced the judgment of all ages and of all mankind; nothing has ever happened to invalidate it, and every advance which the race has made in knowledge and power has confirmed it. There is no doubt as to the rank of the office; but there is a practical question how men may be made fit to hold it. The calling of the preacher is more difficult now than it has ever been, but it is also loftier, and it ought to be more attractive. The improvement of his hearers in general intelligence, range of interests and inquisitiveness, is a gain to him, not a loss; that he has more comrades in the intellectual life than his predecessors had should be a satisfaction to him; that he has many worthy competitors, who with their various messages claim the public ear, should be no discouragement to him, but rather a stimulus; that greater demands are now made upon the knowledge and judgment of the minister in practical affairs than formerly, should only prompt the aspirant to prepare himself to meet those demands; that the adventitious distinctions of the profession have come to naught should delight him. It is indubitable that the political changes of the past century have been for the better, that the progress of science has made the earth a more cheerful and comfortable home for the race than it ever was before, and that modern society is better worth preaching to than any earlier society. Material well-being has

wonderfully increased, but it was never plainer than it is now, that "man does not live by bread alone." Many new avenues to distinction and usefulness have been opened to men of vigor, but never had the true priest so high a station and so great an influence as he has to-day. As Emerson said here in the address already quoted, "Discharge to men the priestly office, and, present or absent, you shall be followed with their love as by an angel."

It is then a practical and a timely inquiry, How can young men be better trained than they have ever been to discharge the priestly office; how can the traditional education of a minister be modified and enlarged so as to enable him to meet the new demands which modern society makes upon him? I take up here the second branch of my subject, namely, the proposition that to prepare the minister for his work in modern society grave changes ought to be made in his traditional education.

II. In the first place, theological study, if it is to be respected by laymen, must absolutely be carried on with the same freedom for teacher and pupil which is enjoyed in other great departments of learning. This fundamental principle does not at all imply, as some have supposed, that teachers of theology (I use that term in the widest sense) are to have no convictions, or at least are to express none. It simply means that the teacher is free to think and say whatever seems to him good, and to change his mind as often as he likes; and that the pupil is free to adopt whatever opinions or theories most commend themselves to his judgment after he has studied the subject. This academic freedom is much more likely to be obtained in universities, and in cities which are large enough to be centres of diversified intellectual activity, than it is in isolated denominational seminaries. I see, therefore, with satisfaction that students of theology in this country resort more and more to universities and seminaries situated in large cities.

Secondly, two practices which greatly discredit the ministry in the eyes of laymen ought to be stopped: I mean, first, the practice of subsidizing boys in academies and colleges from the funds of sectarian societies, on the understanding that the beneficiaries will subsequently go into the ministry; and, secondly, the practice of supporting in theological seminaries, andulti-

mately imposing upon parishes, young men of small mental capacity and flaccid physical or moral fibre. The belief prevalent among laymen that boys are tempted to pledge themselves to the clerical profession by the attractive offer of a liberal education, and that incompetent and unworthy persons are drawn into the seminaries by the standing offer of gratuitous board, lodging, and instruction, works incalculable injury to the Protestant ministry. This belief wounds the reputation of the profession in its most vital part; for it impairs confidence in its sincerity. The gratuitous character of the ordinary theological training supplied by denominational seminaries is in itself an injury to the Protestant ministry. It would be better for the profession, on the whole, if no young men could get into it except those whose parents are able to support them, and those who have capacity and energy enough to earn their own way. These tests constitute a natural method of selection, which has long been applied in the other learned professions to their great advantage. Exceptions should be made in favor of needy young men of decided merit and promise, to whom scholarships should be awarded on satisfactory tests of ability and character.¹ It is much to be wished that young men who are not entirely dependent on their own earnings—sons of well-to-do people, for example—should go into the ministry, as they are constantly going into law and medicine. The profession has much to offer

¹ The usefulness of beneficiary endowments seems to me to depend upon the strict observance of the following rules of administration: 1. No aid should be promised merely on recommendations or certificates, or in advance of satisfactory tests of scholarship and character. 2. All awards should be based upon merit, and merit alone. 3. No aid should be given except to persons of unquestionable promise—physical, mental, and moral. 4. An immediate return for the aid should be exacted in good scholarship. 5. The aid should fall short of complete support, except in the case of advanced students who seem capable of such researches as promote the progress of knowledge. 6. All awards should be public, the conditions of award being in every respect calculated to make the receipt of beneficiary aid honorable. 7. No pledges, either explicit or implied, should be taken from beneficiaries in regard to religious belief, personal habits, or future profession, and no services or observances should be expected of them which are not expected of other students. The injury which the undiscriminating use of the large beneficiary funds possessed by some of the most considerable education societies and theological seminaries in this country has inflicted, as I think, upon the clerical profession, is by no means without remedy; but the evil must be recognized by the responsible managers of such endowments before it can be cured.

beside an honorable livelihood: it offers to the fit man consideration, the sense of usefulness, and the great privilege of giving himself to the highest human interests and keeping his mind full of great themes. A young man who has a modest competency, or whose parents can support him, as parents support for years young lawyers and physicians, enters the clerical profession with this great advantage over a man who has no means of living except his salary—he is known to be independent of the pecuniary relation with his congregation, and this recognized independence strengthens their faith in his sincerity and disinterestedness.

Thirdly. Let us consider what the mental furnishing of a minister ought to be. The subjects which in our day should be set before a candidate for the ministry are divisible into two classes: those which every candidate should master, and those from which every candidate should make a limited selection. In any respectable university all the subjects which I am about to enumerate will be somewhere taught, and it does not matter for our purpose in what department the student finds the teacher he needs; but since many of the required subjects are not taught at all in ordinary theological seminaries, it would be necessary for a student who proposed to attend a seminary not connected with a university, to pursue elsewhere some of the preliminary studies. In universities, properly so called, a zealous student ought to have no difficulty in mastering all the preliminary required subjects while a candidate for the degree of Bachelor of Arts, and in counting them all towards that degree. The preliminary subjects which every student of theology should in my judgment be required to master are as follows:

1. Languages: Greek (including New Testament Greek), Latin, Hebrew, and German.
2. English literature, with practice in writing, and study of style.
3. The elements of psychology.
4. The elements of political economy.
5. Constitutional history, or the history of some interesting period of moderate length.
6. Science: Botany, zoölogy, or geology, studied in the laboratory and the field.

The requisitions in the languages other than English are the only ones in this list which are now habitually enforced in theological seminaries. The acquisition of a reasonable facility in reading should be the main object in view while studying all four languages. These linguistic studies are valuable for training, for the ideas and information acquired, and, in the case of Latin and German, for the power to be gained of studying other subjects in books written in either of these languages. A minister greatly needs—no matter whether his congregation be cultivated or uncultivated—a comprehensive and critical acquaintance with English literature; yet how few have it. At present, the theological seminaries enforce no requisitions on this subject; and since many American colleges pay very little attention to it, the degree of A.B. is no evidence that the graduate has had an adequate opportunity of studying English literature systematically. If it be said that this subject can be left to after years and private reading, I reply that there is no study in which good guidance is of more value, that large libraries are not accessible in every parish, and that the policy of leaving the subject to each man's after-study has been tried long and found utterly wanting. That a minister should know something of the science which deals with the phenomena of mind, requires no urging. A knowledge of the first principles of political economy would be useful to the minister in several ways: 1, to guide him in charitable and reformatory undertakings; 2, to guard him against making public mistakes about trade, finance, taxation, capital, labor, and similar topics which are sure to be more familiar to some of his parishioners than to him; and, 3, to offset the general drift of his habitual studies toward a too sentimental philanthropy. The preliminary education of a minister should embrace some fragment of political history in order that he may early learn how all history is to be studied. The constitutional history of England or of the United States, or the history of some important period,—like the period of the Reformation, or of the English Commonwealth, or of the French Revolution,—will answer the purpose. Much more depends upon the method of instruction than upon the choice of a topic. Finally, a minister ought to have gained in youth a good knowledge of at least one branch of natural history, that his powers of

accurate observation and description may be cultivated, and that he learn to comprehend the scientific habit of mind and the scientific method of study. Keen powers of observation serve a minister as well as they serve a poet. The educated and the uneducated alike respect those powers, and enjoy the fruits of their exercise. People will be delighted to hear him describe things which they have often seen but never noticed, and draw fresh lessons from facts they have always known but never put together. A sober love of nature underlies and reinforces love to God and love to man; these sentiments belong together; dissociated they are impaired. No religious teacher can avoid dealing sometimes with the relations of man and God to nature; for these subjects are intensely interesting alike to simple and to cultivated minds. The minister will deal much more wisely with these great themes if he has an intimate acquaintance with some small field in nature's vast domain.

Having finished the preliminary required studies, the candidate for the ministry is ready to enter upon the advanced studies which may properly be called professional. Since preaching is to be his most important function, he will naturally give a good share of his time to homiletics and the practice of writing and speaking. The other subjects which are now included under the comprehensive term theology or divinity may be grouped as follows:

1. Semitic studies: linguistic, archæological, and historical.
2. New Testament criticism and exegesis.
3. Ecclesiastical history.
4. Comparative religion, or historical religions compared.
5. Psychology, ethics, and the philosophy of religion.
6. Systematic theology, and the history of Christian doctrines.
7. Charitable and reformatory methods, and the contest of Christian society with licentiousness, intemperance, pauperism, and crime.

The mere enumeration of these subjects will satisfy any reasonable person that if no more than three years is ordinarily to be given to theological study, election must be allowed among the groups, or no thorough acquaintance with any subject will be attained. The subjects have sufficient range to meet a great

variety of tastes and capacities: they are philological, historical, philosophical, and practical. Any three of these seven groups thoroughly studied, in addition to homiletics and the preliminary required studies, would in my judgment give a far better training for the duties of a Protestant minister in our day than is now offered in any theological seminary within my knowledge. It may be objected to this scheme that it will admit men to the degree of Bachelor of Divinity and to the pulpit who may never have studied church history, or New Testament criticism, or even systematic theology. This result would be possible, and certainly it is not in itself desirable; but let us look at the compensating advantages of the system. In the first place, let me urge the supreme importance of making an exhaustive study of one or two limited subjects, for the effect of such study upon the whole mental and moral disposition. It is the hasty and superficial student who is conceited, presumptuous, and rash. The master is humble, unassuming, and cautious. Secondly, let me point out that theology is already a field so vast that no man can survey it all within three years, even in the hastiest manner, and that it is daily growing vaster still, by the indefinite extension of some of its old subjects, and by the addition of new ones. It is hopeless to try to cover such a field. Thirdly, let it be observed that the object to be held in view in training a young man for the ministry is the imparting of power, not of information, and that the most important step towards getting mental power is the acquisition of a right method in work and a just standard of attainment. But a right method of work may be acquired in the conscientious study of any one of the groups into which I have roughly divided the present subjects in theology; for the true spirit of research is the same in all fields—namely, the free, fair, fearless, and faithful spirit of modern science.

The education of a minister should not end with the theological school, but should be prolonged like that of a teacher or physician to the latest day of his life. He must always be learning and growing. To this end he must make time to read and study every week, and he ought to keep on hand some more continuous and erudite work than sermon-writing. Most ministers run dry, or pump the same water over and over again, like the pumps on exhibition at a fair, which draw only from the lit-

tle box into which they discharge. To guard against this danger, the minister must draw day by day from the living springs of literature, science, and art. The churches are greatly responsible for the desiccation of ministers. They expect from the minister too many services a week ; they swaddle him in forms ; they look for pastoral visits ; they give him insufficient vacations ; and they drive or entice him into the fatal habit of prolonged, unpremeditated speech.

It would be a great improvement in the relation between minister and congregation if the minister were frankly allowed sometimes to comment upon a fresh book instead of preaching a sermon, sometimes to read other men's sermons instead of his own, and in general to direct his hearers to good reading, and bring them to know something of the minds and works of the leaders of the race, living and dead. The wise professor or teacher thinks it a very important part of his function to direct the reading of his pupils, and he tries to give that reading as wide a range as possible. If he were forced to do nothing for his pupils but lecture to them himself, he would feel as if he had been thrown back into the Middle Ages. The habits of the pulpit in this respect are a survival of the dark times before printing. Objection may be made to this view, that the religious teacher, unlike the secular teacher, needs but one book—the Bible, to which indeed the Anglican Church would add the Prayer-book. Such an objector would probably think of a minister chiefly as a public reader ; for if he admitted the idea that the minister might be also an expositor or commentator, there would immediately arise a demand for a variety of comment or exposition, and other books would thereby be let in. The voluminous issues of the evangelical religious press supply the readiest answer to this objection. It is not given to every able and well-educated man to originate much useful thought ; he also does good service who quotes judiciously, compiles well, and knows where to borrow. A skilful and honest purveyor of good mental food is an invaluable person, and a congregation ought to be highly content if it discovers in its minister the gifts of a good purveyor.

Finally, the minister whose education is to be prolonged throughout his life must have liberty of thought and speech.

Many a minister is half afraid to read and study freely, lest he should grow out of his decorous clerical garments. The churches do not give their ministers room enough to grow in. They settle a young man of twenty-five, fresh from a monastic life and with very little knowledge of the world, and expect him to announce a set of opinions on the greatest subjects of human speculation and experience, which he is to hold to during life. For changes of opinion upon points which no discreet and impartial person would consider essential to Christian character or right living, a minister finds himself obliged to leave one denomination and seek refuge in another, or to leave one church and go into another; and every change is cause of reproach and offence. Other learned professions are not so hampered, and if the Protestant ministry is to hold its own in the modern world, it must have, and be believed to have, freedom of growth. Whether the creeds and confessions of the Protestant sects are to be recast or not by councils or synods, no one can tell, and it is not very important to inquire; for the needed liberty may be procured through the quiet action of single churches, or of small councils and local conventions, quite as well as by more general action. When the Protestant churches clearly perceive that creed-stretching and creed-blinking are in the eyes of the immense majority of intelligent laymen demoralizing and contemptible practices, they will find some remedy for the evil conditions which foster these practices. Their own history may well incline them to accord to their ministers some reasonable right of private judgment.

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